---
title: "United States — New York Data Protection &amp; Privacy Regulation | Data Protection Monitor"
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source_html: /jurisdictions/united-states-new-york/index.html
description: "United States — New York data protection and privacy regulation: 10 categories, 105 claims, updated 2026-11-04."
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---
# United States — New York Data Protection & Privacy Regulation

schema gdpri-v2
trajectory: not yet assessed regulated (sectoral) overlaps: [Sentinel (AML/CFT)](https://sentinel.gi/jurisdictions/united-states-new-york/), [World Payments](https://payments.gi/jurisdictions/united-states-new-york/), artificial-intelligence, [Advennt](https://advennt.io/jurisdictions/united-states-new-york/)

Last updated 2026-11-04 · 10 categories · 105
claims · 81 sources in the cumulative register

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New York&#x27;s algorithmic and biometric governance landscape advanced this cycle with the state Senate&#x27;s passage of the statewide Biometric Privacy Act (S1422A) by a vote of 41-20 on June 3, 2026.

Data collected 2026-11-04 · Data published 2026-11-04

AI-assembled from cited sources

Not covered: Cross-Border & Adequacy. Not fully checked this cycle: Regulator & Framework, Algorithmic, Biometric & Surveillance Governance (2 open gaps).

Supervisory authority [New York Department of State (Division of Consumer Protection) and Office of the Attorney General, under the SHIELD Act (no dedicated standalone DPA)](https://ag.ny.gov/)

Next milestone No upcoming dated milestone on record

Record & confidence mix 105 claims · 74 sources · machine-compiled

6 Confirmed 86 Probable 13 Contested / unverified

Evidence re-verified: 2026-11-04 · Position last changed: 2026-11-04 · Record history & provenance &#9662; Methodology & record provenance: Module confidence is derived from the underlying claims (source tier and primary excerpt retention), while statutory legal force is tracked independently.

Review status: AI-synthesised · Tier-1/2 verified · As-of date: 2026-11-17

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10 Categories

3 Red categories 57 Sub-modules

105 Claims

2 Tier-1 sources

Traffic-light mix 6 amber 3 red 1 n/a
(sums to 10 rendered categories; click to filter)

3 categories flagged red

United States federal law that applies in United States — New York is covered once, on the [United States](/jurisdictions/united-states/) page. This page covers United States — New York&#8217;s own layer: its own law, regulators and enforcement.

## Jurisdiction brief

Jurisdiction lead brief 676 Full executive summary 374

###### Latest update · 25 October 2026

#### Lead Signal

New York&#x27;s Attorney General secured a $2.7 million settlement, of which $2.1 million is a penalty payable to New York, from Boston Children&#x27;s Health Physicians and its IT vendor XTIUM over an August 2024 data breach affecting approximately 825,000 New York residents. The joint New York/Connecticut investigation found that the controller failed to implement common information-security policies and procedures. The settlement, dated 16 October 2026, continues a sustained twelve-month pattern of multistate-coordinated enforcement by the New York Attorney General against inadequate baseline security practices, following prior actions involving other healthcare-adjacent and vendor relationships.

#### Other Developments

NYDFS sets new cybersecurity examination expectations. A 10 September 2026 industry letter from the Department of Financial Services, reported on 22 October 2026, sets the examination standard for cybersecurity risk assessments under 23 NYCRR Part 500, flagging artificial-intelligence adoption, third-party and cloud dependency, and vendor risk as inputs that covered entities are expected to build into their risk-assessment process. The reporting on this letter fell inside the current window even though the letter itself predates it, and it signals how examiners will likely approach Part 500 risk-assessment reviews going forward.

#### Cross-Monitor Connections

The NYDFS cybersecurity risk-assessment standard connects directly to the financial-sector supervisory work tracked on the financial-integrity side, since Part 500 risk-assessment expectations and anti-money-laundering control expectations increasingly draw on the same vendor-risk and third-party-dependency inputs. Separately, the enforcement pattern against healthcare-adjacent vendors for inadequate security practices is the kind of baseline-security failure that recurs across sectoral examinations tracked elsewhere in the compliance landscape, reinforcing that security-control adequacy is a cross-cutting theme rather than a sector-specific one.

#### Outlook

The BCHP/XTIUM settlement is likely not the final enforcement action in this pattern; the New York Attorney General has shown a sustained cadence of healthcare-and-vendor security enforcement over the past year, and further actions of similar shape should be expected. On the sectoral-examination side, covered entities under Part 500 should expect that the risk-assessment inputs flagged in the September letter, particularly AI adoption and vendor dependency, will be tested directly in upcoming examination cycles, even though the letter itself does not create a new binding obligation beyond the existing Part 500 risk-assessment requirement.

2 earlier updates not shown here.

###### Standing brief · as of 28 September 2026

Written before the update above. Where they differ, the update is the more recent position.

#### Lead Signal

New York&#x27;s algorithmic and biometric governance landscape advanced this cycle with the state Senate&#x27;s passage of the statewide Biometric Privacy Act (S1422A) by a vote of 41-20 on June 3, 2026. The bill is now pending in the Assembly. If enacted, it would extend statewide biometric-consent obligations beyond the scope of New York City&#x27;s existing Local Law 3, which currently governs biometric data collection only within the city.

#### Other Developments

Children and vulnerable groups exposure. The same S1422A reform, if enacted, would extend biometric-consent obligations to cover populations and contexts beyond NYC&#x27;s Local Law 3, which is understood to bear directly on protections for minors and other vulnerable groups whose biometric data is collected outside a narrowly municipal frame. No separate, distinct children-specific statutory development beyond this biometric-reform vector was identified this cycle.

#### Cross-Monitor Connections

Biometric identity-verification requirements are also live in the gambling-regulatory space this cycle, where the advennt monitor is tracking a New York State Gaming Commission draft rule that would mandate biometric verification at registration and per wagering session; that is a separate, sector-specific instrument from S1422A and is not analysed further here. No world-payments or financial-integrity connection was identified for this cycle&#x27;s data-protection developments in New York.

#### Outlook

S1422A&#x27;s progress through the Assembly is the item to watch; its current status beyond the June 3, 2026 Senate vote requires confirmation against primary legislative-tracking records rather than the single secondary source available this cycle. If enacted, the statewide biometric-consent framework would represent the most significant expansion of New York&#x27;s algorithmic and biometric governance regime since the SHIELD Act&#x27;s standing security requirements, and would be the first statewide (rather than New York City-specific) biometric statute in the state.

Read full brief · 3 min read (676 words)

###### Latest update · 4 November 2026

#### Regulatory Status

New York&#x27;s data-protection landscape continues to develop sector by sector rather than through a single omnibus statute. The SHIELD Act remains the baseline, imposing data-security and breach-notification duties enforced by the Attorney General without conferring comprehensive consumer data-protection rights. The New York Health Information Privacy Act is understood to have passed both legislative chambers in June 2026 after a prior gubernatorial veto, though its final gubernatorial status is not confirmed here, while the broader New York Privacy Act remains stalled in committee. The most consequential development is the finalized Responsible AI Safety and Education Act, enacted 27 March 2026 and taking effect 1 January 2027, which creates a new Department of Financial Services oversight office for large frontier AI developers, mandatory published safety frameworks, a 72-hour critical-incident reporting duty, and an Attorney-General-enforced penalty structure reaching $3 million for repeat violations. Separately, the Department continued enforcement of its existing cybersecurity regulation, including a $250,000 consent order against a limited-exemption money transmitter for an inadequate risk assessment.

#### Outlook

The state&#x27;s regulatory trajectory is tightening, driven primarily by the incoming frontier-AI oversight regime and sustained cybersecurity enforcement, while the broader consumer-privacy omnibus question remains unresolved pending further legislative movement on the stalled Privacy Act and the unconfirmed fate of the health-privacy bill.

###### Standing brief · as of 28 September 2026

#### Regulatory Status

New York&#x27;s data-protection regulatory status this cycle is defined by a single material development: the statewide Biometric Privacy Act (S1422A) passed the state Senate 41-20 on June 3, 2026 and is pending in the Assembly. If enacted, this would be New York&#x27;s first statewide biometric-consent statute, extending obligations beyond New York City&#x27;s Local Law 3. The state&#x27;s core security and breach-notification statute, the SHIELD Act, remains the operative baseline instrument and was not itself subject to change this cycle.

#### Outlook

The Assembly&#x27;s handling of S1422A following the June 3, 2026 Senate vote is the primary item to watch for New York&#x27;s data-protection posture. Its resolution, in either direction, would materially affect the state&#x27;s algorithmic, biometric and surveillance governance regime and the protections available to minors and vulnerable groups outside New York City.

Read full brief · 2 min read (374 words)

Key regulatory facts for United States — New York Key regulatory facts for United States — New York Regulatory Dimension United States — New York Standing Position

Jurisdiction United States — New York (US-NY)

Regulatory Scope Data Protection & Privacy Regulation (10 modules, 105 sourced findings)

Regulator & Framework A robust sectoral/breach-security framework exists (SHIELD, NYDFS) but there is no omnibus statute defining lawful bases, controller obligations broadly, or a general registration duty.

Lawful Processing & Special Data No general lawful-bases or special-category regime exists; coverage is fragmented and purpose-specific (children&#x27;s data only).

Data Subject Rights No comprehensive data-subject-rights statute exists; only sector-specific access/correction rights (education) were identified.

Controller/Processor Duties Strong security/breach regime (SHIELD + NYDFS) but no DPIA/DPO/ROPA/joint-controller framework generally applicable.

Primary Instruments Cited Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute (23 NYCRR Part 500 text), NY Public Law (Fastcase), NY Labor and Employment Law Report, NY Public Law (Fastcase), Regulations.ai

Last Confirmed / Updated 4 November 2026 (81 sources in cumulative register)

10 of 10 categories

Signal
Red
Amber
Green

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Compact

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### Regulator & Framework5 sub-modulesAmberEnacted in forceModule confidence: Probable&#9662;

A robust sectoral/breach-security framework exists (SHIELD, NYDFS) but there is no omnibus statute defining lawful bases, controller obligations broadly, or a general registration duty.

Primary framework SHIELD Act (GBL Art. 39-F) / NYDFS 23 NYCRR Part 500

Supervisory authority [New York State Attorney General (Office of the Attorney General)](https://ag.ny.gov/)

Traffic-light rationale — Amber A robust sectoral/breach-security framework exists (SHIELD, NYDFS) but there is no omnibus statute defining lawful bases, controller obligations broadly, or a general registration duty.

#### Sub-modules (5)

#### Regulator and authorityGreen

The NY AG is the primary regulator; NYDFS is the sectoral financial-services cybersecurity regulator with independent enforcement powers.

Claims (4):

- The New York State Attorney General is the primary enforcer of data security and privacy statutes in New York, including the SHIELD Act.
- SHIELD Act violations are enforceable by the NY Attorney General as deceptive acts or practices.
- New York Office of the Attorney General — The SHIELD Act (NY GBL §899-bb) authorises the NY Attorney General to bring an action to enjoin violations and seek civil penalties; it does not create a private right of action.
- New York Attorney General — SHIELD Act violations (GBL §899-bb) are treated as deceptive acts or practices under GBL §349, enforceable exclusively by the NY AG; no private right of action, no dedicated state DPA.

#### Act and instrumentsAmber

Core instruments are the SHIELD Act, Civil Rights Law Art. 5, NYDFS 23 NYCRR Part 500, the Child Data Protection Act, and the SAFE for Kids Act.

Claims (5):

- The SHIELD Act regulates data breach and data security matters in New York and expanded enforcement capabilities of the Attorney General.
- New York&#x27;s SHIELD Act imposes data-security and breach-notification obligations enforced by the Attorney General, and does not establish comprehensive consumer data-protection rights.
- The revised NYHIPA (S9269/A10357) passed the Senate 48-13 on 3 June 2026 and passed the Assembly the same session, following the Governor&#x27;s December 2025 veto of its prior version.
- The New York Privacy Act (A.4947 and companion bills) remains in committee and has not been passed or signed into law.
- New York Health Information Privacy Act (NYHIPA, S9269/A10357) — Passed Senate June 3, 2026 and Assembly June 4, 2026; sits on Governor Hochul&#x27;s desk; no sign/veto/chapter-amendment decision found as of this cycle, following her December 19, 2025 veto of the original S929/A2141

#### Material scopeAmber

Scope centers on &#x27;private information&#x27; (SSNs, driver&#x27;s license numbers, financial account data, and biometric data after SHIELD amendments) rather than a general personal-data definition.

Claims (1):

- New York has not adopted a comprehensive data protection law and does not recognize a constitutional or common law right of privacy; privacy is instead regulated statutorily through Article 5 of the Civil Rights Law.

#### Territorial scopeGreen

SHIELD Act security and breach obligations apply to any person or business that owns or licenses computerized private information of a NY resident, regardless of whether the business operates in New York.

Claims (1):

- The security requirements of the SHIELD Act apply to any business that collects or maintains private information of a New York resident, giving the law broad extraterritorial reach.

#### Regulator registration and filingAmber

No general controller registration exists; NYDFS requires an annual Certification of Compliance from covered entities. A pending Senate Bill 9088 would create a data-broker registration/deletion regime but is not yet enacted.

Claims (2):

- NYDFS Covered Entities must annually validate and submit a certificate of compliance with the Cybersecurity Regulation, signed by the board of directors or a senior officer.
- Senate Bill 9088, introduced January 30, 2026, would require data brokers to register annually with the Attorney General, pay a fee, and disclose extensive information about their operations.

New York has no single comprehensive data-protection statute. The New York Attorney General (Bureau of Internet & Technology) is the primary consumer-privacy enforcer, operating under the Stop Hacks and Improve Electronic Data Security Act (SHIELD Act, GBL Art. 39-F, §§899-aa/bb) and the Civil Rights Law Art. 5. The New York State Department of Financial Services (NYDFS) is the sectoral regulator for financial-services cybersecurity under 23 NYCRR Part 500. Material and territorial scope are defined breach-by-breach (private information of NY residents) rather than by a general &#x27;personal data&#x27; concept, and there is no comprehensive controller/processor registration regime.

No periodic updates recorded in this cycle

Sources and claims (13)
- [NYS Office of the Attorney General / DataGuidance](https://www.dataguidance.com/sites/default/files/factsheet_for_business-_nys_information_security_breach_and_notification_act_20_august_2014.pdf) — The New York State Attorney General is the primary enforcer of data security and privacy statutes in New York, including the SHIELD Act.
- [DataGuidance](https://www.dataguidance.com/jurisdictions/new-york) — The SHIELD Act regulates data breach and data security matters in New York and expanded enforcement capabilities of the Attorney General.
- [DataGuidance](https://www.dataguidance.com/jurisdictions/new-york) — New York has not adopted a comprehensive data protection law and does not recognize a constitutional or common law right of privacy; privacy is instead regulated statutorily through Article 5 of the Civil Rights Law.
- [IAPP](https://iapp.org/news/a/new-yorks-shield-act-has-taken-effect-what-does-this-mean-for-your-business) — The security requirements of the SHIELD Act apply to any business that collects or maintains private information of a New York resident, giving the law broad extraterritorial reach.
- [DataGuidance](https://corporate.dataguidance.com/usa-ny-dfs-final-cybersecurity-regulation-sea-change-covered-entities-2/) — NYDFS Covered Entities must annually validate and submit a certificate of compliance with the Cybersecurity Regulation, signed by the board of directors or a senior officer.
- [DataGuidance](https://www.dataguidance.com/news/new-york-bill-data-brokers-registration-and-data) — Senate Bill 9088, introduced January 30, 2026, would require data brokers to register annually with the Attorney General, pay a fee, and disclose extensive information about their operations.
- [NY Office of the Attorney General](https://ag.ny.gov/) — SHIELD Act violations are enforceable by the NY Attorney General as deceptive acts or practices.
- [NY Office of the Attorney General](https://ag.ny.gov/) — New York&#x27;s SHIELD Act imposes data-security and breach-notification obligations enforced by the Attorney General, and does not establish comprehensive consumer data-protection rights.
- [New York State Senate](https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2025/S9269) — The revised NYHIPA (S9269/A10357) passed the Senate 48-13 on 3 June 2026 and passed the Assembly the same session, following the Governor&#x27;s December 2025 veto of its prior version.
- [Optery](https://www.optery.com/state-laws/new-york/) — The New York Privacy Act (A.4947 and companion bills) remains in committee and has not been passed or signed into law.
- [NY Office of the Attorney General](https://ag.ny.gov/) — New York Office of the Attorney General — The SHIELD Act (NY GBL §899-bb) authorises the NY Attorney General to bring an action to enjoin violations and seek civil penalties; it does not create a private right of action.
- [New York State Senate](https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2025/S9269) — New York Health Information Privacy Act (NYHIPA, S9269/A10357) — Passed Senate June 3, 2026 and Assembly June 4, 2026; sits on Governor Hochul&#x27;s desk; no sign/veto/chapter-amendment decision found as of this cycle, following her December 19, 2025 veto of the original S929/A2141
- [Osano](https://www.osano.com/articles/new-york-shield-law) — New York Attorney General — SHIELD Act violations (GBL §899-bb) are treated as deceptive acts or practices under GBL §349, enforceable exclusively by the NY AG; no private right of action, no dedicated state DPA.

### Lawful Processing & Special Data4 sub-modulesRedEnacted in forceModule confidence: Probable&#9662;

No general lawful-bases or special-category regime exists; coverage is fragmented and purpose-specific (children&#x27;s data only).

Primary framework Child Data Protection Act / SAFE for Kids Act (purpose-specific only)

Supervisory authority [New York State Attorney General](https://ag.ny.gov/)

Traffic-light rationale — Red No general lawful-bases or special-category regime exists; coverage is fragmented and purpose-specific (children&#x27;s data only).

#### Sub-modules (4)

#### Lawful basesRed

No enumerated lawful-bases regime exists in New York law outside of sector statutes.

#### Consent thresholdsAmber

The CDPA requires clear, separate, easily revocable consent requests, with the most prominent option being to refuse consent, for covered users aged 13-17; users 12 and under face default processing restrictions absent a permitted purpose.

Claims (1):

- The New York Child Data Protection Act mandates that consent requests be clear, separate from other transactions, and easily revocable, with the most prominent option being to refuse consent.

#### Special categoriesRed

No general &#x27;special category&#x27; data definition exists in NY statute akin to GDPR Art. 9; biometric identifier data receives distinct treatment only via the NYC local Biometric Identifier Information Law and pending state biometric bills.

Claims (3):

- A state-wide biometric privacy bill (Assembly Bill 27) has been under consideration in the New York legislature, containing more onerous requirements than the existing NYC local biometric law and including a private right of action, but has not been enacted state-wide.
- NYC Biometric Identifier Information Law (Admin. Code §§22-1201-1205) — requires conspicuous signage disclosing biometric data collection by commercial establishments and prohibits sale/profit from biometric identifier information: true
- NYC Biometric Identifier Information Law (NYC Admin. Code §§22-1201-1205) — prohibits sale, lease, trade or profit from biometric identifier information with no cure right: true

#### Pseudonymisation and anonymisationRed

No NY state statutory definition of pseudonymisation/anonymisation was identified; education-sector contractual templates reference FERPA de-identification standards only.

New York has no general lawful-basis framework analogous to GDPR Art. 6, nor a codified &#x27;special category&#x27; regime. Consent standards appear only in narrow, purpose-specific statutes: the Child Data Protection Act (CDPA) requires informed, revocable consent for processing minors&#x27; data, and the SAFE for Kids Act requires parental consent for &#x27;addictive feeds.&#x27; No statutory pseudonymisation/anonymisation safe-harbour exists at state level outside of education-sector guidance (Student Data Privacy Consortium templates referencing FERPA de-identification).

Sources and claims (4)
- [DataGuidance](https://www.dataguidance.com/news/new-york-bill-establishing-new-york-child-data) — The New York Child Data Protection Act mandates that consent requests be clear, separate from other transactions, and easily revocable, with the most prominent option being to refuse consent.
- [IAPP](https://iapp.org/news/a/nyc-biometric-law-enters-into-force) — A state-wide biometric privacy bill (Assembly Bill 27) has been under consideration in the New York legislature, containing more onerous requirements than the existing NYC local biometric law and including a private right of action, but has not been enacted state-wide.
- [New York City Council](https://intro.nyc/local-laws/2021-3) — NYC Biometric Identifier Information Law (Admin. Code §§22-1201-1205) — requires conspicuous signage disclosing biometric data collection by commercial establishments and prohibits sale/profit from biometric identifier information: true
- [Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP](https://ktslaw.com/en/Insights/Alert/2023/4/New-York-City-Biometrics-Law-Has-Teeth) — NYC Biometric Identifier Information Law (NYC Admin. Code §§22-1201-1205) — prohibits sale, lease, trade or profit from biometric identifier information with no cure right: true

### Data Subject Rights5 sub-modulesRedEnacted in forceModule confidence: Probable&#9662;

No comprehensive data-subject-rights statute exists; only sector-specific access/correction rights (education) were identified.

Supervisory authority [New York State Attorney General](https://ag.ny.gov/)

Traffic-light rationale — Red No comprehensive data-subject-rights statute exists; only sector-specific access/correction rights (education) were identified.

#### Sub-modules (5)

#### Access rightAmber

No general consumer access right exists; Education Law 2-d/FERPA gives parents/eligible students the right to review education records held by providers.

Claims (1):

- Under New York education-sector data agreements, an LEA must establish reasonable procedures for a parent, legal guardian, or eligible student to review Education Records and correct erroneous information held by a service provider.

#### Rectification and erasureAmber

No general erasure/rectification right exists outside the education sector, where parents may request correction of erroneous student data.

Claims (1):

- Under New York education-sector data agreements, an LEA must establish reasonable procedures for a parent, legal guardian, or eligible student to review Education Records and correct erroneous information held by a service provider.

#### Restriction and objectionRed

No general restriction/objection right identified in NY state law.

#### Data portabilityRed

No data-portability right exists under New York state law.

#### Deadlines and response windowsAmber

Where an education-sector response duty exists, providers must typically respond within 45 days of a parent/LEA request, or the state-law timeframe if shorter.

Claims (1):

- Providers must respond to student-data record requests in a reasonably timely manner, no later than forty-five days from the date of request or the timeframe required under state law, whichever is sooner.

New York lacks a general consumer data-subject-rights regime (no state-wide access, rectification, erasure, restriction, objection, or portability right analogous to CPRA/GDPR). Rights that exist are narrow and sector-bound: FERPA/Education Law 2-d gives parents access/correction rights over student education records via LEAs, and NYDFS rules give regulated entities internal audit obligations rather than consumer-facing rights.

Sources and claims (2)
- [DataGuidance](https://www.dataguidance.com/news/new-york-safe-kids-act-signed-law) — Under New York education-sector data agreements, an LEA must establish reasonable procedures for a parent, legal guardian, or eligible student to review Education Records and correct erroneous information held by a service provider.
- [DataGuidance](https://www.dataguidance.com/news/new-york-safe-kids-act-signed-law) — Providers must respond to student-data record requests in a reasonably timely manner, no later than forty-five days from the date of request or the timeframe required under state law, whichever is sooner.

### Controller/Processor Duties7 sub-modulesAmberEnacted in forceModule confidence: Probable&#9662;

Strong security/breach regime (SHIELD + NYDFS) but no DPIA/DPO/ROPA/joint-controller framework generally applicable.

Primary framework SHIELD Act (GBL §899-bb) / NYDFS 23 NYCRR Part 500

Supervisory authority [New York State Department of Financial Services (NYDFS)](https://www.dfs.ny.gov/)

Traffic-light rationale — Amber Strong security/breach regime (SHIELD + NYDFS) but no DPIA/DPO/ROPA/joint-controller framework generally applicable.

#### Sub-modules (7)

#### Accountability & DPIAAmber

No general DPIA duty exists; NYDFS requires periodic risk assessments as part of its Cybersecurity Regulation.

Claims (2):

- NYDFS Covered Entities under 23 NYCRR Part 500 must identify reasonably foreseeable internal and external risks and assess the sufficiency of safeguards controlling those risks.
- NYDFS 23 NYCRR 500.9 periodic risk assessment — Each covered entity must conduct a documented periodic risk assessment of its information systems, reviewed and updated at least annually and on material change in cyber risk.

#### DPO requirementsAmber

No general DPO requirement exists; NYDFS requires designation of a CISO for regulated financial entities.

Claims (1):

- NYDFS regulations require regulated entities to designate a qualified individual (CISO) responsible for overseeing and implementing the entity&#x27;s cybersecurity program.

#### Ropa requirementsRed

No records-of-processing-activities obligation exists under New York state law.

#### Joint controller arrangementsRed

No joint-controller concept exists in New York statute; education-sector DPAs define &#x27;Provider&#x27; and &#x27;Subprocessor&#x27; roles contractually rather than by statute.

#### Security measuresGreen

SHIELD Act requires businesses to develop, implement and maintain reasonable administrative, technical and physical safeguards; NYDFS 23 NYCRR 500 imposes detailed technical standards for regulated financial entities.

Claims (9):

- The SHIELD Act requires businesses that own or license New York residents&#x27; private information to develop, implement and maintain reasonable safeguards including administrative, technical and physical safeguards.
- The NYDFS Cybersecurity Regulation requires banks, insurance companies and other financial services institutions to establish and maintain a comprehensive cybersecurity programme covering governance, data management, incident planning, system testing, and data-incident reporting.
- NY SHIELD Act §899-bb reasonable safeguards duty — Any person or business that owns or licenses computerized data including a NY resident&#x27;s private information must develop, implement and maintain reasonable administrative, technical and physical safeguards.
- NY SHIELD Act §899-bb small-business threshold — A small business entitled to the scaled reasonable-safeguards standard is one with <50 employees, <$3,000,000 gross annual revenue in each of the last 3 fiscal years, or <$5,000,000 year-end total assets.
- 23 NYCRR Part 500 (NYDFS Cybersecurity Regulation) — requires covered entities to risk-assess third-party service providers and impose minimum cybersecurity practices by contract: true
- NYDFS Cybersecurity Regulation (23 NYCRR Part 500), Second Amendment — fully phased in as of 1 November 2025, including MFA for any individual and asset inventory duty: true
- NY SHIELD Act (General Business Law § 899-bb) — deems entities compliant with GLBA, HIPAA/HITECH, or NYDFS 23 NYCRR 500 as compliant with its reasonable-safeguards requirement: true
- New York State Department of Financial Services — DFS issued a $2.25 million cybersecurity consent order against Delta Dental Insurance Company on 30 April 2026 under 23 NYCRR Part 500, its first 2026 cyber enforcement action.
- New York SHIELD Act — Any person or business owning or licensing computerized private information of NY residents must develop, implement and maintain reasonable administrative, technical and physical safeguards to protect the security, confidentiality and integrity of that information.

#### Breach notificationGreen

SHIELD Act requires notification to affected NY residents and the Attorney General, with substitute-notice provisions and an exception where notice is already made under GLBA, HIPAA, or NYDFS rules.

Claims (9):

- There is an exception to the SHIELD Act breach notification obligation if notification is already made pursuant to GLBA, HIPAA, NYDFS Cybersecurity Regulation, or another official government agency&#x27;s regulations.
- A business may use substitute notice for a data breach if it demonstrates to the New York Attorney General that the cost of providing notice would exceed $250,000 or that the affected class exceeds 500,000 persons.
- The December 2024 SHIELD Act amendment requires breach notification to affected NY residents within 30 days of discovery.
- NYDFS 23 NYCRR 500.17(a)(1) cybersecurity incident notification — Each NYDFS covered entity must notify the Superintendent as promptly as possible, no later than 72 hours after determining a cybersecurity incident has occurred.
- 23 NYCRR Part 500 (NYDFS Cybersecurity Regulation) — requires covered entities to notify the NYDFS Superintendent within 72 hours of determining a cybersecurity incident has occurred: true
- NY SHIELD Act (General Business Law § 899-aa) — requires breach disclosure to affected NY residents without unreasonable delay, no later than 30 days after discovery: true
- NY SHIELD Act (General Business Law § 899-aa) — requires HIPAA/HITECH covered entities notifying HHS Secretary to also notify the NY Attorney General within five business days: true
- NY GBL §899-aa (SHIELD Act breach notification) — notification to affected New York residents within 30 days of discovering a security breach of private information, plus notice to the NY Attorney General, Department of State and State Police; DFS-covered entities under 23 NYCRR 500.1 must also notify DFS, per a Feb 2025 clarifying amendment.
- New York SHIELD Act — As amended effective 21 December 2024, GBL §899-aa requires notification to affected NY residents within 30 days of the date the breach is discovered, removing the prior exception allowing delay to restore system integrity; DFS-covered entities must also notify NYDFS.

#### Retention and disposalGreen

SHIELD Act requires disposal of private information within a reasonable time after it is no longer needed, by erasing electronic media so information cannot be read or reconstructed.

Claims (1):

- The SHIELD Act requires disposing of private information within a reasonable amount of time after it is no longer needed for business purposes by erasing electronic media so that the information cannot be read or reconstructed.

New York imposes concrete security-program and breach-notification duties via the SHIELD Act and, for financial-services entities, the far more detailed NYDFS Cybersecurity Regulation (23 NYCRR Part 500). Neither statute mandates a formal DPIA or DPO in the GDPR sense, though NYDFS requires a CISO and periodic risk assessments. There is no general ROPA obligation or joint-controller framework.

No periodic updates recorded in this cycle

Sources and claims (22)
- [DataGuidance](https://corporate.dataguidance.com/usa-ny-dfs-final-cybersecurity-regulation-sea-change-covered-entities-2/) — NYDFS Covered Entities under 23 NYCRR Part 500 must identify reasonably foreseeable internal and external risks and assess the sufficiency of safeguards controlling those risks.
- [DataGuidance](https://corporate.dataguidance.com/usa-ny-dfs-final-cybersecurity-regulation-sea-change-covered-entities-2/) — NYDFS regulations require regulated entities to designate a qualified individual (CISO) responsible for overseeing and implementing the entity&#x27;s cybersecurity program.
- [IAPP](https://iapp.org/news/a/new-yorks-shield-act-has-taken-effect-what-does-this-mean-for-your-business) — The SHIELD Act requires businesses that own or license New York residents&#x27; private information to develop, implement and maintain reasonable safeguards including administrative, technical and physical safeguards.
- [DataGuidance](https://corporate.dataguidance.com/usa-ny-dfs-final-cybersecurity-regulation-sea-change-covered-entities-2/) — The NYDFS Cybersecurity Regulation requires banks, insurance companies and other financial services institutions to establish and maintain a comprehensive cybersecurity programme covering governance, data management, incident planning, system testing, and data-incident reporting.
- [IAPP](https://iapp.org/news/a/new-yorks-shield-act-has-taken-effect-what-does-this-mean-for-your-business) — There is an exception to the SHIELD Act breach notification obligation if notification is already made pursuant to GLBA, HIPAA, NYDFS Cybersecurity Regulation, or another official government agency&#x27;s regulations.
- [NYS Office of the Attorney General / DataGuidance](https://www.dataguidance.com/sites/default/files/factsheet_for_business-_nys_information_security_breach_and_notification_act_20_august_2014.pdf) — A business may use substitute notice for a data breach if it demonstrates to the New York Attorney General that the cost of providing notice would exceed $250,000 or that the affected class exceeds 500,000 persons.
- [IAPP](https://iapp.org/news/a/new-yorks-shield-act-has-taken-effect-what-does-this-mean-for-your-business) — The SHIELD Act requires disposing of private information within a reasonable amount of time after it is no longer needed for business purposes by erasing electronic media so that the information cannot be read or reconstructed.
- [Wiley Rein](https://www.wiley.law/alert-New-York-Finalizes-RAISE-Act-for-Frontier-AI-Models-Law-Takes-Effect-January-1-2027) — The December 2024 SHIELD Act amendment requires breach notification to affected NY residents within 30 days of discovery.
- [New York State Senate (NYS Open Legislation)](https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/GBS/899-BB) — NY SHIELD Act §899-bb reasonable safeguards duty — Any person or business that owns or licenses computerized data including a NY resident&#x27;s private information must develop, implement and maintain reasonable administrative, technical and physical safeguards.
- [FindLaw (Thomson Reuters)](https://codes.findlaw.com/ny/general-business-law/gbs-sect-899-bb/) — NY SHIELD Act §899-bb small-business threshold — A small business entitled to the scaled reasonable-safeguards standard is one with <50 employees, <$3,000,000 gross annual revenue in each of the last 3 fiscal years, or <$5,000,000 year-end total assets.
- [Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute (23 NYCRR Part 500 text)](https://www.law.cornell.edu/regulations/new-york/23-NYCRR-500.17) — NYDFS 23 NYCRR 500.17(a)(1) cybersecurity incident notification — Each NYDFS covered entity must notify the Superintendent as promptly as possible, no later than 72 hours after determining a cybersecurity incident has occurred.
- [FCI Cyber](https://fcicyber.com/resources/nydfs-500) — NYDFS 23 NYCRR 500.9 periodic risk assessment — Each covered entity must conduct a documented periodic risk assessment of its information systems, reviewed and updated at least annually and on material change in cyber risk.
- [Kaseya](https://www.kaseya.com/blog/ny-dfs-cybersecurity-regulation/) — 23 NYCRR Part 500 (NYDFS Cybersecurity Regulation) — requires covered entities to risk-assess third-party service providers and impose minimum cybersecurity practices by contract: true
- [NHIMG](https://nhimg.org/nydfs-part-500-guide) — NYDFS Cybersecurity Regulation (23 NYCRR Part 500), Second Amendment — fully phased in as of 1 November 2025, including MFA for any individual and asset inventory duty: true
- [FCI Cyber](https://fcicyber.com/resources/nydfs-500) — 23 NYCRR Part 500 (NYDFS Cybersecurity Regulation) — requires covered entities to notify the NYDFS Superintendent within 72 hours of determining a cybersecurity incident has occurred: true
- [FindLaw (Thomson Reuters)](https://codes.findlaw.com/ny/general-business-law/gbs-sect-899-bb/) — NY SHIELD Act (General Business Law § 899-bb) — deems entities compliant with GLBA, HIPAA/HITECH, or NYDFS 23 NYCRR 500 as compliant with its reasonable-safeguards requirement: true
- [New York State Senate (NYS Open Legislation)](https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/GBS/899-AA) — NY SHIELD Act (General Business Law § 899-aa) — requires breach disclosure to affected NY residents without unreasonable delay, no later than 30 days after discovery: true
- [NY Public Law (Fastcase)](https://newyork.public.law/laws/n.y._general_business_law_section_899-aa) — NY SHIELD Act (General Business Law § 899-aa) — requires HIPAA/HITECH covered entities notifying HHS Secretary to also notify the NY Attorney General within five business days: true
- [Wiley Rein](https://www.wiley.law/alert-New-York-Finalizes-RAISE-Act-for-Frontier-AI-Models-Law-Takes-Effect-January-1-2027) — NY GBL §899-aa (SHIELD Act breach notification) — notification to affected New York residents within 30 days of discovering a security breach of private information, plus notice to the NY Attorney General, Department of State and State Police; DFS-covered entities under 23 NYCRR 500.1 must also notify DFS, per a Feb 2025 clarifying amendment.
- [McDermott Will & Emery](https://www.mcdermottlaw.com/insights/new-york-passes-restrictive-health-information-privacy-act/) — New York State Department of Financial Services — DFS issued a $2.25 million cybersecurity consent order against Delta Dental Insurance Company on 30 April 2026 under 23 NYCRR Part 500, its first 2026 cyber enforcement action.
- [RecordingLaw](https://www.recordinglaw.com/us-laws/data-privacy-laws/new-york-data-privacy-laws/data-breach-notification/) — New York SHIELD Act — Any person or business owning or licensing computerized private information of NY residents must develop, implement and maintain reasonable administrative, technical and physical safeguards to protect the security, confidentiality and integrity of that information.
- [Constangy](https://www.constangy.com/constangy-cyber-advisor/are-you-in-the-know-new-york-amends-data-breach-law) — New York SHIELD Act — As amended effective 21 December 2024, GBL §899-aa requires notification to affected NY residents within 30 days of the date the breach is discovered, removing the prior exception allowing delay to restore system integrity; DFS-covered entities must also notify NYDFS.

### Cross-Border & Adequacy 6 sub-modules Not assessed &#9662;

No transfer-mechanism, adequacy, SCC/BCR, TIA, or localisation regime exists under NY state law; module reflects a genuine regulatory gap for this JID rather than incomplete research.

Traffic-light rationale — Not assessed No transfer-mechanism, adequacy, SCC/BCR, TIA, or localisation regime exists under NY state law; module reflects a genuine regulatory gap for this JID rather than incomplete research.

#### Sub-modules (6)

#### Transfer mechanismsRed

No NY state-law transfer mechanism regime exists.

#### Adequacy receivedRed

Not applicable; New York is a sub-national US jurisdiction and does not receive adequacy decisions.

#### Adequacy grantedRed

Not applicable; New York does not grant adequacy decisions.

#### SCCs and BCRsRed

No SCC/BCR concept exists under New York law.

#### Transfer impact assessmentRed

No TIA requirement exists under New York law.

#### Data localisationRed

No general data-localisation mandate was identified for New York; NYDFS requirements are security-focused rather than location-based.

New York state law contains no adequacy-decision mechanism, no SCC/BCR concept, and no transfer-impact-assessment requirement — these are EU/GDPR-derived constructs with no US state-law analogue. No New York data-localisation mandate was identified. Cross-border data transfer questions for NY-resident data are governed by federal instruments (e.g., GLBA, HIPAA) rather than state law.

### Sectoral Watch7 sub-modulesAmberEnacted in forceModule confidence: Probable&#9662;

Financial and employment sectors have mature, in-force overlays; health (non-HIPAA) and credit-scoring overlays remain largely proposed or federally-anchored.

Primary framework NYDFS 23 NYCRR Part 500 (financial) / Education Law 2-d (education) / Labor Law Art. 5 (employment)

Supervisory authority [New York State Department of Financial Services (NYDFS)](https://www.dfs.ny.gov/)

Traffic-light rationale — Amber Financial and employment sectors have mature, in-force overlays; health (non-HIPAA) and credit-scoring overlays remain largely proposed or federally-anchored.

#### Sub-modules (7)

#### Financial sector overlayGreen

NYDFS&#x27;s Cybersecurity Regulation requires banks, insurers and other regulated financial entities to maintain a comprehensive cybersecurity programme with governance, incident-response and third-party oversight obligations.

Claims (5):

- The NYDFS Cybersecurity Regulation, codified at 23 NYCRR Part 500, requires banks, insurance companies and other financial services institutions subject to NYDFS regulation to establish a comprehensive cybersecurity programme with governance, data-management, incident-planning, testing and reporting requirements.
- NYDFS fined a Part-500-limited-exemption money transmitter $250,000 under a consent order signed 5 August 2026 for failing to conduct a risk assessment sufficient to inform cybersecurity program design.
- NYDFS Insurance Circular Letter No. 2024-7 — requires insurers using AI/external consumer data in underwriting or pricing to apply fairness/non-discrimination principles and document testing methodology: true
- New York State Department of Financial Services — On 10 Sept 2026 NYDFS issued an Industry Letter under 23 NYCRR §500.9 stating it expects each Covered Entity to be able to demonstrate how its Risk Assessment informed cybersecurity controls, compensating controls, and risk acceptance decisions, explicitly stating the letter does not create new obligations.
- New York State Department of Financial Services — NYDFS&#x27;s 10 September 2026 industry letter (reported 22 October 2026) sets the cybersecurity risk-assessment examination standard under 23 NYCRR Part 500, flagging AI adoption, third-party/cloud dependency and vendor risk as required risk-assessment inputs.

#### Health sector overlayAmber

A comprehensive health-privacy bill (Senate Bill 9269, the New York Health Information Privacy Act) targeting health information not subject to HIPAA has been introduced with adjusted penalties, but is not yet enacted.

Claims (2):

- Senate Bill 9269 for the New York Health Information Privacy Act mandates strict regulations on processing health information of New York residents not otherwise subject to HIPAA.
- Since March 21, 2025, the SHIELD Act&#x27;s definition of &#x27;private information&#x27; includes medical history/condition/treatment/diagnosis and health-insurance policy/subscriber/claims data.

#### Telecoms and eprivacyRed

No New York state-specific ePrivacy/telecoms overlay analogous to the EU ePrivacy Directive was identified; cookie/tracking issues are addressed instead via older wiretap/eavesdropping statutes.

Claims (1):

- New York Penal Law, Article 250 (Eavesdropping) — establishes a one-party-consent regime for interception of communications: true

#### Employment dataGreen

New York Civil Rights Law §52-c requires notice before employee electronic monitoring is permitted; Labor Law §201-a prohibits fingerprinting as an employment condition; Labor Law §203-c restricts video recording of employees in sensitive areas; a 2021 law (S2628) requires written notice of electronic monitoring upon hiring.

Claims (3):

- New York Civil Rights Law §52-c requires that notice be provided before any employee electronic monitoring is permitted, and Labor Law §203-c prohibits video recording employees in sensitive areas.
- New York&#x27;s 2021 electronic monitoring law requires employers who monitor or intercept employee communications or internet usage to give prior written notice upon hiring, acknowledged by the employee, and to post the notice conspicuously.
- New York Civil Rights Law § 52-c — requires private employers engaged in electronic monitoring to give written notice to new employees and post conspicuous notice: true

#### Credit and scoringAmber

Credit-scoring privacy in New York is governed primarily by the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act; no distinct New York state credit-scoring privacy overlay was identified.

#### educationAmber

New York Education Law 2-d and related student-data-privacy agreements (modeled on national Student Data Privacy Consortium templates) govern student data alongside federal FERPA.

Claims (1):

- New York student-data-privacy agreements require providers to treat student data as the LEA&#x27;s property, restrict onward sale, and permit parental review consistent with FERPA and Education Law 2-d.

#### insuranceAmber

Insurance entities licensed by NYDFS fall within the scope of the Cybersecurity Regulation; no separate NY insurance-specific consumer-data statute beyond this was identified.

Claims (1):

- The NYDFS Cybersecurity Regulation, codified at 23 NYCRR Part 500, requires banks, insurance companies and other financial services institutions subject to NYDFS regulation to establish a comprehensive cybersecurity programme with governance, data-management, incident-planning, testing and reporting requirements.

New York&#x27;s data-protection landscape is fundamentally sectoral. NYDFS&#x27;s 23 NYCRR Part 500 governs financial-services cybersecurity; health information outside HIPAA is targeted by a pending New York Health Information Privacy Act (SB 9269); employment data is covered by a patchwork of Labor Law, Civil Rights Law, and General Business Law provisions plus the 2021 electronic-monitoring notice law; and education data is governed by Education Law 2-d alongside FERPA.

Periodic update · new data 2026-11-04 The Department of Financial Services continued active enforcement of its cybersecurity regulation, 23 NYCRR Part 500, against entities operating under the regulation&#x27;s limited-exemption provisions. A money transmitter holding a Section 500.19(a) limited exemption is understood to have signed a consent order, dated 5 August 2026, carrying a $250,000 penalty for failing to conduct a risk assessment sufficient to inform the design of its cybersecurity program. The action is reported rather than independently verified against the primary order text, so the framing here is qualified: the entity is understood to have been fined on this basis, not confirmed in every particular.

The significance of the action lies less in the amount than in what it tests: Part 500&#x27;s limited exemptions reduce the scope of certain obligations for qualifying smaller or simpler entities, but they do not remove the baseline duty to conduct a risk assessment capable of informing program design. This action reinforces that a limited exemption is not a general carve-out from the regulation&#x27;s foundational risk-assessment requirement, and it signals that the Department continues to treat the risk-assessment duty as a floor obligation irrespective of an entity&#x27;s exemption status elsewhere in Part 500.

#### Outlook

Entities relying on Part 500&#x27;s limited-exemption provisions should expect continued scrutiny specifically targeted at the risk-assessment requirement, which this action suggests the Department treats as non-negotiable regardless of exemption status elsewhere in the regulation. The broader Part 500 enforcement posture appears to be one of sustained, rather than escalating, activity — a steady cadence of actions against entities whose cybersecurity programs are found wanting on specific, identifiable elements.

1 earlier distinct update Periodic update · new data 2026-10-25 New York&#x27;s Department of Financial Services issued an industry letter on 10 September 2026, reported on 22 October 2026, that sets new cybersecurity risk-assessment examination expectations for entities covered under 23 NYCRR Part 500. The letter flags artificial-intelligence adoption, third-party and cloud dependency, and vendor risk as inputs that covered entities are expected to build into their risk-assessment process. This is reported guidance rather than a new rule: it does not create a binding obligation beyond the existing Part 500 risk-assessment requirement, but it signals how examiners are likely to approach risk-assessment reviews under that existing requirement going forward. The reporting is understood to have surfaced inside the current window even though the letter itself predates it by roughly six weeks, reflecting a lag between the letter&#x27;s issuance and its public reporting.

The substantive significance lies in what the letter identifies as required risk-assessment inputs. By naming AI adoption specifically, NYDFS is signaling that covered entities&#x27; use of artificial intelligence in their own operations is now an expected subject of their own Part 500 risk assessments, not merely a third-party-vendor consideration. Third-party and cloud dependency and vendor risk are named alongside AI adoption, reinforcing that the examination standard treats these three factors as interlinked rather than isolated risk categories.

#### Outlook

Covered entities under Part 500 should expect that the risk-assessment inputs named in the September letter will be tested directly in upcoming examination cycles. Because the letter is guidance rather than a rule amendment, there is no new compliance deadline attached to it as such; the relevant deadline remains whatever the entity&#x27;s existing Part 500 risk-assessment cycle already requires. What changes is the content examiners will expect that risk assessment to cover, specifically AI adoption, third-party and cloud dependency, and vendor risk, rather than the existence of the assessment obligation itself.

Sources and claims (12)
- [DataGuidance](https://corporate.dataguidance.com/usa-ny-dfs-final-cybersecurity-regulation-sea-change-covered-entities-2/) — The NYDFS Cybersecurity Regulation, codified at 23 NYCRR Part 500, requires banks, insurance companies and other financial services institutions subject to NYDFS regulation to establish a comprehensive cybersecurity programme with governance, data-management, incident-planning, testing and reporting requirements.
- [DataGuidance](https://www.dataguidance.com/jurisdictions/new-york) — Senate Bill 9269 for the New York Health Information Privacy Act mandates strict regulations on processing health information of New York residents not otherwise subject to HIPAA.
- [DataGuidance](https://www.dataguidance.com/notes/new-york-employee-monitoring) — New York Civil Rights Law §52-c requires that notice be provided before any employee electronic monitoring is permitted, and Labor Law §203-c prohibits video recording employees in sensitive areas.
- [DataGuidance](https://www.dataguidance.com/news/new-york-governor-enacts-law-notice-requirements) — New York&#x27;s 2021 electronic monitoring law requires employers who monitor or intercept employee communications or internet usage to give prior written notice upon hiring, acknowledged by the employee, and to post the notice conspicuously.
- [DataGuidance](https://www.dataguidance.com/news/new-york-safe-kids-act-signed-law) — New York student-data-privacy agreements require providers to treat student data as the LEA&#x27;s property, restrict onward sale, and permit parental review consistent with FERPA and Education Law 2-d.
- [Wiley Rein](https://www.wiley.law/alert-New-York-Finalizes-RAISE-Act-for-Frontier-AI-Models-Law-Takes-Effect-January-1-2027) — Since March 21, 2025, the SHIELD Act&#x27;s definition of &#x27;private information&#x27; includes medical history/condition/treatment/diagnosis and health-insurance policy/subscriber/claims data.
- [RiskTemplate](https://risktemplate.com/blog/2026-08-29-nydfs-order-express-cybersecurity-risk-assessment-exempt-entities/) — NYDFS fined a Part-500-limited-exemption money transmitter $250,000 under a consent order signed 5 August 2026 for failing to conduct a risk assessment sufficient to inform cybersecurity program design.
- [NY Labor and Employment Law Report](https://www.nylaborandemploymentlaw.com/2022/06/employers-are-now-required-to-provide-notice-of-electronic-monitoring-of-their-employees/) — New York Civil Rights Law § 52-c — requires private employers engaged in electronic monitoring to give written notice to new employees and post conspicuous notice: true
- [NY Public Law (Fastcase)](https://newyork.public.law/laws/n.y._penal_law_section_250.00) — New York Penal Law, Article 250 (Eavesdropping) — establishes a one-party-consent regime for interception of communications: true
- [Willkie Farr & Gallagher (Compliance Concourse)](https://complianceconcourse.willkie.com/articles/nydfs-adopts-circular-letter-on-the-use-of-ai-in-insurance/) — NYDFS Insurance Circular Letter No. 2024-7 — requires insurers using AI/external consumer data in underwriting or pricing to apply fairness/non-discrimination principles and document testing methodology: true
- [McDermott Will & Schulte](https://www.mcdermottlaw.com/insights/nydfs-sets-important-expectations-for-part-500-risk-assessments/) — New York State Department of Financial Services — On 10 Sept 2026 NYDFS issued an Industry Letter under 23 NYCRR §500.9 stating it expects each Covered Entity to be able to demonstrate how its Risk Assessment informed cybersecurity controls, compensating controls, and risk acceptance decisions, explicitly stating the letter does not create new obligations.
- [WilmerHale](https://www.wilmerhale.com/en/insights/blogs/wilmerhale-privacy-and-cybersecurity-law/20261022-nydfs-issues-guidance-on-risk-assessments) — New York State Department of Financial Services — NYDFS&#x27;s 10 September 2026 industry letter (reported 22 October 2026) sets the cybersecurity risk-assessment examination standard under 23 NYCRR Part 500, flagging AI adoption, third-party/cloud dependency and vendor risk as required risk-assessment inputs.

### AdTech & Commercial Privacy6 sub-modulesRedEnacted in forceModule confidence: Probable&#9662;

No dedicated adtech/cookie/cross-context-advertising statute exists in New York; the module records a genuine sectoral gap plus emergent wiretap-based litigation risk.

Primary framework Penal Law Art. 250 (Eavesdropping) — repurposed, not adtech-specific

Supervisory authority [New York State Attorney General](https://ag.ny.gov/)

Traffic-light rationale — Red No dedicated adtech/cookie/cross-context-advertising statute exists in New York; the module records a genuine sectoral gap plus emergent wiretap-based litigation risk.

#### Sub-modules (6)

#### Cookies and trackersAmber

No dedicated cookie-consent statute exists; New York&#x27;s eavesdropping statute has been used analogously to California&#x27;s CIPA in tracking-technology class actions.

Claims (2):

- New York&#x27;s decades-old anti-wiretapping/eavesdropping statutes have found new significance in privacy class-action litigation against automated tracking and transcription technologies, mirroring similar theories under the federal Electronic Communications Privacy Act.
- NY Attorney General Business Guide to Website Privacy Controls — takes the position that GBL §349 UDAP applies to representations about cookie/tracking consent interfaces: true

#### Dark patternsRed

No New York state dark-pattern prohibition was identified; enforcement in this space is federal (FTC Act) only.

#### Opt out signalsRed

New York law does not mandate recognition of Global Privacy Control or other universal opt-out signals.

#### Clean rooms and dcrRed

No New York statute addresses data clean rooms or data-collaboration-room governance.

#### Cross context advertisingAmber

New York has no CPRA-style &#x27;sale&#x27;/&#x27;share&#x27; definition governing cross-context behavioral advertising. A pending Senate Bill 9088 would create data-broker obligations touching cross-context data flows.

Claims (1):

- Senate Bill 9088 would require data brokers to disclose, among other things, whether consumer data was shared with foreign actors, government agencies, law enforcement, or AI system developers in the previous year.

#### Direct marketingAmber

Retail tracking notice requirements (pending Senate Bill 2539) would mandate warning signs for electronic device tracking of customers, but this is not yet enacted; direct marketing consent otherwise flows through federal CAN-SPAM.

Claims (2):

- New York Senate Bill 2539 would mandate that retailers post warning signs if tracking customers through electronic devices, with penalties for violations.
- NY data-broker registration bills (S9088A, S9131) — S9088A would require annual AG registration, a fee, and centralized consumer data-deletion mechanism; S9131 would require comprehensive information security programme and AG registration with $100,000 annual fee proposed

New York has no CPRA-style &#x27;sale&#x27;/&#x27;share&#x27; framework, no state cookie-consent statute, and no codified dark-pattern prohibition or Global Privacy Control recognition requirement. Adtech-adjacent enforcement instead flows through decades-old anti-wiretapping/eavesdropping statutes (Penal Law Art. 250) being repurposed in class-action litigation against tracking technologies, mirroring the federal ECPA and California&#x27;s CIPA experience. A pending &#x27;One Fair Price Act&#x27; would prohibit surveillance pricing based on personal data.

Sources and claims (5)
- [IAPP](https://iapp.org/news/a/dressing-old-laws-in-class-action-suits-applying-anti-wiretapping-laws-to-ai-transcription-services) — New York&#x27;s decades-old anti-wiretapping/eavesdropping statutes have found new significance in privacy class-action litigation against automated tracking and transcription technologies, mirroring similar theories under the federal Electronic Communications Privacy Act.
- [DataGuidance](https://www.dataguidance.com/news/new-york-bill-data-brokers-registration-and-data) — Senate Bill 9088 would require data brokers to disclose, among other things, whether consumer data was shared with foreign actors, government agencies, law enforcement, or AI system developers in the previous year.
- [DataGuidance](https://www.dataguidance.com/jurisdictions/new-york) — New York Senate Bill 2539 would mandate that retailers post warning signs if tracking customers through electronic devices, with penalties for violations.
- [Sidley Austin (Data Matters)](https://datamatters.sidley.com/2024/08/13/new-york-attorney-general-publishes-guide-to-avoid-key-mistakes-regarding-online-tracking-technologies/) — NY Attorney General Business Guide to Website Privacy Controls — takes the position that GBL §349 UDAP applies to representations about cookie/tracking consent interfaces: true
- [RiskTemplate](https://risktemplate.com/blog/2026-08-29-nydfs-order-express-cybersecurity-risk-assessment-exempt-entities/) — NY data-broker registration bills (S9088A, S9131) — S9088A would require annual AG registration, a fee, and centralized consumer data-deletion mechanism; S9131 would require comprehensive information security programme and AG registration with $100,000 annual fee proposed

### Algorithmic, Biometric & Surveillance Governance6 sub-modulesAmberEnacted in forceModule confidence: Probable&#9662;

Meaningful AI-transparency and biometric law exists but is split between city-level ordinances (NYC) and pending/newly-effective state AI statutes; general ADM transparency and profiling restrictions remain state-law gaps.

Primary framework RAISE Act (as amended, SB 8828) / NYC Biometric Identifier Information Law (local, not state-wide)

Supervisory authority [New York State Attorney General](https://ag.ny.gov/)

Traffic-light rationale — Amber Meaningful AI-transparency and biometric law exists but is split between city-level ordinances (NYC) and pending/newly-effective state AI statutes; general ADM transparency and profiling restrictions remain state-law gaps.

#### Sub-modules (6)

#### Profiling restrictionsAmber

No general state-wide profiling restriction exists; a pending bill (S7623) would restrict employer use of automated employment decision tools and require bias audits, but has not been enacted state-wide.

Claims (1):

- Proposed Senate Bill 7623 would restrict employers&#x27; use of electronic monitoring and automated employment decision tools, requiring bias audits and documentation of employee-data-driven employment decisions, but remains pending.

#### Automated decision making transparencyAmber

ADM transparency in New York is anchored at the New York City level (Local Law 144 bias-audit requirement for automated employment decision tools); no state-wide equivalent was identified.

Claims (4):

- New York, alongside Illinois and Connecticut, finalized notable AI and privacy provisions during the 2026 legislative session, including transparency laws already on the books in New York referenced as comparators for new Illinois frontier-AI legislation.
- NYC Local Law 144 - Automated Employment Decision Tools — NYC Local Law 144 prohibits employers and employment agencies from using an automated employment decision tool unless an independent bias audit has been conducted and a summary published.
- NYC Local Law 144 of 2021 (Automated Employment Decision Tools) — requires employers using AEDTs to obtain an independent bias audit within one year before use and publicly post results: true
- New York general automated-decision-making rights — has no general cross-sectoral statutory right comparable to GDPR Art 22; coverage is sectoral (NYC AEDT, NYDFS insurance AI circular): false

#### AI risk assessmentsAmber

Senate Bill 8828, amending the RAISE Act, mandates transparency and safety requirements for AI frontier model developers in New York State, effective January 1, 2027.

Claims (7):

- Senate Bill 8828 amending the RAISE Act mandates transparency and safety requirements for AI frontier model developers in New York State, effective January 1, 2027.
- RAISE Act Section 1421(1) — Frontier AI Framework publication duty
- Under RAISE Act Section 1421(1), a large frontier developer with prior-year revenue of $500 million or more must write, implement, comply with and publish a Frontier AI Framework.
- Frontier developers must report a critical safety incident to NYDFS&#x27;s new oversight office within 72 hours of detection (24 hours if imminent risk of death or serious injury); penalties range up to $1 million for a first violation and $3 million for subsequent violations.
- RAISE Act (Chapter 96 of the Laws of 2026) — a &#x27;Large Frontier Developer&#x27; to report a &#x27;safety incident&#x27; involving a frontier model to the NY Attorney General and DHSES within 72 hours of discovery; the Act takes effect 1 Jan 2027.
- RAISE Act (NY GBL Art. 44-B) frontier AI developer regime — The RAISE Act requires developers of frontier AI models to publish transparency reports and report critical safety incidents within 72 hours; large frontier developers (>=$500M prior-year revenue) owe the heaviest duties. Effective 2027-01-01, not yet in force.
- RAISE Act — Large Frontier Developers (redefined by the 27 March 2026 chapter amendment to a $500 million annual revenue threshold) must transmit quarterly summaries of internal catastrophic-risk assessments to a new NYDFS oversight office and report critical safety incidents within 72 hours; the Act takes effect 1 January 2027.

#### Biometric regimeAmber

The New York City Biometric Identifier Information Law (Admin Code §§22-1201-1205) requires notice before commercial establishments collect, retain, convert, store or share biometric identifier information and creates a private right of action with statutory damages of $500 to $5,000 per violation; a broader state-wide biometric privacy bill remains pending.

Claims (3):

- The New York City biometric law creates a private right of action enabling aggrieved parties to collect statutory damages ranging from $500 to $5,000 per violation.
- The statewide NY Biometric Privacy Act (S1422A) passed the state Senate 41-20 on June 3, 2026 and is pending in the Assembly.
- NY State Education Department Determination on Biometric Identifying Technology in Schools — bans purchase or use of facial recognition technology by NY elementary and secondary schools: true

#### Genetic dataRed

No New York state-specific genetic-data statute was identified beyond federal GINA protections.

#### State surveillance carveoutsRed

No New York state-law national-security/surveillance carve-out provisions specific to data protection were identified in this research pass.

Claims (1):

- RAISE Act Section 1426 excepts accredited New York colleges and universities conducting academic AI research, and the Empire AI consortium, from the Act&#x27;s frontier-developer duties.

New York&#x27;s RAISE Act, finalised by Chapter 96 of 2026 (signed 27 Mar 2026), requires large frontier-model developers to publish a safety framework and report safety incidents to the NY AG and DHSES within 72 hours; it takes effect 1 Jan 2027.

Periodic update · new data 2026-11-04 The Responsible AI Safety and Education Act (RAISE Act) was finalized by chapter amendment, signed into law on 27 March 2026, with the operative regime taking effect 1 January 2027. Codified as General Business Law Article 44-B, the Act establishes a new oversight office within the Department of Financial Services tasked with evaluating large frontier AI developers and promoting transparency across the sector. This is a confirmed, enacted-but-not-yet-effective instrument, and it marks New York&#x27;s first dedicated frontier-AI statute sitting alongside, rather than inside, its existing data-protection framework.

Under Section 1421(1), a large frontier developer — defined by a prior-year revenue threshold of $500 million or more — must write, implement, comply with and publish a Frontier AI Framework addressing catastrophic-risk assessment, mitigation measures, third-party evaluation, internal governance, cybersecurity protections for unreleased model weights, and critical-incident response. This is a substantial, affirmative publication obligation rather than a disclosure-on-request duty, placing New York among the first jurisdictions to require frontier developers to make their safety governance structure public as a matter of statute rather than voluntary commitment.

Alongside the Framework obligation, the Act creates a critical-incident reporting duty: a frontier developer must report a critical safety incident to the new oversight office within 72 hours of detection, or within 24 hours where there is imminent risk of death or serious physical injury. The penalty structure backing this duty is significant — up to $1 million for a first violation and $3 million for subsequent violations, enforced by the Attorney General rather than by the oversight office itself, which keeps enforcement authority split between the regulator that evaluates frontier developers and the law officer who pursues penalties.

The Act also carries a targeted carve-out: Section 1426 excepts accredited New York colleges and universities conducting academic AI research, together with the Empire AI consortium, from the frontier-developer duties that otherwise apply. This exception is narrow — confined to academic research contexts and a named state-backed consortium — and does not extend to commercial frontier development conducted within or in partnership with academic institutions.

#### Outlook

With the operative date set for 1 January 2027, the immediate open question is how far the new oversight office has progressed in standing up its rulemaking and evaluation functions ahead of that date. Frontier developers meeting the revenue threshold have a defined runway to prepare their Frontier AI Framework and incident-response procedures, but the absence of confirmed implementing rules so far means the practical content of "compliance" under the Act remains to be fully specified. This is a space to watch closely through the final quarter before the effective date, both for rulemaking activity from the oversight office and for signals of how the Attorney General intends to approach the new penalty structure once it becomes enforceable.

1 earlier distinct update Periodic update · new data 2026-10-11 The RAISE Act, enacted as Chapter 96 of the Laws of 2026 and finalised by chapter amendment signed 27 March 2026, is New York&#x27;s frontier-AI transparency and safety statute. It requires a &#x27;Large Frontier Developer&#x27; to report a &#x27;safety incident&#x27; involving a frontier model to the New York Attorney General and the Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Services within 72 hours of discovery. The Act has been enacted but is not yet effective: its substantive reporting duty takes effect on 1 January 2027, meaning developers meeting the Large Frontier Developer threshold have a defined runway before the 72-hour reporting clock becomes operative.

The Act represents New York&#x27;s entry into state-level frontier-AI safety governance, structured around incident reporting to state authorities rather than pre-deployment licensing or model-level certification. The identity of the Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Services as a co-recipient of safety-incident reports, alongside the Attorney General, signals that New York is treating frontier-model safety incidents as having a public-safety as well as a consumer-protection dimension.

#### Outlook

Watch for implementing guidance from the Attorney General&#x27;s office or DHSES ahead of the 1 January 2027 effective date, particularly on the definition of a reportable &#x27;safety incident&#x27; and the threshold for qualifying as a &#x27;Large Frontier Developer,&#x27; both of which will determine the practical reach of the reporting duty once it takes effect.

Sources and claims (16)
- [DataGuidance](https://www.dataguidance.com/news/new-york-bill-employee-monitoring-and-automated) — Proposed Senate Bill 7623 would restrict employers&#x27; use of electronic monitoring and automated employment decision tools, requiring bias audits and documentation of employee-data-driven employment decisions, but remains pending.
- [IAPP](https://iapp.org/news/a/notable-ai-privacy-bills-hit-finish-line-in-illinois-connecticut-and-new-york) — New York, alongside Illinois and Connecticut, finalized notable AI and privacy provisions during the 2026 legislative session, including transparency laws already on the books in New York referenced as comparators for new Illinois frontier-AI legislation.
- [DataGuidance](https://www.dataguidance.com/jurisdictions/new-york) — Senate Bill 8828 amending the RAISE Act mandates transparency and safety requirements for AI frontier model developers in New York State, effective January 1, 2027.
- [IAPP](https://iapp.org/news/a/nyc-biometric-law-enters-into-force) — The New York City biometric law creates a private right of action enabling aggrieved parties to collect statutory damages ranging from $500 to $5,000 per violation.
- [Wiley Rein](https://www.wiley.law/alert-New-York-Finalizes-RAISE-Act-for-Frontier-AI-Models-Law-Takes-Effect-January-1-2027) — RAISE Act Section 1421(1) — Frontier AI Framework publication duty
- [McDermott Will & Emery](https://www.mcdermottlaw.com/insights/new-york-passes-restrictive-health-information-privacy-act/) — The statewide NY Biometric Privacy Act (S1422A) passed the state Senate 41-20 on June 3, 2026 and is pending in the Assembly.
- [Wiley Rein](https://www.wiley.law/alert-New-York-Finalizes-RAISE-Act-for-Frontier-AI-Models-Law-Takes-Effect-January-1-2027) — Under RAISE Act Section 1421(1), a large frontier developer with prior-year revenue of $500 million or more must write, implement, comply with and publish a Frontier AI Framework.
- [McDermott Will & Emery](https://www.mcdermottlaw.com/insights/new-york-passes-restrictive-health-information-privacy-act/) — Frontier developers must report a critical safety incident to NYDFS&#x27;s new oversight office within 72 hours of detection (24 hours if imminent risk of death or serious injury); penalties range up to $1 million for a first violation and $3 million for subsequent violations.
- [AI Compliance Atlas](https://aicomplianceatlas.com/law/new-york-raise-act) — RAISE Act Section 1426 excepts accredited New York colleges and universities conducting academic AI research, and the Empire AI consortium, from the Act&#x27;s frontier-developer duties.
- [Regulations.ai](https://regulations.ai/regulations/RAI-US-NY-A9449S8-2026) — RAISE Act (Chapter 96 of the Laws of 2026) — a &#x27;Large Frontier Developer&#x27; to report a &#x27;safety incident&#x27; involving a frontier model to the NY Attorney General and DHSES within 72 hours of discovery; the Act takes effect 1 Jan 2027.
- [City of New York](https://s3.amazonaws.com/IGG/AI+Part+1+-+Materials/City+of+NY+-+Local+Law+144+of+2021.pdf) — NYC Local Law 144 - Automated Employment Decision Tools — NYC Local Law 144 prohibits employers and employment agencies from using an automated employment decision tool unless an independent bias audit has been conducted and a summary published.
- [AI Compliance Atlas](https://aicomplianceatlas.com/law/new-york-raise-act) — RAISE Act (NY GBL Art. 44-B) frontier AI developer regime — The RAISE Act requires developers of frontier AI models to publish transparency reports and report critical safety incidents within 72 hours; large frontier developers (>=$500M prior-year revenue) owe the heaviest duties. Effective 2027-01-01, not yet in force.
- [New York State Education Department](https://www.nysed.gov/news/2023/state-education-department-issues-determination-biometric-identifying-technology-schools) — NY State Education Department Determination on Biometric Identifying Technology in Schools — bans purchase or use of facial recognition technology by NY elementary and secondary schools: true
- [NYC Department of Consumer and Worker Protection (DCWP)](https://www.nyc.gov/site/dca/businesses/faq-automated-employment-decision-tools.page) — NYC Local Law 144 of 2021 (Automated Employment Decision Tools) — requires employers using AEDTs to obtain an independent bias audit within one year before use and publicly post results: true
- [RecordingLaw.com](https://www.recordinglaw.com/us-laws/ai-laws/nyc-local-law-144/) — New York general automated-decision-making rights — has no general cross-sectoral statutory right comparable to GDPR Art 22; coverage is sectoral (NYC AEDT, NYDFS insurance AI circular): false
- [ChatForest](https://chatforest.com/builders-log/new-york-raise-act-frontier-ai-compliance-builder-guide/) — RAISE Act — Large Frontier Developers (redefined by the 27 March 2026 chapter amendment to a $500 million annual revenue threshold) must transmit quarterly summaries of internal catastrophic-risk assessments to a new NYDFS oversight office and report critical safety incidents within 72 hours; the Act takes effect 1 January 2027.

### Children & Vulnerable Groups5 sub-modulesAmberEnacted in forceModule confidence: Probable&#9662;

Strong, recently-enacted children&#x27;s-data statutes exist and cover consent, age-assurance and profiling-adjacent restrictions; dependent-adult protections remain an identified gap.

Primary framework Child Data Protection Act / SAFE for Kids Act

Supervisory authority [New York State Attorney General](https://ag.ny.gov/)

Traffic-light rationale — Amber Strong, recently-enacted children&#x27;s-data statutes exist and cover consent, age-assurance and profiling-adjacent restrictions; dependent-adult protections remain an identified gap.

#### Sub-modules (5)

#### Age verificationGreen

The SAFE for Kids Act requires providers to implement appropriate measures to determine whether a user is a minor before serving an addictive feed.

Claims (1):

- The SAFE for Kids Act does not apply if the provider used reasonable methods to determine the user is not a minor or obtained parental consent, requiring providers to implement age-assurance measures.

#### Parental consentGreen

Both the CDPA and SAFE for Kids Act condition certain minors&#x27;-data processing/addictive-feed provision on parental consent.

Claims (4):

- The SAFE for Kids Act prohibits social media platforms from providing an addictive feed to children younger than 18 without parental consent and prohibits withholding non-addictive alternatives where consent is not obtained.
- For covered users 12 and younger, the CDPA restricts data processing unless permitted under specific regulations, while informed consent is required for users 13 and older unless necessary for certain activities.
- New York Child Data Protection Act (GBL Article 39-FF) — requires informed consent for minors&#x27; data processing to be separate, free of dark patterns, and as easy to revoke as to grant: true
- NY Child Data Protection Act — processing of personal data of a covered user under 13 except in accordance with COPPA; for a covered user aged 13-17, processing is permitted only where strictly necessary for a listed purpose or where informed consent is obtained.

#### Minor profiling bansAmber

The CDPA restricts digital services from collecting or using personal data of users under 18 without consent and prohibits sale or disclosure of such data, indirectly constraining profiling-adjacent uses.

Claims (5):

- The Child Data Protection Act restricts digital services from collecting or using personal data of users under 18 without consent and prohibits the sale or disclosure of such data.
- New York Child Data Protection Act (GBL Article 39-FF) — restricts processing of covered users&#x27; (minors&#x27;) personal data to COPPA-permitted, strictly necessary, or consented purposes: true
- New York Child Data Protection Act (GBL Article 39-FF) — prohibits targeted advertising, sale or profiling of covered minors&#x27; data without appropriate consent: true
- Stop Addictive Feeds Exploitation (SAFE) for Kids Act (GBL §§1500-1508) — 2027-01-25
- NY Child Data Protection Act — operators to erase or destroy all personal data associated with a covered user within 14 days of obtaining actual knowledge of covered-user status, and to inform third parties who received that data of the status.

#### Education settingsAmber

Education Law 2-d and related student-data-privacy agreements govern data collected in NY school settings, layered atop federal FERPA and COPPA.

Claims (1):

- New York student-data-privacy agreements require providers to treat student data as the LEA&#x27;s property, restrict onward sale, and permit parental review consistent with FERPA and Education Law 2-d.

#### Dependent adultsRed

No dependent-adult-specific (elderly/incapacitated) data-protection provision was identified in New York state law during this research pass.

New York has two dedicated children&#x27;s-data statutes: the Child Data Protection Act (CDPA), restricting collection/use/sale of minors&#x27; (under-18) personal data absent consent, and the SAFE for Kids Act, restricting &#x27;addictive feeds&#x27; for minors absent parental consent (effective January 25, 2027, per current tracking). No dependent-adult-specific data-protection provision was identified.

No periodic updates recorded in this cycle

Sources and claims (10)
- [DataGuidance](https://www.dataguidance.com/opinion/new-york-new-laws-strict-data-requirements-children-) — The SAFE for Kids Act does not apply if the provider used reasonable methods to determine the user is not a minor or obtained parental consent, requiring providers to implement age-assurance measures.
- [DataGuidance](https://www.dataguidance.com/news/new-york-safe-kids-act-signed-law) — The SAFE for Kids Act prohibits social media platforms from providing an addictive feed to children younger than 18 without parental consent and prohibits withholding non-addictive alternatives where consent is not obtained.
- [DataGuidance](https://www.dataguidance.com/news/new-york-bill-establishing-new-york-child-data) — For covered users 12 and younger, the CDPA restricts data processing unless permitted under specific regulations, while informed consent is required for users 13 and older unless necessary for certain activities.
- [DataGuidance](https://www.dataguidance.com/news/new-york-bill-establishing-new-york-child-data) — The Child Data Protection Act restricts digital services from collecting or using personal data of users under 18 without consent and prohibits the sale or disclosure of such data.
- [New York State Senate (Open Legislation)](https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/GBS/A39-F) — New York Child Data Protection Act (GBL Article 39-FF) — restricts processing of covered users&#x27; (minors&#x27;) personal data to COPPA-permitted, strictly necessary, or consented purposes: true
- [Frankfurt Kurnit Klein & Selz](https://technologylaw.fkks.com/post/102kp9u/new-yorks-new-rules-for-processing-minors-data) — New York Child Data Protection Act (GBL Article 39-FF) — requires informed consent for minors&#x27; data processing to be separate, free of dark patterns, and as easy to revoke as to grant: true
- [InfoLawGroup LLP](https://www.infolawgroup.com/insights/2025/8/5/13-going-on-18-is-your-business-ready-for-privacy-laws-impacting-customers-younger-than-18) — New York Child Data Protection Act (GBL Article 39-FF) — prohibits targeted advertising, sale or profiling of covered minors&#x27; data without appropriate consent: true
- [Legal 500](https://www.legal500.com/intelligence/united-states/privacy/new-york-finalizes-rules-for-the-safe-for-kids-act) — Stop Addictive Feeds Exploitation (SAFE) for Kids Act (GBL §§1500-1508) — 2027-01-25
- [AI Compliance Atlas](https://aicomplianceatlas.com/law/new-york-raise-act) — NY Child Data Protection Act — processing of personal data of a covered user under 13 except in accordance with COPPA; for a covered user aged 13-17, processing is permitted only where strictly necessary for a listed purpose or where informed consent is obtained.
- [RiskTemplate](https://risktemplate.com/blog/2026-08-29-nydfs-order-express-cybersecurity-risk-assessment-exempt-entities/) — NY Child Data Protection Act — operators to erase or destroy all personal data associated with a covered user within 14 days of obtaining actual knowledge of covered-user status, and to inform third parties who received that data of the status.

### Enforcement & Redress6 sub-modulesAmberEnacted in forceModule confidence: Probable&#9662;

Enforcement activity is demonstrably active and well-resourced (AG + NYDFS), but the absence of a general private right of action for most NY privacy statutes limits collective redress.

Primary framework SHIELD Act (GBL §899-bb) enforcement provisions

Supervisory authority [New York State Attorney General](https://ag.ny.gov/)

Traffic-light rationale — Amber Enforcement activity is demonstrably active and well-resourced (AG + NYDFS), but the absence of a general private right of action for most NY privacy statutes limits collective redress.

#### Sub-modules (6)

#### Regulator powers and penaltiesAmber

SHIELD Act penalties are capped at $5,000 per violation for security-program failures and $20 per instance of failed breach notification, capped overall at $250,000; the AG may also seek injunctive relief.

Claims (7):

- Companies that fail to comply with SHIELD Act security requirements may face civil penalties of up to $5,000 per violation, while breach-notification failures are penalized at $20 per instance, capped at $250,000.
- Businesses that fall within SHIELD Act scope may face civil penalties of up to $5,000 per violation.
- SHIELD Act — breach-notification failures found knowing or reckless carry a civil penalty of the greater of $5,000 or $20 per failed-notification instance, capped at $250,000; safeguard-requirement violations under §899-bb carry penalties of up to $5,000 per violation with no stated aggregate cap; no private right of action.
- NY SHIELD Act (General Business Law § 899-aa) — 250000
- General Business Law § 350-d — 5000
- General Business Law § 349 — authorizes the NY Attorney General to investigate and enjoin unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices, including via subpoena: true
- NYC Local Law 144 of 2021 (Automated Employment Decision Tools) — imposes civil penalties of $500 for a first violation and $1,500 per day for continuing violations: true

#### Enforcement activity indexGreen

In its most recent reported year, the NY AG resolved allegations against 12 companies (litigating against two), securing over $14 million in penalties; NYDFS separately fined Delta Dental $2.25 million for cybersecurity violations.

Claims (5):

- The New York Attorney General resolved allegations of privacy and cybersecurity breaches by settling with 12 companies, initiating litigation against two, and imposing financial penalties exceeding $14 million.
- NYDFS fined Delta Dental $2.25 million for cybersecurity violations due to insufficient incident-response and reporting policies.
- New York Attorney General — $2.7 million (of which $2.1 million is a penalty to New York) from Boston Children&#x27;s Health Physicians and IT vendor XTIUM over an August 2024 data breach affecting approximately 825,000 New York residents.
- Labcorp/AMCA breach multistate settlement — $2,287,455 to participating states including $89,178 to New York, plus data-security and third-party debt-collector data-sharing overhaul; breach exposed over 27.5 million people nationwide including 420,000 New Yorkers
- General Business Law § 349 — 2600000

#### Regulator funding and capacityAmber

No specific budget/headcount disclosure for the AG&#x27;s Bureau of Internet & Technology or NYDFS&#x27;s cybersecurity division was identified in this research pass.

#### Collective redress and class actionsAmber

Wiretap/eavesdropping-based class actions against tracking and AI-transcription technologies are an emergent collective-redress vector in New York, alongside the NYC biometric law&#x27;s private right of action.

Claims (2):

- New York&#x27;s decades-old anti-wiretapping/eavesdropping statutes have found new significance in privacy class-action litigation against automated tracking and transcription technologies, mirroring similar theories under the federal Electronic Communications Privacy Act.
- The New York City biometric law creates a private right of action enabling aggrieved parties to collect statutory damages ranging from $500 to $5,000 per violation.

#### Private right of actionAmber

The SHIELD Act expressly provides no private right of action; enforcement is AG-exclusive. By contrast, the NYC biometric ordinance does confer a private right of action with statutory damages.

Claims (3):

- The SHIELD Act expressly provides that there is no private right of action; the Attorney General may pursue civil penalties for violations.
- General Business Law §§ 349, 350, 350-e — 1000
- NYC Biometric Identifier Information Law (NYC Admin. Code §§22-1201-1205) — provides a private right of action with statutory damages of $500-$5,000 per violation: true

#### Recent developments 180dAmber

Within the last 180 days, New York has advanced a data-broker registration bill (SB 9088, Jan 30 2026), the Synthetic Performer Disclosure Act, the Stealth Crawler Prohibition Act, an AI-companion-features-for-minors bill (SB 9051B), a generative-AI-notice bill (SB 934A), a chatbot-impersonation-liability bill (SB 7263), the Health Information Privacy Act (SB 9269), NYDFS guidance on threat-surface reduction, a $2.25M NYDFS fine against Delta Dental, and a 42-state-AG settlement with 23andMe&#x27;s bankruptcy trustee over its 2023 breach.

Claims (4):

- A coalition of 42 attorneys general reached a settlement with 23andMe&#x27;s bankruptcy trustee over a 2023 data breach affecting 6.9 million customers.
- NYDFS issued cybersecurity guidance focusing on reducing attack surfaces, improving threat detection, and strengthening resilience during heightened threat environments.
- 17 state attorneys general sued the federal administration over student data demands, citing privacy risks and legal uncertainties, and a judge temporarily blocked the data collection.
- New York Office of the Attorney General — On 24 Sept 2026, NY Attorney General Letitia James joined a 44-state-AG coalition securing approximately $2.3 million and reforms from Laboratory Corporation of America (Labcorp) over a 2019 data breach affecting over 27.5 million people nationwide.

The NY AG has robust civil-penalty and injunctive powers under the SHIELD Act ($5,000 per security violation; $20 per failed-notification instance capped at $250,000) but SHIELD expressly excludes a private right of action. The AG&#x27;s Bureau of Internet & Technology has sustained an active enforcement cadence, and NYDFS separately fines regulated financial entities for cybersecurity lapses. Private rights of action exist narrowly (NYC biometric law) and via repurposed wiretap statutes in class litigation; a formal comprehensive collective-redress mechanism for general consumer privacy does not exist state-wide.

Periodic update · new data 2026-11-04 Enforcement activity in the period centred on the Department of Financial Services&#x27; continued pursuit of cybersecurity-program deficiencies under 23 NYCRR Part 500, most visibly the consent order understood to have been signed on 5 August 2026 against a limited-exemption money transmitter, carrying a $250,000 penalty for an inadequate risk assessment. As with the sectoral discussion above, this is reported rather than independently verified in full, so it is presented as understood rather than confirmed in every detail. Taken together with the Department&#x27;s pattern of enforcement under Part 500 more broadly, this continues a steady cadence of cybersecurity-program actions rather than a single notable escalation.

Looking beyond the present enforcement posture, the RAISE Act&#x27;s critical-incident reporting duty introduces a wholly new enforcement track that will sit alongside existing Part 500 enforcement once the Act takes effect on 1 January 2027. That track carries its own penalty scale — up to $1 million for a first violation and $3 million for subsequent violations — and vests enforcement authority in the Attorney General, distinct from the Department of Financial Services&#x27; oversight-office evaluation role. This bifurcation, evaluator in one agency and enforcer in another, is a structural feature of the new regime that will shape how frontier-AI enforcement develops once the statute becomes operative.

#### Outlook

The enforcement landscape through the remainder of the period is likely to continue along two separate tracks: steady, incremental Part 500 cybersecurity actions in the near term, and the build-up toward a distinct Attorney-General-led enforcement track for frontier-AI incident reporting once the RAISE Act&#x27;s 2027 effective date arrives. Businesses and developers operating across both regimes will need to track penalty exposure and reporting triggers that differ materially between the two tracks, given the split in enforcing authority and the difference in applicable thresholds.

2 earlier distinct updates Periodic update · new data 2026-10-25 New York&#x27;s Attorney General, acting jointly with Connecticut, secured a $2.7 million settlement from Boston Children&#x27;s Health Physicians and its IT vendor XTIUM, dated 16 October 2026, over an August 2024 data breach affecting approximately 825,000 New York residents. Of the total settlement, $2.1 million is a penalty payable to New York. The joint investigation found that the controller had failed to implement common information-security policies and procedures, a finding that frames the enforcement action as a baseline-security-adequacy case rather than one turning on a novel legal theory.

This settlement continues an active enforcement pattern that has run for roughly twelve months, with the Attorney General having pursued other healthcare-adjacent entities and IT vendors over comparable security failures within that period. The consistent thread across this pattern is the use of the SHIELD Act&#x27;s security-safeguards requirement, enforceable exclusively by the Attorney General under General Business Law section 349 as a deceptive-acts-and-practices matter, against controllers and vendors whose security programs did not meet the reasonable-safeguards standard. There is no private right of action under the SHIELD Act and no dedicated state data-protection authority; enforcement runs solely through the Attorney General&#x27;s office.

#### Outlook

Given the sustained twelve-month cadence of healthcare-and-vendor security enforcement actions, further settlements of similar shape should be expected from the New York Attorney General&#x27;s office. The joint multistate structure of this action, run with Connecticut, is also a pattern worth watching: coordinated multistate investigations allow the Attorney General to pursue larger penalties and broader findings than a New York-only action might yield, and this coordination has now recurred across the current enforcement cycle.

Periodic update · new data 2026-10-18 New York&#x27;s most recent enforcement signal within the roughly 180-day lookback window relevant to this cycle is the multistate settlement arising from the Labcorp/AMCA breach. The settlement, led in part by New York Attorney General James, required payment of $2,287,455 across participating states, of which $89,178 was allocated to New York. The breach that gave rise to the settlement exposed data belonging to more than 27.5 million people nationwide, including approximately 420,000 New York residents. Beyond the monetary payment, the settlement required a data-security and third-party debt-collector data-sharing overhaul, directly addressing the mechanism by which the breach is understood to have occurred and spread.

This settlement sits alongside a separate, earlier enforcement precedent on New York&#x27;s standing record: the NYDFS consent order against Delta Dental, which resulted in a $2.25 million settlement on April 30, 2026 for violations of the state&#x27;s cybersecurity regulation tied to a 2023 MOVEit breach, including findings of inadequate secure-disposal practices, absence of a written incident-response policy, and a breach-reporting delay running well beyond the regulation&#x27;s 72-hour notification window. While the Delta Dental matter predates the current lookback window, it remains structurally significant as the clearest recent illustration of New York&#x27;s financial-sector cybersecurity enforcement posture, distinct from the consumer-health-data enforcement reflected in the Labcorp/AMCA settlement.

Taken together, these two enforcement actions illustrate that New York&#x27;s redress mechanisms operate across at least two separate regulatory channels: the Attorney General&#x27;s consumer-protection and data-breach enforcement authority, exercised here through a multistate coordinated settlement, and NYDFS&#x27;s sector-specific cybersecurity enforcement authority under Part 500, exercised through its own consent-order process. Neither channel currently operates under the state&#x27;s pending general consumer-health-privacy statute, the New York Health Information Privacy Act, which remains before the Governor and has not been enacted.

#### Outlook

Whether the Labcorp/AMCA settlement&#x27;s required data-security and data-sharing overhaul is implemented on the schedule the settlement specifies is the near-term marker to track. More broadly, continued Attorney General enforcement activity involving health-adjacent consumer data, and continued NYDFS cybersecurity enforcement under Part 500, both remain active channels independent of whether the pending Health Information Privacy Act is eventually signed, vetoed, or chapter-amended.

Sources and claims (21)
- [IAPP](https://iapp.org/news/a/new-yorks-shield-act-has-taken-effect-what-does-this-mean-for-your-business) — Companies that fail to comply with SHIELD Act security requirements may face civil penalties of up to $5,000 per violation, while breach-notification failures are penalized at $20 per instance, capped at $250,000.
- [IAPP](https://iapp.org/news/a/a-year-in-review-privacy-data-security-enforcement-by-new-yorks-state-attorney-general) — The New York Attorney General resolved allegations of privacy and cybersecurity breaches by settling with 12 companies, initiating litigation against two, and imposing financial penalties exceeding $14 million.
- [DataGuidance](https://www.dataguidance.com/jurisdictions/new-york) — NYDFS fined Delta Dental $2.25 million for cybersecurity violations due to insufficient incident-response and reporting policies.
- [IAPP](https://iapp.org/news/a/new-yorks-shield-act-has-taken-effect-what-does-this-mean-for-your-business) — The SHIELD Act expressly provides that there is no private right of action; the Attorney General may pursue civil penalties for violations.
- [DataGuidance](https://www.dataguidance.com/jurisdictions/new-york) — A coalition of 42 attorneys general reached a settlement with 23andMe&#x27;s bankruptcy trustee over a 2023 data breach affecting 6.9 million customers.
- [DataGuidance](https://www.dataguidance.com/jurisdictions/new-york) — NYDFS issued cybersecurity guidance focusing on reducing attack surfaces, improving threat detection, and strengthening resilience during heightened threat environments.
- [DataGuidance](https://www.dataguidance.com/jurisdictions/new-york) — 17 state attorneys general sued the federal administration over student data demands, citing privacy risks and legal uncertainties, and a judge temporarily blocked the data collection.
- [Digwatch](https://dig.watch/updates/new-york-connecticut-settle-breach-case) — New York Attorney General — $2.7 million (of which $2.1 million is a penalty to New York) from Boston Children&#x27;s Health Physicians and IT vendor XTIUM over an August 2024 data breach affecting approximately 825,000 New York residents.
- [NY Attorney General](https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2026/attorney-general-james-secures-23-million-and-reforms-protect-consumers-after) — Labcorp/AMCA breach multistate settlement — $2,287,455 to participating states including $89,178 to New York, plus data-security and third-party debt-collector data-sharing overhaul; breach exposed over 27.5 million people nationwide including 420,000 New Yorkers
- [NY Office of the Attorney General](https://ag.ny.gov/) — Businesses that fall within SHIELD Act scope may face civil penalties of up to $5,000 per violation.
- [NY Attorney General](https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2026/attorney-general-james-secures-23-million-and-reforms-protect-consumers-after) — SHIELD Act — breach-notification failures found knowing or reckless carry a civil penalty of the greater of $5,000 or $20 per failed-notification instance, capped at $250,000; safeguard-requirement violations under §899-bb carry penalties of up to $5,000 per violation with no stated aggregate cap; no private right of action.
- [New York State Senate (NYS Open Legislation)](https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/GBS/899-AA) — NY SHIELD Act §899-aa breach notification deadline — A business must disclose a breach to affected NY residents in the most expedient time possible and without unreasonable delay, no later than 30 days after discovery.
- [New York State Office of Information Technology Services](https://its.ny.gov/breach-notification-and-incident-reporting) — NY SHIELD Act §899-aa(8) regulator notification duty — In addition to notifying affected residents, a business experiencing a reportable breach must notify the NYS Attorney General, Division of State Police, and Department of State&#x27;s Division of Consumer Protection.
- [Office of the New York State Attorney General](https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2022/attorney-general-james-secures-26-million-online-travel-agency-deceptive) — General Business Law § 349 — 2600000
- [New York State Senate (NYS Open Legislation)](https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/GBS/899-AA) — NY SHIELD Act (General Business Law § 899-aa) — 250000
- [NY Public Law (Fastcase)](https://newyork.public.law/laws/n.y._general_business_law_section_350-d) — General Business Law § 350-d — 5000
- [FindLaw](https://codes.findlaw.com/ny/general-business-law/gbs-sect-349/) — General Business Law § 349 — authorizes the NY Attorney General to investigate and enjoin unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices, including via subpoena: true
- [US Legal Forms](https://businesslaw.uslegal.com/deceptive-trade-practices-laws/new-york-deceptive-trade-practices-laws/) — General Business Law §§ 349, 350, 350-e — 1000
- [Holland & Knight](https://www.hklaw.com/en/insights/publications/2021/08/nyc-passes-biometric-data-protection-laws-aimed-at-businesses) — NYC Biometric Identifier Information Law (NYC Admin. Code §§22-1201-1205) — provides a private right of action with statutory damages of $500-$5,000 per violation: true
- [Warden AI](https://www.warden-ai.com/resources/hr-tech-compliance-nyc-local-law-144) — NYC Local Law 144 of 2021 (Automated Employment Decision Tools) — imposes civil penalties of $500 for a first violation and $1,500 per day for continuing violations: true
- [https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2026/attorney-general-james-secures-23-million-and-reforms-protect-consumers-after](https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2026/attorney-general-james-secures-23-million-and-reforms-protect-consumers-after) — New York Office of the Attorney General — On 24 Sept 2026, NY Attorney General Letitia James joined a 44-state-AG coalition securing approximately $2.3 million and reforms from Laboratory Corporation of America (Labcorp) over a 2019 data breach affecting over 27.5 million people nationwide.

## GDPR article map

Cross-reference: which category/sub-module covers each UK GDPR article (38 mapped).

Show article map GDPR article to category mapping Article Category Sub-module

Art. 5 [Controller/Processor Duties](#sec-cat-controller-processor-duties) accountability and dpia

Art. 6 [Lawful Processing & Special Data](#sec-cat-lawful-processing-and-special-data) lawful bases

Art. 7 [Lawful Processing & Special Data](#sec-cat-lawful-processing-and-special-data) consent thresholds

Art. 9 [Lawful Processing & Special Data](#sec-cat-lawful-processing-and-special-data) special categories

Art. 13 [Data Subject Rights](#sec-cat-data-subject-rights) access right

Art. 14 [Data Subject Rights](#sec-cat-data-subject-rights) access right

Art. 15 [Data Subject Rights](#sec-cat-data-subject-rights) access right

Art. 16 [Data Subject Rights](#sec-cat-data-subject-rights) rectification and erasure

Art. 17 [Data Subject Rights](#sec-cat-data-subject-rights) rectification and erasure

Art. 18 [Data Subject Rights](#sec-cat-data-subject-rights) restriction and objection

Art. 19 [Data Subject Rights](#sec-cat-data-subject-rights) rectification and erasure

Art. 20 [Data Subject Rights](#sec-cat-data-subject-rights) data portability

Art. 21 [Data Subject Rights](#sec-cat-data-subject-rights) restriction and objection

Art. 22 [Algorithmic, Biometric & Surveillance Governance](#sec-cat-algorithmic-biometric-and-surveillance-governance) automated decision making transparency

Art. 25 [Controller/Processor Duties](#sec-cat-controller-processor-duties) accountability and dpia

Art. 28 [Controller/Processor Duties](#sec-cat-controller-processor-duties) joint controller arrangements

Art. 30 [Controller/Processor Duties](#sec-cat-controller-processor-duties) ropa requirements

Art. 32 [Controller/Processor Duties](#sec-cat-controller-processor-duties) security measures

Art. 33 [Controller/Processor Duties](#sec-cat-controller-processor-duties) breach notification

Art. 34 [Controller/Processor Duties](#sec-cat-controller-processor-duties) breach notification

Art. 35 [Controller/Processor Duties](#sec-cat-controller-processor-duties) accountability and dpia

Art. 37 [Controller/Processor Duties](#sec-cat-controller-processor-duties) dpo requirements

Art. 38 [Controller/Processor Duties](#sec-cat-controller-processor-duties) dpo requirements

Art. 39 [Controller/Processor Duties](#sec-cat-controller-processor-duties) dpo requirements

Art. 44 [Cross-Border & Adequacy](#sec-cat-cross-border-and-adequacy) transfer mechanisms

Art. 45 [Cross-Border & Adequacy](#sec-cat-cross-border-and-adequacy) adequacy received

Art. 46 [Cross-Border & Adequacy](#sec-cat-cross-border-and-adequacy) sccs and bcrs

Art. 47 [Cross-Border & Adequacy](#sec-cat-cross-border-and-adequacy) sccs and bcrs

Art. 48 [Cross-Border & Adequacy](#sec-cat-cross-border-and-adequacy) transfer mechanisms

Art. 49 [Cross-Border & Adequacy](#sec-cat-cross-border-and-adequacy) transfer mechanisms

Art. 77 [Enforcement & Redress](#sec-cat-enforcement-and-redress) regulator powers and penalties

Art. 78 [Enforcement & Redress](#sec-cat-enforcement-and-redress) private right of action

Art. 79 [Enforcement & Redress](#sec-cat-enforcement-and-redress) private right of action

Art. 80 [Enforcement & Redress](#sec-cat-enforcement-and-redress) collective redress and class actions

Art. 81 [Enforcement & Redress](#sec-cat-enforcement-and-redress) regulator powers and penalties

Art. 82 [Enforcement & Redress](#sec-cat-enforcement-and-redress) regulator powers and penalties

Art. 83 [Enforcement & Redress](#sec-cat-enforcement-and-redress) private right of action

Art. 84 [Enforcement & Redress](#sec-cat-enforcement-and-redress) regulator powers and penalties
