Data Protection Monitor
Global Privacy & Data Protection Intelligence

Nepal Data Protection & Privacy Regulation

NP schema gdpri-v2 trajectory: not yet assessed unregulated gap

Last updated · 10 categories · 59 claims · 35 sources in the cumulative register

Nepal's data-protection enforcement architecture remains a case of statutory framework without an operational enforcer.

Data collected Data published

AI-assembled from cited sources

Not covered: Lawful Processing & Special Data, Data Subject Rights, Cross-Border & Adequacy, Sectoral Watch, AdTech & Commercial Privacy, Algorithmic, Biometric & Surveillance Governance, Children & Vulnerable Groups. Not fully checked this cycle: Regulator & Framework, Enforcement & Redress (2 open gaps).

Framework & posture10 of 10 modules active
10 active · 5 binding instruments
Next milestoneNo upcoming dated milestone on record
Record & confidence mix63 claims · 26 sources · machine-compiled
2 Confirmed34 Probable17 Contested / unverified
Evidence re-verified: ·Position last changed: ·
Record history & provenance ▾

Methodology & record provenance: Module confidence is derived from the underlying claims (source tier and primary excerpt retention), while statutory legal force is tracked independently.

Review status: AI-synthesised · Tier-1/2 verified · As-of date: 2026-11-17

Jurisdiction brief

Latest update · 8 November 2026

Lead Signal

Nepal's data-protection posture saw one notable movement: an Information Technology and Cyber Security Bill, 2082 has been tabled in Parliament and remains pending, carrying a purpose-limitation provision that would restrict the use of personal details collected through an information-technology system beyond the purpose originally disclosed, absent consent. The bill has not been enacted, and its current parliamentary stage and expected passage timing could not be established with confidence. If passed, it would be the first material tightening of personal-data handling rules in Nepal in several cycles, since the jurisdiction's existing framework is understood to rest on the Individual Privacy Act 2075 and its 2077 Regulation, the Electronic Transactions Act, and relevant constitutional provisions, rather than on a single dedicated data-protection statute.

Key regulatory facts for Nepal
Key regulatory facts for Nepal
Regulatory DimensionNepal Standing Position
JurisdictionNepal (NP)
Regulatory ScopeData Protection & Privacy Regulation (10 modules, 59 sourced findings)
Regulator & FrameworkNo independent supervisory authority exists and the seed-anchor regulator URL does not resolve to the ministry it is labelled as; the only in-force instrument (Individual Privacy Act 2018) is explicitly narrower than a comprehensive data-protection statute.
Lawful Processing & Special DataNo comprehensive lawful-basis, consent, special-category, or pseudonymisation regime identified; jurisdiction_status is unregulated_gap for this domain.
Data Subject RightsNo confirmed statutory data-subject-rights framework; absence is treated as a genuine gap given jurisdiction_status=unregulated_gap.
Controller/Processor DutiesConfirmed absence of DPO/controller-processor definitions; all other accountability sub-modules unconfirmed and treated as gaps.
Primary Instruments CitedLaw Bhandari, Nepal Divorce Law (commentary site), OneTrust DataGuidance, The Farsight Nepal, Softwarica College
Last Confirmed / Updated (35 sources in cumulative register)

#

No independent supervisory authority exists and the seed-anchor regulator URL does not resolve to the ministry it is labelled as; the only in-force instrument (Individual Privacy Act 2018) is explicitly narrower than a comprehensive data-protection statute.

Primary frameworkIndividual Privacy Act, 2075 (2018); Electronic Transactions Act, 2063 (2006)
Traffic-light rationale — RedNo independent supervisory authority exists and the seed-anchor regulator URL does not resolve to the ministry it is labelled as; the only in-force instrument (Individual Privacy Act 2018) is explicitly narrower than a comprehensive data-protection statute.

Sub-modules (5)

Regulator and authorityRed

No dedicated data protection authority exists in Nepal; the Individual Privacy Act 2018 does not establish or designate a supervisory body.

Claims (6):

  • Nepal's Individual Privacy Act, 2075 (2018) does not establish or designate an independent data protection authority or regulatory authority.
  • Ministry of Communication and Information Technology (MoCIT) — No independent dedicated data-protection authority exists; the National Data Office under the Individual Privacy Act 2075 has not been empowered as a regulatory agency
  • No independent statutory data-protection authority exists in Nepal; adjacent competence over information-technology/privacy matters sits with the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology.
  • Ministry of Communication and Information Technology (MoCIT) — No independent dedicated data-protection authority exists in Nepal; adjacent competence sits with MoCIT.
  • Individual Privacy Act, 2075 — The National Data Office created under the Act has not been empowered or operationalised as a dedicated regulatory/enforcement agency.
  • Nepal — No independent data-protection authority exists; the Individual Privacy Act 2075 created no regulator and complaints proceed to the District Court.

Act and instrumentsAmber

The Individual Privacy Act, 2075 (2018) is the primary privacy-adjacent statute currently in force; the Electronic Transactions Act, 2063 (2006) contains separate confidentiality/non-disclosure obligations for electronic records.

Claims (11):

  • The Individual Privacy Act, 2075 (2018) is Nepal's primary in-force privacy-related statute but is narrower in scope than a comprehensive GDPR-type data-protection law.
  • Nepal's Electronic Transactions Act, 2063 (2006) imposes confidentiality/non-disclosure duties on persons who obtain access to electronic records under statutory powers, functioning as an adjacent but non-comprehensive data-handling constraint.
  • Government of Nepal — Standalone Data Protection Act
  • Information Technology and Cyber Security Bill 2082 — Tabled May 2025, would replace the Electronic Transactions Act 2063 and add data-related provisions (Chapter 10); unauthenticated as of the most recent secondary reporting, no stage movement found this window
  • Government of Nepal — Standalone Data Protection Act defining data-collection purposes, use limits, data-subject rights, an independent oversight body, and penalties/remedies, for personal/biometric data under the National ID programme
  • Information Technology and Cyber Security Bill 2082 — One source states the Bill 'passed' the House of Representatives in August 2025 with full enactment unconfirmed as of mid-2026; another, dated October 2026, describes it as 'tabled' and 'under active parliamentary review'.
  • Individual Privacy Act 2075 and Regulation 2077 — Nepal's data-protection framework spans the Constitution, the Individual Privacy Act 2075, its 2020 Regulation, and the Electronic Transactions Act, rather than a single dedicated statute.
  • Information Technology and Cyber Security Bill, 2082 — A pending bill would restrict use of personal details collected through an IT system beyond the originally disclosed purpose without consent.
  • Information Technology and Cyber Security Bill, 2082 — Registered in the House of Representatives 2082-02-28 (10 June 2025); passed unanimously by the House of Representatives 14 August 2025; remains at committee-stage discussion as at the latest parliamentary tracker entry, not yet enacted.
  • Data Act, 2079 (2022) — Came into force 13 October 2022, establishing a National Data Council/National Data Office and a proposed Data Protection Board, distinct from the Individual Privacy Act 2075; status not verified at a T1 source.
  • Information Technology and Cyber Security Bill 2082 — The IT and Cyber Security Bill 2082, which would repeal the Electronic Transactions Act 2063 and introduce mandatory breach notification, passed the House of Representatives in August 2025 but has not been fully enacted as of the most recent secondary reporting located (mid-2026); no enactment found within this window.

Material scopeRed

The Act's material scope is narrower than a comprehensive personal-data regime and lacks core definitions found in GDPR-style statutes.

Claims (2):

  • The Individual Privacy Act, 2075 (2018) does not define the terms 'data controller' or 'data processor', indicating a narrower material scope than comprehensive controller/processor-based regimes.
  • Individual Privacy Act 2075 s.27(2) — Sensitive personal information as caste/ethnicity/origin, political affiliation, religious faith, physical/mental health, sexual orientation and property details; public entities prohibited from processing absent diagnosis/treatment/emergency grounds or self-publication

Territorial scopeRed

No provision establishing extraterritorial/territorial application to non-established controllers was identified in available sources.

Regulator registration and filingRed

No controller registration or filing regime exists in the absence of a supervisory authority.

Claims (1):

  • No statutory controller registration or filing obligation exists in Nepal in the absence of a designated supervisory authority under the Individual Privacy Act.
Category narrative 107 words

Nepal has no independent, dedicated data-protection authority. <cite index="6-4">The Act does not provide for a data protection authority or regulatory authority. Adjacent regulatory competence is asserted by the seed to sit with a communications/IT ministry, but live verification of the seed-injected URL (https://moics.gov.np/) during this run resolved to the Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Supplies, not a Ministry of Communication and Information Technology -- this is flagged as a QA discrepancy requiring operator confirmation of the correct MoCIT-equivalent domain. The primary in-force instrument is the Individual Privacy Act, 2075 (2018), supplemented by confidentiality/disclosure restrictions in the Electronic Transactions Act, 2063 (2006); neither constitutes a comprehensive GDPR-type statute.

Periodic update · new data 2026-11-08

Nepal continues to manage personal-data matters without a dedicated, independent data-protection authority. Adjacent competence sits with the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology, which administers the broader information-technology and communications policy space within which privacy questions arise, rather than exercising a discrete supervisory mandate over personal-data processing. The substantive legal framework remains distributed across several instruments: the Individual Privacy Act 2075 and its 2020 Regulation, the Electronic Transactions Act, and relevant constitutional protections, rather than a single consolidated statute comparable to a general data-protection law. This fragmented structure is a standing feature of the jurisdiction and has not changed.

What has changed is the emergence of a pending legislative instrument that would, if enacted, materially affect this framework. The Information Technology and Cyber Security Bill, 2082 has been tabled in Parliament and remains at an unconfirmed stage of the legislative process. Among its provisions is a purpose-limitation rule: personal details collected through an information-technology system would be restricted from use, sharing, or exchange for any purpose beyond the one originally disclosed to the data subject, absent consent. This is a meaningfully different legal posture from the current Individual Privacy Act regime, which does not appear, on the evidence available, to articulate an equivalent purpose-limitation standard with this degree of specificity.

The bill remains in consultation or pending-enactment status; no legally effective date has been established, and the current sourcing does not permit a confident statement of where in the parliamentary process the bill currently sits. It should accordingly be treated as a proposed instrument whose eventual shape, and whether its purpose-limitation provision survives in its current form, cannot yet be taken as settled. Separately, whether the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology or any other body has issued implementing regulations under the Individual Privacy Regulation 2077 since its 2020 adoption could not be established, leaving open whether the existing framework has itself evolved administratively in the years since enactment, independent of the pending bill.

Outlook

The bill's progress through Parliament is the development to track going forward. Reports suggest a path toward passage extending into 2027, though this estimate carries a wide uncertainty band and should be treated as indicative rather than firm. Should the purpose-limitation provision be enacted substantially as currently drafted, it would represent the first statutory articulation of a use-limitation principle for information-technology-collected personal data in Nepal, a meaningful structural development for a framework that has otherwise remained stable across several cycles. Confirmation of the bill's current reading stage, and of any implementing regulations issued under the 2077 Regulation, would materially improve the confidence with which this trajectory can be assessed.

2 earlier distinct updates
Periodic update · new data 2026-11-04

Nepal's Supreme Court has ordered the Government to enact a standalone Data Protection Act, ruling on a writ filed by advocate Sarita Adhikari on 8 June 2026 before a bench of Justices Sapana Pradhan Malla and Meghraj Pokharel. The order is directed specifically at data collected and processed under the National ID programme, and it is understood to require the forthcoming legislation to clearly define data collection purposes, set usage limits, articulate data-subject rights, establish an independent oversight body, and provide for penalties and remedies for non-compliance.

This is a structural development: Nepal currently has no standalone data protection statute, and the ruling does not amend an existing framework but orders the creation of one. The breadth of elements the Court specified, covering purpose limitation, use restriction, enforceable individual rights, an independent regulator, and a penalty regime, maps closely onto the core architecture found in comprehensive data protection statutes elsewhere, suggesting the Court intends a comprehensive instrument rather than a narrow sectoral rule confined to identity documents.

The order's framing around the National ID programme specifically means the first test of any resulting legislation is likely to be how it governs a large-scale government biometric identity system, rather than commercial data processing generally. This sequencing, regulation emerging first in response to a state identity programme rather than commercial adtech or cross-border transfer pressure, differs from the path many frameworks have followed elsewhere and may shape which provisions are prioritised and drafted first.

Outlook

No formal status is available on whether the Government has begun drafting the ordered Data Protection Act, or on what timeline it intends to bring legislation forward. Until such a law is enacted, data collection purposes, usage limits, data-subject rights and independent oversight for the National ID programme remain without statutory definition in Nepal, and the practical content of the ordered framework depends entirely on how the Government chooses to draft it.

Periodic update · new data 2026-10-25

Nepal has no independent statutory data-protection authority. Adjacent competence over information-technology and privacy matters currently sits with the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology, a general-purpose ministry rather than a body constituted to supervise data protection as such. This institutional gap is the structural backdrop against which the rest of the framework must be read: there is no regulator positioned to issue guidance, receive complaints at the administrative level, or enforce the Individual Privacy Act 2075 outside the court system.

The clearest open question in the framework is the status of the Information Technology and Cyber Security Bill 2082, which would, if and when fully enacted, establish a Data Protection Board and introduce a mandatory breach-notification duty that does not presently exist. The record is genuinely split on where that Bill stands: one account describes it as having passed the House of Representatives in August 2025, with full enactment unconfirmed as of mid-2026, while another account, dated October 2026, describes the Bill as still tabled and under active parliamentary review. These are not two framings of the same fact but a direct conflict between sources on whether a specific legislative step has occurred, and it is reported here as such rather than resolved in either direction.

Outlook

Resolution of the Bill's enactment status is the single development most likely to change this picture, with a loosely expected window in the fourth quarter of 2026 and a wide uncertainty band around that timing. Until the conflict in reporting is resolved, Nepal's data-protection framework continues to rest on the Individual Privacy Act 2075, administered without a dedicated regulator.

1 further periodic run re-emitted the standing brief unchanged and is not shown.

Sources and claims (21)
  1. Confirmed OneTrust DataGuidance — Nepal's Individual Privacy Act, 2075 (2018) does not establish or designate an independent data protection authority or regulatory authority. observed
  2. Confirmed OneTrust DataGuidance — The Individual Privacy Act, 2075 (2018) is Nepal's primary in-force privacy-related statute but is narrower in scope than a comprehensive GDPR-type data-protection law. observed
  3. Probable OneTrust DataGuidance — Nepal's Electronic Transactions Act, 2063 (2006) imposes confidentiality/non-disclosure duties on persons who obtain access to electronic records under statutory powers, functioning as an adjacent but non-comprehensive data-handling constraint. observed
  4. Confirmed OneTrust DataGuidance — The Individual Privacy Act, 2075 (2018) does not define the terms 'data controller' or 'data processor', indicating a narrower material scope than comprehensive controller/processor-based regimes. observed
  5. Confirmed OneTrust DataGuidance — No statutory controller registration or filing obligation exists in Nepal in the absence of a designated supervisory authority under the Individual Privacy Act. observed
  6. Probable Ministry of Communication and Information Technology — Government of Nepal — Standalone Data Protection Act observed
  7. ? Primary statutory record — Data Act 2079 establishes a National Data Council and DPA, neither fully operational as of 2026.
  8. Probable Sociair — Ministry of Communication and Information Technology (MoCIT) — No independent dedicated data-protection authority exists; the National Data Office under the Individual Privacy Act 2075 has not been empowered as a regulatory agency observed
  9. Uncertain Attorney Nepal — Information Technology and Cyber Security Bill 2082 — Tabled May 2025, would replace the Electronic Transactions Act 2063 and add data-related provisions (Chapter 10); unauthenticated as of the most recent secondary reporting, no stage movement found this window observed
  10. Probable The Farsight Nepal — Individual Privacy Act 2075 s.27(2) — Sensitive personal information as caste/ethnicity/origin, political affiliation, religious faith, physical/mental health, sexual orientation and property details; public entities prohibited from processing absent diagnosis/treatment/emergency grounds or self-publication observed
  11. Probable Ministry of Communication and Information Technology — Government of Nepal — Standalone Data Protection Act defining data-collection purposes, use limits, data-subject rights, an independent oversight body, and penalties/remedies, for personal/biometric data under the National ID programme observed
  12. Disputed WorldWatch Global — Information Technology and Cyber Security Bill 2082 — One source states the Bill 'passed' the House of Representatives in August 2025 with full enactment unconfirmed as of mid-2026; another, dated October 2026, describes it as 'tabled' and 'under active parliamentary review'. observed
  13. Probable LawAlpine — No independent statutory data-protection authority exists in Nepal; adjacent competence over information-technology/privacy matters sits with the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology. observed
  14. Probable Ministry of Communication and Information Technology — Ministry of Communication and Information Technology (MoCIT) — No independent dedicated data-protection authority exists in Nepal; adjacent competence sits with MoCIT. observed
  15. Probable Softwarica College — Individual Privacy Act 2075 and Regulation 2077 — Nepal's data-protection framework spans the Constitution, the Individual Privacy Act 2075, its 2020 Regulation, and the Electronic Transactions Act, rather than a single dedicated statute. observed
  16. Probable Sociair — Information Technology and Cyber Security Bill, 2082 — A pending bill would restrict use of personal details collected through an IT system beyond the originally disclosed purpose without consent. observed
  17. Confirmed Federal Parliament of Nepal (House of Representatives) — Information Technology and Cyber Security Bill, 2082 — Registered in the House of Representatives 2082-02-28 (10 June 2025); passed unanimously by the House of Representatives 14 August 2025; remains at committee-stage discussion as at the latest parliamentary tracker entry, not yet enacted. observed
  18. Probable Law Bhandari — Individual Privacy Act, 2075 — The National Data Office created under the Act has not been empowered or operationalised as a dedicated regulatory/enforcement agency.
  19. Uncertain Nepal Divorce Law (commentary site) — Data Act, 2079 (2022) — Came into force 13 October 2022, establishing a National Data Council/National Data Office and a proposed Data Protection Board, distinct from the Individual Privacy Act 2075; status not verified at a T1 source.
  20. Probable Ministry of Communication and Information Technology — Nepal — No independent data-protection authority exists; the Individual Privacy Act 2075 created no regulator and complaints proceed to the District Court. observed
  21. Uncertain Softwarica College — Information Technology and Cyber Security Bill 2082 — The IT and Cyber Security Bill 2082, which would repeal the Electronic Transactions Act 2063 and introduce mandatory breach notification, passed the House of Representatives in August 2025 but has not been fully enacted as of the most recent secondary reporting located (mid-2026); no enactment found within this window. observed

#

No comprehensive lawful-basis, consent, special-category, or pseudonymisation regime identified; Jurisdiction status is Unregulated gap for this domain.

Primary frameworkIndividual Privacy Act, 2075 (2018) (narrow scope only)
Traffic-light rationale — RedNo comprehensive lawful-basis, consent, special-category, or pseudonymisation regime identified; Jurisdiction status is Unregulated gap for this domain.

Sub-modules (4)

Lawful basesRed

No enumerated lawful-basis framework equivalent to GDPR Art. 6 identified.

Claims (3):

  • Individual Privacy Act 2075 — Collection, recording, storage, analysis, processing or publication of personal information only by an authorised official ('Authorized Person') or with data-subject consent; no separate enumerated set of lawful bases
  • Individual Privacy Act 2075 — Rests on three core principles — authority approval, data-subject consent, and the right to be informed — rather than an enumerated set of lawful processing bases.
  • Individual Privacy Act 2075 — The Act is organised around three core principles: authority approval, subject consent, and the right to be informed.

Special categoriesRed

No special/sensitive-category data regime (health, biometric, genetic, ethnic, political, sexual, criminal) identified.

Pseudonymisation and anonymisationRed

No pseudonymisation/anonymisation definitions or safe-harbours located.

Category narrative 69 words

No enumerated lawful-basis framework analogous to GDPR Art. 6, no codified consent-threshold standard, no special/sensitive-category regime, and no pseudonymisation/anonymisation safe-harbour was located in available Tier-1/Tier-2 material for Nepal. The Individual Privacy Act 2018 centers on protecting bodily, residential, documentary, data and correspondence privacy rather than setting out a processing-lawfulness regime; absence of a comprehensive statute (per jurisdiction_status) makes this a genuine regulatory gap rather than an omission of research.

Sources and claims (4)
  1. Probable Nepal Cloud Blog — Individual Privacy Act 2075 — Collection, recording, storage, analysis, processing or publication of personal information only by an authorised official ('Authorized Person') or with data-subject consent; no separate enumerated set of lawful bases observed
  2. Uncertain LawAlpine — Individual Privacy Act 2075 — Rests on three core principles — authority approval, data-subject consent, and the right to be informed — rather than an enumerated set of lawful processing bases. observed
  3. Uncertain https://lawalpine.com/blog/privacy-laws-in-nepal — Individual Privacy Act 2075 — The Act is organised around three core principles: authority approval, subject consent, and the right to be informed.
  4. Probable Sociair — Individual Privacy Act 2075 — Section 12 and adjacent provisions require informed, freely given consent from the data subject for the collection, recording, processing or disclosure of personal information. observed

#

No confirmed statutory data-subject-rights framework; absence is treated as a genuine gap given Jurisdiction status=unregulated_gap.

Primary frameworkIndividual Privacy Act, 2075 (2018) (narrow scope only)
Traffic-light rationale — RedNo confirmed statutory data-subject-rights framework; absence is treated as a genuine gap given Jurisdiction status=unregulated_gap.

Sub-modules (5)

Access rightRed

No confirmed statutory subject-access-request mechanism located.

Claims (1):

  • Nepal Individual Privacy Act, 2075 (2018) — a right to be informed and a right of access to one's own personal data

Rectification and erasureRed

No confirmed statutory rectification or erasure ('right to be forgotten') mechanism located.

Claims (4):

  • Nepal Individual Privacy Act, 2075 (2018) — a right to rectification and a right to erasure of inaccurate or unlawfully held personal data, together with a right to file a complaint and seek compensation via the District Court
  • Individual Privacy Act 2075 s.28 — Right to rectification of inaccurate personal data, enforceable to the District Court within a 3-month limitation period; no general access, erasure, objection or portability right exists
  • Individual Privacy Act 2075 — s.28 gives data subjects the right to request correction of inaccurate personal data on supporting evidence; the data handler must process the request 'within a reasonable time', with no fixed statutory deadline figure stated.
  • Individual Privacy Act 2075, Section 28 — Right to rectification of inaccurate personal data.

Restriction and objectionRed

No confirmed restriction-of-processing or objection/profiling opt-out right located.

Data portabilityRed

No confirmed data-portability right located.

Deadlines and response windowsRed

No confirmed statutory controller response-window/deadline regime located.

Claims (2):

  • Individual Privacy Act 2075 — A Privacy Act complaint must be filed at the District Court within 3 months of the incident.
  • Individual Privacy Act 2075 — A privacy-breach claim must be brought to the District Court within a strict 3-month limitation period.
Category narrative 40 words

No statutory subject-access, rectification/erasure, restriction/objection, portability, or defined response-window framework equivalent to a comprehensive DP statute was located for Nepal. The Individual Privacy Act 2018's rights architecture (per available secondary analysis) does not extend to a full GDPR-style data-subject-rights suite.

Sources and claims (7)
  1. Probable CaseGuard — Nepal Individual Privacy Act, 2075 (2018) — a right to be informed and a right of access to one's own personal data observed
  2. Probable LawAlpine — Nepal Individual Privacy Act, 2075 (2018) — a right to rectification and a right to erasure of inaccurate or unlawfully held personal data, together with a right to file a complaint and seek compensation via the District Court observed
  3. Probable Sociair — Individual Privacy Act 2075 s.28 — Right to rectification of inaccurate personal data, enforceable to the District Court within a 3-month limitation period; no general access, erasure, objection or portability right exists observed
  4. Probable https://lawalpine.com/blog/privacy-laws-in-nepal — Individual Privacy Act 2075 — A Privacy Act complaint must be filed at the District Court within 3 months of the incident.
  5. Uncertain LawAlpine — Individual Privacy Act 2075 — s.28 gives data subjects the right to request correction of inaccurate personal data on supporting evidence; the data handler must process the request 'within a reasonable time', with no fixed statutory deadline figure stated. observed
  6. Uncertain Attorney Nepal — Individual Privacy Act 2075, Section 28 — Right to rectification of inaccurate personal data. observed
  7. Uncertain Attorney Nepal — Individual Privacy Act 2075 — A privacy-breach claim must be brought to the District Court within a strict 3-month limitation period. observed

#

Confirmed absence of DPO/controller-processor definitions; all other accountability sub-modules unconfirmed and treated as gaps.

Primary frameworkIndividual Privacy Act, 2075 (2018) (narrow scope only)
Traffic-light rationale — RedConfirmed absence of DPO/controller-processor definitions; all other accountability sub-modules unconfirmed and treated as gaps.

Sub-modules (7)

Accountability & DPIARed

No accountability principle or DPIA-trigger regime identified.

DPO requirementsRed

The Individual Privacy Act 2018 contains no DPO definition and no DPO appointment requirement.

Claims (1):

  • The Individual Privacy Act, 2075 (2018) contains no definition of a data protection officer and imposes no requirement to appoint one.

Ropa requirementsRed

No records-of-processing-activity obligation identified.

Joint controller arrangementsRed

No joint-controller framework identified (consistent with absence of a 'data controller' definition in the Act).

Security measuresRed

No codified technical/organisational security-of-processing standard specific to personal data identified beyond general confidentiality duties under the Electronic Transactions Act.

Claims (1):

  • Information Technology and Cyber Security Bill, 2082 — Owners of 'sensitive information infrastructure' must provide the National Cyber Security Center with necessary information, conduct security audits, and assist in monitoring, under draft ss.55-58 and 47; s.54 leaves the term 'sensitive information infrastructure' to future Gazette notification.

Breach notificationRed

No statutory breach-notification duty (to regulator or data subjects) identified.

Claims (2):

  • IT and Cyber Security Bill 2082 — Statutory personal-data breach-notification obligation to a regulator or affected individuals; Digital Rights Nepal found the pending Bill leaves out a breach-victim complaint mechanism and leaves data-retention clause (s.65) ambiguous
  • Electronic Transactions Act 2063 — Nepal has no statutory personal-data breach-notification obligation and no dedicated data-protection regulator to notify; s.47 criminalises certain digital-privacy offences but creates no notification duty.

Retention and disposalRed

No statutory retention-limit or disposal-duty regime identified.

Category narrative 56 words

No accountability/DPIA regime, no DPO appointment requirement, no ROPA obligation, no joint-controller framework, and no codified breach-notification duty were located; the strongest confirmed finding is the explicit absence of a DPO requirement or of 'data controller'/'data processor' definitions in the Individual Privacy Act 2018. <cite index="6-16">There is no requirement to appoint a DPO in the Act.

Sources and claims (4)
  1. Confirmed OneTrust DataGuidance — The Individual Privacy Act, 2075 (2018) contains no definition of a data protection officer and imposes no requirement to appoint one. observed
  2. Probable Gandhi & Associates — IT and Cyber Security Bill 2082 — Statutory personal-data breach-notification obligation to a regulator or affected individuals; Digital Rights Nepal found the pending Bill leaves out a breach-victim complaint mechanism and leaves data-retention clause (s.65) ambiguous observed
  3. Probable LawAlpine — Electronic Transactions Act 2063 — Nepal has no statutory personal-data breach-notification obligation and no dedicated data-protection regulator to notify; s.47 criminalises certain digital-privacy offences but creates no notification duty. observed
  4. Probable Techpana — Information Technology and Cyber Security Bill, 2082 — Owners of 'sensitive information infrastructure' must provide the National Cyber Security Center with necessary information, conduct security audits, and assist in monitoring, under draft ss.55-58 and 47; s.54 leaves the term 'sensitive information infrastructure' to future Gazette notification. observed

#

Complete absence of confirmed cross-border transfer regulation; treated as a genuine gap consistent with Jurisdiction status=unregulated_gap.

Traffic-light rationale — RedComplete absence of confirmed cross-border transfer regulation; treated as a genuine gap consistent with Jurisdiction status=unregulated_gap.

Sub-modules (6)

Transfer mechanismsRed

No statutory cross-border transfer mechanism identified.

Claims (3):

  • Codified cross-border personal-data transfer mechanism (adequacy, SCCs, BCRs or derogations); Digital Rights Nepal's gap analysis of the pending Bill names this as unaddressed
  • Nepal cross-border personal-data-transfer regime — No cross-border personal-data-transfer mechanism (adequacy, SCCs, BCRs or statutory derogation) exists in Nepali law.
  • Information Technology and Cyber Security Bill, 2082 — Digital Rights Nepal's gap analysis identifies the absence of detailed cross-border data-transfer rules and of a complaint mechanism for people harmed by data breaches as a general gap, not itemised by named mechanism (adequacy, SCCs, BCRs).

Adequacy receivedRed

No adequacy decisions received from other regimes identified.

Adequacy grantedRed

No adequacy decisions granted by Nepal to other regimes identified (no mechanism to grant such status exists absent a comprehensive statute).

SCCs and BCRsRed

No SCC or BCR framework identified.

Transfer impact assessmentRed

No TIA requirement identified.

Data localisationRed

No general data-localisation mandate identified for personal data under the Individual Privacy Act or Electronic Transactions Act.

Claims (1):

  • Data Protection & Privacy Act 2082 (disputed) — A secondary source asserts an Act requiring in-country storage of Nepali citizens' personal data; this conflicts with better-sourced commentary stating no such comprehensive statute yet exists.
Category narrative 27 words

No transfer-mechanism regime (adequacy, SCCs, BCRs, derogations), no adequacy decisions received or granted, no TIA requirement, and no data-localisation mandate were located for Nepal in available sources.

Sources and claims (4)
  1. Disputed CyberSamir — Data Protection & Privacy Act 2082 (disputed) — A secondary source asserts an Act requiring in-country storage of Nepali citizens' personal data; this conflicts with better-sourced commentary stating no such comprehensive statute yet exists. observed
  2. Probable Gandhi & Associates — Codified cross-border personal-data transfer mechanism (adequacy, SCCs, BCRs or derogations); Digital Rights Nepal's gap analysis of the pending Bill names this as unaddressed observed
  3. Uncertain LawAlpine — Nepal cross-border personal-data-transfer regime — No cross-border personal-data-transfer mechanism (adequacy, SCCs, BCRs or statutory derogation) exists in Nepali law. observed
  4. Probable The Kathmandu Post — Information Technology and Cyber Security Bill, 2082 — Digital Rights Nepal's gap analysis identifies the absence of detailed cross-border data-transfer rules and of a complaint mechanism for people harmed by data breaches as a general gap, not itemised by named mechanism (adequacy, SCCs, BCRs). observed

#

No sector-specific DP overlays confirmed across financial, health, telecoms, employment, credit, education, or insurance sectors.

Traffic-light rationale — RedNo sector-specific DP overlays confirmed across financial, health, telecoms, employment, credit, education, or insurance sectors.

Sub-modules (7)

Financial sector overlayRed

No confirmed Nepal Rastra Bank data-privacy-specific directive was located; NRB's crypto-asset prohibition is a separate matter per seed disambiguation and is not treated as a DP overlay.

Claims (2):

  • Payment and Settlement (First Amendment) Bill, 2083 — Strict confidentiality of customer logs, accounts and personal details, capping how much financial data payment institutions may share with software vendors, subject to NRB standards
  • NRB Payment Systems-Related Unified Directives — Licensed payment institutions may only host their data centres with entities officially listed by the Department of Information Technology.

Health sector overlayRed

No health-sector-specific data-privacy overlay identified.

Telecoms and eprivacyRed

No ePrivacy-equivalent telecoms overlay identified beyond general Electronic Transactions Act confidentiality duties.

Claims (1):

  • Nepal Telecommunications Authority — NTA sectoral rules protect subscriber data, call records and location data; surveillance access requires proper legal authority and commercial reuse of subscriber data requires consent.

Employment dataRed

No employment-data-specific privacy code identified.

Credit and scoringRed

No credit-scoring-specific data rules identified.

educationRed

No education-sector-specific data rules identified.

insuranceRed

No insurance-sector-specific data rules identified.

Key findings (1)

  • Mandates strict confidentiality of customer logs, accounts and personal details, capping data-sharing with software vendors to NRB standards. — source on file
Category narrative 43 words

No sector-specific data-protection overlays (financial, health, telecoms/eprivacy, employment, credit-scoring, education, insurance) were confirmed for Nepal in available sources. Per the seed disambiguation, Nepal Rastra Bank's affirmative crypto-asset prohibition is a distinct regulatory posture unrelated to data-protection overlay and is explicitly not conflated here.

Periodic update · new data 2026-10-11

Nepal Rastra Bank's 15th Amendment to the Integrated Payment Systems Directive, 2082 introduces a financial-sector identity-verification overlay onto the country's general data-handling environment. Licensed payment service providers must verify a digital-wallet applicant's National Identity Card details before opening a wallet; for existing users, the same verification must be completed by 17 October 2026. This is a payments-regulatory instrument rather than a data-protection statute, but it has direct consequences for how personal identity data is collected, matched against a government register, and held by private payment service providers as a condition of continued service.

The amendment sits alongside Nepal's existing general-law position: there is no independent data-protection authority to oversee how the collected National ID data is secured or retained, and no statutory breach-notification duty applies if the resulting identity-linked wallet records are compromised. The overlay therefore expands the volume and sensitivity of personal data held by a regulated private sector at the same time the general protective architecture around that data remains unchanged.

Outlook

The 17 October 2026 update deadline for existing wallet holders is the operative date to watch; it will show whether enforcement reaches the installed base of users as firmly as it reaches new applicants. No indication has surfaced of a parallel identity-verification mandate being extended to other financial products or non-banking payment channels at this stage.

Sources and claims (4)
  1. Probable Ministry of Communication and Information Technology — Payment and Settlement (First Amendment) Bill, 2083 — Strict confidentiality of customer logs, accounts and personal details, capping how much financial data payment institutions may share with software vendors, subject to NRB standards observed
  2. Uncertain LawAlpine — Nepal data-access/sharing regime — No Data-Act-equivalent connected-product data-access, B2B/B2G sharing, or cloud/data-processing-service switching scheme exists in Nepali law. observed
  3. Uncertain LawAlpine — Nepal Telecommunications Authority — NTA sectoral rules protect subscriber data, call records and location data; surveillance access requires proper legal authority and commercial reuse of subscriber data requires consent. observed
  4. Probable DLA Piper — NRB Payment Systems-Related Unified Directives — Licensed payment institutions may only host their data centres with entities officially listed by the Department of Information Technology. observed

#

No adtech/commercial-privacy regulation confirmed across any sub-module.

Traffic-light rationale — RedNo adtech/commercial-privacy regulation confirmed across any sub-module.

Sub-modules (6)

Cookies and trackersRed

No cookie/tracker consent law identified.

Claims (1):

  • Individual Privacy Act 2075 — The Privacy Act 2075 does not explicitly address cookies or online identifiers.

Dark patternsRed

No dark-pattern prohibition identified.

Opt out signalsRed

No recognised opt-out signal regime (e.g., GPC-equivalent) identified.

Clean rooms and dcrRed

No clean-room/data-collaboration-room rules identified.

Cross context advertisingRed

No cross-context-advertising ('sale'/'share') regime identified.

Direct marketingRed

No direct-marketing consent or suppression regime identified.

Category narrative 21 words

No cookie/tracker consent regime, dark-pattern prohibition, recognised opt-out signal, clean-room rules, cross-context-advertising regime, or direct-marketing consent/suppression framework was located for Nepal.

Sources and claims (1)
  1. Uncertain Nepal Cloud Blog — Individual Privacy Act 2075 — The Privacy Act 2075 does not explicitly address cookies or online identifiers. observed

#

No algorithmic/biometric/surveillance-governance regime confirmed despite targeted searches on national ID and SIM-registration biometric contexts.

Traffic-light rationale — RedNo algorithmic/biometric/surveillance-governance regime confirmed despite targeted searches on national ID and SIM-registration biometric contexts.

Sub-modules (6)

Profiling restrictionsRed

No Art. 22-equivalent profiling restriction identified.

Automated decision making transparencyRed

No ADM transparency/explanation right identified.

AI risk assessmentsRed

No AI-specific risk-assessment requirement identified.

Biometric regimeRed

No biometric-data-specific regime identified, despite the existence of national ID and SIM-registration processes that likely involve biometric collection.

Claims (3):

  • Nepal Rastra Bank — NID-sole-basis biometric KYC rule struck down
  • No biometric-data-protection regime exists in Nepali data-protection law; Casino Regulations 2082 mandates biometric identification of casino entrants as a surveillance/AML control, not as a data-subject safeguard.
  • Nepal Rastra Bank — Unified/Integrated Directive 2082 provision requiring NID as sole basis for customer identification/KYC and biometric verification for bank-account opening/renewal was struck down

Genetic dataRed

No genetic-data regime identified.

State surveillance carveoutsRed

No confirmed national-security/state-surveillance carveout provisions specific to data protection identified.

Claims (1):

  • IT and Cyber Security Bill 2082 ss.47, 54-58 — A new National Cyber Security Center to require monitoring/security-audit assistance from owners of undefined 'sensitive information infrastructure', scope left to future Gazette notice
Category narrative 25 words

No profiling-restriction, ADM-transparency, AI-risk-assessment, biometric-specific, genetic-data, or state-surveillance-carveout regime was located for Nepal, including in the context of national ID and SIM-registration biometric collection practices.

Periodic update · new data 2026-11-04

Nepal's Supreme Court has struck down a provision of Nepal Rastra Bank's Unified/Integrated Directive 2082 that required the National ID card or its number to serve as the sole basis for verifying a customer's identity, including biometric verification, when opening or renewing a bank account. The ruling, handed down on 9 October 2026, holds that private-bank access to biometric data without a clear legal framework or explicit consent risks violating Article 28 of the Constitution, which protects the right to privacy.

The ruling draws a distinction between use of the National ID card as one available means of identification, which remains permissible, and its imposition as the sole mandatory basis for identity and biometric verification, which the Court found constitutionally problematic absent a clear legal framework and explicit consent. The practical effect is that banks can no longer refuse services solely because a customer declines biometric verification tied to the National ID card; customers retain other means of identification.

The decision is significant because it addresses biometric data processing in the banking sector specifically through a constitutional privacy lens, rather than through banking-regulation or consumer-protection doctrine alone, and it does so in the absence of any standalone data protection statute. This leaves the ruling operating as a freestanding constitutional check on biometric data practice pending the separate order for a standalone Data Protection Act addressed elsewhere in this review.

Whether this reasoning extends beyond banks to other sectors that have adopted similar National-ID-based biometric verification requirements, such as non-bank payment-wallet providers, is not yet settled. The ruling as reported is confined to the banking directive at issue, and no parallel finding concerning other regulated sectors has been identified.

Outlook

Whether the quashing of the National-ID-sole-basis rule extends to non-bank payment wallets, or remains confined to banks regulated under Nepal Rastra Bank's directive, remains unsettled as at mid-October 2026. The broader question of how biometric data processing will be governed once the ordered standalone Data Protection Act is drafted, including whether it will codify the Article 28 consent standard the Court applied here, is also open.

Sources and claims (4)
  1. Probable Softwarica College — Nepal Rastra Bank — NID-sole-basis biometric KYC rule struck down observed
  2. Uncertain Gandhi & Associates — No biometric-data-protection regime exists in Nepali data-protection law; Casino Regulations 2082 mandates biometric identification of casino entrants as a surveillance/AML control, not as a data-subject safeguard. observed
  3. Uncertain https://techpana.com/2025/152527/cybersecurity-bill-puts-freedom-of-expression-and-data-rights-at-risk — IT and Cyber Security Bill 2082 ss.47, 54-58 — A new National Cyber Security Center to require monitoring/security-audit assistance from owners of undefined 'sensitive information infrastructure', scope left to future Gazette notice
  4. Probable Softwarica College — Nepal Rastra Bank — Unified/Integrated Directive 2082 provision requiring NID as sole basis for customer identification/KYC and biometric verification for bank-account opening/renewal was struck down observed

#

No children/vulnerable-groups-specific data-protection regime confirmed.

Traffic-light rationale — Not assessedNo children/vulnerable-groups-specific data-protection regime confirmed.

Sub-modules (5)

Age verificationRed

No statutory age-of-consent-for-data-processing threshold identified.

Minor profiling bansRed

No minor-specific profiling ban identified.

Education settingsRed

No education-settings-specific data rule identified.

Dependent adultsRed

No dependent-adult (elderly/incapacitated) data-protection regime identified.

Category narrative 17 words

No age-of-consent-for-processing rule, parental-consent mechanism, minor-profiling ban, education-settings-specific rule, or dependent-adult protection regime was located for Nepal.

#

No DP-specific enforcement architecture exists absent a designated regulator; recent-developments search returned no Nepal-specific comprehensive-DP-law activity.

Traffic-light rationale — RedNo DP-specific enforcement architecture exists absent a designated regulator; recent-developments search returned no Nepal-specific comprehensive-DP-law activity.

Sub-modules (6)

Regulator powers and penaltiesRed

No DP-specific regulator investigative powers or maximum-penalty schedule identified, consistent with the absence of a designated supervisory authority.

Claims (6):

  • Individual Privacy Act 2075 — Penalty for breach of its provisions is capped at up to 3 years' imprisonment plus a fine up to NPR 30,000, plus compensation to the affected data subject.
  • Individual Privacy Act 2075 — Unlawful collection, disclosure or processing of personal information by up to 3 years' imprisonment, NPR 30,000 fine and compensation, enforced via District Court (3-month limitation); parallel Penal Code 2074 offences (ss.293-295) available
  • Individual Privacy Act, 2075 (2018) — Breach of the Privacy Act carries a penalty band up to three years' imprisonment and an NPR 30,000 fine.
  • Individual Privacy Act 2075 — Maximum penalty is 3 years' imprisonment plus an NPR 30,000 fine and compensation.
  • Individual Privacy Act, 2075 (2018) — Unlawful collection, disclosure or processing of personal information is punishable by up to 3 years' imprisonment and/or a fine of up to NPR 30,000, enforced via a District Court complaint subject to a strict 3-month limitation period.
  • Individual Privacy Act 2075 — Breach carries a maximum penalty of 3 years' imprisonment, an NPR 30,000 fine, and compensation to the data subject.

Enforcement activity indexRed

No enforcement-activity record (decisions, fines) under a DP-specific regime identified for the last 12 months.

Regulator funding and capacityRed

Not applicable in the absence of a designated data-protection authority.

Collective redress and class actionsRed

No DP-specific collective-redress or class-action mechanism identified.

Private right of actionRed

No confirmed DP-specific private right of action identified; general civil/criminal remedies under the Individual Privacy Act were not verified at section level.

Claims (3):

  • Individual Privacy Act 2075 — A data subject must file a complaint with the District Court within 3 months of the incident to seek redress.
  • Individual Privacy Act 2075 — A data subject's complaint must be brought to the District Court within 3 months of the incident; there is no administrative regulator route.
  • The Privacy Act, 2075 (2018) — No administrative regulator or complaints body exists; the only statutory avenues are a District Court complaint within 3 months of the act (s.30), or a police FIR for offences under s.29(3).

Recent developments 180dRed

No Nepal-specific comprehensive data-protection legislative, judicial, or regulatory development was identified within the 180 days preceding the dispatch date (2026-08-07). A candidate 'Data Protection Bill, 2024' located during research was identified as Botswana's bill (repealing/re-enacting Cap. 43:14), not a Nepal instrument, and is excluded from this baseline to avoid JID misattribution.

Claims (1):

  • No comprehensive Nepal-specific data-protection legislative or regulatory development was identified within the 180 days preceding 2026-08-07; a 'Data Protection Bill, 2024' surfaced during research is a Botswana instrument, not a Nepal instrument, and must not be attributed to JID=NP.
Category narrative 57 words

In the absence of a designated data-protection authority, no DP-specific investigative/enforcement powers, penalty schedule, enforcement-activity record, regulator funding signal, collective-redress mechanism, or private right of action tied to a comprehensive statute could be confirmed for Nepal. No developments specific to a comprehensive Nepal data-protection framework were identified within the last 180 days as of the dispatch date.

Periodic update · new data 2026-11-08

Enforcement under Nepal's Individual Privacy Act 2075 continues to operate without an independent regulator empowered to levy administrative fines of the kind found in frameworks built around a dedicated supervisory authority. Reports suggest the maximum penalty available under the Act is three years' imprisonment together with a fine of NPR 30,000 and compensation to the affected individual, a structure that routes enforcement through the general court system - specifically, claims brought to the District Court - rather than through an administrative penalty regime issued by a specialised regulator. This is a standing feature of the jurisdiction's enforcement architecture and has not changed; it is noted here because it is the frame against which any future obligations, including those that might eventually arise from the pending Information Technology and Cyber Security Bill, 2082, would have to be enforced absent the creation of a new supervisory body.

The absence of an independent regulator with administrative fining power is a structural characteristic worth stating plainly: enforcement currently depends on individuals bringing their own claims to court within the applicable limitation period, rather than on a regulator initiating investigations or issuing penalties on its own motion. This places a materially different burden on affected individuals than would exist under a model built around regulator-led enforcement, and it means that the practical deterrent effect of the Act's penalty provisions depends heavily on individual willingness and capacity to litigate, a factor the current sourcing does not allow further assessment of.

No new enforcement action, court decision, or legislative amendment to the penalty or redress provisions was identified. The pending Information Technology and Cyber Security Bill, 2082, insofar as its publicly described provisions have been reviewed, has not been shown to include a parallel enforcement or penalty mechanism of its own; whether it would do so, or would rely on the existing Individual Privacy Act redress route, has not been established.

Outlook

Without the creation of an independent authority with administrative fining power, the enforcement model identified here is likely to remain the operative one even if the pending Bill is enacted, unless the Bill's final text is shown to include its own enforcement mechanism - a question the current record does not resolve. Whether the Bill, once its provisions are more fully confirmed, introduces any change to this redress architecture is the specific point worth monitoring going forward.

1 further periodic run re-emitted the standing brief unchanged and is not shown.

Sources and claims (10)
  1. Confirmed OneTrust DataGuidance — No comprehensive Nepal-specific data-protection legislative or regulatory development was identified within the 180 days preceding 2026-08-07; a 'Data Protection Bill, 2024' surfaced during research is a Botswana instrument, not a Nepal instrument, and must not be attributed to JID=NP. observed
  2. Probable LawAlpine — Individual Privacy Act 2075 — Penalty for breach of its provisions is capped at up to 3 years' imprisonment plus a fine up to NPR 30,000, plus compensation to the affected data subject. observed
  3. Probable Sociair — Individual Privacy Act 2075 — Unlawful collection, disclosure or processing of personal information by up to 3 years' imprisonment, NPR 30,000 fine and compensation, enforced via District Court (3-month limitation); parallel Penal Code 2074 offences (ss.293-295) available observed
  4. Probable https://lawalpine.com/blog/privacy-laws-in-nepal — Individual Privacy Act, 2075 (2018) — Breach of the Privacy Act carries a penalty band up to three years' imprisonment and an NPR 30,000 fine.
  5. Probable LawAlpine — Individual Privacy Act 2075 — A data subject must file a complaint with the District Court within 3 months of the incident to seek redress. observed
  6. Probable https://lawalpine.com/blog/privacy-laws-in-nepal — Individual Privacy Act 2075 — A data subject's complaint must be brought to the District Court within 3 months of the incident; there is no administrative regulator route.
  7. Uncertain Attorney Nepal — Individual Privacy Act 2075 — Maximum penalty is 3 years' imprisonment plus an NPR 30,000 fine and compensation. observed
  8. Confirmed LawAlpine — Individual Privacy Act, 2075 (2018) — Unlawful collection, disclosure or processing of personal information is punishable by up to 3 years' imprisonment and/or a fine of up to NPR 30,000, enforced via a District Court complaint subject to a strict 3-month limitation period. observed
  9. Confirmed Government of Nepal — The Privacy Act, 2075 (2018) — No administrative regulator or complaints body exists; the only statutory avenues are a District Court complaint within 3 months of the act (s.30), or a police FIR for offences under s.29(3). observed
  10. Probable LawAlpine — Individual Privacy Act 2075 — Breach carries a maximum penalty of 3 years' imprisonment, an NPR 30,000 fine, and compensation to the data subject. observed
No categories match.

No categories match your current search or filter selection.

Provenance and declared absence

Disclosure model: category cards load OPEN; narratives render in full; standing narratives load as a clamped teaser with an explicit “read full” control carrying the true word count. No text is hidden without disclosing how much of it there is.

Sub-modules are DP-specific nested subsections with their own real per-sub-module traffic light, rendered under each category across all regulatory modules.

Traffic-light dots are REAL data (baseline.<category>.traffic_light), not renderer-invented taxonomy, and are never suppressed -- unlike WPM, where a RAG dot would be forbidden as invented severity.

Family/accent taxonomy is renderer-level presentation config, not a JID field; it decorates the RAG dot, it does not replace it. Colour is always duplicated in text and is never the sole carrier of meaning.

Suppressed by doctrine: derived risk score. Not shown on this page.

Band honesty: uncertainty bands are computed against a frozen build clock of 2026-11-17. A year-precision row is never promoted into a tighter band.

Envelope: baseline resolved at jurisdiction_json.baseline; 10 categories, 57 sub-module(s), 59 claim(s) (59 category placement(s)), 35 source(s) in the cumulative register.

Audit trail

Machine checkChallenged on 24 Oct 2026: not upheld (4 confirmed against the cited source; 1 contradicted by the cited source; 9 could not be checked). An automated, adversarial test run by a second model; no person has assessed the result.

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GDPR article map

Cross-reference: which category/sub-module covers each UK GDPR article (37 mapped).

Show article map
GDPR article to category mapping
ArticleCategorySub-module
Art. 5Controller/Processor Dutiesaccountability and dpia
Art. 6Lawful Processing & Special Datalawful bases
Art. 7Lawful Processing & Special Dataconsent thresholds
Art. 9Lawful Processing & Special Dataspecial categories
Art. 13Data Subject Rightsdeadlines and response windows
Art. 14Data Subject Rightsdeadlines and response windows
Art. 15Data Subject Rightsaccess right
Art. 16Data Subject Rightsrectification and erasure
Art. 17Data Subject Rightsrectification and erasure
Art. 18Data Subject Rightsrestriction and objection
Art. 19Data Subject Rightsrestriction and objection
Art. 20Data Subject Rightsdata portability
Art. 21Data Subject Rightsrestriction and objection
Art. 22Algorithmic, Biometric & Surveillance Governanceautomated decision making transparency
Art. 25Controller/Processor Dutiesaccountability and dpia
Art. 28Controller/Processor Dutiesjoint controller arrangements
Art. 30Controller/Processor Dutiesropa requirements
Art. 32Controller/Processor Dutiessecurity measures
Art. 33Controller/Processor Dutiesbreach notification
Art. 34Controller/Processor Dutiesbreach notification
Art. 35Controller/Processor Dutiesaccountability and dpia
Art. 37Controller/Processor Dutiesdpo requirements
Art. 38Controller/Processor Dutiesdpo requirements
Art. 39Controller/Processor Dutiesdpo requirements
Art. 44Cross-Border & Adequacytransfer mechanisms
Art. 45Cross-Border & Adequacyadequacy received
Art. 46Cross-Border & Adequacysccs and bcrs
Art. 47Cross-Border & Adequacysccs and bcrs
Art. 48Cross-Border & Adequacytransfer mechanisms
Art. 49Cross-Border & Adequacytransfer mechanisms
Art. 77Enforcement & Redressprivate right of action
Art. 78Enforcement & Redressprivate right of action
Art. 79Enforcement & Redressprivate right of action
Art. 80Enforcement & Redresscollective redress and class actions
Art. 82Enforcement & Redresscollective redress and class actions
Art. 83Enforcement & Redressregulator powers and penalties
Art. 84Enforcement & Redressregulator powers and penalties