Data Protection Monitor
Global Privacy & Data Protection Intelligence

Not every instrument is backed by its official text yet. At least one law or rulebook covered here has no official source (tier 1) retrieved for it yet. No finding on this page is shown with confidence above “Probable” until stronger sources are retrieved.

Slovenia Data Protection & Privacy Regulation

SI schema gdpri-v2 trajectory: not yet assessed regulated (omnibus) overlaps: artificial-intelligence

Last updated · 10 categories · 82 claims · 34 sources in the cumulative register

Slovenia's data protection framework is understood to set the national age threshold for a child's own valid consent to information-society services at 15 years under ZVOP-2 Article 8, below the GDPR default of 16, following a correction applied during this cycle's review.

Data collected Data published

AI-assembled from cited sources

Not fully checked this cycle: Cross-Border & Adequacy, Sectoral Watch, Enforcement & Redress (3 open gaps).

Framework & posture10 of 10 modules active
10 active · 12 binding instruments
Next milestone
DEC272031
UK adequacy decisions (GDPR + LED) renewed sunset date
Record & confidence mix81 claims · 28 sources · machine-compiled
75 Probable6 Contested / unverified
Evidence re-verified: ·Position last changed: ·
Record history & provenance ▾

Methodology & record provenance: Module confidence is derived from the underlying claims (source tier and primary excerpt retention), while statutory legal force is tracked independently.

Review status: AI-synthesised · Tier-1/2 verified · As-of date: 2026-11-17

Law made at European Economic Area (Bloc) level that applies in Slovenia is covered once, on the European Economic Area (Bloc) page. This page covers Slovenia’s own layer: implementation, national authorities, national options and local enforcement.

Jurisdiction brief

Latest update · 25 October 2026

Lead Signal

Slovenia's Constitutional Court has found that provisions governing access to beneficial-ownership and related data under the predecessor anti-money-laundering statute were inconsistent with the constitutional right to personal-data protection. The decision, numbered U-I-331/22 and dated 3 September 2026, with publication following on 24 September 2026, examined the fifth paragraph of Article 51, the second paragraph of Article 134, and the first indent of the fifth paragraph of Article 145 of the Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Act, as those provisions stood before an earlier legislative amendment. The Court held these provisions inconsistent with the third paragraph of Article 38 of the Constitution, the article protecting personal-data protection as a fundamental right. This ruling arrives at a moment when the same underlying access framework is also undergoing legislative reconstruction to meet a separate EU transposition deadline, and the two developments, one judicial and one legislative, address the same practical question of who may access beneficial-ownership data and under what procedural safeguards, from two different institutional directions.

Key regulatory facts for Slovenia
Key regulatory facts for Slovenia
Regulatory DimensionSlovenia Standing Position
JurisdictionSlovenia (SI)
Regulatory ScopeData Protection & Privacy Regulation (10 modules, 82 sourced findings)
Regulator & FrameworkComprehensive omnibus regime fully in force with an operational, EDPB-member supervisory authority and confirmed national implementing statute.
Lawful Processing & Special DataCore lawful-basis and special-category framework is GDPR-aligned and confirmed in force; one sub-module (consent thresholds) has an unresolved gap.
Data Subject RightsFull GDPR rights suite in force with confirmed active regulator engagement on a specific right (erasure) in the current cycle.
Controller/Processor DutiesCore controller/processor duties confirmed in force with recent, concrete enforcement precedent; several sub-modules (ROPA, joint-controller, retention specifics) lack SI-specific secondary sourcing.
Primary Instruments CitedUradni list RS (Official Gazette), regulations.ai Slovenia AI Overview, Slovenia Official Instrument (cms.law slovenia), IAPP, EUR-Lex / European Union
Last Confirmed / Updated (34 sources in cumulative register)

#

Comprehensive omnibus regime fully in force with an operational, EDPB-member supervisory authority and confirmed national implementing statute.

Primary frameworkGDPR (Regulation (EU) 2016/679) as implemented and supplemented by ZVOP-2 (Personal Data Protection Act, Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia)
Traffic-light rationale — GreenComprehensive omnibus regime fully in force with an operational, EDPB-member supervisory authority and confirmed national implementing statute.

Sub-modules (5)

Regulator and authorityGreen

The Information Commissioner is confirmed as Slovenia's GDPR supervisory authority and EDPB member.

Claims (7):

  • The Information Commissioner of the Republic of Slovenia (Informacijski pooblaščenec) is the national supervisory authority responsible for enforcing GDPR and ZVOP-2 in Slovenia and is a full voting member of the European Data Protection Board.
  • Informacijski pooblaščenec (IP-RS) — Autonomous, independent state authority enforcing GDPR and ZVOP-2, not subordinate to any ministry.
  • Informacijski pooblaščenec (IP) — Slovenia's single national data-protection supervisory authority, combining DP and FOI mandates
  • Informacijski pooblaščenec (IP) — The Information Commissioner of the Republic of Slovenia is the national supervisory authority responsible for enforcing GDPR and ZVOP-2 and is a full voting member of the European Data Protection Board.
  • Information Commissioner (AI Act market-surveillance role) — Under ZIUDHPUI (in force from November 2025), the IP is designated as one of five national market-surveillance authorities for the AI Act, alongside AKOS, Banka Slovenije, the Insurance Supervision Agency and the Market Inspectorate (TIRS); the IP supervises prohibited AI practices and high-risk AI systems in biometrics, education, law-enforcement, migration/asylum/border-control and justice/elections.
  • Informacijski pooblaščenec (Information Commissioner) — National supervisory authority responsible for enforcing GDPR and ZVOP-2, and a full voting member of the EDPB
  • The Information Commissioner (Informacijski pooblaščenec) is Slovenia's national supervisory authority enforcing GDPR and ZVOP-2, and is a full voting member of the EDPB.

Act and instrumentsGreen

ZVOP-2, adopted 15 December 2022, transposes GDPR into Slovenian law.

Claims (7):

  • Slovenia's Personal Data Protection Act (ZVOP-2), adopted by the National Assembly on 15 December 2022, transposes the GDPR into Slovenian national law.
  • ZVOP-2 (2022) is Slovenia's current Personal Data Protection Act, replacing ZVOP-1 (2004), in force 26 January 2023.
  • ZVOP-2 (Uradni list RS 163/22) entered into force 26 January 2023, replacing ZVOP-1 as Slovenia's GDPR-implementing statute
  • ZInfV-1 Article 67 — Article 67 of the Information Security Act (ZInfV-1, Off. Gazette 40/25) amends Article 23 of ZVOP-2
  • ZVOP-2 (Personal Data Protection Act) — ZVOP-2, adopted 15 December 2022, replaced ZVOP-1 (2004) as Slovenia's national GDPR-implementing Personal Data Protection Act, making Slovenia the last EU member state to adopt such an act.
  • ZVOP-2 (Personal Data Protection Act) — Adopted by the National Assembly on 15 December 2022; entered into force 26 January 2023, making Slovenia the last EU Member State to adopt a national GDPR-implementing act
  • The Personal Data Protection Act (ZVOP-2), enacted 2022, replaced the outdated 2004 ZVOP-1.

Material scopeGreen

ZVOP-2 covers confidentiality of processing, public-area video surveillance, special categories, biometrics, and research/archival/statistical processing.

Claims (2):

  • ZVOP-2 contains specific national provisions on the confidentiality of personal data processing, video surveillance in public areas, and the processing of special categories of personal data.
  • ZVOP-2 additionally regulates transmission of personal data in the public and private sectors, biometric data processing, and personal data processing for research, archival, and statistical purposes.

Territorial scopeGreen

GDPR Article 3 establishment- and targeting-based territorial scope applies directly in Slovenia as EU law.

Claims (1):

  • As GDPR applies directly in Slovenia as an EU Member State, GDPR Article 3's establishment-based and targeting-based extraterritorial application rules govern controllers/processors operating in or targeting data subjects in Slovenia.

Regulator registration and filingAmber

GDPR's abolition of general prior-notification/registration duties applies; no confirmed Slovenia-specific residual general filing regime was located in this pass beyond narrow sectoral possibilities.

Claims (1):

  • GDPR's abolition of general prior notification/registration duties applies in Slovenia; ZVOP-2 does not reinstate a general filing regime, though narrower national filing/registration duties may apply to specific processing operations under national law.
Category narrative 78 words

Slovenia is an EU Member State operating under the GDPR as directly-applicable EU law, implemented and supplemented nationally by the Personal Data Protection Act (ZVOP-2), adopted 15 December 2022 and in force since 2023. The Information Commissioner of the Republic of Slovenia (Informacijski pooblaščenec) is the single national supervisory authority for both general data protection and, separately, access-to-information matters. ZVOP-2 supplements GDPR with national rules on confidentiality of personal data, public-area video surveillance, biometric data, and research/archival/statistical processing.

Periodic update · new data 2026-10-19

Slovenia's data-protection regulatory architecture rests on the Information Commissioner (Informacijski pooblaščenec, IP) as the national supervisory authority responsible for enforcing both the GDPR and ZVOP-2, the Personal Data Protection Act, with the IP holding full voting membership on the European Data Protection Board. ZVOP-2 itself, adopted 15 December 2022, replaced the earlier ZVOP-1 of 2004 as Slovenia's national GDPR-implementing act, a transition notable for its timing: Slovenia was the last EU member state to adopt such an implementing act following the GDPR's entry into application.

The most material development to this standing framework is the IP's newly confirmed role under ZIUDHPUI, Slovenia's implementing act for the AI Act, in force since November 2025. ZIUDHPUI designates five national market-surveillance authorities for Regulation (EU) 2024/1689: AKOS, which serves as the single point of contact; the Information Commissioner; Banka Slovenije; the Insurance Supervision Agency; and the Market Inspectorate (TIRS). Within this five-authority structure, the IP's specific supervisory competence covers prohibited AI practices under Article 5 of the AI Act, together with high-risk AI systems operating in five sensitive domains: biometrics, education, law enforcement, migration, asylum and border control, and justice and elections.

This represents a genuine expansion of the IP's institutional footprint beyond its traditional GDPR/ZVOP-2 enforcement remit into a new regulatory domain, AI governance, where its competence is defined by subject-matter sensitivity rather than by the data-protection framework alone. The pairing of prohibited-practices oversight with high-risk-system oversight in domains that are themselves heavily personal-data-intensive, biometrics and law enforcement among them, situates the IP's new AI Act role as a natural extension of its existing data-protection expertise rather than a wholly separate competence being grafted onto an unrelated authority. At the same time, the five-authority structure means the IP's AI Act role is bounded: AKOS holds the single-point-of-contact function and the other three sectoral authorities retain jurisdiction over their respective sectors, so the IP's AI Act competence should be read as domain-specific rather than general.

The practical significance of this architectural expansion is now visible in early enforcement-relevant signals, detailed further under the Algorithmic, Biometric & Surveillance Governance module, where AKOS has confirmed receiving first complaints regarding AI-labelling non-compliance. For the Regulator & Framework picture specifically, the key structural fact is that Slovenia's data-protection authority is no longer confined to GDPR/ZVOP-2 matters alone; its mandate now extends into AI-specific market surveillance for a defined set of high-sensitivity domains, a expansion dated precisely to the November 2025 entry into force of ZIUDHPUI.

The exact press-release or primary-source announcement from the IP itself regarding this new AI Act competence has not been located this cycle; the confirming source is secondary coverage (STA/tax-fin-lex.si) rather than a primary IP-RS publication, leaving the precise primary citation as an open item notwithstanding the clear dating and substance of the underlying development.

Outlook

Confirmation of the IP's AI Act competence from a primary IP-RS source, rather than secondary STA coverage, would strengthen the standing record of this architectural expansion. Separately, how the five-authority market-surveillance structure under ZIUDHPUI operates in practice, particularly where AI systems might straddle more than one designated authority's sectoral competence, is an area to watch as enforcement activity under the new framework develops.

1 further periodic run re-emitted the standing brief unchanged and is not shown.

Sources and claims (18)
  1. Probable European Data Protection Board — The Information Commissioner of the Republic of Slovenia (Informacijski pooblaščenec) is the national supervisory authority responsible for enforcing GDPR and ZVOP-2 in Slovenia and is a full voting member of the European Data Protection Board. observed
  2. Probable DataGuidance — Slovenia's Personal Data Protection Act (ZVOP-2), adopted by the National Assembly on 15 December 2022, transposes the GDPR into Slovenian national law. observed
  3. Probable DataGuidance — ZVOP-2 contains specific national provisions on the confidentiality of personal data processing, video surveillance in public areas, and the processing of special categories of personal data. observed
  4. Probable IAPP — ZVOP-2 additionally regulates transmission of personal data in the public and private sectors, biometric data processing, and personal data processing for research, archival, and statistical purposes. observed
  5. Probable EUR-Lex / European Union — As GDPR applies directly in Slovenia as an EU Member State, GDPR Article 3's establishment-based and targeting-based extraterritorial application rules govern controllers/processors operating in or targeting data subjects in Slovenia. observed
  6. Uncertain DataGuidance — GDPR's abolition of general prior notification/registration duties applies in Slovenia; ZVOP-2 does not reinstate a general filing regime, though narrower national filing/registration duties may apply to specific processing operations under national law. observed
  7. Probable EUR-Lex — Informacijski pooblaščenec (IP-RS) — Autonomous, independent state authority enforcing GDPR and ZVOP-2, not subordinate to any ministry. observed
  8. Probable Uradni list RS (Official Gazette) — ZVOP-2 (2022) is Slovenia's current Personal Data Protection Act, replacing ZVOP-1 (2004), in force 26 January 2023. observed
  9. Probable regulations.ai Slovenia AI Overview — Informacijski pooblaščenec (IP) — Slovenia's single national data-protection supervisory authority, combining DP and FOI mandates observed
  10. Probable Uradni list RS (Official Gazette) — ZVOP-2 (Uradni list RS 163/22) entered into force 26 January 2023, replacing ZVOP-1 as Slovenia's GDPR-implementing statute observed
  11. Probable dlapiperdataprotection.com — ZInfV-1 Article 67 — Article 67 of the Information Security Act (ZInfV-1, Off. Gazette 40/25) amends Article 23 of ZVOP-2 observed
  12. Probable EUR-Lex — Informacijski pooblaščenec (IP) — The Information Commissioner of the Republic of Slovenia is the national supervisory authority responsible for enforcing GDPR and ZVOP-2 and is a full voting member of the European Data Protection Board. observed
  13. Probable Uradni list RS (Official Gazette) — ZVOP-2 (Personal Data Protection Act) — ZVOP-2, adopted 15 December 2022, replaced ZVOP-1 (2004) as Slovenia's national GDPR-implementing Personal Data Protection Act, making Slovenia the last EU member state to adopt such an act. observed
  14. Probable tax-fin-lex.si (STA) — Information Commissioner (AI Act market-surveillance role) — Under ZIUDHPUI (in force from November 2025), the IP is designated as one of five national market-surveillance authorities for the AI Act, alongside AKOS, Banka Slovenije, the Insurance Supervision Agency and the Market Inspectorate (TIRS); the IP supervises prohibited AI practices and high-risk AI systems in biometrics, education, law-enforcement, migration/asylum/border-control and justice/elections. observed
  15. Probable https://dataprotection.gi/jurisdictions/slovenia/ — Informacijski pooblaščenec (Information Commissioner) — National supervisory authority responsible for enforcing GDPR and ZVOP-2, and a full voting member of the EDPB
  16. Probable https://dataprotection.gi/jurisdictions/slovenia/ — ZVOP-2 (Personal Data Protection Act) — Adopted by the National Assembly on 15 December 2022; entered into force 26 January 2023, making Slovenia the last EU Member State to adopt a national GDPR-implementing act
  17. Probable EUR-Lex — The Information Commissioner (Informacijski pooblaščenec) is Slovenia's national supervisory authority enforcing GDPR and ZVOP-2, and is a full voting member of the EDPB. observed
  18. Probable EUR-Lex — The Personal Data Protection Act (ZVOP-2), enacted 2022, replaced the outdated 2004 ZVOP-1. observed

#

Core lawful-basis and special-category framework is GDPR-aligned and confirmed in force; one sub-module (consent thresholds) has an unresolved gap.

Primary frameworkGDPR Articles 6-11, supplemented by ZVOP-2
Traffic-light rationale — GreenCore lawful-basis and special-category framework is GDPR-aligned and confirmed in force; one sub-module (consent thresholds) has an unresolved gap.

Sub-modules (4)

Lawful basesGreen

GDPR Article 6's six lawful bases apply directly; ZVOP-2 adds public-sector derogations rather than replacing them.

Claims (1):

  • The six lawful bases for processing under GDPR Article 6 (consent, contract, legal obligation, vital interests, public task, legitimate interests) apply directly in Slovenia, with ZVOP-2 adding national derogations for certain public-sector processing.

Special categoriesGreen

ZVOP-2 contains dedicated national rules on special categories and biometric data, supplementing GDPR Article 9.

Claims (3):

  • ZVOP-2 includes dedicated national rules on the processing of special categories of personal data and on biometric data processing, supplementing the GDPR Article 9 regime.
  • ZVOP-2 uses GDPR opening clauses to specially regulate processing of health, biometric and genetic data
  • Informacijski pooblaščenec (IP) dashcam opinion — On 1 October 2026 the IP issued a non-binding opinion stating dashcam use is lawful only in rare cases under GDPR Art 6(1) and ZVOP-2's video-surveillance provisions, given the absence of SI-specific dashcam legislation; failure to establish a lawful basis requires immediate cessation of recording and may carry administrative, civil or criminal liability.

Pseudonymisation and anonymisationRed

No Slovenia-specific pseudonymisation/anonymisation safe-harbour provisions were identified in this research pass beyond the GDPR baseline definitions.

Category narrative 40 words

GDPR Articles 6-11 apply directly in Slovenia. ZVOP-2 supplements the GDPR special-categories regime (Article 9) with dedicated national rules on biometric data processing. The specific national age-of-consent derogation under GDPR Article 8 could not be confirmed in this research pass.

Periodic update · new data 2026-10-19

On 1 October 2026 the Information Commissioner issued a non-binding opinion addressing the legality of dashcam use in Slovenia, a processing context not addressed by any Slovenia-specific dashcam legislation. The opinion concludes that dashcam use is lawful only in rare cases, with the lawful basis analysis grounded in GDPR Article 6(1) and in the video-surveillance provisions of ZVOP-2. The absence of dedicated dashcam legislation means that general lawful-processing principles, rather than a purpose-built statutory framework, govern this processing activity, and the IP's opinion functions as an application of those general principles to a specific, increasingly common personal-data-processing scenario.

The opinion's practical instruction is notable for its directness: where a controller, in this context typically an individual vehicle operator, cannot establish a lawful basis for dashcam recording, the opinion states that immediate cessation of recording is required. It further notes that continued unlawful recording may carry administrative, civil, or criminal liability, indicating that the consequences of non-compliance in this specific processing context are not confined to the administrative-fine track alone but may extend into civil and criminal liability channels as well, depending on the circumstances of the recording and any downstream use or disclosure of the footage.

As guidance rather than binding law, this opinion does not itself alter ZVOP-2's statutory text or the GDPR's lawful-processing framework; it is an interpretive clarification of how those existing frameworks apply to dashcam recording specifically. The opinion is nonetheless a material development for this module because it addresses, for the first time within the scope of material reviewed, a processing activity, in-vehicle recording via dashcam, that is widespread among the public but had not previously received dedicated regulatory clarification in Slovenia. The rare-cases framing is itself informative: it signals that the IP's default position treats dashcam recording as presumptively difficult to justify under a lawful basis, rather than presumptively permissible subject to safeguards, placing the burden of justification squarely on anyone operating such a device.

The opinion's reasoning draws on ZVOP-2's general video-surveillance provisions, which were not themselves amended or newly introduced by this development; rather, the opinion represents the IP applying existing statutory video-surveillance principles to a specific technology and use case. This suggests that other emerging recording technologies with a similarly ambiguous statutory footing in Slovenia could, in principle, receive comparable opinion-based clarification from the IP going forward, following the same Article 6(1)/ZVOP-2 video-surveillance analytical template.

Outlook

Whether the IP's dashcam opinion is followed by concrete enforcement action against identified non-compliant use, or remains at the level of guidance without a dated enforcement case, is not established from the material reviewed this cycle and is a point to watch going forward.

1 further periodic run re-emitted the standing brief unchanged and is not shown.

Sources and claims (5)
  1. Probable EUR-Lex / European Union — The six lawful bases for processing under GDPR Article 6 (consent, contract, legal obligation, vital interests, public task, legitimate interests) apply directly in Slovenia, with ZVOP-2 adding national derogations for certain public-sector processing. observed
  2. Uncertain EUR-Lex / European Union — The precise national age threshold Slovenia has set for a child's own consent to information-society services under the GDPR Article 8 derogation could not be confirmed from available secondary sources in this research pass; the GDPR default of 16 applies absent a confirmed lower national threshold. observed
  3. Probable IAPP — ZVOP-2 includes dedicated national rules on the processing of special categories of personal data and on biometric data processing, supplementing the GDPR Article 9 regime. observed
  4. Probable Uradni list RS (Official Gazette) — ZVOP-2 uses GDPR opening clauses to specially regulate processing of health, biometric and genetic data observed
  5. Probable regulations.ai Slovenia AI Overview — Informacijski pooblaščenec (IP) dashcam opinion — On 1 October 2026 the IP issued a non-binding opinion stating dashcam use is lawful only in rare cases under GDPR Art 6(1) and ZVOP-2's video-surveillance provisions, given the absence of SI-specific dashcam legislation; failure to establish a lawful basis requires immediate cessation of recording and may carry administrative, civil or criminal liability. observed

#

Full GDPR rights suite in force with confirmed active regulator engagement on a specific right (erasure) in the current cycle.

Primary frameworkGDPR Articles 12-22, procedurally supplemented by ZVOP-2
Traffic-light rationale — GreenFull GDPR rights suite in force with confirmed active regulator engagement on a specific right (erasure) in the current cycle.

Sub-modules (5)

Access rightGreen

GDPR Article 15 access right applies directly; no SI-specific derogation identified.

Claims (2):

  • GDPR Articles 13-22 data subject rights, including the right of access under Article 15, apply directly and are enforced by the Slovenian Information Commissioner, supplemented procedurally by ZVOP-2.
  • GDPR Articles 13-22 — Data subject rights including right of access under Art 15 apply directly, enforced by IP-RS.

Rectification and erasureGreen

The Slovenian SA is participating in the EDPB's 2025 coordinated enforcement action on the right to erasure.

Claims (1):

  • In 2025, the Slovenian Information Commissioner is participating, alongside 29 other DPAs and the EDPS, in the EDPB's Coordinated Enforcement Framework action focused on controllers' implementation of the right to erasure (Article 17 GDPR).

Restriction and objectionAmber

GDPR Articles 18/21 apply directly; no SI-specific case identified in this pass.

Data portabilityAmber

GDPR Article 20 portability right applies directly; no SI-specific implementation guidance identified in this pass.

Deadlines and response windowsGreen

The standard one-month (extendable to three-month) response deadline under GDPR Article 12(3) applies to controller responses in Slovenia.

Claims (2):

  • The one-month standard response deadline (extendable up to three months for complex requests) under GDPR Article 12(3) applies to controller responses to data subject rights requests in Slovenia.
  • ZVOP-2 Article 8 — Age of a child's own valid consent to information-society services at 15 years, below the GDPR Art 8(1) default of 16, consistent with the Family Code
Category narrative 35 words

GDPR Articles 13-22 data subject rights apply directly and are enforced by the Information Commissioner. The Slovenian SA is an active participant in the EDPB's 2025 Coordinated Enforcement Framework focused on the right to erasure.

No new data since the standing brief. 1 periodic run re-emitted it unchanged.

Sources and claims (5)
  1. Probable EUR-Lex / European Union — GDPR Articles 13-22 data subject rights, including the right of access under Article 15, apply directly and are enforced by the Slovenian Information Commissioner, supplemented procedurally by ZVOP-2. observed
  2. Probable European Data Protection Board — In 2025, the Slovenian Information Commissioner is participating, alongside 29 other DPAs and the EDPS, in the EDPB's Coordinated Enforcement Framework action focused on controllers' implementation of the right to erasure (Article 17 GDPR). observed
  3. Probable EUR-Lex / European Union — The one-month standard response deadline (extendable up to three months for complex requests) under GDPR Article 12(3) applies to controller responses to data subject rights requests in Slovenia. observed
  4. Probable tax-fin-lex.si (STA) — GDPR Articles 13-22 — Data subject rights including right of access under Art 15 apply directly, enforced by IP-RS. observed
  5. Probable https://kibervarnost.si/zvop-2-the-slovenian-personal-data-protection-act/ — ZVOP-2 Article 8 — Age of a child's own valid consent to information-society services at 15 years, below the GDPR Art 8(1) default of 16, consistent with the Family Code

#

Core controller/processor duties confirmed in force with recent, concrete enforcement precedent; several sub-modules (ROPA, joint-controller, retention specifics) lack SI-specific secondary sourcing.

Primary frameworkGDPR Articles 5, 24-32, 35, 37-39, supplemented by ZVOP-2
Traffic-light rationale — GreenCore controller/processor duties confirmed in force with recent, concrete enforcement precedent; several sub-modules (ROPA, joint-controller, retention specifics) lack SI-specific secondary sourcing.

Sub-modules (7)

Accountability & DPIAGreen

The 2025 school case confirms active enforcement of GDPR Article 25 privacy-by-design/default duties.

Claims (1):

  • In a 2025 enforcement action, the Slovenian SA reprimanded a school and its principal after finding a failure to implement data protection by design and by default under GDPR Article 25, having granted an external school-meal-service provider unrestricted access to the entire student database, including sensitive subsidy and account-balance data, when only names and surnames were necessary.

DPO requirementsAmber

GDPR Articles 37-39 DPO thresholds apply directly; ZVOP-2 does not materially narrow them per available sources.

Claims (2):

  • GDPR Articles 37-39 DPO appointment thresholds (public authorities, large-scale systematic monitoring, large-scale special-category processing) apply directly in Slovenia; no confirmed material narrowing or widening by ZVOP-2 was identified in this pass.
  • ZVOP-2 Article 23 — DPO appointment by public-sector controllers/processors and by any controller/processor meeting specified thresholds (e.g. processing concerning 100,000+ individuals, or predominant special-category processing), in addition to the general GDPR Art 37 test

Ropa requirementsAmber

No Slovenia-specific ROPA guidance beyond the GDPR Article 30 baseline was identified in this pass.

Joint controller arrangementsAmber

No Slovenia-specific joint-controller guidance was identified in this pass beyond the GDPR Article 26 baseline.

Security measuresGreen

The 2024 FOVELLA/DODO PIZZA CCTV enforcement action illustrates active supervision of security/lawful-basis compliance under national employment-monitoring rules.

Claims (5):

  • In a 2024 enforcement action, the Slovenian SA fined FOVELLA d.o.o. (operator of the DODO PIZZA franchise) €25,000 for unlawful CCTV monitoring of employees inside a restaurant kitchen and for unlawfully live-broadcasting that footage on the company's website without a valid Article 6 GDPR legal basis, together with a reprimand for failing to inform data subjects under Article 13 GDPR and Article 76 of ZVOP-2.
  • ZVOP-2 imposes additional data-security requirements on controllers/processors beyond the GDPR baseline
  • The IP fined a controller EUR 13,491 under Art.32 GDPR for insufficient technical and organisational security measures.
  • ZVOP-2 Art 23(1) — Information Security Act risk-management and incident-notification duties apply mutatis mutandis to specified controllers
  • ZVOP-2 Art 23(1) — Information Security Act risk-management and incident-notification duties applicable to essential entities apply mutatis mutandis to controllers of listed high-risk information systems who are not already essential entities for that processing

Breach notificationGreen

GDPR Article 33's 72-hour breach-notification standard applies; the Information Commissioner maintains and periodically updates national breach-notification guidance/forms.

Claims (2):

  • Controllers in Slovenia must notify the Information Commissioner of a personal data breach without undue delay and, where feasible, within 72 hours of becoming aware of it, per GDPR Article 33.
  • ZVOP-2 Art 23 regulates data security in special processing fields and applies the Information Security Act's risk-management and incident-reporting provisions mutatis mutandis where the controller is not itself an essential entity under that Act for the relevant processing activities.

Retention and disposalAmber

No Slovenia-specific retention/disposal guidance was identified in this pass beyond the GDPR Article 5(1)(e) storage-limitation baseline.

Category narrative 37 words

GDPR accountability, DPIA, DPO, ROPA, security, and breach-notification duties apply directly in Slovenia, supplemented by ZVOP-2's stricter national employment-CCTV standard. Recent enforcement (FOVELLA/DODO PIZZA CCTV case, 2024; school data-protection-by-design case, 2025) confirms these duties are actively supervised.

No new data since the standing brief. 1 periodic run re-emitted it unchanged.

Sources and claims (10)
  1. Probable European Data Protection Board (national news, published on behalf of SI SA) — In a 2025 enforcement action, the Slovenian SA reprimanded a school and its principal after finding a failure to implement data protection by design and by default under GDPR Article 25, having granted an external school-meal-service provider unrestricted access to the entire student database, including sensitive subsidy and account-balance data, when only names and surnames were necessary. observed
  2. Probable EUR-Lex / European Union — GDPR Articles 37-39 DPO appointment thresholds (public authorities, large-scale systematic monitoring, large-scale special-category processing) apply directly in Slovenia; no confirmed material narrowing or widening by ZVOP-2 was identified in this pass. observed
  3. Probable European Data Protection Board (national news, published on behalf of SI SA) — In a 2024 enforcement action, the Slovenian SA fined FOVELLA d.o.o. (operator of the DODO PIZZA franchise) €25,000 for unlawful CCTV monitoring of employees inside a restaurant kitchen and for unlawfully live-broadcasting that footage on the company's website without a valid Article 6 GDPR legal basis, together with a reprimand for failing to inform data subjects under Article 13 GDPR and Article 76 of ZVOP-2. observed
  4. Probable EUR-Lex / European Union — Controllers in Slovenia must notify the Information Commissioner of a personal data breach without undue delay and, where feasible, within 72 hours of becoming aware of it, per GDPR Article 33. observed
  5. Probable Uradni list RS (Official Gazette) — ZVOP-2 imposes additional data-security requirements on controllers/processors beyond the GDPR baseline observed
  6. Probable dlapiperdataprotection.com — ZVOP-2 Art 23 regulates data security in special processing fields and applies the Information Security Act's risk-management and incident-reporting provisions mutatis mutandis where the controller is not itself an essential entity under that Act for the relevant processing activities. observed
  7. Probable Linklaters — ZVOP-2 Article 23 — DPO appointment by public-sector controllers/processors and by any controller/processor meeting specified thresholds (e.g. processing concerning 100,000+ individuals, or predominant special-category processing), in addition to the general GDPR Art 37 test observed
  8. Probable Uradni list RS (Official Gazette) — The IP fined a controller EUR 13,491 under Art.32 GDPR for insufficient technical and organisational security measures. observed
  9. Probable Informacijski pooblaščenec Republike Slovenije (IP-RS) — ZVOP-2 Art 23(1) — Information Security Act risk-management and incident-notification duties apply mutatis mutandis to specified controllers observed
  10. Probable Informacijski pooblaščenec Republike Slovenije (IP-RS) — ZVOP-2 Art 23(1) — Information Security Act risk-management and incident-notification duties applicable to essential entities apply mutatis mutandis to controllers of listed high-risk information systems who are not already essential entities for that processing observed

#

Standard GDPR transfer regime confirmed applicable, with concrete evidence of national SA engagement in the EU consistency mechanism on SCCs.

Primary frameworkGDPR Chapter V (Articles 44-49)
Traffic-light rationale — GreenStandard GDPR transfer regime confirmed applicable, with concrete evidence of national SA engagement in the EU consistency mechanism on SCCs.

Sub-modules (6)

Transfer mechanismsGreen

GDPR Chapter V transfer mechanisms (adequacy, SCCs, BCRs, derogations) apply directly.

Claims (2):

  • GDPR Chapter V transfer mechanisms (adequacy decisions, SCCs, BCRs, derogations) apply directly to Slovenian controllers and processors as EU law.
  • Slovenia relies directly on the GDPR's Chapter V transfer mechanisms with no additional national requirement identified

Adequacy receivedGreen

Slovenia is covered by the UK's transitional EU-adequacy regulations, enabling UK-to-Slovenia transfers without additional safeguards.

Claims (1):

  • Slovenia, as an EU Member State, is covered by the UK's transitional EU-adequacy regulations, meaning personal data can flow from the UK to Slovenia without additional transfer safeguards.

Adequacy grantedGreen

As an EU Member State, Slovenia does not independently grant adequacy; this is an EU Commission competence exercised at Union level.

SCCs and BCRsGreen

The Slovenian SA submitted draft national SCCs (Article 28(8) GDPR) to the EDPB for a consistency opinion (Opinion 17/2020).

Claims (1):

  • The Slovenian supervisory authority submitted draft national standard contractual clauses under Article 28(8) GDPR to the EDPB for a consistency opinion (Opinion 17/2020), indicating national-level SCC engagement alongside the EU-wide SCC toolkit.

Transfer impact assessmentAmber

The EU-wide Schrems II transfer-impact-assessment obligation applies directly to Slovenian exporters; no SI-specific TIA guidance beyond EDPB recommendations was identified.

Data localisationGreen

No Slovenia-specific data-localisation mandate beyond the EU-wide GDPR transfer regime was identified in this research pass.

Category narrative 42 words

GDPR Chapter V transfer mechanisms apply directly in Slovenia. Slovenia (as an EU Member State) is covered by the UK's transitional EU-adequacy regulations, and the Slovenian SA has engaged with the EDPB Article 64 consistency mechanism on national SCCs for controller-processor relationships.

No new data since the standing brief. 1 periodic run re-emitted it unchanged.

Sources and claims (4)
  1. Probable EUR-Lex / European Union — GDPR Chapter V transfer mechanisms (adequacy decisions, SCCs, BCRs, derogations) apply directly to Slovenian controllers and processors as EU law. observed
  2. Probable UK Information Commissioner's Office — Slovenia, as an EU Member State, is covered by the UK's transitional EU-adequacy regulations, meaning personal data can flow from the UK to Slovenia without additional transfer safeguards. observed
  3. Probable European Data Protection Board — The Slovenian supervisory authority submitted draft national standard contractual clauses under Article 28(8) GDPR to the EDPB for a consistency opinion (Opinion 17/2020), indicating national-level SCC engagement alongside the EU-wide SCC toolkit. observed
  4. Probable EUR-Lex — Slovenia relies directly on the GDPR's Chapter V transfer mechanisms with no additional national requirement identified observed

#

Two of seven sub-modules (employment, education) have confirmed findings; five carry absent-field provenance gaps requiring primary-source escalation.

Primary frameworkZVOP-2 sector-specific provisions supplementing GDPR
Traffic-light rationale — AmberTwo of seven sub-modules (employment, education) have confirmed findings; five carry absent-field provenance gaps requiring primary-source escalation.

Sub-modules (7)

Financial sector overlayRed

No Slovenia-specific financial-sector DP overlay was identified in this research pass.

Health sector overlayRed

No Slovenia-specific health-sector DP overlay was identified in this research pass.

Telecoms and eprivacyRed

No Slovenia-specific ePrivacy/telecoms enforcement or transposition detail was confirmed in this research pass.

Claims (1):

  • The Electronic Communications Act (ZEKom-2) implements the ePrivacy Directive 2002/58/EC in Slovenia

Employment dataGreen

ZVOP-2 Article 78 imposes an ultima ratio standard restricting employee video surveillance, confirmed via the 2024 FOVELLA enforcement action.

Claims (1):

  • ZVOP-2 Article 78 imposes an ultima ratio (last-resort) standard restricting employee video surveillance to circumstances absolutely necessary for the safety of people or property, a national employment-data overlay stricter than default GDPR Article 6 balancing.

Credit and scoringRed

No Slovenia-specific credit-scoring DP overlay was identified in this research pass.

educationGreen

The 2025 school case confirms an operative education-sector DP overlay concerning minors' data and third-party processor access.

Claims (1):

  • The Slovenian SA's 2025 enforcement action against a school over unauthorized meal-service-provider access to student data confirms an operative education-sector overlay of GDPR Article 25 data-protection-by-design duties.

insuranceRed

No Slovenia-specific insurance-sector DP overlay was identified in this research pass.

Category narrative 47 words

Direct sectoral-overlay evidence was limited in this research pass to the employment/education sectors. ZVOP-2 imposes a stricter-than-GDPR-default ultima ratio standard for employee video surveillance, and the 2025 school case demonstrates operative education-sector enforcement. Financial, health, telecoms/ePrivacy, credit-scoring, and insurance overlays were not independently confirmed in this pass.

No new data since the standing brief. 1 periodic run re-emitted it unchanged.

Sources and claims (4)
  1. Probable European Data Protection Board (national news, published on behalf of SI SA) — ZVOP-2 Article 78 imposes an ultima ratio (last-resort) standard restricting employee video surveillance to circumstances absolutely necessary for the safety of people or property, a national employment-data overlay stricter than default GDPR Article 6 balancing. observed
  2. Probable European Data Protection Board (national news, published on behalf of SI SA) — The Slovenian SA's 2025 enforcement action against a school over unauthorized meal-service-provider access to student data confirms an operative education-sector overlay of GDPR Article 25 data-protection-by-design duties. observed
  3. Probable Delo.si — The Electronic Communications Act (ZEKom-2) implements the ePrivacy Directive 2002/58/EC in Slovenia observed
  4. Uncertain Primary statutory record — EU Data Act (Regulation (EU) 2023/2854) — No Slovenian implementing or enforcement instrument, nor a designated national competent authority/data coordinator, was located this cycle; the Regulation applies directly as EU law in the interim

#

General EU ePrivacy framework presumed applicable, but no SI-specific enforcement or guidance located across any of the six sub-modules in this pass.

Primary frameworkePrivacy Directive (2002/58/EC) national transposition, operating alongside GDPR
Traffic-light rationale — AmberGeneral EU ePrivacy framework presumed applicable, but no SI-specific enforcement or guidance located across any of the six sub-modules in this pass.

Sub-modules (6)

Cookies and trackersAmber

Cookie/tracker consent is presumed governed by the national ePrivacy transposition alongside GDPR consent standards; the specific national instrument name was not independently verified in this pass.

Claims (2):

  • Cookie and tracker consent in Slovenia is presumed governed by the national transposition of the ePrivacy Directive (2002/58/EC) operating alongside GDPR consent standards and enforced by the Information Commissioner; no Slovenia-specific adtech enforcement action was identified in this research pass.
  • ZEKom-2, effective 26 January 2023, governs cookie/tracker consent in Slovenia; national maximum fine EUR 40,000, but ZVOP-2 enables GDPR-scale penalties up to EUR 20 million or 4% of global turnover.

Dark patternsRed

No SI-specific dark-pattern enforcement was identified in this research pass.

Opt out signalsRed

No SI-specific Global Privacy Control/DAA opt-out signal guidance was identified in this research pass.

Clean rooms and dcrRed

No SI-specific data clean-room/collaboration-room guidance was identified in this research pass.

Cross context advertisingRed

No SI-specific cross-context advertising enforcement or guidance was identified in this research pass.

Direct marketingAmber

No SI-specific direct-marketing consent/suppression guidance was identified in this research pass beyond the GDPR/ePrivacy baseline.

Category narrative 41 words

No Slovenia-specific adtech enforcement action (cookies/dark patterns/cross-context advertising) was identified in this research pass. Cookie and tracker consent is presumed governed by the national ePrivacy Directive transposition operating alongside GDPR consent standards, but the specific national instrument was not independently verified.

No new data since the standing brief. 1 periodic run re-emitted it unchanged.

Sources and claims (2)
  1. Uncertain European Data Protection Board — Cookie and tracker consent in Slovenia is presumed governed by the national transposition of the ePrivacy Directive (2002/58/EC) operating alongside GDPR consent standards and enforced by the Information Commissioner; no Slovenia-specific adtech enforcement action was identified in this research pass. observed
  2. Probable tax-fin-lex.si (STA) — ZEKom-2, effective 26 January 2023, governs cookie/tracker consent in Slovenia; national maximum fine EUR 40,000, but ZVOP-2 enables GDPR-scale penalties up to EUR 20 million or 4% of global turnover. observed

#

Confirmed national biometric and surveillance provisions plus active AI-privacy engagement, but three of six sub-modules lack SI-specific sourcing.

Primary frameworkGDPR Article 22 and ZVOP-2 national biometric/surveillance provisions
Traffic-light rationale — AmberConfirmed national biometric and surveillance provisions plus active AI-privacy engagement, but three of six sub-modules lack SI-specific sourcing.

Sub-modules (6)

Profiling restrictionsAmber

GDPR Article 22 profiling restrictions apply directly; no SI-specific elaboration identified in this pass.

Automated decision making transparencyAmber

GDPR Article 22 ADM transparency/explanation rights apply directly; no SI-specific elaboration identified in this pass.

AI risk assessmentsGreen

The Information Commissioner co-signed a February 2026 international joint statement on AI-generated imagery and privacy risk.

Claims (6):

  • The Information Commissioner of the Republic of Slovenia is a signatory to a February 2026 multi-regulator Joint Statement on AI-Generated Imagery and the Protection of Privacy, alongside other global data protection and privacy authorities.
  • ZIUDHPUI (AI Act implementing act) — Slovenia's ZIUDHPUI, in force since November 2025, designates five market-surveillance authorities for Regulation (EU) 2024/1689: AKOS (single point of contact), the Information Commissioner, Banka Slovenije, the Insurance Supervision Agency, and the Market Inspectorate (TIRS); the Information Commissioner supervises prohibited AI practices (Art 5) and high-risk AI systems in biometrics, education, law-enforcement, migration/asylum/border-control and justice/elections.
  • AKOS confirmed, in reporting dated 10 October 2026 during EU Cybersecurity Month, that it has received its first complaints concerning the non-labelling of AI-generated products (including deepfakes) used by business users, the first enforcement-relevant signal under Slovenia's AI Act transparency obligations.
  • AI Act enforcement bodies (AKOS, IP-RS, Banka Slovenije, Market Inspectorate) — AI Act fines for prohibited AI practices can reach EUR 35 million or 7% of worldwide turnover, enforced via national administrative/inspection procedures under ZUP and ZIN.
  • ZIUDHPUI (AI Act implementing law) — AKOS as Slovenia's single point of contact, central market-surveillance authority, and AI regulatory-sandbox authority under the EU AI Act; Information Commissioner retains jurisdiction over high-risk AI systems processing personal data
  • Under ZIUDHPUI, the Information Commissioner is designated as a market surveillance authority for AI systems that process personal data or impact fundamental rights.

Biometric regimeGreen

ZVOP-2 contains a dedicated national legal framework regulating biometric data processing.

Claims (2):

  • ZVOP-2 contains a dedicated national legal framework regulating biometric data processing, operating as a national specification permitted under GDPR Article 9(4).
  • ZVOP-2 contains Slovenia-specific detailed rules regarding video surveillance, biometrics, and traceability

Genetic dataAmber

No SI-specific genetic-data regime elaboration was identified in this research pass beyond the GDPR Article 9 baseline.

State surveillance carveoutsGreen

ZVOP-2 separately regulates video surveillance in public areas as a national carve-out area addressed alongside GDPR's general processing rules.

Claims (3):

  • ZVOP-2 separately regulates video surveillance in public areas, addressed alongside (not superseding) GDPR's general processing rules.
  • Information Commissioner (IP-RS) — Non-binding dashcam legality opinion, 1 October 2026
  • Information Commissioner (IP-RS) — Non-binding opinion (1 October 2026) finding dashcam use lawful only in very rare cases, as most recordings fall outside the household-activity exemption in GDPR Art 2(2)(c)
Category narrative 50 words

ZVOP-2 contains a dedicated national biometric-data regime and separately addresses public-area video surveillance. The Slovenian Information Commissioner has also co-signed a February 2026 international joint statement on AI-generated imagery and privacy. Profiling restrictions, ADM transparency, and genetic-data specifics rely on the GDPR baseline without confirmed SI-specific elaboration in this pass.

Periodic update · new data 2026-10-19

Slovenia's algorithmic and AI-governance architecture has been substantially clarified this cycle through ZIUDHPUI, the national implementing act for the AI Act (Regulation (EU) 2024/1689), in force since November 2025. The act designates five national market-surveillance authorities: AKOS, which holds the single-point-of-contact role; the Information Commissioner; Banka Slovenije; the Insurance Supervision Agency; and the Market Inspectorate (TIRS). Within this structure, the Information Commissioner's specific competence covers prohibited AI practices under Article 5 of the AI Act and high-risk AI systems operating in biometrics, education, law enforcement, migration, asylum and border control, and justice and elections, a set of domains chosen for their intersection with personal-data sensitivity and fundamental-rights exposure.

The practical operation of this governance framework is no longer purely structural. AKOS confirmed, in reporting dated 10 October 2026 during EU Cybersecurity Month, that it has received its first complaints concerning the non-labelling of AI-generated products, including deepfakes, used by business users. This is described as the first enforcement-relevant signal under Slovenia's AI Act transparency obligations, meaning that the labelling and transparency requirements that the AI Act imposes on AI-generated content are now generating reportable activity in practice, barely a year after the implementing act's entry into force. The confirmation came from Nataša Vidmar Kraljević, head of the AI sector at AKOS, in Slovenian-language reporting, and the translated substance of her confirmation is that first-wave complaints specifically concern the failure to label AI-generated outputs, rather than other categories of AI Act non-compliance such as prohibited-practice violations or high-risk-system non-conformity.

The significance of this development is best read as an early-stage effectiveness signal for a governance framework that is barely a year old: a designated market-surveillance structure that is already receiving complaints indicates the transparency obligations are reaching public and business awareness sufically for non-compliance to be flagged and reported, rather than the framework remaining dormant on paper. At the same time, the fact that these are described as "first complaints" means there is, as yet, no confirmed enforcement decision, penalty, or formal finding of non-compliance arising from them; the development is a reporting-activity signal, not an enforcement-outcome signal.

This AI-governance expansion sits alongside, rather than replaces, the Information Commissioner's traditional data-protection competence. The domains of IP high-risk-system oversight, biometrics, law enforcement, migration and border control, justice and elections, are domains that are themselves heavily reliant on personal-data processing, meaning the IP's AI Act role and its GDPR/ZVOP-2 role are likely to intersect substantially in practice even though they derive from formally distinct legal instruments: the AI Act on one hand and the GDPR/ZVOP-2 framework on the other.

The five-authority designation structure also means that not every AI-related complaint or concern will fall to the Information Commissioner specifically; the AKOS first-complaints signal itself concerns AI-generated-content labelling, which appears to sit within AKOS's own single-point-of-contact and sectoral competence rather than being a matter the IP would supervise directly, illustrating the practical division of labour contemplated by ZIUDHPUI's five-authority model.

Outlook

Whether AKOS's first AI-labelling complaints develop into a named enforcement decision, and whether the Information Commissioner's own high-risk-system and prohibited-practice competence under ZIUDHPUI generates comparable enforcement-relevant signals in its specific domains (biometrics, law enforcement, migration, justice and elections), are both open items to watch in subsequent reporting periods.

1 further periodic run re-emitted the standing brief unchanged and is not shown.

Sources and claims (11)
  1. Probable European Data Protection Supervisor (co-signatories) — The Information Commissioner of the Republic of Slovenia is a signatory to a February 2026 multi-regulator Joint Statement on AI-Generated Imagery and the Protection of Privacy, alongside other global data protection and privacy authorities. observed
  2. Probable IAPP — ZVOP-2 contains a dedicated national legal framework regulating biometric data processing, operating as a national specification permitted under GDPR Article 9(4). observed
  3. Probable DataGuidance — ZVOP-2 separately regulates video surveillance in public areas, addressed alongside (not superseding) GDPR's general processing rules. observed
  4. Probable jadek-pensa.si — ZIUDHPUI (AI Act implementing act) — Slovenia's ZIUDHPUI, in force since November 2025, designates five market-surveillance authorities for Regulation (EU) 2024/1689: AKOS (single point of contact), the Information Commissioner, Banka Slovenije, the Insurance Supervision Agency, and the Market Inspectorate (TIRS); the Information Commissioner supervises prohibited AI practices (Art 5) and high-risk AI systems in biometrics, education, law-enforcement, migration/asylum/border-control and justice/elections. observed
  5. Probable Delo.si — AKOS confirmed, in reporting dated 10 October 2026 during EU Cybersecurity Month, that it has received its first complaints concerning the non-labelling of AI-generated products (including deepfakes) used by business users, the first enforcement-relevant signal under Slovenia's AI Act transparency obligations. observed
  6. Probable regulations.ai Slovenia AI Overview — AI Act enforcement bodies (AKOS, IP-RS, Banka Slovenije, Market Inspectorate) — AI Act fines for prohibited AI practices can reach EUR 35 million or 7% of worldwide turnover, enforced via national administrative/inspection procedures under ZUP and ZIN. observed
  7. Probable Uradni list RS (Official Gazette) — ZVOP-2 contains Slovenia-specific detailed rules regarding video surveillance, biometrics, and traceability observed
  8. Probable AKOS — ZIUDHPUI (AI Act implementing law) — AKOS as Slovenia's single point of contact, central market-surveillance authority, and AI regulatory-sandbox authority under the EU AI Act; Information Commissioner retains jurisdiction over high-risk AI systems processing personal data observed
  9. Uncertain regulations.ai Slovenia AI Overview — Under ZIUDHPUI, the Information Commissioner is designated as a market surveillance authority for AI systems that process personal data or impact fundamental rights. observed
  10. Probable DataGuidance — Information Commissioner (IP-RS) — Non-binding dashcam legality opinion, 1 October 2026 observed
  11. Probable DataGuidance — Information Commissioner (IP-RS) — Non-binding opinion (1 October 2026) finding dashcam use lawful only in very rare cases, as most recordings fall outside the household-activity exemption in GDPR Art 2(2)(c) observed

#

One sub-module (education settings) is well-evidenced; age verification/parental consent, minor profiling bans, and dependent adults carry unresolved gaps.

Primary frameworkGDPR Article 8, supplemented by ZVOP-2 and education-sector enforcement precedent
Traffic-light rationale — AmberOne sub-module (education settings) is well-evidenced; age verification/parental consent, minor profiling bans, and dependent adults carry unresolved gaps.

Sub-modules (5)

Age verificationAmber

Slovenia's specific national age-of-consent threshold was not confirmed in this research pass.

Claims (1):

  • Slovenia's specific national age-of-consent threshold under the GDPR Article 8 derogation for children's consent to information-society services was not confirmed in this research pass; absent a confirmed derogation, the GDPR default age of 16 would presumptively apply.

Minor profiling bansRed

No Slovenia-specific minor-profiling ban was identified in this research pass beyond the GDPR Recital 38 baseline caution on profiling minors.

Education settingsGreen

The 2025 school case is direct evidence of operative enforcement protecting minors' data in the education setting.

Claims (1):

  • The 2025 Slovenian SA decision addressing unauthorized third-party access to a school's student database (including minors' subsidy and financial data) demonstrates operative enforcement of data-protection-by-design duties in the education setting for minors' data.

Dependent adultsRed

No Slovenia-specific dependent-adult data-protection provisions were identified in this research pass.

Category narrative 39 words

The 2025 school enforcement case confirms operative protection of minors' data in the education setting. The specific national age-of-consent threshold under GDPR Article 8 was not confirmed in this pass, and minor-profiling-ban and dependent-adult specifics were not independently identified.

No new data since the standing brief. 1 periodic run re-emitted it unchanged.

Sources and claims (3)
  1. Uncertain EUR-Lex / European Union — Slovenia's specific national age-of-consent threshold under the GDPR Article 8 derogation for children's consent to information-society services was not confirmed in this research pass; absent a confirmed derogation, the GDPR default age of 16 would presumptively apply. observed
  2. Probable European Data Protection Board (national news, published on behalf of SI SA) — The 2025 Slovenian SA decision addressing unauthorized third-party access to a school's student database (including minors' subsidy and financial data) demonstrates operative enforcement of data-protection-by-design duties in the education setting for minors' data. observed
  3. Probable Uradni list RS (Official Gazette) — ZVOP-2 Article 8 specifically regulates a child's consent to information-society services as a category requiring special protection observed

#

Regulator powers, penalty ceilings, and recent enforcement activity are well-evidenced; regulator funding/capacity specifics remain unconfirmed.

Primary frameworkGDPR Articles 58, 77-84, supplemented by ZVOP-2 procedural provisions
Traffic-light rationale — GreenRegulator powers, penalty ceilings, and recent enforcement activity are well-evidenced; regulator funding/capacity specifics remain unconfirmed.

Sub-modules (6)

Regulator powers and penaltiesGreen

The Information Commissioner may impose GDPR Article 83 maximum fines and other corrective measures (reprimands, processing bans).

Claims (11):

  • The Information Commissioner may impose administrative fines up to the GDPR Article 83 maxima (up to €20 million or 4% of global annual turnover, whichever is higher, for the most serious infringements), alongside corrective powers such as reprimands and processing bans.
  • GDPR Article 83 — Lower-tier fine ceiling EUR 10 million or 2% of worldwide turnover; higher tier EUR 20 million or 4%, enforceable by IP-RS.
  • ZVOP-2's own administrative-offence fines for legal entities range from EUR 100 to EUR 40,000, distinct from GDPR-ceiling fines.
  • ZVOP-2 administrative-offence fines for legal entities amount up to EUR 40,000, distinct from GDPR's own EUR 10m/20m ceilings
  • Informacijski pooblaščenec (IP) — The IP may impose GDPR/ZVOP-2 fines itself via a fast-track misdemeanour procedure under the Minor Offences Act (ZP-1), proceedings usually initiated ex officio
  • GDPR Art 83 / ZVOP-2 Art 114 — GDPR Art 83 empowers the IP to impose fines up to 4% of annual worldwide turnover or EUR 20 million (whichever is higher); ZVOP-2 additionally provides for sanctions against responsible persons and individuals up to EUR 40,000, with fine calculation following the Minor Offences Act together with GDPR Art 83(1) and ZVOP-2 Art 114; public authorities cannot be fined under the Minor Offences Act.
  • ZVOP-2 — Treats GDPR violations as misdemeanours (prekrški), with the Information Commissioner as prekršek body, and separately permits fines up to EUR 40,000 against a 'responsible person' (director, CEO or DPO), in addition to corporate GDPR Art 83 fines
  • Information Commissioner (IP-RS) — ZP-1 + GDPR Art 83(1) + ZVOP-2 Art 114
  • ZVOP-2 misdemeanour provision (breach of Art 84) — EUR 16,000-40,000 for medium/large companies
  • Information Commissioner (IP-RS) — IP-RS applies the Minor Offences Act (ZP-1) general criteria together with GDPR Art 83(1) and ZVOP-2 Art 114 when calculating fines for Art 83(4)-(6) GDPR infringements
  • ZVOP-2 misdemeanour provision (breach of Art 84) — EUR 16,000 to EUR 40,000 for legal entities classed as medium or large companies on breach of ZVOP-2 Art 84; lower bands (from EUR 100) apply to individuals and other misdemeanours

Enforcement activity indexGreen

2023 annual report figures and the 2024 FOVELLA fine evidence active enforcement.

Claims (4):

  • During 2023, Slovenia's Information Commissioner received, handled, and advised on 1,146 requests to open investigation procedures, including 7 cases of unauthorized processing, as reported in its annual report submitted to the National Assembly on 21 May 2024.
  • In 2024, the Slovenian SA imposed a €25,000 administrative fine on FOVELLA d.o.o. for unlawful employee CCTV monitoring and unlawful live broadcast of that footage, together with a reprimand for transparency failures.
  • IP-RS — Highest fine to date, EUR 71,474, on an employer for covert employee monitoring, decision dated 11 December 2025, plus EUR 4,000 on the responsible individual.
  • FOVELLA d.o.o. — EUR 25,000 in 2024 for unlawful employee CCTV monitoring and live-broadcast

Regulator funding and capacityAmber

No specific headcount/budget figures for the Information Commissioner were identified in this research pass.

Collective redress and class actionsAmber

GDPR Article 80 representative-action mechanics apply directly; no SI-specific collective-redress expansion was confirmed.

Claims (2):

  • GDPR Articles 79-80 provide data subjects in Slovenia with a direct judicial remedy against controllers/processors and the right to mandate a not-for-profit body to lodge complaints or seek judicial remedy on their behalf; no SI-specific expansion of collective redress beyond the GDPR baseline was confirmed in this pass.
  • Class actions/model declaratory proceedings are not available for decisions issued in Slovenian personal-data matters

Private right of actionGreen

GDPR Article 79 provides a direct judicial remedy for data subjects against controllers/processors in Slovenia.

Claims (2):

  • GDPR Articles 79-80 provide data subjects in Slovenia with a direct judicial remedy against controllers/processors and the right to mandate a not-for-profit body to lodge complaints or seek judicial remedy on their behalf; no SI-specific expansion of collective redress beyond the GDPR baseline was confirmed in this pass.
  • ZVOP-2 / GDPR Art 79 — Individuals may pursue judicial protection directly before the Administrative Court of the Republic of Slovenia for data-protection-rights violations

Recent developments 180dGreen

Within the recent reporting window, the Slovenian SA is running the 2025 EDPB right-to-erasure coordinated enforcement action and co-signed a February 2026 joint statement on AI-generated imagery privacy risk.

Claims (2):

  • The Slovenian SA is running its 2025 EDPB Coordinated Enforcement Framework action on the right to erasure and issued a May 2025 decision on school data-protection-by-design failures; a February 2026 joint international statement on AI-generated imagery privacy risks was also co-signed by the Slovenian Information Commissioner.
  • Ustavno sodišče Republike Slovenije (Constitutional Court) — By decision U-I-331/22 of 3 September 2026 (published 24 September 2026), ZPPDFT-2 Art 51(5), Art 134(2) and the first indent of Art 145(5), as they stood before the ZPPDFT-2A amendment, were inconsistent with Article 38(3) of the Constitution (right to personal-data protection)
Category narrative 58 words

The Information Commissioner holds full GDPR Article 58/83 investigative and corrective powers, including fines up to the GDPR maxima. Enforcement activity in the reporting window includes the 2024 FOVELLA/DODO PIZZA fine, the 2025 school data-protection-by-design reprimand, and ongoing participation in the EDPB's 2025 right-to-erasure coordinated enforcement action. GDPR Articles 79-80 provide direct judicial remedy and representative-body complaint mechanisms.

Periodic update · new data 2026-10-25

Slovenia's enforcement and redress landscape registered a significant judicial development with the Constitutional Court's decision U-I-331/22, dated 3 September 2026 and published 24 September 2026. The Court examined provisions of the Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Act governing access to beneficial-ownership and related data, specifically the fifth paragraph of Article 51, the second paragraph of Article 134, and the first indent of the fifth paragraph of Article 145, as those provisions stood before an earlier legislative amendment took effect. The Court held that these predecessor provisions were inconsistent with the third paragraph of Article 38 of the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia, the constitutional provision establishing the right to the protection of personal data. This is a confirmed constitutional ruling on a discrete set of statutory provisions rather than a broader pronouncement on the anti-money-laundering access regime as a whole, and its scope should be read as limited to the specific pre-amendment provisions the Court examined.

This ruling should be read within Slovenia's broader, already-established enforcement architecture rather than as a standalone event. The Information Commissioner continues to function as the national supervisory authority responsible for enforcing both the General Data Protection Regulation and the national Personal Data Protection Act, and treats violations as misdemeanours for which it acts as the competent prekršek body, with fines of up to EUR 40,000 available against a responsible individual such as a director, chief executive, or data protection officer, in addition to the corporate fining powers available under Article 83 of the General Data Protection Regulation. Individuals retain the standing right to pursue judicial protection directly before the Administrative Court of the Republic of Slovenia for violations of their data-protection rights, a route that operates alongside, rather than in place of, the Information Commissioner's own enforcement powers. The most recent concrete enforcement record available involves a EUR 25,000 fine imposed in 2024 against a company for unlawful employee closed-circuit-television monitoring and live-broadcast of that footage, which remains the clearest illustration of the Commissioner's enforcement activity in the recent period, notwithstanding that it predates.

The Constitutional Court's ruling is of particular interest because it demonstrates that the boundary between financial-crime-reporting obligations and personal-data-protection rights in Slovenia is subject to active judicial testing, and that such testing can result in a finding of constitutional inconsistency even for provisions embedded within a sector-specific statute rather than the general data-protection framework itself. This suggests that Slovenia's courts are prepared to scrutinise data-access provisions wherever they appear in the statute book, not only within instruments explicitly framed as data-protection law.

Outlook

The immediate practical question arising from this ruling is how the legislature responds in its ongoing redesign of beneficial-ownership-register access procedures, an exercise already under way to meet separate European transposition requirements. Whether the Information Commissioner or the Constitutional Court will see further referrals testing other access provisions connected to financial-crime-reporting obligations is not indicated by the evidence available and should be treated as an open question. The existing enforcement architecture, including the Information Commissioner's misdemeanour powers, the available fines against both corporate and responsible-person defendants, and the private right of recourse before the Administrative Court, remains otherwise unchanged and continues to operate as the backdrop against which this ruling's practical effects will play out.

1 further periodic run re-emitted the standing brief unchanged and is not shown.

Sources and claims (20)
  1. Probable EUR-Lex / European Union — The Information Commissioner may impose administrative fines up to the GDPR Article 83 maxima (up to €20 million or 4% of global annual turnover, whichever is higher, for the most serious infringements), alongside corrective powers such as reprimands and processing bans. observed
  2. Probable DataGuidance — During 2023, Slovenia's Information Commissioner received, handled, and advised on 1,146 requests to open investigation procedures, including 7 cases of unauthorized processing, as reported in its annual report submitted to the National Assembly on 21 May 2024. observed
  3. Probable European Data Protection Board (national news, published on behalf of SI SA) — In 2024, the Slovenian SA imposed a €25,000 administrative fine on FOVELLA d.o.o. for unlawful employee CCTV monitoring and unlawful live broadcast of that footage, together with a reprimand for transparency failures. observed
  4. Probable EUR-Lex / European Union — GDPR Articles 79-80 provide data subjects in Slovenia with a direct judicial remedy against controllers/processors and the right to mandate a not-for-profit body to lodge complaints or seek judicial remedy on their behalf; no SI-specific expansion of collective redress beyond the GDPR baseline was confirmed in this pass. observed
  5. Probable European Data Protection Board — The Slovenian SA is running its 2025 EDPB Coordinated Enforcement Framework action on the right to erasure and issued a May 2025 decision on school data-protection-by-design failures; a February 2026 joint international statement on AI-generated imagery privacy risks was also co-signed by the Slovenian Information Commissioner. observed
  6. Probable IUS-INFO — Ustavno sodišče Republike Slovenije (Constitutional Court) — By decision U-I-331/22 of 3 September 2026 (published 24 September 2026), ZPPDFT-2 Art 51(5), Art 134(2) and the first indent of Art 145(5), as they stood before the ZPPDFT-2A amendment, were inconsistent with Article 38(3) of the Constitution (right to personal-data protection) observed
  7. Probable dlapiperdataprotection.com — GDPR Article 83 — Lower-tier fine ceiling EUR 10 million or 2% of worldwide turnover; higher tier EUR 20 million or 4%, enforceable by IP-RS. observed
  8. Probable jadek-pensa.si — ZVOP-2's own administrative-offence fines for legal entities range from EUR 100 to EUR 40,000, distinct from GDPR-ceiling fines. observed
  9. Probable Delo.si — IP-RS — Highest fine to date, EUR 71,474, on an employer for covert employee monitoring, decision dated 11 December 2025, plus EUR 4,000 on the responsible individual. observed
  10. Probable Delo.si — ZVOP-2 administrative-offence fines for legal entities amount up to EUR 40,000, distinct from GDPR's own EUR 10m/20m ceilings observed
  11. Probable jadek-pensa.si — Informacijski pooblaščenec (IP) — The IP may impose GDPR/ZVOP-2 fines itself via a fast-track misdemeanour procedure under the Minor Offences Act (ZP-1), proceedings usually initiated ex officio observed
  12. Probable jadek-pensa.si — Class actions/model declaratory proceedings are not available for decisions issued in Slovenian personal-data matters observed
  13. Probable https://cms.law/en/deu/publication/gdpr-enforcement-tracker-report/slovenia — GDPR Art 83 / ZVOP-2 Art 114 — GDPR Art 83 empowers the IP to impose fines up to 4% of annual worldwide turnover or EUR 20 million (whichever is higher); ZVOP-2 additionally provides for sanctions against responsible persons and individuals up to EUR 40,000, with fine calculation following the Minor Offences Act together with GDPR Art 83(1) and ZVOP-2 Art 114; public authorities cannot be fined under the Minor Offences Act.
  14. Probable Complico Consulting — ZVOP-2 — Treats GDPR violations as misdemeanours (prekrški), with the Information Commissioner as prekršek body, and separately permits fines up to EUR 40,000 against a 'responsible person' (director, CEO or DPO), in addition to corporate GDPR Art 83 fines observed
  15. Probable dataprotection.gi — FOVELLA d.o.o. — EUR 25,000 in 2024 for unlawful employee CCTV monitoring and live-broadcast observed
  16. Probable Kibervarnost.si — ZVOP-2 / GDPR Art 79 — Individuals may pursue judicial protection directly before the Administrative Court of the Republic of Slovenia for data-protection-rights violations observed
  17. Probable CMS — Information Commissioner (IP-RS) — ZP-1 + GDPR Art 83(1) + ZVOP-2 Art 114 observed
  18. Probable Pravno-informacijski sistem Republike Slovenije (PISRS) — ZVOP-2 misdemeanour provision (breach of Art 84) — EUR 16,000-40,000 for medium/large companies observed
  19. Probable CMS — Information Commissioner (IP-RS) — IP-RS applies the Minor Offences Act (ZP-1) general criteria together with GDPR Art 83(1) and ZVOP-2 Art 114 when calculating fines for Art 83(4)-(6) GDPR infringements observed
  20. Probable Pravno-informacijski sistem Republike Slovenije (PISRS) — ZVOP-2 misdemeanour provision (breach of Art 84) — EUR 16,000 to EUR 40,000 for legal entities classed as medium or large companies on breach of ZVOP-2 Art 84; lower bands (from EUR 100) apply to individuals and other misdemeanours observed
No categories match.

No categories match your current search or filter selection.

Provenance and declared absence

Disclosure model: category cards load OPEN; narratives render in full; standing narratives load as a clamped teaser with an explicit “read full” control carrying the true word count. No text is hidden without disclosing how much of it there is.

Sub-modules are DP-specific nested subsections with their own real per-sub-module traffic light, rendered under each category across all regulatory modules.

Traffic-light dots are REAL data (baseline.<category>.traffic_light), not renderer-invented taxonomy, and are never suppressed -- unlike WPM, where a RAG dot would be forbidden as invented severity.

Family/accent taxonomy is renderer-level presentation config, not a JID field; it decorates the RAG dot, it does not replace it. Colour is always duplicated in text and is never the sole carrier of meaning.

Suppressed by doctrine: derived risk score. Not shown on this page.

Band honesty: uncertainty bands are computed against a frozen build clock of 2026-11-17. A year-precision row is never promoted into a tighter band.

Envelope: baseline resolved at jurisdiction_json.baseline; 10 categories, 57 sub-module(s), 82 claim(s) (82 category placement(s)), 34 source(s) in the cumulative register.

Audit trail

Machine checkChallenged on 24 Oct 2026: not settled (3 could not be checked). An automated, adversarial test run by a second model; no person has assessed the result.

Think something on this page is wrong? Report an error.

GDPR article map

Cross-reference: which category/sub-module covers each UK GDPR article (38 mapped).

Show article map
GDPR article to category mapping
ArticleCategorySub-module
Art. 5Controller/Processor Dutiesaccountability and dpia
Art. 6Lawful Processing & Special Datalawful bases
Art. 7Lawful Processing & Special Dataconsent thresholds
Art. 8Children & Vulnerable Groupsparental consent
Art. 9Lawful Processing & Special Dataspecial categories
Art. 13Data Subject Rightsaccess right
Art. 14Data Subject Rightsaccess right
Art. 15Data Subject Rightsaccess right
Art. 16Data Subject Rightsrectification and erasure
Art. 17Data Subject Rightsrectification and erasure
Art. 18Data Subject Rightsrestriction and objection
Art. 19Data Subject Rightsrectification and erasure
Art. 20Data Subject Rightsdata portability
Art. 21Data Subject Rightsrestriction and objection
Art. 22Algorithmic, Biometric & Surveillance Governanceautomated decision making transparency
Art. 25Controller/Processor Dutiesaccountability and dpia
Art. 28Controller/Processor Dutiesjoint controller arrangements
Art. 30Controller/Processor Dutiesropa requirements
Art. 32Controller/Processor Dutiessecurity measures
Art. 33Controller/Processor Dutiesbreach notification
Art. 34Controller/Processor Dutiesbreach notification
Art. 35Controller/Processor Dutiesaccountability and dpia
Art. 37Controller/Processor Dutiesdpo requirements
Art. 38Controller/Processor Dutiesdpo requirements
Art. 39Controller/Processor Dutiesdpo requirements
Art. 44Cross-Border & Adequacytransfer mechanisms
Art. 45Cross-Border & Adequacyadequacy received
Art. 46Cross-Border & Adequacysccs and bcrs
Art. 47Cross-Border & Adequacysccs and bcrs
Art. 48Cross-Border & Adequacytransfer mechanisms
Art. 49Cross-Border & Adequacytransfer mechanisms
Art. 77Enforcement & Redressprivate right of action
Art. 78Enforcement & Redressprivate right of action
Art. 79Enforcement & Redressprivate right of action
Art. 80Enforcement & Redresscollective redress and class actions
Art. 82Enforcement & Redresscollective redress and class actions
Art. 83Enforcement & Redressregulator powers and penalties
Art. 84Enforcement & Redressregulator powers and penalties