🔒 Data Protection Regulatory Intelligence
Data Protection Monitor · dataprotection.gi
MH v13-gdpri-1.0.0
content: ai_generated legal review: never_reviewed (informational) publication gate: 2 failing2 sources retrieved model claude-sonnet-5 · 2026-10-03

Based mainly on secondary sources. Only 2 of the sources retrieved for this jurisdiction are official or direct reporting of official material (tier 1 or 2), against the 3 we look for. No finding on this page is shown with confidence above “Uncertain” until stronger sources are retrieved.

MH

MH schema gdpri-v2 trajectory: not yet assessedunregulated gapoverlaps: FIM, WPM

The Marshall Islands has, for the first time, a dedicated personal-data statute on its books.

Data collected Data published

AI-assembled from cited sources

Not covered: Lawful Processing & Special Data, Data Subject Rights, Controller/Processor Duties, Cross-Border & Adequacy, AdTech & Commercial Privacy, Algorithmic, Biometric & Surveillance Governance, Children & Vulnerable Groups. Not fully checked this cycle: Regulator & Framework, Enforcement & Redress (3 open gaps).

10 categories · 8 claims · 5 sources in the cumulative register

10Categoriesbaseline.[]
58Sub-modulesbaseline..sub_modules{}
8Claimsbaseline..claims[]
1Tier-1 sourcesrun_metadata.t1_source_count
Traffic-light mix (sums to 10 rendered categories; click to filter)

Jurisdiction lead brief

Latest update · 11 October 2026

Lead Signal

The Marshall Islands enacted its first dedicated data-protection statute this cycle: the Personal Data Protection Act 2025 (6 MIRC Ch.4) establishes an enabling legal framework to protect the personal data and privacy of natural persons in the Republic, with the Executive Property and Social Security Office, EPSSO, designated as the competent authority. The scope of the Act is narrow in a way that matters substantially for anyone assessing the jurisdiction's overall data-protection posture: it applies only to core Government ministries and agencies, leaving the private sector, including commercial data processing of any kind, outside the Act's reach entirely. The citation and scope are drawn from the primary statute text itself, though the specific provision designating EPSSO as competent authority was not independently pinpointed this cycle.

10 of 10 categories
Signal
Density

Selections OR within a group, AND across groups. Press / to search.

#

No omnibus instrument and no general supervisory authority; only constitutional/criminal-law and sectoral fragments found.

Traffic-light rationale — RedNo omnibus instrument and no general supervisory authority; only constitutional/criminal-law and sectoral fragments found.

Sub-modules (5)

Regulator And AuthorityRed

No general data protection authority exists in RMI.

Claims (1):

  • The Republic of the Marshall Islands does not have a general data protection authority.

Act And InstrumentsRed

No general personal data protection law exists; searched for an RMI omnibus DP act, a DPA-enabling statute, and any pending bill — none located.

Claims (1):

  • The Republic of the Marshall Islands does not have a general/omnibus personal data protection law.

Material ScopeAmber

Material scope of privacy protection is defined only by the Constitution (general privacy right) and the Criminal Code 2011 (specific intrusion offences), not by any data-processing-specific statute.

Claims (2):

  • Section 13 of the Constitution of the Republic of the Marshall Islands provides a general right to be free from unreasonable interference in personal choices and from unreasonable intrusions into privacy, operating as the sole constitutional-level privacy protection absent any data-processing statute.
  • Section 250.12 of the Criminal Code 2011 [31 MIRC Ch.1] covers unlawful eavesdropping or surveillance and breach of privacy of messages, framing such conduct as a criminal offence rather than a data-processing obligation.

Territorial ScopeRed

No territorial-scope / extraterritoriality provision exists because there is no controller-facing DP statute to carry one. Searched RMI Criminal Code, Constitution and sectoral acts for an establishment/targeting test; none found.

Regulator Registration And FilingRed

No registration, notification or filing duty on controllers exists; there is no regulator to register with. Searched for a controller-registration scheme; none found.

Category narrative58 words

The Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) has no comprehensive/omnibus data-protection statute and no dedicated data-protection authority. Privacy-adjacent protection exists only as: (i) a constitutional privacy guarantee, (ii) a criminal-law prohibition on specific privacy intrusions, and (iii) fragmented sectoral confidentiality provisions in banking, tax and AML law. No registration/filing regime for controllers exists because no controller-facing statute exists.

Periodic update · new data 2026-10-11

Regulator & Framework

The Marshall Islands now has its first dedicated data-protection statute. The Personal Data Protection Act 2025, codified at 6 MIRC Chapter 4, establishes an enabling legal framework intended to protect the personal data and privacy of natural persons in the Republic. The Executive Property and Social Security Office, EPSSO, is designated as the competent authority responsible for administering the framework, according to the primary statute text retrieved this cycle, although the specific provision designating EPSSO was not independently pinpointed within that text.

The defining feature of this new framework, and the one with the most significant practical implications, is its scope: the Act applies only to core Government ministries and agencies. It is not a general data-protection law of the kind that would cover private-sector controllers and processors, commercial data handling, or data processing by non-governmental organisations. This means that, notwithstanding the enactment of a dedicated statute bearing the title Personal Data Protection Act, the private sector in the Marshall Islands remains without any general data-protection law governing how businesses collect, use, store or share personal data.

Outside the new Act, the private sector continues to rely on a narrow set of pre-existing, non-data-protection-specific legal provisions that happen to touch on privacy. Section 250.12 of the Criminal Code 2011 criminalises unlawful eavesdropping, surveillance and breach of the privacy of messages as a misdemeanour, and Article II of the Constitution guarantees a general right to personal privacy. According to secondary legal commentary, these remain the only private-sector-applicable privacy provisions in Marshall Islands law, a gap the enactment of the 2025 Act does not close.

A secondary tracker reports that the Act's effective date falls approximately twelve months after certification, which would place full commencement around November 2026; this could not be confirmed against the primary text's own commencement clause this cycle, and should be treated as an unconfirmed secondary claim pending verification.

Outlook

The central open question for the Marshall Islands' regulatory framework is whether the government intends, at some future point, to extend data-protection regulation beyond the government sector to cover private-sector controllers and processors. The enacted Act, as currently understood, does not itself signal such an intention, and the residual Criminal Code and constitutional provisions remain the only applicable private-sector privacy protections. Confirmation of the Act's actual commencement date against primary statute text, rather than secondary-source estimation, would also materially clarify the framework's practical timeline.

Sources and claims (4)
  1. UncertainDataGuidance — The Republic of the Marshall Islands does not have a general/omnibus personal data protection law.observed
  2. UncertainDataGuidance — The Republic of the Marshall Islands does not have a general data protection authority.observed
  3. UncertainDataGuidance — Section 13 of the Constitution of the Republic of the Marshall Islands provides a general right to be free from unreasonable interference in personal choices and from unreasonable intrusions into privacy, operating as the sole constitutional-level privacy protection absent any data-processing statute.observed
  4. UncertainRepublic of the Marshall Islands (hosted copy) — Section 250.12 of the Criminal Code 2011 [31 MIRC Ch.1] covers unlawful eavesdropping or surveillance and breach of privacy of messages, framing such conduct as a criminal offence rather than a data-processing obligation.observed

#

No comprehensive regime; absent_field_provenance applies to the entire module.

Traffic-light rationale — Not assessedNo comprehensive regime; absent_field_provenance applies to the entire module.

Sub-modules (4)

Lawful BasesRed

No enumerated lawful bases exist in RMI law.

Special CategoriesRed

No special/sensitive-category processing rules exist.

Pseudonymisation And AnonymisationRed

No statutory pseudonymisation/anonymisation definitions or safe-harbours exist.

Category narrative47 words

No lawful-basis regime, consent-validity standard, special-category rules, or pseudonymisation/anonymisation safe-harbour exists in RMI law, as there is no general processing statute to carry them. Searched for an RMI data-processing act, EDPB-equivalent guidance, or special-category provision; none found beyond the general constitutional privacy right already recorded under regulator_and_framework.

no periodic updates on record for this sub-brief

#

No comprehensive regime for this module; empty claims with explicit rationale per gap discipline.

Traffic-light rationale — Not assessedNo comprehensive regime for this module; empty claims with explicit rationale per gap discipline.

Sub-modules (5)

Access RightRed

No statutory subject-access-request right exists.

Rectification And ErasureRed

No statutory rectification or erasure right exists.

Restriction And ObjectionRed

No statutory restriction or objection right exists.

Data PortabilityRed

No statutory portability right exists.

Deadlines And Response WindowsRed

No statutory response deadline exists for any data-subject request, as no such request right is created by RMI law.

Category narrative32 words

No subject-access, rectification/erasure, restriction/objection, portability, or statutory response-deadline framework exists in RMI law, as there is no general data-processing statute. Searched for an RMI data-subject-rights provision or minors'-rights age threshold; none found.

#

No comprehensive controller/processor obligations regime identified.

Traffic-light rationale — Not assessedNo comprehensive controller/processor obligations regime identified.

Sub-modules (7)

Accountability And DpiaRed

No accountability principle or DPIA trigger list exists.

Dpo RequirementsRed

No DPO appointment threshold exists.

Ropa RequirementsRed

No records-of-processing duty exists.

Joint Controller ArrangementsRed

No joint-controller or processor-contract mandatory-terms rule exists.

Security MeasuresRed

No general security-of-processing standard exists outside sectoral banking/AML confidentiality provisions (see sectoral_watch).

Breach NotificationRed

No data-protection breach-notification duty (regulator or data-subject facing) exists in RMI law.

Retention And DisposalRed

No general retention-limit or disposal duty exists outside sector-specific record-keeping obligations.

Category narrative52 words

No accountability/DPIA regime, DPO threshold, ROPA duty, processor-contract mandatory-terms rule, or data-protection breach-notification duty exists in RMI law. Searched for an RMI breach-notification rule, DPIA trigger list, and DPO appointment threshold; none found. (Cyber-incident reporting regimes such as NIS2/DORA analogues are out of scope for this producer and are not assessed here.)

Periodic update · new data 2026-10-11

Controller/Processor Duties

The clearest confirmed controller-duty finding this cycle is narrow but directly sourced. Section 408 of the Personal Data Protection Act 2025 provides, in language quoted directly from the primary statute text, that any director, employee, consultant, or other legal or natural person engaged by the competent authority under the relevant chapter must maintain confidentiality of personal data obtained in the performance of their duties. This is a confidentiality obligation attaching specifically to personnel engaged by the competent authority, EPSSO, rather than a general controller or processor duty applying across government bodies more broadly, let alone the private sector.

Beyond this confidentiality provision, the Act does not appear to establish a breach-notification duty. No personal-data breach-notification obligation, whether owed to a regulator or to affected individuals and whether or not accompanied by a specified deadline, was located anywhere in Marshall Islands law for any sector. This includes sectors that might otherwise be expected to carry heightened data-handling obligations, such as gambling operators processing significant volumes of personal data in the course of their operations. This is treated as a genuine negative finding reached through direct examination of the primary statute text, rather than as an unresolved research gap: the Act simply contains no such provision for the government sector it covers, and no equivalent instrument exists for the private sector either.

No data protection impact assessment, DPIA, requirement or data protection officer, DPO, designation requirement was identified in connection with the Act or any other Marshall Islands instrument. These are significant gaps relative to comparative international frameworks, though they should be read in the context of the Act's overall narrow government-sector scope rather than as isolated omissions within an otherwise comprehensive regime.

Outlook

The confidentiality duty under Section 408, while confirmed, is narrow in application and does not substitute for the breach-notification, DPIA or DPO mechanisms that are absent from Marshall Islands law entirely. Any future amendment extending breach-notification obligations, even within the government sector the Act currently covers, would represent a materially significant development for this module, as would any sign of private-sector-directed controller or processor duties being introduced for the first time.

#

No cross-border transfer regime identified for this JID.

Traffic-light rationale — Not assessedNo cross-border transfer regime identified for this JID.

Sub-modules (6)

Transfer MechanismsRed

No statutory transfer mechanism exists.

Adequacy ReceivedRed

No adequacy decision naming RMI was located.

Adequacy GrantedRed

RMI has not granted adequacy to any third regime, as it has no adequacy-conferring instrument.

Sccs And BcrsRed

No SCC or BCR framework is recognised in RMI law.

Transfer Impact AssessmentRed

No TIA requirement exists.

Data LocalisationRed

No data-localisation mandate was located.

Category narrative64 words

RMI has received no adequacy decision from the EU/UK or other regimes and has granted none; no statutory transfer mechanism (SCCs, BCRs, derogations), transfer-impact-assessment duty, or data-localisation mandate exists, as there is no general data-protection statute to carry them. Searched for an RMI transfer-mechanism provision and for RMI's presence on the EU Commission adequacy list; no RMI-specific transfer regime or adequacy listing was located.

#

Partial sectoral coverage (financial sector) only; all other sub-modules are gaps.

Traffic-light rationale — AmberPartial sectoral coverage (financial sector) only; all other sub-modules are gaps.

Sub-modules (8)

Financial Sector OverlayAmber

The Banking Act 1987 [17 MIRC Ch.1], the Income Tax Act 1989 [48 MIRC Ch.1], and the Anti-Money Laundering Regulations 2002 each carry information-confidentiality provisions applicable to banking, tax and AML customer data respectively.

Claims (3):

  • The Banking Act 1987 [17 MIRC Ch.1] refers broadly to 'information' in a manner that addresses the protection of personal information held by banks, without a defined data-processing test.
  • The Income Tax Act 1989 [48 MIRC Ch.1] provides for the secrecy of all information concerning individual taxpayers in relation to the Secretary of Finance and every employee of the Department of Finance.
  • The Anti-Money Laundering Regulations 2002 include provisions governing customer information held by obliged entities in the Marshall Islands.

Health Sector OverlayRed

No health-sector data-confidentiality statute was located.

Telecoms And EprivacyRed

No ePrivacy/telecoms communications-data retention or access regime was located.

Employment DataRed

No employment-context data provision was located.

Credit And ScoringRed

No credit-scoring-specific data rule was located.

EducationRed

No education-sector data rule was located.

InsuranceRed

No insurance-sector data rule was located.

Data Access SharingRed

No Data-Act-equivalent horizontal data-access/sharing or smart-data scheme was located for RMI.

Category narrative36 words

Outside the general-DP gap, RMI maintains fragmented sector-specific confidentiality provisions in banking and tax law and customer-information provisions in its AML regulations. No health, telecoms/ePrivacy, employment-data, credit-scoring, education, insurance, or horizontal data-access/data-sharing (Data-Act-equivalent) regime was located.

Sources and claims (3)
  1. UncertainDataGuidance — The Banking Act 1987 [17 MIRC Ch.1] refers broadly to 'information' in a manner that addresses the protection of personal information held by banks, without a defined data-processing test.observed
  2. UncertainDataGuidance — The Income Tax Act 1989 [48 MIRC Ch.1] provides for the secrecy of all information concerning individual taxpayers in relation to the Secretary of Finance and every employee of the Department of Finance.observed
  3. UncertainDataGuidance — The Anti-Money Laundering Regulations 2002 include provisions governing customer information held by obliged entities in the Marshall Islands.observed

#

No adtech/commercial-privacy regime identified.

Traffic-light rationale — Not assessedNo adtech/commercial-privacy regime identified.

Sub-modules (6)

Cookies And TrackersRed

No cookie/tracker consent provision exists.

Dark PatternsRed

No dark-pattern prohibition was located.

Opt Out SignalsRed

No opt-out-signal recognition rule was located.

Clean Rooms And DcrRed

No clean-room/data-collaboration rule was located.

Cross Context AdvertisingRed

No cross-context-advertising rule was located.

Direct MarketingRed

No direct-marketing consent or suppression rule was located.

Category narrative29 words

No cookie/tracker consent rule, dark-pattern prohibition, opt-out-signal recognition, clean-room rule, or direct-marketing consent/suppression regime exists in RMI law. Searched for an RMI ePrivacy-equivalent or consumer-protection dark-pattern provision; none found.

#

No algorithmic/biometric/surveillance governance regime identified.

Traffic-light rationale — Not assessedNo algorithmic/biometric/surveillance governance regime identified.

Sub-modules (6)

Profiling RestrictionsRed

No profiling-restriction rule exists.

Automated Decision Making TransparencyRed

No ADM-transparency or explanation right exists.

Ai Risk AssessmentsRed

No AI-specific risk-assessment duty or AI Act interface exists for RMI (non-EU JID).

Biometric RegimeRed

No biometric-data processing condition exists.

Genetic DataRed

No genetic-data regime exists.

State Surveillance CarveoutsRed

No codified state-surveillance carve-out or national-security exemption test was located; the Criminal Code 2011 §250.12 surveillance offence (CLM-MH-004) is the only located surveillance-adjacent provision.

Category narrative34 words

No profiling restriction, ADM-transparency right, AI-specific risk-assessment duty, biometric-processing condition, genetic-data rule, or codified state-surveillance carve-out exists in RMI law. Searched for an RMI ADM/Art 22-equivalent provision, AI-specific statute, and biometric/facial-recognition rule; none found.

#

No children/vulnerable-groups data regime identified.

Traffic-light rationale — Not assessedNo children/vulnerable-groups data regime identified.

Sub-modules (5)

Age VerificationRed

No age-verification duty exists.

Minor Profiling BansRed

No minor-profiling prohibition exists.

Education SettingsRed

No education-settings-specific data rule exists.

Dependent AdultsRed

No dependent-adults data protection was located.

Category narrative27 words

No age-of-digital-consent provision, parental-consent mechanism, minor-profiling ban, education-settings data rule, or dependent-adults protection exists in RMI law. Searched for an RMI minors'-data or children's-design-code provision; none found.

#

No general enforcement/redress regime; only a narrow criminal-law penalty exists.

Traffic-light rationale — RedNo general enforcement/redress regime; only a narrow criminal-law penalty exists.

Sub-modules (6)

Regulator Powers And PenaltiesAmber

The Criminal Code 2011 [31 MIRC Ch.1] §250.12 frames unlawful eavesdropping/surveillance and breach of privacy of messages as misdemeanors; there is no administrative-fine regime because there is no DP regulator.

Claims (1):

  • Criminal Code 2011 [31 MIRC Ch.1] §250.12 frames unlawful eavesdropping or surveillance and breach of privacy of messages as misdemeanors, the sole codified penalty tier for privacy intrusion in RMI law.

Enforcement Activity IndexRed

No data-protection enforcement activity (decisions, fines) was located for RMI in the last 12 months.

Regulator Funding And CapacityRed

Not applicable; no general data-protection regulator exists to fund.

Collective Redress And Class ActionsRed

No collective-redress or class-action mechanism for data-protection claims was located.

Private Right Of ActionRed

No statutory private right of action for data-protection harm was located; civil recourse, if any, would arise only under general tort/constitutional-privacy principles, which were not independently verified in this pass.

Recent Developments 180DRed

Searched for RMI data-protection legislative or enforcement developments in the last 180 days (new statute, DPA announcement, FATF/APG RMI mutual-evaluation update); none found.

Category narrative51 words

No general data-protection regulator exists, so no Art 83/84-style administrative fine tier, cross-border procedural rule, or representative/class-action mechanism for data-protection complaints exists. The only enforcement-adjacent provision located is the Criminal Code 2011 §250.12 misdemeanor penalty for specific privacy intrusions (eavesdropping/surveillance/message-privacy breach). No RMI-specific data-protection enforcement decisions or recent-180-day developments were located.

no periodic updates on record for this sub-brief

Sources and claims (1)
  1. UncertainRepublic of the Marshall Islands (hosted copy) — Criminal Code 2011 [31 MIRC Ch.1] §250.12 frames unlawful eavesdropping or surveillance and breach of privacy of messages as misdemeanors, the sole codified penalty tier for privacy intrusion in RMI law.observed
No categories match.

Filters combine as OR inside a group and AND across groups.

Publication gate

Blocking. 2 failing check(s).

schema_validpass
min_quoted_text_presentwaived — floor 0%
translation_provenance_recordedn/a — no subject in this jurisdiction
egress_verifiedpass
min_t1_per_instrument_metn/a — no subject in this jurisdiction
jurisdiction_source_floor_metFAIL
source_tier_integrity_okpass
manual_overrideFAIL
tier_a_b_national_primary_pct50.0
aggregator_only_jurisdiction_count0

Editorial metadata

Provenance only. Nothing below gates publication or affects the render.

Editorial metadata for MH
FieldValue
trust.lawyer_review.statusnever_reviewed
trust.lawyer_review.reviewerno reviewer on record
trust.content_sourceai_generated

Provenance and declared absence

Disclosure model: category cards load OPEN; narratives render in full; standing narratives load as a clamped teaser with an explicit “read full” control carrying the true word count. No text is hidden without disclosing how much of it there is.

Sub-modules are DP-specific nested subsections with their own real per-sub-module traffic light, rendered under each category (BRIEF section 2b.5). Neither WPM nor the crypto monitor carries this field.

Traffic-light dots are REAL data (baseline.<category>.traffic_light), not renderer-invented taxonomy, and are never suppressed -- unlike WPM, where a RAG dot would be forbidden as invented severity.

Family/accent taxonomy is renderer-level presentation config, not a JID field; it decorates the RAG dot, it does not replace it. Colour is always duplicated in text and is never the sole carrier of meaning.

Suppressed by doctrine: derived risk score; derived_scores = {}.

Band honesty: uncertainty bands are computed against a frozen build clock of 2026-10-20. A year-precision row is never promoted into a tighter band.

Envelope: baseline resolved at jurisdiction_json.baseline; 10 categories, 58 sub-module(s), 8 claim(s) (8 category placement(s)), 5 source(s) in the cumulative register.

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GDPR article map

Cross-reference: which category/sub-module covers each UK GDPR article (23 mapped).

Show article map
GDPR article to category mapping
ArticleCategorySub-module
Art. 5Controller/Processor Dutiesaccountability and dpia
Art. 6Lawful Processing & Special Datalawful bases
Art. 7Lawful Processing & Special Dataconsent thresholds
Art. 9Lawful Processing & Special Dataspecial categories
Art. 15Data Subject Rightsaccess right
Art. 18Data Subject Rightsrestriction and objection
Art. 20Data Subject Rightsdata portability
Art. 21Data Subject Rightsrestriction and objection
Art. 22Algorithmic, Biometric & Surveillance Governanceautomated decision making transparency
Art. 25Controller/Processor Dutiesaccountability and dpia
Art. 28Controller/Processor Dutiesjoint controller arrangements
Art. 30Controller/Processor Dutiesropa requirements
Art. 32Controller/Processor Dutiessecurity measures
Art. 35Controller/Processor Dutiesaccountability and dpia
Art. 80Enforcement & Redresscollective redress and class actions
Art. 82Enforcement & Redressprivate right of action
Art. 13-14Data Subject Rightsaccess right
Art. 16-17Data Subject Rightsrectification and erasure
Art. 33-34Controller/Processor Dutiesbreach notification
Art. 37-39Controller/Processor Dutiesdpo requirements
Art. 44-49Cross-Border & Adequacytransfer mechanisms
Art. 77-79Enforcement & Redressregulator powers and penalties
Art. 83-84Enforcement & Redressregulator powers and penalties

Self-audit

All 10 modules were surveyed. regulator_and_framework, sectoral_watch (financial_sector_overlay only) and enforcement_and_redress (regulator_powers_and_penalties only) carry T3-sourced claims plus one T1 primary-instrument citation (Criminal Code 2011 PDF, SRC-MH-002); the remaining seven modules (lawful_processing_and_special_data, data_subject_rights, controller_processor_duties, cross_border_and_adequacy, adtech_and_commercial_privacy, algorithmic_biometric_and_surveillance_governance, children_and_vulnerable_groups) and five of six sectoral_watch sub-modules carry no findings and are recorded with explicit absent_field_provenance narratives naming the searches run. No RMI-specific T1 primary text was located for the Constitution, Banking Act 1987, Income Tax Act 1989, or AML Regulations 2002; all four rest on a single T3 secondary summary (DataGuidance).

Unresolved questions (5):

  • Is there an official RMI gazette or legislative portal (Nitijela / Office of the Attorney-General MIRC compiler) reachable to verify primary text of the Banking Act 1987 [17 MIRC Ch.1], Income Tax Act 1989 [48 MIRC Ch.1], and AML Regulations 2002?
  • What is the precise commencement date of RMI Constitution Section 13?
  • Has RMI enacted any data-protection, cybersecurity, or electronic-transactions legislation since the secondary sources surveyed here were last updated?
  • Does the RMI Banking Commission or any Financial Intelligence Unit publish binding customer-data confidentiality rules beyond the 2002 AML Regulations, and is there a current FATF/APG mutual evaluation of RMI's AML customer-information regime?
  • Is there any civil (non-criminal) private right of action available under RMI common law/tort principles for invasion of privacy, distinct from the Criminal Code 2011 misdemeanor offence?

Escalate to primary-source review: yes