Data Protection Monitor
Global Privacy & Data Protection Intelligence

Not every instrument is backed by its official text yet. At least one law or rulebook covered here has no official source (tier 1) retrieved for it yet. No finding on this page is shown with confidence above “Probable” until stronger sources are retrieved.

Algeria Data Protection & Privacy Regulation

DZ schema gdpri-v2 trajectory: not yet assessed regulated (omnibus) overlaps: Sentinel (AML/CFT), World Payments

Last updated · 10 categories · 94 claims · 42 sources in the cumulative register

Algeria's data-protection framework moved materially this cycle with Law No.

Data collected Data published

AI-assembled from cited sources

Not covered: AdTech & Commercial Privacy, Algorithmic, Biometric & Surveillance Governance, Children & Vulnerable Groups. Not fully checked this cycle: Regulator & Framework (1 open gap).

Framework & posture10 of 10 modules active
10 active · 9 binding instruments
Next milestoneNo upcoming dated milestone on record
Record & confidence mix93 claims · 32 sources · machine-compiled
45 Probable7 Indicative41 Contested / unverified
Evidence re-verified: ·Position last changed: ·
Record history & provenance ▾

Methodology & record provenance: Module confidence is derived from the underlying claims (source tier and primary excerpt retention), while statutory legal force is tracked independently.

Review status: AI-synthesised · Tier-1/2 verified · As-of date: 2026-11-17

Jurisdiction brief

Latest update · 4 November 2026

Lead Signal

Algeria's data protection regime is showing a pattern of operational tightening through a series of sector-specific decisions issued by the national data-protection authority, the ANPDP, across the first part of 2026, even as the core statutory framework remains the one established by Law No. 18-07 as amended by Law No. 25-11 of 24 July 2025. The ANPDP holds powers including warnings, formal notices, withdrawal of processing authorisations, administrative fines and data-modification or destruction orders, and recent deliberations show the authority applying that toolkit to a widening set of everyday processing contexts rather than amending the statute itself. Taken together, these decisions point to an authority moving from a largely dormant statutory presence toward active sector-level rule-making, even though a visible enforcement record against named controllers is still reported as thin.

Key regulatory facts for Algeria
Key regulatory facts for Algeria
Regulatory DimensionAlgeria Standing Position
JurisdictionAlgeria (DZ)
Regulatory ScopeData Protection & Privacy Regulation (10 modules, 94 sourced findings)
Regulator & FrameworkComprehensive omnibus statute exists and regulator is nominally operational, but recency/detail of implementing texts (2025 amendment) and ANPDP's practical enforcement posture could not be fully corroborated from primary sources in this run.
Lawful Processing & Special DataNo sentence-level primary or secondary source content was retrieved describing the specific lawful-basis enumeration, consent threshold, or special-category list; findings rely on regional-pattern inference only.
Data Subject RightsNo sentence-level source content was retrieved on DZ's specific subject-rights catalogue, deadlines, or portability provision; module populated with inference-based, low-confidence claims and explicit gaps only.
Controller/Processor DutiesRegulator activity (guidance-issuing) is corroborated; underlying granular statutory obligations (DPIA/DPO/ROPA/breach-notification specifics) are not verified.
Primary Instruments CitedAlgeria Official Instrument (cookieyes.com algeria-data-protection-law), CMS Law, DataGuidance (OneTrust), DataGuidance (OneTrust), DataGuidance (OneTrust)
Last Confirmed / Updated (42 sources in cumulative register)

#

Comprehensive omnibus statute exists and regulator is nominally operational, but recency/detail of implementing texts (2025 amendment) and ANPDP's practical enforcement posture could not be fully corroborated from primary sources in this run.

Primary frameworkLaw No. 18-07 of 10 June 2018 on the Protection of Individuals in the Processing of Personal Data (as amended, 2025)
Supervisory authorityAutorité Nationale de Protection des Données à Caractère Personnel (ANPDP)
Traffic-light rationale — AmberComprehensive omnibus statute exists and regulator is nominally operational, but recency/detail of implementing texts (2025 amendment) and ANPDP's practical enforcement posture could not be fully corroborated from primary sources in this run.

Sub-modules (5)

Regulator and authorityAmber

ANPDP is named in secondary reporting as the body issuing compliance reminders and recommendations to controllers, indicating an operational (not merely nominal) regulator.

Claims (10):

  • ANPDP (Autorité Nationale de Protection des Données à Caractère Personnel) is the designated national data-protection supervisory authority for Algeria and has issued compliance reminders and recommendations to controllers.
  • Law No. 18-07 (2018), as amended by Law No. 25-11, establishes the ANPDP with enforcement powers including fines and authorisation withdrawal.
  • ANPDP — Enforcing Algeria's data-protection law since August 2023, as an independent administrative authority headquartered in Algiers
  • Any processing of personal data requires a prior declaration to, or authorisation from, ANPDP (established by Law 18-07, operational since August 2023).
  • Law 18-07 as amended by Law 25-11 establishes ANPDP with powers of warnings, formal notices, authorisation withdrawal, fines, data-modification/destruction orders
  • Autorité Nationale de Protection des Données à Caractère Personnel (ANPDP) — Established under Law No. 18-07, operational since August 2022, with publicly published decisions.
  • ANPDP, established under Law 18-07, fully operational since August 2023
  • Law 25-11 establishes regional ANPDP poles with audit and guidance powers across all wilayas.
  • Law No. 18-07, as amended by Law No. 25-11 of 24 July 2025 — ANPDP is equipped with regional poles (pôles régionaux) responsible for control and audit of institutions and persons processing personal data (Art. 27 bis); implementing regulations on operation of the poles remained pending as of mid-2026.
  • Presidential Decree No. 26-07 of 7 January 2026 — Dedicated cybersecurity units within public institutions with a preventive/repressive mandate covering corruption, terrorism, state-security attacks, money laundering/terrorism financing, smuggling, fraudulent data/tech use, and discrimination/hate speech.

Act and instrumentsAmber

Law 18-07 (2018) is the founding instrument; a modifying law was published in the Official Gazette in 2025.

Claims (7):

  • Law No. 18-07 of 10 June 2018 on the Protection of Individuals in the Processing of Personal Data was published in Algeria's Official Gazette and constitutes the founding comprehensive data-protection statute.
  • A law modifying the 2018 Data Protection Law was published in Algeria's Official Gazette in 2025, indicating an active legislative refinement of the regime.
  • Law No. 25-11 (2025) — Law 18-07, introducing mandatory DPOs, 5-day breach notification and DPIA obligations.
  • Law No. 18-07 — Law No. 25-11 of 24 July 2025, described as modernising Algeria's data-protection framework toward GDPR-style accountability, risk-based and governance requirements
  • Law No. 25-11 — Enacted 24 July 2025, amends Law No. 18-07, introducing mandatory DPO appointment, processing records, DPIAs for high-risk processing, 5-day breach-notification deadline, expanded ANPDP powers and Article 27 bis regional audit/advisory poles.
  • Law No. 25-11 of July 2025 — Introduces biometric data, profiling, pseudonymisation and personal-data-breach concepts; strengthens controller obligations (processing register, automated audit log)
  • Law No. 25-11 of 24 July 2025 — Law No. 18-07, introducing DPO appointment, DPIA, 5-day breach notification, regional oversight poles

Material scopeAmber

The law is understood to cover automated and structured manual processing of personal data by public and private controllers established in Algeria, following the general Francophone-civil-law model; granular scope wording could not be independently retrieved.

Claims (2):

  • Law 18-07 is understood to apply to automated and organised manual processing of personal data carried out by public and private-sector controllers within Algeria, consistent with the general Francophone civil-law data-protection model.
  • Law No. 18-07 of 10 June 2018 — Processing for law-enforcement purposes (prevention, investigation, prosecution of criminal offences) is exempt from consent and may restrict data-subject rights.

Territorial scopeRed

No confirmed evidence of an explicit extraterritorial/non-established-controller trigger comparable to GDPR Art 3(2) was retrieved for Law 18-07.

Claims (1):

  • Law No. 18-07 — Extraterritorial reach — international companies collecting data from Algerian users are subject to the law even without physical presence in Algeria

Regulator registration and filingAmber

Francophone-model DP statutes of this era typically require prior declaration/authorisation filings with the national authority for certain processing categories; ANPDP's specific filing/registration procedures under 18-07 could not be verified from primary sources in this run.

Claims (3):

  • Algeria's regime is understood to require prior declaration or authorisation from ANPDP for certain categories of processing, following the regional CNIL-style prior-formality model, though the precise thresholds under 18-07 were not independently confirmed in this run.
  • ANPDP national register — Article 28 of Law 18-07 establishes a national data-protection register recording declared processing files and issued authorisations.
  • ANPDP authorisation track — Controllers must obtain the ANPDP's written approval for high-risk/cross-border processing before the processing activity begins.
Category narrative 149 words

Algeria's comprehensive data-protection regime rests on Law No. 18-07 of 10 June 2018 on the Protection of Individuals in the Processing of Personal Data, which created the Autorité Nationale de Protection des Données à Caractère Personnel (ANPDP) as supervisory authority. The law was published in 2018 but its practical entry into force (and ANPDP's operationalisation) was delayed for several years, with sources confirming the law was still pending full effect as of early 2023 and reported as having entered into force in August 2023. A modifying law was published in the Official Gazette in 2025, indicating the regime is still being actively refined. Because primary JORADP full-text and the ANPDP's own confirmed institutional URL could not be independently retrieved in this run (secondary commentary sources were access-restricted at point of research), several structural details rely on established general knowledge of the statute rather than a freshly retrieved primary-source quotation.

Periodic update · new data 2026-11-04

Algeria's data protection regime rests on Law No. 18-07 of 2018, as amended by Law No. 25-11 of 24 July 2025, which establishes the ANPDP as the national data-protection authority. The ANPDP's powers extend to issuing warnings and formal notices, withdrawing processing authorisations, imposing administrative fines, and ordering the modification or destruction of data held in violation of the law. The authority also maintains a national register, provided for under Article 28 of Law 18-07, recording declared processing files and the authorisations it issues. The precise year the ANPDP became operational is reported inconsistently across available sources, and whether the regional audit poles introduced by Law 25-11 are yet operationally active, as opposed to awaiting implementing regulation, has not been confirmed against a primary ANPDP source as at this brief.

Outlook

The framework itself is statutorily settled following the 2025 amendment; the open question for this dimension is institutional rather than legislative, namely whether the expanded regional-pole structure for ANPDP oversight has moved from statute into practical operation.

4 earlier distinct updates
Periodic update · new data 2026-11-03

Algeria's data protection authority, the ANPDP, has had its institutional toolkit materially strengthened under Law No. 25-11, which amends the foundational Law No. 18-07. The authority is understood to now hold powers extending to warnings, formal notices, withdrawal of processing authorisation, fines, and orders to modify or destroy data. Law No. 25-11 is also reported to create regional ANPDP poles intended to audit and guide businesses across the country's wilayas, a structural change in how oversight capacity is distributed outside the capital. Whether these regional poles are already operating or remain at an implementation stage has not been confirmed against a primary ANPDP source as at this writing, and that distinction matters for how quickly the expanded institutional reach translates into actual audit activity on the ground.

Outlook

The near-term signal to watch is whether the regional poles move from statutory creation to operational audit activity through the remainder of 2026. Their rollout, if it proceeds as described, would represent a genuine expansion of oversight capacity reaching businesses outside Algiers, rather than a mere paper reorganisation.

Periodic update · new data 2026-10-25

Algeria's data-protection regulator, the ANPDP, was established under Law No. 18-07 and is understood to have become fully operational in August 2023, a gap of several years between the original law's adoption in 2018 and the authority's practical commencement of activity. That institutional baseline was substantially overlaid in July 2025 when Law No. 25-11 modernised the statutory framework, introducing concepts that had not been clearly present in the original 2018 text: biometric data as a defined category, profiling, pseudonymisation and a personal-data-breach concept, alongside strengthened controller obligations including a processing register and an automated audit log. This modernisation brought Algeria's statutory vocabulary substantially closer to the internationally familiar data-protection terminology seen in comparable regimes, while remaining a distinct domestic framework with its own institutional architecture and enforcement mechanics.

Since that 2025 modernisation, the ANPDP's visible activity in 2026 has taken the form of specific sector-focused decisions rather than further primary legislative amendment. At least three named decisions were issued across the first half of 2026 addressing recruitment-related health data, video surveillance and biometric workplace-attendance monitoring respectively, each applying the general concepts introduced by Law No. 25-11 to a concrete, recurring processing scenario. This pattern, developing the regime through authority-level deliberation and decision rather than through further statutory amendment, is a meaningful signal about how the ANPDP intends to operate going forward: as an active interpretive and decision-issuing body applying a relatively young statutory framework to the practical processing situations Algerian organisations actually encounter, rather than one awaiting further legislative instruction before acting on specific contexts.

A further institutional development concerns the ANPDP's own internal structure: Law No. 25-11 is understood to have created, under an article numbered 27 bis, a mechanism for regional audit poles intended to extend the authority's supervisory reach beyond its central administration toward regulated businesses located outside the capital. Implementing regulations giving practical effect to this regional-poles mechanism had not been located as, meaning the mechanism exists as a statutory creation without a confirmed operational implementation framework. This is a meaningful gap in the framework's practical reach precisely because regional presence would determine how effectively the ANPDP can actually audit and supervise businesses outside its existing central capacity, a capacity constraint that is common among newly established data-protection authorities more broadly but is nonetheless one specific gap in Algeria's regime as it currently stands.

The overall picture for Algeria's regulatory framework at this point is one of a statutorily modern but institutionally still-developing regime: the vocabulary and the formal powers available to the ANPDP, including the decision-issuing function demonstrated through the three 2026 decisions discussed elsewhere in this brief, are comparable in structure to more established data-protection regimes, but the authority's practical reach, particularly outside the capital pending the regional audit poles' implementation, and its track record of sustained enforcement activity, remain areas where the framework's maturity is still being established rather than already demonstrated.

No primary-source text from the ANPDP's own website or from Algeria's official gazette was directly retrieved in support of these findings; the regulator-and-framework picture presented here rests on secondary compliance commentary describing the ANPDP's operational status, Law No. 25-11's content, and the named 2026 decisions, and that reliance on secondary sourcing should be read as a limit on the precision of specific statutory citations rather than as doubt about the underlying direction of the findings, which are corroborated across multiple independent secondary accounts.

Outlook

The principal institutional development to track is whether implementing regulations for the ANPDP's regional audit poles under article 27 bis are published, plausibly around the final quarter of 2026 on current indications, which would materially extend the authority's practical supervisory reach beyond its central administration. Separately, whether the ANPDP continues to issue sector-specific decisions of the kind seen in the first half of 2026, addressing further processing contexts such as direct marketing, automated decision-making, or additional employment-related scenarios, would confirm that decision-based consolidation, rather than further primary legislative amendment, remains the regime's primary near-term mode of development.

Periodic update · new data 2026-10-18

The Autorité Nationale de Protection des Données à Caractère Personnel (ANPDP) is Algeria's data-protection supervisory authority, established under Law No. 18-07 and operational since August 2022, with its decisions publicly published. Law No. 25-11, enacted on 24 July 2025, substantially amends Law No. 18-07 and introduces mandatory DPO appointment, mandatory processing records, Data Protection Impact Assessments for high-risk processing, a five-day breach-notification deadline, expanded ANPDP powers, and Article 27 bis, which establishes regional audit and advisory poles. The law amends and modernises the original 2018 framework rather than replacing it, retaining Law 18-07 as the base statute while layering a materially more GDPR-aligned accountability structure onto it.

The amendment is described as marking a material tightening of Algeria's regime toward GDPR-style accountability, bringing in DPO, processing-records, DPIA and breach-notification obligations that did not previously exist in Algerian law in this form. The underlying primary legal text of Law No. 25-11 has not itself been retrieved from an official Algerian government or ANPDP source; the claims set out here rest on secondary commentary describing the amendment's content and effect.

Outlook

The framework is already in force on its core accountability provisions. The remaining open question is procedural rather than substantive: how Article 27 bis's regional audit and advisory poles will be implemented, which depends on implementing regulations expected through the remainder of 2026.

Periodic update · new data 2026-09-28

Algeria's data protection framework is anchored in Law No. 18-07, with the National Data Protection Authority, ANPDP, operational and understood to be responsible for enforcing the law, advising individuals and entities, receiving declarations and authorising processing, handling complaints and imposing administrative sanctions. This cycle's material development is Law No. 25-11 of 2025, which is understood to reinforce Law 18-07 by introducing mandatory data protection officers, a five-day breach notification requirement and data protection impact assessment obligations, a meaningful strengthening of the accountability architecture controllers must maintain.

This reinforcement suggests ANPDP is moving from an institution primarily focused on registration and authorisation toward one exercising a broader accountability-oversight mandate, consistent with the sectoral deliberations and active enforcement inspections observed elsewhere this cycle. The precise operative detail of Law 25-11's provisions rests on academic secondary reporting rather than a directly retrieved statutory text, a gap noted in the underlying research.

Outlook

The framework's trajectory is toward increased institutional activity and codified accountability obligations. The open question for future cycles is whether ANPDP's expanded mandate under Law 25-11 will be matched by published guidance or enforcement decisions that make the DPO, breach-notification and DPIA obligations operationally concrete for controllers.

1 further periodic run re-emitted the standing brief unchanged and is not shown.

Sources and claims (23)
  1. Probable DataGuidance (OneTrust) — ANPDP (Autorité Nationale de Protection des Données à Caractère Personnel) is the designated national data-protection supervisory authority for Algeria and has issued compliance reminders and recommendations to controllers. observed
  2. Probable DataGuidance (OneTrust) — Law No. 18-07 of 10 June 2018 on the Protection of Individuals in the Processing of Personal Data was published in Algeria's Official Gazette and constitutes the founding comprehensive data-protection statute. observed
  3. Uncertain DataGuidance (OneTrust) — A law modifying the 2018 Data Protection Law was published in Algeria's Official Gazette in 2025, indicating an active legislative refinement of the regime. observed
  4. Speculative Internal (no external corroboration retrieved for this specific claim) — Law 18-07 is understood to apply to automated and organised manual processing of personal data carried out by public and private-sector controllers within Algeria, consistent with the general Francophone civil-law data-protection model. observed
  5. Speculative Internal (no external corroboration retrieved for this specific claim) — Algeria's regime is understood to require prior declaration or authorisation from ANPDP for certain categories of processing, following the regional CNIL-style prior-formality model, though the precise thresholds under 18-07 were not independently confirmed in this run. observed
  6. Probable algeriatech.news — Law No. 18-07 (2018), as amended by Law No. 25-11, establishes the ANPDP with enforcement powers including fines and authorisation withdrawal. observed
  7. Uncertain LawLab Africa — ANPDP national register — Article 28 of Law 18-07 establishes a national data-protection register recording declared processing files and issued authorisations. observed
  8. Probable algeriatech.news — Law No. 25-11 (2025) — Law 18-07, introducing mandatory DPOs, 5-day breach notification and DPIA obligations. observed
  9. High DLA Piper Data Protection Laws of the World — ANPDP — Enforcing Algeria's data-protection law since August 2023, as an independent administrative authority headquartered in Algiers observed
  10. High DLA Piper — Law No. 18-07 — Law No. 25-11 of 24 July 2025, described as modernising Algeria's data-protection framework toward GDPR-style accountability, risk-based and governance requirements observed
  11. High Algeria Tech News — Law No. 18-07 — Extraterritorial reach — international companies collecting data from Algerian users are subject to the law even without physical presence in Algeria observed
  12. Probable Gide Loyrette Nouel — Any processing of personal data requires a prior declaration to, or authorisation from, ANPDP (established by Law 18-07, operational since August 2023). observed
  13. Probable algeriatech.news — ANPDP authorisation track — Controllers must obtain the ANPDP's written approval for high-risk/cross-border processing before the processing activity begins. observed
  14. Probable algeriatech.news — Law 18-07 as amended by Law 25-11 establishes ANPDP with powers of warnings, formal notices, authorisation withdrawal, fines, data-modification/destruction orders observed
  15. Probable https://www.cookieyes.com/blog/algeria-data-protection-law/ — Law No. 25-11 — Enacted 24 July 2025, amends Law No. 18-07, introducing mandatory DPO appointment, processing records, DPIAs for high-risk processing, 5-day breach-notification deadline, expanded ANPDP powers and Article 27 bis regional audit/advisory poles.
  16. Probable https://research.lawlab.africa/algeria/ — Autorité Nationale de Protection des Données à Caractère Personnel (ANPDP) — Established under Law No. 18-07, operational since August 2022, with publicly published decisions.
  17. Probable Gide Loyrette Nouel — ANPDP, established under Law 18-07, fully operational since August 2023 observed
  18. Probable Gide Loyrette Nouel — Law No. 25-11 of July 2025 — Introduces biometric data, profiling, pseudonymisation and personal-data-breach concepts; strengthens controller obligations (processing register, automated audit log) observed
  19. Uncertain algeriatech.news — Law 25-11 establishes regional ANPDP poles with audit and guidance powers across all wilayas. observed
  20. Probable DLA Piper — Law No. 18-07 of 10 June 2018 — Processing for law-enforcement purposes (prevention, investigation, prosecution of criminal offences) is exempt from consent and may restrict data-subject rights. observed
  21. Probable Journal Officiel de la République Algérienne / Ministère de la Justice — Law No. 18-07, as amended by Law No. 25-11 of 24 July 2025 — ANPDP is equipped with regional poles (pôles régionaux) responsible for control and audit of institutions and persons processing personal data (Art. 27 bis); implementing regulations on operation of the poles remained pending as of mid-2026. observed
  22. Probable CMS Law — Presidential Decree No. 26-07 of 7 January 2026 — Dedicated cybersecurity units within public institutions with a preventive/repressive mandate covering corruption, terrorism, state-security attacks, money laundering/terrorism financing, smuggling, fraudulent data/tech use, and discrimination/hate speech. observed
  23. Probable algeriatech.news — Law No. 25-11 of 24 July 2025 — Law No. 18-07, introducing DPO appointment, DPIA, 5-day breach notification, regional oversight poles observed

#

No sentence-level primary or secondary source content was retrieved describing the specific lawful-basis enumeration, consent threshold, or special-category list; findings rely on regional-pattern inference only.

Primary frameworkLaw No. 18-07 of 10 June 2018
Supervisory authorityANPDP
Traffic-light rationale — RedNo sentence-level primary or secondary source content was retrieved describing the specific lawful-basis enumeration, consent threshold, or special-category list; findings rely on regional-pattern inference only.

Sub-modules (4)

Lawful basesRed

Believed to include consent and other statutory grounds (legal obligation, public-interest task, contract necessity), but no verified article-level enumeration was retrieved.

Claims (2):

  • Law 18-07 is understood to permit personal-data processing on grounds including data-subject consent and other statutory bases (e.g., legal obligation, public-interest task), following the regional Francophone data-protection model, though the exact enumerated list was not independently verified from primary text in this run.
  • Law No. 18-07 — Consent required before collecting personal data or transferring to third parties, unless legal obligation, protection of life, or contract performance exception applies

Special categoriesAmber

Regional-model statutes of this type typically restrict processing of health, genetic, biometric, religious, political and criminal-record data absent specific authorisation; DZ-specific enumeration not independently verified.

Claims (5):

  • Algeria's data-protection law is expected to designate categories such as health, genetic, biometric, religious/philosophical, political, and criminal-record data as sensitive, subject to heightened restrictions or authorisation requirements, consistent with comparable regional statutes; DZ-specific statutory wording was not independently confirmed in this run.
  • ANPDP Decision No. 01/2026 — Negative results of drug-screening tests requested during recruitment constitute health data under Law 18-07/25-11, with retention limited to three months.
  • ANPDP Decision No. 01 of 25 Feb 2026 — Treats negative drug/psychotropic-substance test results obtained in recruitment as health data, subject to declaration and a retention period capped at 3 months.
  • ANPDP Decision No. 01 of 25 February 2026 — Negative drug/psychotropic-substance test results obtained for recruitment are health data, subject to declaration and a retention period limited to three months
  • Algeria HR-data processing rule — Processing posing an obvious risk to privacy is permissible for HR-management purposes subject to prior ANPDP authorisation, without requiring employee consent; retention limited to the employment relationship duration (subject to the narrower 3-month health-data limit).

Pseudonymisation and anonymisationRed

No sourced information located on statutory pseudonymisation/anonymisation safe-harbour definitions under 18-07.

Category narrative 68 words

Law 18-07 is expected to set out grounds for lawful processing (consent and other statutory grounds) and heightened protection for sensitive categories (health, genetic, religious/philosophical opinion, ethnic origin, criminal records, etc.), consistent with the Francophone-model statutes of the same generation (e.g. Tunisia, Morocco, Senegal). Independent verification of the precise enumerated lawful bases, consent standard wording, and pseudonymisation/anonymisation definitions could not be completed against primary text in this run.

Periodic update · new data 2026-11-04

Two recent ANPDP actions have tightened the practical lawful-processing surface in Algeria without amending the governing statute. Rules reported as adopted on 15 July 2026 require explicit consent before identifiable photographs or videos containing personal information are collected, stored, retained or published online, extending consent obligations squarely into image-sharing activity. Separately, ANPDP Decision No. 01 of 25 February 2026 classifies negative drug and psychotropic-substance test results obtained during recruitment screening as health data, a special category under the regime, subjecting such results to a declaration obligation and capping their retention at three months. Neither development has been independently re-verified against primary ANPDP text as at this brief, and both should be read as recently adopted sectoral applications of the existing special-category and consent architecture rather than as changes to the underlying statute.

Outlook

The direction of travel is toward more granular, context-specific consent and special-category rules issued by sectoral ANPDP decision rather than by statutory amendment, and further decisions of this kind addressing other common processing contexts should be anticipated.

3 earlier distinct updates
Periodic update · new data 2026-11-03

Two discrete developments are understood to have reached the special-category and lawful-basis space this year. A rule dated 15 July 2026 is reported to impose a consent requirement before an identifiable person's image or video may be published online, a measure with evident relevance to social and commercial content practices. Separately, a decision dated 25 February 2026 is reported to classify a negative drug-test result as health data, which if accurate would pull a category of workplace screening information squarely inside the special-data regime rather than treating it as routine personnel data. Neither development has been corroborated against a primary ANPDP text in the material reviewed, and both should be treated as provisional pending that confirmation.

Outlook

The drug-test classification, in particular, is the kind of interpretive extension that could have broader knock-on effects for employment screening practices generally if it is confirmed and applied consistently; it is worth tracking whether ANPDP issues further guidance generalising the principle beyond the single reported decision.

Periodic update · new data 2026-10-25

The ANPDP issued Decision No. 01 on 25 February 2026 addressing a specific and commercially significant processing scenario: the status of negative drug and psychotropic-substance test results obtained by employers for recruitment purposes. The decision classifies these results as health data, bringing them within Algeria's special-category data framework as introduced or clarified under Law No. 25-11, and accordingly subjects their processing to a declaration requirement with the ANPDP. Beyond the special-category classification itself, the decision imposes a specific and operationally concrete constraint: retention of these results is limited to a period of three months.

This three-month retention ceiling is a notably precise rule compared to the more general data-minimisation and purpose-limitation principles that typically govern retention under data-protection frameworks of this kind. By specifying an exact retention period for this particular category of recruitment-related health data, the ANPDP has removed a degree of interpretive latitude that employers might otherwise have exercised under a general minimisation principle, replacing it with a bright-line rule that is straightforward to apply and, in principle, straightforward to enforce. The choice of recruitment-stage drug testing as the subject of this specific decision suggests the ANPDP identified this as a recurring processing activity in the Algerian labour market significant enough to warrant dedicated regulatory attention, rather than treating it as adequately covered by the special-category framework's general provisions alone.

The decision sits within Algeria's broader lawful-processing architecture, which Law No. 25-11 is understood to have modernised to include concepts such as profiling and pseudonymisation alongside the special-category framework into which the drug-testing decision falls. The decision does not, on the reporting available, address what lawful basis beyond the special-category declaration requirement an employer must additionally establish for the underlying processing, for example whether consent, a legal obligation, or an employment-contract necessity basis is also required alongside the declaration; this is a gap in the available findings rather than a conclusion that no such additional basis is required.

No other special-category or lawful-processing decision specific to Algeria was identified beyond the drug-testing decision discussed above. The biometric and video-surveillance decisions issued by the ANPDP in the same period are treated separately under the algorithmic, biometric and surveillance governance heading, reflecting their distinct subject matter even though they share the same underlying statutory framework and the same issuing authority.

The drug-testing decision was identified through secondary legal commentary summarising ANPDP decisions rather than through direct retrieval of the ANPDP's own decision text or its publication in the official gazette; this sourcing limitation means the precise wording of the declaration requirement and any exceptions or qualifications the decision text may contain cannot be confirmed at this point.

Outlook

The marker to watch is whether the ANPDP issues further special-category decisions addressing other recurring employment-screening or health-adjacent processing scenarios beyond recruitment-stage drug testing, which would indicate the agency is working systematically through common Algerian employment-sector processing practices rather than having addressed this single scenario in isolation. Retrieval of the primary decision text, whether from the ANPDP's own publications or Algeria's official gazette, would also materially improve confidence in the precise scope of the declaration requirement and the three-month retention rule, including whether any exceptions apply.

Periodic update · new data 2026-10-18

ANPDP Decision No. 01/2026 classifies the negative results of drug-screening tests requested of candidates during recruitment as health data under Law No. 18-07 as amended by Law No. 25-11, and limits retention of such results to three months. This is a regulator-level interpretive act applying the special-category concept to a specific, previously unaddressed employment scenario, and it signals that the ANPDP is actively extending the special-categories framework to new fact patterns rather than leaving the concept abstract.

A related rule allows processing that poses an obvious risk to privacy to proceed for HR-management purposes subject to prior ANPDP authorisation, without requiring the employee's own consent as the legal basis. Retention under this companion rule is tied to the duration of the employment relationship, except where the narrower three-month limit for health data specifically applies, as it does to the drug-screening results addressed in Decision No. 01/2026.

Taken together, these two findings describe an emerging regulatory position on employment-context special-category data: consent is not the operative basis for high-risk HR processing in Algeria, and regulator authorisation functions as the substitute safeguard, paired with retention limits that vary depending on the sensitivity of the specific data category involved.

Outlook

Employers conducting recruitment or employment screening that touches special-category data, including health-adjacent results such as drug-screening, should expect the three-month retention ceiling applied in Decision No. 01/2026 to serve as a reference point for how the ANPDP treats comparable categories of employment data going forward.

1 further periodic run re-emitted the standing brief unchanged and is not shown.

Sources and claims (9)
  1. Speculative Internal (no external corroboration retrieved for this specific claim) — Law 18-07 is understood to permit personal-data processing on grounds including data-subject consent and other statutory bases (e.g., legal obligation, public-interest task), following the regional Francophone data-protection model, though the exact enumerated list was not independently verified from primary text in this run. observed
  2. Speculative Internal (no external corroboration retrieved for this specific claim) — Algeria's data-protection law is expected to designate categories such as health, genetic, biometric, religious/philosophical, political, and criminal-record data as sensitive, subject to heightened restrictions or authorisation requirements, consistent with comparable regional statutes; DZ-specific statutory wording was not independently confirmed in this run. observed
  3. High CookieYes — Law No. 18-07 — Consent required before collecting personal data or transferring to third parties, unless legal obligation, protection of life, or contract performance exception applies observed
  4. High CookieYes — Law No. 18-07 — Data subjects must be able to withdraw consent at any time observed
  5. Uncertain Africa Business Insight — ANPDP rules adopted 15 July 2026 require explicit consent before collecting, storing, retaining or publishing identifiable photos/videos containing personal information online. observed
  6. Probable Badis.ai — ANPDP Decision No. 01/2026 — Negative results of drug-screening tests requested during recruitment constitute health data under Law 18-07/25-11, with retention limited to three months. observed
  7. Uncertain Gide Loyrette Nouel — ANPDP Decision No. 01 of 25 Feb 2026 — Treats negative drug/psychotropic-substance test results obtained in recruitment as health data, subject to declaration and a retention period capped at 3 months. observed
  8. Probable Africa Business Insight — ANPDP Decision No. 01 of 25 February 2026 — Negative drug/psychotropic-substance test results obtained for recruitment are health data, subject to declaration and a retention period limited to three months observed
  9. Probable https://www.gide.com/en/news-insights/protection-of-personal-data-focus-on-algerian-regulations/ — Algeria HR-data processing rule — Processing posing an obvious risk to privacy is permissible for HR-management purposes subject to prior ANPDP authorisation, without requiring employee consent; retention limited to the employment relationship duration (subject to the narrower 3-month health-data limit).

#

No sentence-level source content was retrieved on DZ's specific subject-rights catalogue, deadlines, or portability provision; module populated with inference-based, low-confidence claims and explicit gaps only.

Primary frameworkLaw No. 18-07 of 10 June 2018
Supervisory authorityANPDP
Traffic-light rationale — RedNo sentence-level source content was retrieved on DZ's specific subject-rights catalogue, deadlines, or portability provision; module populated with inference-based, low-confidence claims and explicit gaps only.

Sub-modules (5)

Access rightAmber

Believed to exist in some form (droit d'accès) consistent with the regional model; not independently verified.

Claims (1):

  • Individuals are expected to hold a right of access to personal data held about them under Law 18-07, consistent with the regional Francophone data-protection model, though the specific statutory mechanics were not independently verified in this run.

Rectification and erasureAmber

Rectification likely present; a full GDPR-style erasure/'right to be forgotten' is uncertain for this statutory generation.

Claims (2):

  • A right to rectify inaccurate personal data is expected under Law 18-07 consistent with the regional statutory model; the presence and scope of an erasure/right-to-be-forgotten equivalent could not be independently confirmed in this run.
  • Algeria data subject rights catalogue — Unlike GDPR, Law 18-07 (as amended by Law 25-11) contains no explicit right to erasure and no right to data portability; codified rights are information, access, rectification, objection, and a right against automated decision-making.

Restriction and objectionRed

A right of objection (droit d'opposition) is plausible by regional pattern; not independently verified for DZ.

Data portabilityRed

No evidence retrieved that Law 18-07 contains a GDPR Art 20-style data-portability right; this is treated as a likely gap pending primary-text confirmation.

Deadlines and response windowsRed

No statutory response-deadline figures for DZ subject-access or rectification requests were retrieved in this run.

Category narrative 48 words

Francophone-model statutes of this generation (which appear to have shaped 18-07) typically grant rights of access, rectification, and objection; an explicit GDPR-style erasure/portability right is less consistently present in this legislative family. No primary-source confirmation of DZ's specific rights catalogue or response-deadline windows was retrieved in this run.

Sources and claims (3)
  1. Speculative Internal (no external corroboration retrieved for this specific claim) — Individuals are expected to hold a right of access to personal data held about them under Law 18-07, consistent with the regional Francophone data-protection model, though the specific statutory mechanics were not independently verified in this run. observed
  2. Speculative Internal (no external corroboration retrieved for this specific claim) — A right to rectify inaccurate personal data is expected under Law 18-07 consistent with the regional statutory model; the presence and scope of an erasure/right-to-be-forgotten equivalent could not be independently confirmed in this run. observed
  3. Probable Cookie-Script — Algeria data subject rights catalogue — Unlike GDPR, Law 18-07 (as amended by Law 25-11) contains no explicit right to erasure and no right to data portability; codified rights are information, access, rectification, objection, and a right against automated decision-making. observed

#

Regulator activity (guidance-issuing) is corroborated; underlying granular statutory obligations (DPIA/DPO/ROPA/breach-notification specifics) are not verified.

Primary frameworkLaw No. 18-07 of 10 June 2018
Supervisory authorityANPDP
Traffic-light rationale — AmberRegulator activity (guidance-issuing) is corroborated; underlying granular statutory obligations (DPIA/DPO/ROPA/breach-notification specifics) are not verified.

Sub-modules (7)

Accountability & DPIARed

No DZ-specific DPIA trigger criteria were retrieved in this run.

Claims (2):

  • Law No. 25-11 — Organisations to conduct Data-Protection Impact Assessments (DPIAs)
  • Law No. 25-11 DPIA requirement — A DPIA is required for new or significantly changed processing activities presenting a high risk to individuals' rights.

DPO requirementsRed

No DZ-specific DPO appointment threshold or independence-guarantee text was retrieved.

Claims (7):

  • Law No. 25-11 — Introduces a mandatory Data Protection Officer requirement for organisations processing sensitive data or processing on a large scale.
  • Law No. 25-11 — Organisations to appoint a Data Protection Officer (DPO)
  • Articles 41 bis / 41 bis 1 (Law 18-07 as amended by Law 25-11) — Public and private bodies must designate a data-protection officer under conditions specified by ANPDP.
  • Law No. 25-11 DPO requirement — DPO appointment is mandatory for organisations conducting significant/high-risk processing; the DPO must be independent, have direct access to leadership, serve as the primary ANPDP contact, and the DPO's contact details must be communicated to the ANPDP.
  • Law No. 25-11 — Mandatory DPO for organisations processing sensitive data or at large scale, serving as ANPDP contact point
  • Law 25-11 mandates DPO appointment and DPIAs for significant/high-risk processing.
  • Law No. 18-07, as amended by Law No. 25-11 of 24 July 2025 — Mandatory DPO appointment by the data controller and the competent authority (Art. 41 bis); DPO missions include advising on legal obligations and breach notification (Art. 41 bis 1). Breach notification to ANPDP and data subjects within 5 days of becoming aware.

Ropa requirementsRed

No DZ-specific records-of-processing obligation text was retrieved.

Claims (1):

  • Law No. 25-11 — Organisations to maintain detailed processing records (records of processing activities)

Joint controller arrangementsRed

No DZ-specific joint-controller or processor-contract provisions were retrieved.

Security measuresAmber

Baseline technical/organisational security obligations are presumed to exist as a general feature of the statute; DZ-specific wording not independently verified.

Claims (2):

  • Controllers under Algeria's data-protection regime are expected to implement baseline technical and organisational security measures, consistent with ANPDP's active issuance of practical compliance recommendations to companies, although the precise statutory security standard was not independently verified in this run.
  • ANPDP Decision No. 02 of 4 March 2026 — Regulates workplace video surveillance, requiring a prior declaration, restricting its purpose to security of persons/property, and imposing transparency and security obligations.

Breach notificationRed

No confirmed statutory breach-notification timeline (to regulator or data subjects) was retrieved for DZ in this run.

Claims (5):

  • Law No. 25-11 — Introduces a breach-notification duty to the ANPDP within 5 days of discovery, alongside a DPIA requirement for high-risk processing.
  • Law No. 25-11 — Breach notification to ANPDP within 5 days of becoming aware of a personal-data breach; affected individuals must also be notified
  • Law n°25-11 (24 July 2025) — ANPDP notification within 5 days of becoming aware of a personal data breach, plus notification of affected individuals
  • Law No. 25-11 breach notification rule — Organisations must notify the ANPDP of a personal-data breach within five days of becoming aware of it and must also notify affected individuals; failure to notify within this deadline is punishable by imprisonment and a fine.
  • Law 25-11 requires breach notification to ANPDP within 5 days of discovery.

Retention and disposalRed

No DZ-specific retention-limit or disposal-duty text was retrieved.

Claims (1):

  • ANPDP Decision No. 01 of 25 February 2026 — Treats negative drug/psychotropic-substance test results obtained in recruitment as health data, subject to the declaration regime and a retention period capped at three months.
Category narrative 68 words

Algeria's regime is expected to impose baseline accountability and security obligations on controllers, but specific DPIA triggers, DPO appointment thresholds, ROPA obligations, joint-controller rules, and statutory breach-notification timelines under Law 18-07 could not be independently verified from primary or secondary sources in this run. The one area with corroborated secondary-source activity is ANPDP's issuance of practical recommendations to controllers (e.g., on disclosure practices), indicating some operational accountability oversight.

Periodic update · new data 2026-11-04

Law No. 25-11 is reported to have introduced three duties of note for controllers and processors: a mandatory Data Protection Officer requirement for organisations processing sensitive data or processing at large scale; a breach-notification duty requiring notice to the ANPDP within five days of discovery; and a Data Protection Impact Assessment requirement for high-risk processing. These duties date to the 2025 amendment and their practical enforcement maturity has not been independently verified as at this brief. Alongside the statutory duties, ANPDP Decision No. 02 of 4 March 2026 regulates workplace video surveillance specifically, requiring a prior declaration to the authority, restricting the purpose of such systems to the security of persons and property, and imposing transparency and security obligations on the controller operating the system.

Outlook

The combination of newly codified statutory duties (DPO, breach notification, DPIA) and a sector-specific decision on workplace surveillance points to an expanding compliance surface for controllers; confirmation of how the ANPDP is supervising the statutory duties in practice would clarify how far this expansion has moved from paper obligation into active oversight.

4 earlier distinct updates
Periodic update · new data 2026-11-03

Law No. 25-11 is reported to introduce a mandatory Data Protection Officer requirement for organisations that process sensitive data or process personal data at large scale, with the officer serving as the designated point of contact for the ANPDP. The same amending law is understood to carry a five-day breach notification obligation owed to the ANPDP and a data protection impact assessment requirement for high-risk processing, though the breach-notification figure is currently sourced to a single compliance-vendor characterisation rather than a primary legal text. A separate decision dated 4 March 2026 is reported to address workplace video surveillance, adding a further sector-specific duty on employers operating camera systems. Taken together, these developments move Algeria's controller obligations meaningfully closer to a structured compliance-programme model, though the DPO mandate itself is currently carried at a lower confidence than the other duties given the limited sourcing behind it.

Outlook

Confirmation of the exact breach-notification window and the precise scope of the DPO trigger (what counts as "large scale" processing) against a primary legal text would materially firm up the compliance picture; until then, organisations operating in Algeria are working from secondary characterisations of these duties rather than settled primary text.

Periodic update · new data 2026-10-18

Law No. 25-11 introduces a cluster of new accountability duties that did not previously exist under Algeria's data-protection framework. DPO appointment is now mandatory for organisations conducting significant or high-risk processing; the DPO appointed must be independent, must have direct access to organisational leadership, must serve as the primary point of contact for the ANPDP, and the DPO's contact details must be communicated to the ANPDP directly.

A Data Protection Impact Assessment is required for any new processing activity, or any existing processing activity undergoing significant change, that presents a high risk to individuals' rights. This DPIA duty sits alongside the DPO requirement as part of the same accountability package introduced by Law No. 25-11, and both obligations are already in force.

The breach-notification duty is the most heavily weighted of the new obligations in terms of consequence: organisations must notify the ANPDP of a personal-data breach within five days of becoming aware of it, and must also notify the individuals affected by that breach. Failure to meet the five-day deadline is punishable by imprisonment and a fine, meaning this is not simply an administrative filing requirement but one that carries criminal exposure for non-compliance.

Outlook

All three obligations described here - DPO appointment, DPIA, and five-day breach notification - are already in force following Law No. 25-11's 24 July 2025 enactment. Organisations operating in Algeria that carry out significant or high-risk processing are already subject to this accountability architecture; there is no transition period or phase-in described in the available record.

Periodic update · new data 2026-10-11

Algeria's controller-duty regime tightened materially through the ANPDP's 2025-2026 implementing wave. On 24 December 2025 the authority published its first deliberation fixing the conditions, missions and operating modalities for designating a Data Protection Officer. Under Law n°25-11, DPO appointment moved from a recommendation to a mandatory obligation, and organisations are required to communicate their DPO's contact details to the ANPDP.

A second deliberation, dated 4 March 2026, addresses workplace video-surveillance specifically. It requires employers to make a prior declaration to the ANPDP before installing a video-surveillance system, prohibits connecting such systems to the internet, and prohibits the installation of cameras in high-privacy areas, naming toilets and changing rooms as examples.

Law n°25-11 of 24 July 2025 is also understood to impose a short breach-notification deadline: controllers must notify the ANPDP within five days of becoming aware of a personal data breach, and must separately notify the individuals affected.

Outlook

These three measures, taken together, move Algeria's controller-duty regime from a largely statutory baseline toward an actively supervised one, with concrete appointment, declaration and notification deadlines now attached to the general obligations in Law n°18-07 as amended. Organisations operating workplace surveillance or holding personal data at scale face a materially more prescriptive compliance surface than existed before the July 2025 amendment.

Periodic update · new data 2026-09-28

Law No. 25-11 is understood to codify mandatory data protection officer appointments, a five-day breach notification obligation and mandatory data protection impact assessments for controllers, a material addition to the duties previously established under Law 18-07. Read alongside ANPDP's sectoral deliberations, such as the biometric-monitoring authorisation and the special-category health-data classification, controllers now face a more codified and more actively supervised set of operational obligations than the earlier framework implied.

The five-day breach notification window in particular is a specific, dated obligation that controllers must build into incident-response processes, and its introduction alongside DPO and DPIA requirements suggests ANPDP is building out a fuller accountability regime rather than relying solely on its pre-existing declaration and authorisation powers.

Outlook

The extent to which ANPDP issues implementing guidance operationalising the DPO, DPIA and breach-notification duties, for example through model DPIA templates or DPO-qualification criteria, is the key item to watch in coming cycles.

1 further periodic run re-emitted the standing brief unchanged and is not shown.

Sources and claims (18)
  1. Uncertain DataGuidance (OneTrust) — Controllers under Algeria's data-protection regime are expected to implement baseline technical and organisational security measures, consistent with ANPDP's active issuance of practical compliance recommendations to companies, although the precise statutory security standard was not independently verified in this run. observed
  2. Uncertain ConsentStack — Law No. 25-11 — Introduces a mandatory Data Protection Officer requirement for organisations processing sensitive data or processing on a large scale. observed
  3. Uncertain ConsentStack — Law No. 25-11 — Introduces a breach-notification duty to the ANPDP within 5 days of discovery, alongside a DPIA requirement for high-risk processing. observed
  4. Uncertain algeriatech.news — ANPDP Decision No. 02 of 4 March 2026 — Regulates workplace video surveillance, requiring a prior declaration, restricting its purpose to security of persons/property, and imposing transparency and security obligations. observed
  5. Probable algeriatech.news — ANPDP Decision No. 01 of 25 February 2026 — Treats negative drug/psychotropic-substance test results obtained in recruitment as health data, subject to the declaration regime and a retention period capped at three months. observed
  6. High DLA Piper — Law No. 25-11 — Organisations to conduct Data-Protection Impact Assessments (DPIAs) observed
  7. High DLA Piper — Law No. 25-11 — Organisations to appoint a Data Protection Officer (DPO) observed
  8. High DLA Piper — Law No. 25-11 — Organisations to maintain detailed processing records (records of processing activities) observed
  9. Probable Africa Business Insight — Articles 41 bis / 41 bis 1 (Law 18-07 as amended by Law 25-11) — Public and private bodies must designate a data-protection officer under conditions specified by ANPDP. observed
  10. Probable https://www.cookieyes.com/blog/algeria-data-protection-law/ — Law No. 25-11 DPO requirement — DPO appointment is mandatory for organisations conducting significant/high-risk processing; the DPO must be independent, have direct access to leadership, serve as the primary ANPDP contact, and the DPO's contact details must be communicated to the ANPDP.
  11. Probable https://algeriatech.news/algeria-anpdp-regional-audit-poles-law-25-11-data-oversight-2026/ — Law No. 25-11 — Breach notification to ANPDP within 5 days of becoming aware of a personal-data breach; affected individuals must also be notified
  12. Uncertain LawLab Africa — Law No. 25-11 — Mandatory DPO for organisations processing sensitive data or at large scale, serving as ANPDP contact point observed
  13. Probable APS — Law No. 25-11 DPIA requirement — A DPIA is required for new or significantly changed processing activities presenting a high risk to individuals' rights. observed
  14. Probable https://cookie-script.com/privacy-laws/algeria-data-protection-law-18-07-and-amendments — Law n°25-11 (24 July 2025) — ANPDP notification within 5 days of becoming aware of a personal data breach, plus notification of affected individuals
  15. Probable https://www.cookieyes.com/blog/algeria-data-protection-law/ — Law No. 25-11 breach notification rule — Organisations must notify the ANPDP of a personal-data breach within five days of becoming aware of it and must also notify affected individuals; failure to notify within this deadline is punishable by imprisonment and a fine.
  16. Uncertain Gide Loyrette Nouel — Law 25-11 mandates DPO appointment and DPIAs for significant/high-risk processing. observed
  17. Uncertain algeriatech.news — Law 25-11 requires breach notification to ANPDP within 5 days of discovery. observed
  18. Probable Journal Officiel de la République Algérienne / Ministère de la Justice — Law No. 18-07, as amended by Law No. 25-11 of 24 July 2025 — Mandatory DPO appointment by the data controller and the competent authority (Art. 41 bis); DPO missions include advising on legal obligations and breach notification (Art. 41 bis 1). Breach notification to ANPDP and data subjects within 5 days of becoming aware. observed

#

Underlying transfer-mechanism statutory detail is unverified (red-level gap), but the AML high-risk designation is a corroborated, materially relevant cross-border data-flow risk factor (amber).

Primary frameworkLaw No. 18-07 of 10 June 2018
Supervisory authorityANPDP
Traffic-light rationale — AmberUnderlying transfer-mechanism statutory detail is unverified (red-level gap), but the AML high-risk designation is a corroborated, materially relevant cross-border data-flow risk factor (amber).

Sub-modules (6)

Transfer mechanismsAmber

Believed to require ANPDP authorisation or a destination-country adequacy-style assessment for transfers of personal data outside Algeria, following the regional model; DZ-specific statutory text not independently verified.

Claims (9):

  • Algeria's data-protection regime is expected to condition cross-border transfers of personal data on prior authorisation from ANPDP or an assessment of the destination country's level of protection, consistent with comparable regional Francophone statutes, though the precise statutory transfer-mechanism text for DZ was not independently verified in this run.
  • Law No. 18-07 — Cross-border transfer of personal data requires authorisation from ANPDP where processing complies with the law's conditions
  • Personal data transfers outside Algeria require prior ANPDP authorisation except where the receiving country is declared adequate; no adequacy country list has been published, so all transfers are assessed case-by-case.
  • Personal data transfers outside Algeria require prior ANPDP authorisation absent an adequacy declaration; no adequacy list published
  • Law No. 18-07 Art. 44/67 cross-border transfer rule — Personal data may only be transferred abroad to a country deemed adequate by the ANPDP; no adequacy list has been published, so transfers require case-by-case authorisation; unauthorised transfer is the statute's most heavily penalised offence, carrying 1-5 years' imprisonment and a DZD 500,000-1,000,000 fine.
  • Law No. 18-07, as amended — Cross-border transfer of personal data requires prior ANPDP authorisation; no adequacy country list published, so every transfer is assessed case-by-case
  • Article 44 of Law 18-07 requires prior ANPDP authorisation for any transfer of personal data abroad.
  • Law No. 18-07 of 10 June 2018 — Cross-border personal data transfers require ANPDP authorisation conditioned on the destination State ensuring adequate protection; Art. 45 provides derogations.
  • Law No. 18-07, Article 44 — transfer of personal data to a foreign state without prior ANPDP authorisation

Adequacy receivedRed

No evidence found that Algeria has received an adequacy decision from the EU or any other omnibus regime.

Adequacy grantedRed

No evidence found that Algeria (ANPDP) has issued formal adequacy findings for other jurisdictions.

Claims (1):

  • No ANPDP adequacy country list has been published as of this cycle; transfers are assessed case-by-case, and Law 25-11 specifies no grace period for existing non-compliant transfer relationships.

SCCs and BCRsRed

No evidence retrieved of a formal SCC or BCR mechanism recognised under Algerian law.

Transfer impact assessmentRed

No evidence retrieved of a formal TIA requirement under Algerian law.

Data localisationAmber

Partial data-localisation tendencies (prior-authorisation-gated transfers) are plausible by regional pattern but not independently confirmed for DZ.

Claims (1):

  • Algeria was added to the EU's Delegated Regulation list of high-risk third countries for AML/CFT purposes in 2024-2025, reflecting heightened scrutiny of Algeria's data-sharing and financial-crime compliance frameworks relevant to cross-border data flows involving Algerian entities.
Category narrative 98 words

Algeria's data-protection law is understood, by regional statutory pattern, to condition cross-border personal-data transfers on prior ANPDP authorisation or an assessment of the destination country's protection level, similar to other Francophone-model regimes. Separately, Algeria was added to the EU's list of high-risk third countries for AML/CFT purposes in 2024-2025 (FATF-driven), which raises the compliance stakes for any AML-related cross-border personal-data sharing even though this is a financial-crime instrument rather than a DP-specific one. Algeria has not received nor granted any DP adequacy decision from/to the EU or other omnibus regimes, and no confirmed SCC/BCR uptake evidence was found.

Periodic update · new data 2026-09-28

Algeria's cross-border transfer regime remains authorisation-based rather than adequacy-based: controllers are understood to require ANPDP's prior written authorisation for high-risk or cross-border processing before the activity may begin, and initiating processing ahead of that authorisation is itself understood to constitute a violation. No adequacy country list has been published, meaning there is no mechanism by which a controller could rely on a pre-cleared destination country instead of seeking case-by-case authorisation, and no SCC- or BCR-equivalent instrument has been identified as an alternative pathway.

This cycle's most significant development is the signal that Law 25-11 has already triggered active ANPDP field inspections of private-sector technology companies for cross-border transfer non-compliance, with a 2026 enforcement calendar reported to be targeting medium-sized technology operators with international data dependencies, including SaaS companies and fintech platforms handling payment data. This is held at a more cautious confidence than the authorisation-regime finding itself, since it rests on a single secondary source.

Outlook

Whether ANPDP's inspection campaign converts into a published enforcement decision is the central item to watch, since it would be the first public test of how the case-by-case authorisation requirement is being enforced in practice against technology and fintech operators with cross-border data dependencies.

1 further periodic run re-emitted the standing brief unchanged and is not shown.

Sources and claims (11)
  1. Speculative Internal (no external corroboration retrieved for this specific claim) — Algeria's data-protection regime is expected to condition cross-border transfers of personal data on prior authorisation from ANPDP or an assessment of the destination country's level of protection, consistent with comparable regional Francophone statutes, though the precise statutory transfer-mechanism text for DZ was not independently verified in this run. observed
  2. Probable Official Journal of the European Union — Algeria was added to the EU's Delegated Regulation list of high-risk third countries for AML/CFT purposes in 2024-2025, reflecting heightened scrutiny of Algeria's data-sharing and financial-crime compliance frameworks relevant to cross-border data flows involving Algerian entities. observed
  3. High DLA Piper Data Protection Laws of the World — Law No. 18-07 — Cross-border transfer of personal data requires authorisation from ANPDP where processing complies with the law's conditions observed
  4. Uncertain Africa Business Insight — No ANPDP adequacy country list has been published as of this cycle; transfers are assessed case-by-case, and Law 25-11 specifies no grace period for existing non-compliant transfer relationships. observed
  5. Probable algeriatech.news — Personal data transfers outside Algeria require prior ANPDP authorisation except where the receiving country is declared adequate; no adequacy country list has been published, so all transfers are assessed case-by-case. observed
  6. Probable algeriatech.news — Personal data transfers outside Algeria require prior ANPDP authorisation absent an adequacy declaration; no adequacy list published observed
  7. Probable Upgrowth.dz — Law No. 18-07 Art. 44/67 cross-border transfer rule — Personal data may only be transferred abroad to a country deemed adequate by the ANPDP; no adequacy list has been published, so transfers require case-by-case authorisation; unauthorised transfer is the statute's most heavily penalised offence, carrying 1-5 years' imprisonment and a DZD 500,000-1,000,000 fine. observed
  8. Uncertain https://algeriatech.news/data-protection-law-18-07-business-guide/ — Law No. 18-07, as amended — Cross-border transfer of personal data requires prior ANPDP authorisation; no adequacy country list published, so every transfer is assessed case-by-case
  9. Uncertain algeriatech.news — Article 44 of Law 18-07 requires prior ANPDP authorisation for any transfer of personal data abroad. observed
  10. Probable Intervalle Technologies — Law No. 18-07 of 10 June 2018 — Cross-border personal data transfers require ANPDP authorisation conditioned on the destination State ensuring adequate protection; Art. 45 provides derogations. observed
  11. Uncertain DLA Piper Data Protection Laws of the World — Law No. 18-07, Article 44 — transfer of personal data to a foreign state without prior ANPDP authorisation observed

#

Financial-sector overlay is materially corroborated (AML high-risk designation); other sectoral sub-modules are unverified gaps.

Primary frameworkLaw No. 18-07 of 10 June 2018; EU AML high-risk list (external, DZ-referencing)
Supervisory authorityANPDP
Traffic-light rationale — AmberFinancial-sector overlay is materially corroborated (AML high-risk designation); other sectoral sub-modules are unverified gaps.

Sub-modules (7)

Financial sector overlayAmber

Algeria's AML/CFT regime was found by the FATF to have not yet fully addressed identified strategic deficiencies, leading to its addition to the EU high-risk third-country list, which affects financial-sector data-sharing risk profiles.

Claims (1):

  • The European Commission concluded that Algeria has not yet fully addressed the concerns that led to its addition to the FATF's list of Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring, and Algeria should therefore be considered a high-risk third country under EU AML/CFT rules.

Health sector overlayRed

No DZ-specific health-sector DP overlay was located.

Telecoms and eprivacyRed

No DZ-specific ePrivacy/telecoms data-protection overlay was located.

Claims (1):

  • Presidential Decree No. 26-07 — Dedicated cybersecurity units within public institutions with preventive and repressive functions covering money laundering, terrorism financing and fraudulent data use

Employment dataRed

No DZ-specific employment-data DP overlay was located.

Claims (1):

  • ANPDP Deliberation No. 03 of 6 May 2026 — Biometric workplace attendance-monitoring systems subject to prior ANPDP authorisation and security/confidentiality obligations, without requiring employee consent, retention limited to the employment relationship.

Credit and scoringRed

No DZ-specific credit-scoring DP overlay was located.

educationRed

No DZ-specific education-sector DP overlay was located.

insuranceRed

No DZ-specific insurance-sector DP overlay was located.

Category narrative 88 words

The most concretely corroborated sectoral signal for Algeria is financial-sector related: Algeria was placed on the EU's AML/CFT high-risk third-country list via Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1184, following FATF plenary additions in 2024 and February 2025, reflecting unresolved deficiencies in Algeria's anti-money-laundering and counter-terrorist-financing regime. This has direct implications for financial-sector personal-data sharing (e.g., beneficial-ownership, suspicious-transaction-report data) even though it is an AML instrument rather than a DP-specific overlay. No independently verified health-sector, telecoms/ePrivacy, employment, credit-scoring, education, or insurance-specific DP overlays were located for Algeria in this run.

Periodic update · new data 2026-09-28

ANPDP Deliberation No. 03 of 6 May 2026 is understood to authorise biometric workplace attendance-monitoring systems, subject to prior ANPDP authorisation and security and confidentiality obligations. Notably, employee consent is not required for this processing; instead the authorisation and security safeguards imposed directly on the controller serve as the lawful basis, with data retention limited to the duration of the employment relationship. This is the first workplace-biometrics-specific ANPDP deliberation captured this cycle and gives employers a concrete authorised pathway for what might otherwise be a contested processing activity given the sensitivity of biometric data.

The combination of no-consent-required processing alongside a mandatory prior-authorisation and security-obligation structure reflects a regulatory model where ANPDP retains direct oversight of higher-risk processing categories rather than relying on individual consent as the primary safeguard.

Outlook

Whether ANPDP extends comparable sector-specific deliberations to other biometric use cases, such as customer-facing biometric authentication in banking or telecoms, is the item to watch. No such extension was identified this cycle.

1 further periodic run re-emitted the standing brief unchanged and is not shown.

Sources and claims (3)
  1. Probable Official Journal of the European Union — The European Commission concluded that Algeria has not yet fully addressed the concerns that led to its addition to the FATF's list of Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring, and Algeria should therefore be considered a high-risk third country under EU AML/CFT rules. observed
  2. High CMS Law — Presidential Decree No. 26-07 — Dedicated cybersecurity units within public institutions with preventive and repressive functions covering money laundering, terrorism financing and fraudulent data use observed
  3. Probable algeriatech.news — ANPDP Deliberation No. 03 of 6 May 2026 — Biometric workplace attendance-monitoring systems subject to prior ANPDP authorisation and security/confidentiality obligations, without requiring employee consent, retention limited to the employment relationship. observed

#

No sourced content located for any adtech/commercial-privacy sub-module specific to Algeria.

Supervisory authorityANPDP
Traffic-light rationale — RedNo sourced content located for any adtech/commercial-privacy sub-module specific to Algeria.

Sub-modules (6)

Cookies and trackersRed

No DZ-specific cookie/tracker consent regime located.

Dark patternsRed

No DZ-specific dark-pattern prohibition located.

Opt out signalsRed

No DZ-specific recognition of browser-based opt-out signals located.

Clean rooms and dcrRed

No DZ-specific clean-room/data-collaboration-room rules located.

Cross context advertisingRed

No DZ-specific cross-context advertising 'sale'/'share' rule located.

Direct marketingRed

No DZ-specific direct-marketing consent/suppression regime located.

Claims (1):

  • ANPDP deliberation of 15 July 2026 — publication or hosting of identifiable photos/videos on foreign platforms as potentially constituting a cross-border personal-data transfer, triggering Art. 44-45 compliance duty
Category narrative 43 words

No evidence was located of an Algeria-specific cookie/tracker consent regime, dark-pattern prohibition, opt-out-signal recognition, clean-room framework, cross-context-advertising rule, or direct-marketing suppression regime distinct from the general provisions of Law 18-07. This module is emitted with explicit gaps across all sub-modules pending primary-source access.

Periodic update · new data 2026-11-03

No dedicated adtech-specific rule has surfaced in the material reviewed. The closest adjacent development is the 15 July 2026 consent requirement for publishing an identifiable person's photo or video online, which touches commercial content and social-platform practices even though it is not framed as an advertising-targeting rule as such. Its practical reach into influencer marketing, user-generated content moderation, or programmatic advertising use of identifiable imagery has not been separately addressed in the sources available.

Outlook

Whether ANPDP extends this consent principle explicitly into advertising or audience-targeting contexts, rather than leaving it as a general publication rule, is the development worth watching for commercial operators relying on identifiable imagery in marketing content.

Sources and claims (1)
  1. Probable Anove.ai — ANPDP deliberation of 15 July 2026 — publication or hosting of identifiable photos/videos on foreign platforms as potentially constituting a cross-border personal-data transfer, triggering Art. 44-45 compliance duty observed

#

No sourced content located for algorithmic/biometric/surveillance-governance sub-modules specific to Algeria.

Supervisory authorityANPDP
Traffic-light rationale — RedNo sourced content located for algorithmic/biometric/surveillance-governance sub-modules specific to Algeria.

Sub-modules (6)

Profiling restrictionsRed

No DZ-specific profiling-restriction provision located.

Automated decision making transparencyRed

No DZ-specific ADM transparency/explanation right located.

AI risk assessmentsRed

No DZ-specific AI risk-assessment regime located.

Biometric regimeRed

Biometric data is plausibly covered under general sensitive-category protection, but a distinct biometric regime (facial recognition, gait, fingerprint specific rules) was not verified.

Claims (5):

  • ANPDP Decision No. 3 of 6 May 2026 — Regulates the use of biometric systems for monitoring workplace attendance, requiring prior declaration and purpose-limitation to security of persons/property.
  • ANPDP Decision No. 03 — Decision No. 03 of 6 May 2026 regulates use of biometric systems for monitoring workplace attendance
  • ANPDP Decision No. 03 of 6 May 2026 — Regulates the use of biometric systems for monitoring workplace attendance.
  • ANPDP Decision No. 03 of 6 May 2026 — Biometric systems for workplace attendance monitoring permissible for HR purposes under declared conditions
  • ANPDP Délibération n°03 du 6 mai 2026 — Biometric workplace attendance monitoring is lawful under HR-management grounds (tracking lateness, absences, overtime) and does not require the employee's prior explicit consent, subject to prior declaration/authorisation, information, security/confidentiality, purpose limitation and deletion at end of employment.

Genetic dataRed

Genetic data is plausibly covered under general sensitive-category protection; a distinct genetic-data regime was not verified.

Claims (1):

  • ANPDP Délibération n°01 du 25 février 2026 — Negative drug/psychotropic test results from recruitment screening are classified as health data subject to ANPDP declaration and a 3-month retention cap, after which data must be destroyed.

State surveillance carveoutsRed

No DZ-specific state-surveillance carve-out text or its limits were verified in this run.

Claims (4):

  • ANPDP Decision No. 02 of 4 March 2026 — Strictly regulates video-surveillance use, requiring prior declaration, restricting purpose to security of persons/property, and imposing transparency and security obligations
  • Law No. 18-07 — Law-enforcement processing (prevention, investigation, prosecution of criminal offences) exempted from consent, with possible restrictions on data-subject rights
  • Presidential Decree No. 26-07 of 7 January 2026 — Dedicated cybersecurity units within public institutions with preventive and repressive missions covering corruption, terrorism, money laundering and related offences.
  • Law n°25-11 — New Title V bis governing processing of personal data for prevention/detection of offences, investigations, prosecutions and sentence enforcement
Category narrative 45 words

No Algeria-specific provisions on profiling restrictions, automated-decision-making transparency, AI-specific risk assessments, a distinct biometric-data regime, genetic-data regime, or codified state-surveillance carve-outs were independently verified in this run, beyond the general (unverified) presence of sensitive-category protections that may cover biometric/genetic data within Law 18-07's special-categories provisions.

Periodic update · new data 2026-11-04

ANPDP Decision No. 03 of 6 May 2026 regulates the use of biometric systems for monitoring workplace attendance, placing a sector-specific constraint on biometric processing in the employment context. This sits alongside the authority's separate regulation of workplace video surveillance, and together the two decisions show the ANPDP addressing biometric and surveillance processing in the workplace through discrete sectoral decisions rather than a single consolidated biometric-governance instrument. As with the authority's other 2026 decisions noted elsewhere, this one has not been independently re-verified against primary ANPDP text as at this brief.

Outlook

The ANPDP's workplace-focused biometric and surveillance decisions suggest attendance-monitoring and access-control biometric systems are an active area of sectoral attention, and further decisions addressing other biometric use cases should be anticipated.

2 earlier distinct updates
Periodic update · new data 2026-11-03

ANPDP Decision No. 03, dated 6 May 2026, is reported to regulate the use of biometric systems for monitoring workplace attendance, placing a specific governance layer over an increasingly common employee-monitoring technology. This sits alongside the separately reported 4 March 2026 decision addressing workplace video surveillance, together suggesting a pattern of sector-specific attention to employer monitoring technologies rather than a single omnibus biometric or surveillance statute. Neither decision has been checked against a primary ANPDP publication in the material available, so the precise scope and compliance obligations each imposes remain to be firmed up.

Outlook

The pairing of a biometric-attendance decision with a video-surveillance decision within months of each other points to workplace monitoring technology as an active area of ANPDP attention; further sector-specific decisions addressing other monitoring technologies (such as productivity-tracking software) would be a natural next step to watch for.

Periodic update · new data 2026-10-25

Two ANPDP decisions issued within a ten-week window in the first half of 2026 together map out a developing Algerian approach to biometric and surveillance processing. Decision No. 02 of 4 March 2026 addresses video surveillance, imposing strict regulation that requires prior declaration to the ANPDP before deployment, restricts the permissible purpose of video-surveillance processing to the security of persons and property, and layers on transparency and security obligations for operators of such systems. Decision No. 03 of 6 May 2026 addresses a narrower and more specific use case, biometric systems deployed for workplace attendance monitoring, and permits such systems for human-resources purposes under declared conditions.

Read together, these two decisions reveal a differentiated regulatory posture depending on the specific surveillance or biometric technology and its purpose, rather than a single blanket rule applied uniformly across all surveillance-adjacent processing. Video surveillance is treated with a notably restrictive purpose limitation, confined to security of persons and property and excluding, by clear implication, broader uses such as general behavioural monitoring or productivity tracking through camera systems. Biometric attendance monitoring, by contrast, is treated as permissible for its stated human-resources purpose provided the declared-conditions requirement is satisfied, a more permissive posture for this particular biometric use case than the video-surveillance decision's purpose restriction would suggest applies to surveillance technology generally. This differentiation is itself informative: it indicates the ANPDP is evaluating biometric and surveillance processing technology by specific use case and purpose rather than applying a single risk category to all technologies that might be loosely grouped as "biometric" or "surveillance" in nature.

Neither decision, on the reporting available, establishes a general statutory test for automated decision-making or profiling of the kind found in more developed data-protection regimes elsewhere; Law No. 25-11 is understood to have introduced profiling as a defined concept, but no ANPDP decision specifically addressing an automated-decision-making scenario, as distinct from the biometric and surveillance decisions discussed here, was identified. This is a gap in current understanding of how Algeria's profiling concept operates in practice, rather than evidence that no such test exists.

Both decisions were identified through secondary legal commentary describing ANPDP decision content rather than through direct retrieval of the decisions' own texts or their publication record, and the specific wording of the declaration requirements, the full list of permitted purposes under the video-surveillance decision, and the exact conditions attached to biometric attendance systems under the Decision No. 03 framework cannot be confirmed with precision on the sourcing available.

Outlook

The marker to watch is whether the ANPDP issues a further decision specifically addressing automated decision-making or profiling as distinct concepts from the biometric and surveillance decisions already issued, which would clarify how Law No. 25-11's profiling concept is actually being applied in enforcement practice. Separately, continued issuance of further sector-specific biometric or surveillance decisions, following the pattern set by the video-surveillance and attendance-monitoring decisions, would confirm that differentiated, use-case-specific regulation is the ANPDP's settled approach to this category of processing rather than a feature of these two particular decisions alone.

1 further periodic run re-emitted the standing brief unchanged and is not shown.

Sources and claims (10)
  1. Probable Africa Business Insight — ANPDP Decision No. 02 of 4 March 2026 — Strictly regulates video-surveillance use, requiring prior declaration, restricting purpose to security of persons/property, and imposing transparency and security obligations observed
  2. Probable algeriatech.news — ANPDP Decision No. 3 of 6 May 2026 — Regulates the use of biometric systems for monitoring workplace attendance, requiring prior declaration and purpose-limitation to security of persons/property. observed
  3. High DLA Piper Data Protection Laws of the World — Law No. 18-07 — Law-enforcement processing (prevention, investigation, prosecution of criminal offences) exempted from consent, with possible restrictions on data-subject rights observed
  4. Probable DLA Piper Data Protection Laws of the World — Presidential Decree No. 26-07 of 7 January 2026 — Dedicated cybersecurity units within public institutions with preventive and repressive missions covering corruption, terrorism, money laundering and related offences. observed
  5. Uncertain algeriatech.news — ANPDP Decision No. 03 — Decision No. 03 of 6 May 2026 regulates use of biometric systems for monitoring workplace attendance observed
  6. Uncertain algeriatech.news — ANPDP Decision No. 03 of 6 May 2026 — Regulates the use of biometric systems for monitoring workplace attendance. observed
  7. Probable Africa Business Insight — ANPDP Decision No. 03 of 6 May 2026 — Biometric systems for workplace attendance monitoring permissible for HR purposes under declared conditions observed
  8. Probable https://cms.law/en/int/expert-guides/cms-expert-guide-to-data-protection-and-cyber-security-laws/algeria2 — Law n°25-11 — New Title V bis governing processing of personal data for prevention/detection of offences, investigations, prosecutions and sentence enforcement
  9. Probable Algérie Eco — ANPDP Délibération n°03 du 6 mai 2026 — Biometric workplace attendance monitoring is lawful under HR-management grounds (tracking lateness, absences, overtime) and does not require the employee's prior explicit consent, subject to prior declaration/authorisation, information, security/confidentiality, purpose limitation and deletion at end of employment. observed
  10. Probable Gide Loyrette Nouel — ANPDP Délibération n°01 du 25 février 2026 — Negative drug/psychotropic test results from recruitment screening are classified as health data subject to ANPDP declaration and a 3-month retention cap, after which data must be destroyed. observed

#

No sourced content located for any children/vulnerable-groups sub-module specific to Algeria.

Supervisory authorityANPDP
Traffic-light rationale — Not assessedNo sourced content located for any children/vulnerable-groups sub-module specific to Algeria.

Sub-modules (5)

Age verificationRed

No DZ-specific age-of-consent or age-verification rule located.

Minor profiling bansRed

No DZ-specific minor-profiling ban located.

Education settingsRed

No DZ-specific education-settings DP rule located.

Dependent adultsRed

No DZ-specific dependent-adult protection rule located.

Category narrative 25 words

No Algeria-specific provisions on age of consent for data processing, parental-consent mechanisms, minor-profiling bans, education-setting-specific rules, or dependent-adult protections were independently verified in this run.

#

Regulator operational activity is corroborated (amber); granular penalty/funding/redress-mechanism details remain unverified (would otherwise be red).

Primary frameworkLaw No. 18-07 of 10 June 2018
Supervisory authorityANPDP
Traffic-light rationale — AmberRegulator operational activity is corroborated (amber); granular penalty/funding/redress-mechanism details remain unverified (would otherwise be red).

Sub-modules (6)

Regulator powers and penaltiesRed

No verified figures for ANPDP's maximum administrative/criminal penalty powers under 18-07 were retrieved in this run.

Claims (7):

  • Law No. 18-07 — Fine ranging from 20,000 to 1,000,000 DZD and/or imprisonment between two months and five years (Articles 47-74)
  • Law 18-07/25-11 — Tiered criminal penalties for data-protection violations: 2 months-2 years imprisonment + 20,000-200,000 DZD for rights-refusal; 2-5 years + 200,000-500,000 DZD for sensitive-data disclosure; 1-3 years + 100,000-300,000 DZD for unauthorised register access; 6 months-2 years + 60,000-200,000 DZD for obstructing ANPDP action.
  • ANPDP — Administrative fine of 500,000 DZD (art.47) and order withdrawal/suspension of unlawful processing; repeat or grave offences referred to criminal courts (art.64)
  • Law No. 18-07, as amended by Law No. 25-11 — Most serious violations carry criminal penalties of up to 10 years' imprisonment and fines up to 10,000,000 DZD
  • Law 18-07/25-11 — 2 months-5 years imprisonment and 20,000-500,000 DZD fines, tiered by offence type (rights-refusal, sensitive-data disclosure, unauthorised register access, obstruction of ANPDP action)
  • ANPDP enforcement powers — ANPDP may impose warning, formal notice, provisional withdrawal of authorisation for up to one year, and definitive withdrawal; failure to notify a breach within five days is itself punishable by imprisonment and a fine.
  • Law No. 18-07 of 10 June 2018 — Non-compliance is punishable by fines of DZD 20,000-1,000,000 and/or imprisonment of 2 months to 5 years under Arts. 47-74.

Enforcement activity indexAmber

ANPDP has issued at least two identifiable public compliance communications (a reminder of obligations under Law 18-07, and recommendations on data-disclosure practices), indicating a modest but real level of enforcement/guidance activity.

Claims (4):

  • ANPDP publicly reminded companies of their obligations under Law No. 18-07, indicating active regulator engagement with controller compliance.
  • ANPDP issued recommendations concerning the disclosure of personal data, evidencing ongoing regulatory guidance activity beyond a purely dormant statutory framework.
  • ANPDP — No publicly reported enforcement actions as of early 2026
  • ANPDP — no publicly reported enforcement action or fine as of early-to-mid 2026

Regulator funding and capacityRed

No verified funding or headcount data for ANPDP was retrieved.

Collective redress and class actionsRed

No verified collective-redress or class-action mechanism for DP violations was located for Algeria.

Private right of actionRed

No verified private-right-of-action provision for data-subject court claims was located for Algeria.

Claims (1):

  • Individuals who believe their personal data has been used unlawfully may submit complaints to the ANPDP and may also seek legal remedies through the courts.

Recent developments 180dAmber

Within the last 180 days, the most concretely corroborated Algeria-relevant regulatory development is the EU's confirmation (June 2025 Delegated Regulation) that Algeria remains a high-risk AML/CFT third country; no DP-specific ANPDP development within the last 180 days as of the run date (2026-08-05) was independently verified.

Claims (4):

  • The European Commission's June 2025 Delegated Regulation confirmed Algeria's continued listing as a high-risk AML/CFT third country, a recent development materially relevant to Algeria's cross-border compliance and data-sharing risk profile.
  • Presidential Decree No. 26-07 — Dedicated cybersecurity units within public institutions, defining their missions, organisation and responsibilities
  • ANPDP 2026 enforcement calendar — Law 25-11 has already triggered ANPDP field inspections of private-sector tech companies for cross-border transfer non-compliance, with the 2026 enforcement calendar targeting medium-sized tech operators with international data dependencies.
  • Law No. 25-11 Art. 27 bis — Establishes regional ANPDP audit and advisory poles bringing oversight closer to Algeria's wilayas; implementing regulations expected throughout 2026, while core DPO/ROPA/DPIA/breach obligations are already in force.
Category narrative 83 words

Secondary reporting corroborates that ANPDP is operationally active, having issued reminders of obligations under Law 18-07 to companies and recommendations on disclosure practices, and that a modifying law was published in 2025. However, specific maximum-penalty figures, headcount/funding data for ANPDP, collective-redress mechanisms, and private-right-of-action provisions under Algerian law were not independently verified in this run. Separately, and outside the DP regime itself, Algeria's placement on the EU AML high-risk list (2024-2025) is a corroborated recent regulatory development relevant to Algeria's broader compliance-enforcement landscape.

Periodic update · new data 2026-11-03

Algeria's statutory penalty architecture for data protection breaches is detailed and criminal in character, with penalties reported to reach up to five years' imprisonment for the most serious offences, within a tiered structure that is said to range from two months to five years' imprisonment and fines of 20,000 to 500,000 dinars depending on the nature of the violation, covering conduct such as refusing to honour a data subject's rights, disclosing sensitive data without authorisation, accessing a protected register without authorisation, or obstructing an ANPDP action. Against that statutory severity, one secondary source characterises the enforcement record as thin, stating that as of early 2026 no enforcement actions against named controllers had been publicly reported. That characterisation is itself dated to early 2026 and has not been refreshed since, so it describes a past state of the enforcement record rather than necessarily today's.

Outlook

The gap between a criminally severe penalty framework on the statute books and an apparently thin public enforcement record is the central tension to track in this area. A first publicly reported ANPDP enforcement decision against a named controller would be a significant marker of the regime moving from statutory design into practical application.

3 earlier distinct updates
Periodic update · new data 2026-10-18

The ANPDP holds a graduated set of administrative sanction powers: it may issue a warning, issue a formal notice, impose a provisional withdrawal of authorisation for up to one year, or impose a definitive withdrawal of authorisation. Separately from this administrative ladder, failure to notify a personal-data breach within the five-day deadline introduced by Law No. 25-11 is itself a criminal offence, punishable by imprisonment and a fine, giving the ANPDP's enforcement reach both an administrative and a criminal dimension.

Article 27 bis of Law No. 25-11 establishes regional audit and advisory poles, intended to bring ANPDP oversight capacity closer to Algeria's wilayas rather than concentrating it centrally. Implementing regulations defining how these regional poles will actually function are expected throughout 2026; in the meantime, the core DPO, processing-records, DPIA and breach-notification obligations that these poles will presumably help enforce are already in force and enforceable through the ANPDP's existing central powers.

Outlook

The implementing regulations for Article 27 bis's regional audit and advisory poles, expected through the remainder of 2026, are the development to track. Until they are issued, enforcement of Law No. 25-11's accountability obligations continues through the ANPDP's existing central administrative and criminal sanction powers rather than through any regionalised structure.

Periodic update · new data 2026-10-11

The same 15 July 2026 deliberation on photo and video publication establishes a dedicated electronic complaint channel through which individuals whose images were processed or published unlawfully can bring a complaint to the ANPDP, without prejudice to their ability to pursue the matter through the courts.

This gives individuals a specific administrative route for the photo/video publication issue addressed by the same deliberation, running alongside, rather than replacing, access to judicial remedies.

Outlook

The new complaint channel is likely to be the practical entry point through which the ANPDP's cross-border-transfer interpretation of foreign-hosted photo and video publication gets tested in individual cases, giving affected individuals a lower-friction route to raise a complaint than litigation alone.

Periodic update · new data 2026-09-28

ANPDP's administrative sanction powers are understood to include warnings, formal notices, and provisional or definitive withdrawal of authorisations, alongside fines from 20,000 to 1,000,000 dinars. Criminal sanctions of two months to five years imprisonment apply for serious violations, and Law No. 25-11 is understood to raise this ceiling further, to up to ten years imprisonment and 10,000,000 dinars for the most serious violations, a substantial strengthening of the statutory penalty architecture.

Despite this strengthened framework, as of early 2026 no publicly reported enforcement action by ANPDP had been identified, meaning the higher penalty ceiling introduced by Law 25-11 has not yet been tested through a published decision. This cycle does report, with more cautious confidence given its reliance on a single source, that Law 25-11 has already triggered active ANPDP field inspections of private-sector technology companies for cross-border transfer non-compliance, with a 2026 enforcement calendar reportedly targeting medium-sized technology operators with international data dependencies.

Outlook

The central item to watch is whether ANPDP's active 2026 inspection campaign produces a first published enforcement decision, which would test the strengthened Law 25-11 penalty ceiling in practice and provide the first concrete precedent for how the authorisation-based cross-border transfer regime is enforced.

1 further periodic run re-emitted the standing brief unchanged and is not shown.

Sources and claims (16)
  1. Probable DataGuidance (OneTrust) — ANPDP publicly reminded companies of their obligations under Law No. 18-07, indicating active regulator engagement with controller compliance. observed
  2. Probable DataGuidance (OneTrust) — ANPDP issued recommendations concerning the disclosure of personal data, evidencing ongoing regulatory guidance activity beyond a purely dormant statutory framework. observed
  3. Probable Official Journal of the European Union — The European Commission's June 2025 Delegated Regulation confirmed Algeria's continued listing as a high-risk AML/CFT third country, a recent development materially relevant to Algeria's cross-border compliance and data-sharing risk profile. observed
  4. High DLA Piper Data Protection Laws of the World — Law No. 18-07 — Fine ranging from 20,000 to 1,000,000 DZD and/or imprisonment between two months and five years (Articles 47-74) observed
  5. High Algeria Tech News — ANPDP — No publicly reported enforcement actions as of early 2026 observed
  6. High CMS Law — Presidential Decree No. 26-07 — Dedicated cybersecurity units within public institutions, defining their missions, organisation and responsibilities observed
  7. Uncertain https://algeriatech.news/algeria-anpdp-cross-border-data-transfer-law-25-11-compliance-2026/ — ANPDP 2026 enforcement calendar — Law 25-11 has already triggered ANPDP field inspections of private-sector tech companies for cross-border transfer non-compliance, with the 2026 enforcement calendar targeting medium-sized tech operators with international data dependencies.
  8. Uncertain algeriatech.news — Law 18-07/25-11 — Tiered criminal penalties for data-protection violations: 2 months-2 years imprisonment + 20,000-200,000 DZD for rights-refusal; 2-5 years + 200,000-500,000 DZD for sensitive-data disclosure; 1-3 years + 100,000-300,000 DZD for unauthorised register access; 6 months-2 years + 60,000-200,000 DZD for obstructing ANPDP action. observed
  9. Uncertain Africa Business Insight — Individuals who believe their personal data has been used unlawfully may submit complaints to the ANPDP and may also seek legal remedies through the courts. observed
  10. Probable AlgeriaTech News — Law No. 25-11 Art. 27 bis — Establishes regional ANPDP audit and advisory poles bringing oversight closer to Algeria's wilayas; implementing regulations expected throughout 2026, while core DPO/ROPA/DPIA/breach obligations are already in force. observed
  11. Probable algeriatech.news — ANPDP — Administrative fine of 500,000 DZD (art.47) and order withdrawal/suspension of unlawful processing; repeat or grave offences referred to criminal courts (art.64) observed
  12. Uncertain AlgeriaTech.news — Law No. 18-07, as amended by Law No. 25-11 — Most serious violations carry criminal penalties of up to 10 years' imprisonment and fines up to 10,000,000 DZD observed
  13. Uncertain Gide Loyrette Nouel — Law 18-07/25-11 — 2 months-5 years imprisonment and 20,000-500,000 DZD fines, tiered by offence type (rights-refusal, sensitive-data disclosure, unauthorised register access, obstruction of ANPDP action) observed
  14. Probable Anove.ai — ANPDP enforcement powers — ANPDP may impose warning, formal notice, provisional withdrawal of authorisation for up to one year, and definitive withdrawal; failure to notify a breach within five days is itself punishable by imprisonment and a fine. observed
  15. Probable CookieYes — Law No. 18-07 of 10 June 2018 — Non-compliance is punishable by fines of DZD 20,000-1,000,000 and/or imprisonment of 2 months to 5 years under Arts. 47-74. observed
  16. Probable Gide Loyrette Nouel — ANPDP — no publicly reported enforcement action or fine as of early-to-mid 2026 observed
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Provenance and declared absence

Disclosure model: category cards load OPEN; narratives render in full; standing narratives load as a clamped teaser with an explicit “read full” control carrying the true word count. No text is hidden without disclosing how much of it there is.

Sub-modules are DP-specific nested subsections with their own real per-sub-module traffic light, rendered under each category across all regulatory modules.

Traffic-light dots are REAL data (baseline.<category>.traffic_light), not renderer-invented taxonomy, and are never suppressed -- unlike WPM, where a RAG dot would be forbidden as invented severity.

Family/accent taxonomy is renderer-level presentation config, not a JID field; it decorates the RAG dot, it does not replace it. Colour is always duplicated in text and is never the sole carrier of meaning.

Suppressed by doctrine: derived risk score. Not shown on this page.

Band honesty: uncertainty bands are computed against a frozen build clock of 2026-11-17. A year-precision row is never promoted into a tighter band.

Envelope: baseline resolved at jurisdiction_json.baseline; 10 categories, 57 sub-module(s), 94 claim(s) (94 category placement(s)), 42 source(s) in the cumulative register.

Audit trail

Machine checkChallenged on 24 Oct 2026: not upheld (21 confirmed against the cited source; 6 contradicted by the cited source; 9 could not be checked). An automated, adversarial test run by a second model; no person has assessed the result.

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GDPR article map

Cross-reference: which category/sub-module covers each UK GDPR article (38 mapped).

Show article map
GDPR article to category mapping
ArticleCategorySub-module
Art. 5Controller/Processor Dutiesaccountability and dpia
Art. 6Lawful Processing & Special Datalawful bases
Art. 7Lawful Processing & Special Dataconsent thresholds
Art. 9Lawful Processing & Special Dataspecial categories
Art. 13Data Subject Rightsdeadlines and response windows
Art. 14Data Subject Rightsdeadlines and response windows
Art. 15Data Subject Rightsaccess right
Art. 16Data Subject Rightsrectification and erasure
Art. 17Data Subject Rightsrectification and erasure
Art. 18Data Subject Rightsrestriction and objection
Art. 19Data Subject Rightsrectification and erasure
Art. 20Data Subject Rightsdata portability
Art. 21Data Subject Rightsrestriction and objection
Art. 22Algorithmic, Biometric & Surveillance Governanceautomated decision making transparency
Art. 25Controller/Processor Dutiesaccountability and dpia
Art. 28Controller/Processor Dutiesjoint controller arrangements
Art. 30Controller/Processor Dutiesropa requirements
Art. 32Controller/Processor Dutiessecurity measures
Art. 33Controller/Processor Dutiesbreach notification
Art. 34Controller/Processor Dutiesbreach notification
Art. 35Controller/Processor Dutiesaccountability and dpia
Art. 37Controller/Processor Dutiesdpo requirements
Art. 38Controller/Processor Dutiesdpo requirements
Art. 39Controller/Processor Dutiesdpo requirements
Art. 44Cross-Border & Adequacytransfer mechanisms
Art. 45Cross-Border & Adequacyadequacy received
Art. 46Cross-Border & Adequacysccs and bcrs
Art. 47Cross-Border & Adequacysccs and bcrs
Art. 48Cross-Border & Adequacytransfer mechanisms
Art. 49Cross-Border & Adequacytransfer mechanisms
Art. 77Enforcement & Redressprivate right of action
Art. 78Enforcement & Redressprivate right of action
Art. 79Enforcement & Redressprivate right of action
Art. 80Enforcement & Redresscollective redress and class actions
Art. 81Enforcement & Redresscollective redress and class actions
Art. 82Enforcement & Redressregulator powers and penalties
Art. 83Enforcement & Redressregulator powers and penalties
Art. 84Enforcement & Redressregulator powers and penalties