Data Protection Monitor
Global Privacy & Data Protection Intelligence

Not every instrument is backed by its official text yet. At least one law or rulebook covered here has no official source (tier 1) retrieved for it yet. No finding on this page is shown with confidence above “Probable” until stronger sources are retrieved.

Laos Data Protection & Privacy Regulation

LA schema gdpri-v2 trajectory: not yet assessed unregulated gap overlaps: Sentinel (AML/CFT), World Payments

Last updated · 10 categories · 86 claims · 23 sources in the cumulative register

Laos is understood to have no independent data-protection authority, with the Ministry of Technology and Communications combining rule-setting, business-facilitation and enforcement functions under the electronic data protection law.

Data collected Data published

AI-assembled from cited sources

Not covered: AdTech & Commercial Privacy, Children & Vulnerable Groups. Not fully checked this cycle: Regulator & Framework (1 open gap).

Framework & posture10 of 10 modules active
10 active · 4 binding instruments
Next milestoneNo upcoming dated milestone on record
Record & confidence mix104 claims · 23 sources · machine-compiled
68 Probable18 Contested / unverified
Evidence re-verified: ·Position last changed: ·
Record history & provenance ▾

Methodology & record provenance: Module confidence is derived from the underlying claims (source tier and primary excerpt retention), while statutory legal force is tracked independently.

Review status: AI-synthesised · Tier-1/2 verified · As-of date: 2026-11-17

Jurisdiction brief

Latest update · 25 October 2026

Lead Signal

Laos has brought a new Law on Cybersecurity, numbered 87/NA, into force, with gazettal recorded on 20 March 2026 and an effective date understood to reach back to 1 September 2025. The instrument sits alongside the existing Law on Electronic Data Protection No. 25/NA rather than replacing it, and the two now operate as parallel regimes covering overlapping ground without a single authority positioned to reconcile them. The Ministry of Technology and Communications, which already carried responsibility for the 2017 data-protection law, continues as the body overseeing compliance and enforcement, and Laos still has no independent data-protection authority separate from that ministry.

Key regulatory facts for Laos
Key regulatory facts for Laos
Regulatory DimensionLaos Standing Position
JurisdictionLaos (LA)
Regulatory ScopeData Protection & Privacy Regulation (10 modules, 86 sourced findings)
Regulator & FrameworkNo independent regulator; core instrument identity/number is contested across otherwise authoritative sources; World Bank explicitly characterizes the framework as non-comprehensive.
Lawful Processing & Special DataAbsence of special-category protections and of purpose-limitation/minimisation principles is an explicit, sourced gap finding.
Data Subject RightsNo sourced evidence of an operative subject-rights regime; treated as an explicit gap rather than silently omitted.
Controller/Processor DutiesExplicit, sourced World Bank finding of misallocated breach responsibility and absent accountability infrastructure.
Primary Instruments CitedAsia IP Law, Laos Official Instrument (clym.io e-data-protection-law-no-25na-la), Asia IP Law, iLaw Asia, Digwatch
Last Confirmed / Updated (23 sources in cumulative register)

#

No independent regulator; core instrument identity/number is contested across otherwise authoritative sources; World Bank explicitly characterizes the framework as non-comprehensive.

Primary frameworkLaw on Electronic Data Protection No. 25/NA (12 May 2017), also cited as Law on Protection of Electronic Data No. 117/PO (23 June 2017), with implementing Guideline No. 2128 (2018)
Traffic-light rationale — RedNo independent regulator; core instrument identity/number is contested across otherwise authoritative sources; World Bank explicitly characterizes the framework as non-comprehensive.

Sub-modules (5)

Regulator and authorityRed

MTC is the implementing ministry for electronic data protection; there is no independent DPA equivalent to GDPR-style supervisory authorities.

Claims (7):

  • The Ministry of Technology and Communications is the implementing authority for Laos's electronic data protection law, and Laos has no independent data-protection authority separating rule-setting, business-facilitation and enforcement functions.
  • Ministry of Technology and Communications (MTC) is sole implementing and enforcing authority: MTC both implements and coordinates enforcement of the Law on Electronic Data Protection; no independent DPA exists.
  • Ministry of Technology and Communications (MTC) — The Law on Electronic Data Protection, with no independent data-protection authority in Laos.
  • Ministry of Technology and Communications (MTC) — implements and enforces data protection law with no independent authority: true
  • Ministry of Technology and Communications (MTC) — MTC both implements and coordinates enforcement of the Law on Electronic Data Protection; no independent DPA exists
  • Ministry of Technology and Communications (MTC) — MTC oversees compliance and enforcement of Law 25/NA; Laos has no independent data-protection authority.
  • The Ministry of Technology and Communications both implements and enforces the Law on Electronic Data Protection; Laos has no independent data-protection authority separate from the ministry.

Act and instrumentsAmber

The core instrument is the Law on Electronic Data Protection, subject to a two-number discrepancy (No. 25/NA vs No. 117/PO) plus an implementing 2018 guideline.

Claims (9):

  • The Law on the Protection of Electronic Data (No. 25/NA) was enacted in 2017.
  • A discrepancy exists across otherwise authoritative sources as to the instrument's reference number and date: National Assembly Law No. 25/NA dated 12 May 2017 (Lao Trade Portal, Council of Europe) versus presidential-decree No. 117/PO dated 23 June 2017 (World Bank), both apparently referring to the same underlying statute, alongside an implementing Guideline No. 2128 of 2018.
  • Law on Cybersecurity No. 87/NA was gazetted on: Published in the Lao Official Gazette on 20 March 2026, for the first time defining 'cybersecurity' and 'critical national information infrastructure' (CNII) in Lao legislation.
  • Law on Cybersecurity No. 87/NA revises definition of: Revisits the definition of personal data to align it more closely with international standards.
  • Law on Electronic Data Protection No.25/NA — 12 May 2017, supplemented by a 2018 Implementing Guideline (No.2128).
  • Law on Cybersecurity No. 87/NA — Published in the Lao Official Gazette on 20 March 2026 and entered into force from 1 September 2025.
  • Law on Cybersecurity No. 87/NA — Published in the Lao Official Gazette on 20 March 2026, for the first time defining 'cybersecurity' and 'critical national information infrastructure' (CNII) in Lao legislation
  • Law on Cybersecurity No. 87/NA — Revisits the definition of personal data to align it more closely with international standards
  • Law on Cybersecurity No. 87/NA — Published in the Lao Official Gazette on 20 March 2026, the law names finance and banking as one of five Critical National Information Infrastructure sectors and revisits definitions of electronic data and personal data protection alongside the 2017 law.

Material scopeAmber

Scope extends to 'general' and 'specific' categories of electronic data across public and private sectors, broader than a narrow personal-data definition.

Claims (4):

  • Laos's electronic data protection law is broader-than-typical in scope, covering 'general' and 'specific' electronic data rather than personal data alone.
  • Law on Electronic Data Protection No. 25/NA covers scope of: 'General' and 'specific' (sensitive) electronic data, broader than personal data alone.
  • Law on Electronic Data Protection No. 25/NA — 'General' and 'specific' (sensitive) electronic data, broader than personal data alone
  • Law on Electronic Data Protection No.25/NA — general data and sensitive/specific (personal and official) data categories

Territorial scopeRed

No explicit extraterritorial-application clause for non-established controllers was identified in available secondary sources.

Claims (3):

  • Law on Electronic Data Protection No. 25/NA applies territorially to: Domestic and foreign entities operating within Laos; does not extend on a pure targeting basis to entities with no Lao presence.
  • Law 25/NA — extends territorial scope to foreign entities without physical presence: true
  • Law on Electronic Data Protection No. 25/NA — Domestic and foreign entities operating within Laos; does not extend on a pure targeting basis to entities with no Lao presence

Regulator registration and filingRed

No controller registration or filing regime with a data-protection authority was identified; MTC-administered licensing (e.g., software/internet-content-center licensing) exists for related ICT services but is not a DP filing obligation.

Claims (1):

  • Related ICT-sector licensing (e.g., Software Business and Internet Content Center licensing under Decision No. 143/MPT) requires operators to respect and protect personal data of service users, including a general prohibition on disclosure except at the request of relevant government authorities, but this is a sector licensing condition rather than a DPA filing/registration regime.
Category narrative 124 words

Laos has no independent data-protection authority. The Ministry of Technology and Communications (MTC) implements the Law on Electronic Data Protection, creating no separation between rule-setter, business-facilitator and enforcer. The primary instrument is variously cited as Law on Electronic Data Protection No. 25/NA (12 May 2017) per the Lao Trade Portal and Council of Europe, and as Law on Protection of Electronic Data No. 117/PO (23 June 2017) per the World Bank, with an implementing Guideline No. 2128 of 2018; both are treated as referring to the same underlying instrument pending clarification. The law covers both 'general' and 'specific' electronic data — a broader scope than typical personal-data statutes — but the World Bank's own assessment finds it falls short of a general-purpose, GDPR-comparable regime.

Periodic update · new data 2026-11-04

Laos has no independent data-protection authority. The Ministry of Technology and Communications itself implements and coordinates enforcement of the country's electronic data protection law, a structure a 2022 World Bank assessment confirms remains the operative arrangement. The foundational instrument, the Law on Electronic Data Protection (No. 25/NA), was enacted on 12 May 2017 and continues to apply without a dedicated regulator sitting apart from the Ministry's general remit. Its territorial scope is understood to extend to foreign entities without a physical presence in Laos that engage in activities subject to the law's provisions, a reading corroborated across more than one secondary source.

A new instrument layers onto this base: the Law on Cybersecurity (No. 87/NA), published in the Official Gazette on 20 March 2026, introduces a concept of Critical National Information Infrastructure spanning five designated sectors. This is a structural addition to the regulatory architecture rather than a replacement of the 2017 data-protection law, and it brings incident-reporting and infrastructure-protection obligations into the framework alongside the existing consent-centred data-protection regime.

Outlook

The absence of an independent supervisory authority remains the central structural feature of the Lao framework as at this record. The newly gazetted Cybersecurity Law adds a further compliance layer without resolving that gap, and a separate unresolved question records two differing official reference numbers for the 2017 statute itself, leaving which citation is operative unsettled.

2 earlier distinct updates
Periodic update · new data 2026-10-25

Laos's Law on Cybersecurity No. 87/NA was gazetted on 20 March 2026 and is understood to have entered into force from 1 September 2025. The Ministry of Technology and Communications oversees compliance and enforcement of the 2017 Law on Electronic Data Protection No. 25/NA, and Laos has no independent data-protection authority standing apart from the ministry itself. The arrival of the cybersecurity law changes the shape of the framework without replacing any part of it: the two instruments now stand side by side, the older one built around consent and the newer one built around security duties and a national monitoring capacity, with no single body named as responsible for reconciling them where they touch the same ground.

World Bank analysis of Laos's digital readiness has identified the concentration of rule-setting, implementation and enforcement functions inside the same ministry as a structural weakness in how obligations of this kind can be made to bite. That finding predates the new cybersecurity law but applies with at least equal force to it, since the same ministry is positioned to administer both instruments.

Outlook

What remains open is whether the two instruments will be formally harmonised or left to operate in parallel, and whether the ministry's dual position as both implementer and enforcer will be revisited as the new law's obligations come into practical effect.

Periodic update · new data 2026-10-11

Laos's data-protection and data-security architecture rests on two statutes whose relationship to one another is, as at this cycle, unresolved. The base instrument is the Law on Electronic Data Protection No. 25/NA, dated 12 May 2017, which covers both general electronic data and a specific category of sensitive data, a scope broader than personal data alone. Implementation and enforcement coordination for this law sits with the Ministry of Technology and Communications, which functions as the sole body with this role; Laos has no independent data protection authority, a fact confirmed by the World Bank's own 2022 digital-economy gap analysis of the country.

Into this existing framework, the Lao Official Gazette published on 20 March 2026 a new Law on Cybersecurity, No. 87/NA. This is, per secondary legal commentary reviewed this cycle, the first Lao statute to define the terms "cybersecurity" and "critical national information infrastructure," positioning the law as part of the country's broader digital-transformation agenda. The same commentary states that the 2026 law also revisits the definition of personal data, in a manner intended to bring it more closely into line with international standards. What is not established by the sources reviewed is whether this revision amends the 2017 law's treatment of personal and sensitive data directly, whether the Cybersecurity Law operates as a free-standing parallel regime, or whether the two instruments are meant to be read together without either formally superseding the other. No primary gazette text establishing an explicit amendment, repeal, or consolidation relationship was retrieved this cycle, and this is recorded as an open gap rather than resolved by inference.

This is a structural development rather than an incremental one: a second national statute now touches the definition of personal data and related obligations in a jurisdiction that previously had a single governing instrument on the subject. Until primary text resolving the relationship between the two laws becomes available, any assessment of Laos's data-protection perimeter must treat the 2017 law's definitions and the 2026 law's definitions as potentially divergent sources of obligation, administered by the same ministry but without a dedicated oversight body positioned to reconcile them. The absence of an independent regulator is itself a notable structural feature here: in jurisdictions with an active, independent supervisory authority, exactly this kind of definitional overlap between two statutes would typically be resolved or at least publicly flagged by that authority's own guidance. In Laos, no such clarifying voice exists, and the practical reading of the regime is left to secondary commentary from law firms and multilateral institutions rather than to the regulator itself.

A secondary but related open question concerns the base law's own citation. Sources reviewed this cycle show a discrepancy between "Law on Electronic Data Protection No. 25/NA, 12 May 2017" and an alternative citation of "No. 117/PO, 23 June 2017" appearing elsewhere; this discrepancy was not resolved from the sources available and is carried forward as an open gap rather than silently reconciled.

Outlook

The question of how the Law on Cybersecurity No. 87/NA interacts with the Law on Electronic Data Protection No. 25/NA is the single most consequential open item for the Lao framework going into the next quarter. If, as stated in the Ministry's own regulatory horizon tracking, this relationship is clarified in the final quarter of 2026, it is likely to come either through an implementing decree under the new Cybersecurity Law or through further Ministry of Technology and Communications guidance. Until such clarification, any compliance assessment of Laos's data-protection regime should treat the two instruments as running in parallel, with the 2017 law's consent-centred processing rules and the 2026 law's security and critical-infrastructure provisions both potentially applicable. No change to the absence of an independent data protection authority has been identified, and the Ministry of Technology and Communications remains the sole implementing body for the foreseeable period covered by this cycle's research.

1 further periodic run re-emitted the standing brief unchanged and is not shown.

Sources and claims (24)
  1. Probable World Bank — The Ministry of Technology and Communications is the implementing authority for Laos's electronic data protection law, and Laos has no independent data-protection authority separating rule-setting, business-facilitation and enforcement functions. observed
  2. Probable Council of Europe — The Law on the Protection of Electronic Data (No. 25/NA) was enacted in 2017. observed
  3. Uncertain Lao Trade Portal — A discrepancy exists across otherwise authoritative sources as to the instrument's reference number and date: National Assembly Law No. 25/NA dated 12 May 2017 (Lao Trade Portal, Council of Europe) versus presidential-decree No. 117/PO dated 23 June 2017 (World Bank), both apparently referring to the same underlying statute, alongside an implementing Guideline No. 2128 of 2018. observed
  4. Probable World Bank — Laos's electronic data protection law is broader-than-typical in scope, covering 'general' and 'specific' electronic data rather than personal data alone. observed
  5. Probable Lao Trade Portal — Related ICT-sector licensing (e.g., Software Business and Internet Content Center licensing under Decision No. 143/MPT) requires operators to respect and protect personal data of service users, including a general prohibition on disclosure except at the request of relevant government authorities, but this is a sector licensing condition rather than a DPA filing/registration regime. observed
  6. Probable World Bank — Ministry of Technology and Communications (MTC) is sole implementing and enforcing authority: MTC both implements and coordinates enforcement of the Law on Electronic Data Protection; no independent DPA exists. observed
  7. Probable Asia IP Law — Law on Cybersecurity No. 87/NA was gazetted on: Published in the Lao Official Gazette on 20 March 2026, for the first time defining 'cybersecurity' and 'critical national information infrastructure' (CNII) in Lao legislation. observed
  8. Probable iLaw Asia — Law on Cybersecurity No. 87/NA revises definition of: Revisits the definition of personal data to align it more closely with international standards. observed
  9. Probable Lao Trade Portal — Law on Electronic Data Protection No. 25/NA covers scope of: 'General' and 'specific' (sensitive) electronic data, broader than personal data alone. observed
  10. Uncertain Digwatch — Law on Electronic Data Protection No. 25/NA applies territorially to: Domestic and foreign entities operating within Laos; does not extend on a pure targeting basis to entities with no Lao presence. observed
  11. Probable Lao Trade Portal — Ministry of Technology and Communications (MTC) — The Law on Electronic Data Protection, with no independent data-protection authority in Laos.
  12. Probable World Bank — Law on Electronic Data Protection No.25/NA — 12 May 2017, supplemented by a 2018 Implementing Guideline (No.2128).
  13. Probable World Bank — Ministry of Technology and Communications (MTC) — implements and enforces data protection law with no independent authority: true
  14. Probable CaseGuard — Law 25/NA — extends territorial scope to foreign entities without physical presence: true observed
  15. Probable DLA Piper — Law on Cybersecurity No. 87/NA — Published in the Lao Official Gazette on 20 March 2026 and entered into force from 1 September 2025. observed
  16. Probable https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/c01714a0bc2ca257bdfe8f3f75a64adc-0070062022/original/Positioning-The-Lao-PDR-for-a-Digital-Future-11-10-22.pdf — Ministry of Technology and Communications (MTC) — MTC both implements and coordinates enforcement of the Law on Electronic Data Protection; no independent DPA exists
  17. Probable Asia IP Law — Law on Cybersecurity No. 87/NA — Published in the Lao Official Gazette on 20 March 2026, for the first time defining 'cybersecurity' and 'critical national information infrastructure' (CNII) in Lao legislation observed
  18. Probable iLaw Asia — Law on Cybersecurity No. 87/NA — Revisits the definition of personal data to align it more closely with international standards observed
  19. Probable https://www.laotradeportal.gov.la/en-gb/site/display/1718 — Law on Electronic Data Protection No. 25/NA — 'General' and 'specific' (sensitive) electronic data, broader than personal data alone
  20. Uncertain https://dig.watch/resource/laos-law-on-electronic-data-protection-no-25-na — Law on Electronic Data Protection No. 25/NA — Domestic and foreign entities operating within Laos; does not extend on a pure targeting basis to entities with no Lao presence
  21. Probable https://www.clym.io/regulations/e-data-protection-law-no-25na-laos — Ministry of Technology and Communications (MTC) — MTC oversees compliance and enforcement of Law 25/NA; Laos has no independent data-protection authority.
  22. Probable Lao Trade Portal — The Ministry of Technology and Communications both implements and enforces the Law on Electronic Data Protection; Laos has no independent data-protection authority separate from the ministry.
  23. Uncertain World Bank — Law on Cybersecurity No. 87/NA — Published in the Lao Official Gazette on 20 March 2026, the law names finance and banking as one of five Critical National Information Infrastructure sectors and revisits definitions of electronic data and personal data protection alongside the 2017 law.
  24. Probable Lao Trade Portal, Ministry of Industry and Commerce — Law on Electronic Data Protection No.25/NA — general data and sensitive/specific (personal and official) data categories observed

#

Absence of special-category protections and of purpose-limitation/minimisation principles is an explicit, sourced gap finding.

Primary frameworkLaw on Electronic Data Protection No. 25/NA (12 May 2017) / No. 117/PO (23 June 2017)
Traffic-light rationale — RedAbsence of special-category protections and of purpose-limitation/minimisation principles is an explicit, sourced gap finding.

Sub-modules (4)

Lawful basesRed

Consent is treated as the near-exclusive lawful basis for processing under the current framework.

Claims (5):

  • Laos's electronic data protection framework relies primarily on consent as the near-exclusive lawful basis for processing, without accompanying purpose-limitation or data-minimisation principles.
  • Law on Electronic Data Protection No. 25/NA requires as lawful basis: Consent from the Information Owner is the near-exclusive lawful basis; no enumerated alternative bases found.
  • Law on Electronic Data Protection No.25/NA — Consent from the Information Owner for the collection of all data, general or sensitive.
  • Law 25/NA — relies on consent as near exclusive lawful basis without purpose limitation: true
  • Law on Electronic Data Protection — Transferring personal or official data out of Laos requires the consent of the Information Owner and must not contravene Lao law; consent is the law's near-exclusive lawful basis for processing generally.

Special categoriesRed

The law lacks a special/sensitive category of personal data (health, biometric, genetic, ethnic, political, sexual, criminal).

Claims (7):

  • The current Lao electronic data protection framework lacks a defined special/sensitive category of personal data, a gap the World Bank identifies as a divergence from international good practice.
  • Law on Electronic Data Protection No. 25/NA, Article 10 classifies as sensitive: Financial information, CVs, medical history, project/budget plans and trade secrets; consent required for collection/use/disclosure.
  • World Bank — The law lacks a distinct special category of sensitive personal data comparable to international good practice.
  • Law 25/NA — categorises data into general sensitive prohibited classes: true
  • Law on Electronic Data Protection No. 25/NA, Article 10 — Financial information, CVs, medical history, project/budget plans and trade secrets; consent required for collection/use/disclosure
  • The Law on Electronic Data Protection does not establish a special category of sensitive personal data, per the World Bank's 2022 gap analysis.
  • Law on Electronic Data Protection No.25/NA, Art.10 and 2018 Implementing Instructions — sensitive data (requiring Information Owner consent) with illustrative list: customer info, financial info, CVs, medical treatment history, race, religion, project plans, budget plans, official secrets

Pseudonymisation and anonymisationRed

No pseudonymisation or anonymisation definitions or safe-harbour provisions were identified.

Category narrative 51 words

The World Bank's gap analysis finds that Laos's electronic data law relies primarily on consent as the near-exclusive lawful basis for processing, without purpose-limitation or data-minimisation safeguards, and lacks a special category of sensitive personal data comparable to GDPR Art 9. No pseudonymisation/anonymisation safe-harbour provisions were identified in available secondary sources.

No new data since the standing brief. 1 periodic run re-emitted it unchanged.

Sources and claims (12)
  1. Probable World Bank — Laos's electronic data protection framework relies primarily on consent as the near-exclusive lawful basis for processing, without accompanying purpose-limitation or data-minimisation principles. observed
  2. Probable World Bank — The current Lao electronic data protection framework lacks a defined special/sensitive category of personal data, a gap the World Bank identifies as a divergence from international good practice. observed
  3. Probable World Bank — Law on Electronic Data Protection No. 25/NA requires as lawful basis: Consent from the Information Owner is the near-exclusive lawful basis; no enumerated alternative bases found. observed
  4. Probable Lao Trade Portal — Law on Electronic Data Protection No. 25/NA, Article 10 classifies as sensitive: Financial information, CVs, medical history, project/budget plans and trade secrets; consent required for collection/use/disclosure. observed
  5. Probable Asia IP Law — Law on Electronic Data Protection No.25/NA — Consent from the Information Owner for the collection of all data, general or sensitive. observed
  6. Probable https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/c01714a0bc2ca257bdfe8f3f75a64adc-0070062022/original/Positioning-The-Lao-PDR-for-a-Digital-Future-11-10-22.pdf — World Bank — The law lacks a distinct special category of sensitive personal data comparable to international good practice.
  7. Probable DLA Piper — Law 25/NA — categorises data into general sensitive prohibited classes: true observed
  8. Probable World Bank — Law 25/NA — relies on consent as near exclusive lawful basis without purpose limitation: true
  9. Probable https://www.laotradeportal.gov.la/en-gb/site/display/1718 — Law on Electronic Data Protection No. 25/NA, Article 10 — Financial information, CVs, medical history, project/budget plans and trade secrets; consent required for collection/use/disclosure
  10. Probable DLA Piper — Law on Electronic Data Protection — Transferring personal or official data out of Laos requires the consent of the Information Owner and must not contravene Lao law; consent is the law's near-exclusive lawful basis for processing generally. observed
  11. Probable CaseGuard — The Law on Electronic Data Protection does not establish a special category of sensitive personal data, per the World Bank's 2022 gap analysis. observed
  12. Probable DLA Piper — Law on Electronic Data Protection No.25/NA, Art.10 and 2018 Implementing Instructions — sensitive data (requiring Information Owner consent) with illustrative list: customer info, financial info, CVs, medical treatment history, race, religion, project plans, budget plans, official secrets observed

#

No sourced evidence of an operative subject-rights regime; treated as an explicit gap rather than silently omitted.

Primary frameworkLaw on Electronic Data Protection No. 25/NA (12 May 2017) / No. 117/PO (23 June 2017)
Traffic-light rationale — RedNo sourced evidence of an operative subject-rights regime; treated as an explicit gap rather than silently omitted.

Sub-modules (5)

Access rightRed

No statutory subject-access-request mechanism identified.

Claims (4):

  • Law on Electronic Data Protection No. 25/NA recognises rights of: Access, rectification, erasure, portability and objection, per secondary commentary, without a statutory response deadline, extension test or fee rule located in primary text.
  • Law on Electronic Data Protection No.25/NA — Individuals may request access to, rectification of, and deletion of electronic data no longer necessary for its original purpose.
  • Individuals under Law 25/NA — have right to access personal data: true
  • Law on Electronic Data Protection No. 25/NA — Access, rectification, erasure, portability and objection, per secondary commentary, without a statutory response deadline, extension test or fee rule located in primary text

Rectification and erasureRed

No statutory right to rectification or erasure identified.

Restriction and objectionRed

No statutory restriction or objection right identified.

Data portabilityRed

No portability right identified.

Deadlines and response windowsRed

No statutory controller response deadlines identified.

Claims (1):

  • Lao data protection law — a statutory deadline for responding to data subject rights requests; does not expressly require DPIAs
Category narrative 40 words

No comprehensive, GDPR-analogue data-subject-rights framework (access, rectification/erasure, restriction/objection, portability, statutory response deadlines) was identified for Laos in available Tier-1/Tier-2 secondary sources. This is consistent with the World Bank's characterization of the statute as falling short of general-application data-protection good practice.

No new data since the standing brief. 1 periodic run re-emitted it unchanged.

Sources and claims (5)
  1. Uncertain Multilaw / Tilleke & Gibbins Lao Co., Ltd — Law on Electronic Data Protection No. 25/NA recognises rights of: Access, rectification, erasure, portability and objection, per secondary commentary, without a statutory response deadline, extension test or fee rule located in primary text. observed
  2. Probable Digwatch — Law on Electronic Data Protection No.25/NA — Individuals may request access to, rectification of, and deletion of electronic data no longer necessary for its original purpose. observed
  3. Uncertain Digwatch — Individuals under Law 25/NA — have right to access personal data: true observed
  4. Uncertain https://www.multilaw.com/Multilaw/Multilaw/Data_Protection_Laws_Guide/DataProtection_Guide_Laos.aspx — Law on Electronic Data Protection No. 25/NA — Access, rectification, erasure, portability and objection, per secondary commentary, without a statutory response deadline, extension test or fee rule located in primary text
  5. Probable Multilaw / Tilleke & Gibbins Lao Co., Ltd — Lao data protection law — a statutory deadline for responding to data subject rights requests; does not expressly require DPIAs observed

#

Explicit, sourced World Bank finding of misallocated breach responsibility and absent accountability infrastructure.

Primary frameworkLaw on Electronic Data Protection No. 25/NA (12 May 2017) / No. 117/PO (23 June 2017); Decision on Software and Data Center Business No. 143/MPT (2017)
Traffic-light rationale — RedExplicit, sourced World Bank finding of misallocated breach responsibility and absent accountability infrastructure.

Sub-modules (7)

Accountability & DPIARed

No DPIA trigger or accountability-principle codification identified.

Claims (3):

  • Law on Electronic Data Protection No. 25/NA may require: An impact-assessment-like duty for high-risk processing, per one secondary source; no DPIA trigger list found in a primary text.
  • Law on Electronic Data Protection No. 25/NA — An impact-assessment-like duty for high-risk processing, per one secondary source; no DPIA trigger list found in a primary text
  • Law on Electronic Data Protection, Art. 23 — Article 23 of the Law on Electronic Data Protection requires the data administrator to conduct a risk assessment of the information system at least once a year.

DPO requirementsRed

No DPO appointment threshold identified.

Claims (3):

  • Law on Electronic Data Protection No. 25/NA contemplates: A team/employee supervising protection of sensitive data, with no defined duties, rights, scope or registration requirement — not a GDPR-style DPO.
  • Law 25/NA — introduces team or employee role without dpo concept: true
  • Law on Electronic Data Protection No. 25/NA — A team/employee supervising protection of sensitive data, with no defined duties, rights, scope or registration requirement — not a GDPR-style DPO

Ropa requirementsRed

No records-of-processing obligation identified.

Joint controller arrangementsRed

No joint-controller framework identified; the law does not appear to draw a clear controller/processor distinction.

Claims (1):

  • Laos's electronic data protection framework does not clearly delineate controller and processor roles, contributing to the World Bank's finding that breach-type responsibilities are misallocated onto the 'data owner'.

Security measuresAmber

General confidentiality obligations exist for ICT-licensed service operators but no codified technical/organisational security-of-processing standard for data controllers generally.

Claims (4):

  • Operators licensed under the Decision on Software and Data Center Business must respect and protect the personal data of service users and must not disclose such data except at the request of relevant government authorities.
  • Law on Cybersecurity No. 87/NA imposes duties of: Risk assessments, encryption, access screening and multi-location backup duties on all legal entities.
  • Law on Cybersecurity No. 87/NA — Requires all legal entities to implement routine risk assessments, data encryption, access screening and multi-location data backup; imposes additional physical-access-control, system-monitoring and third-party-oversight duties on CNII entities across five named sectors.
  • Law on Cybersecurity No.87/NA — all legal entities and organisations to implement cybersecurity measures covering risk assessment, access control, encryption and network security; enhanced duties for designated CNII operators

Breach notificationRed

Breach-type responsibilities are misallocated to the 'data owner' rather than to a controller/processor, per the World Bank's assessment.

Claims (9):

  • The Lao electronic data law misallocates breach-type responsibilities onto the 'data owner' rather than onto the data controller or processor, per the World Bank's own gap analysis.
  • Financial-sector breach-notification decree requires customer notification and regulator reporting: Financial service providers must notify affected customers immediately on a breach and report to BOL if the breach has an 'important adverse impact' or is 'large scale'; neither term is defined and no sanction attaches to a failure to report.
  • Law on Electronic Data Protection No. 25/NA, Article 26 requires notification to: LaoCERT in the event of an intrusion or electronic data breach, primarily for technical assistance; no mandatory individual-notification duty and no stated sanction.
  • World Bank — The law misallocates breach-type responsibilities onto the 'data owner' rather than the data controller/processor.
  • Laos data-protection regime — misallocates breach responsibility to data owner rather than controller: true
  • Financial-sector breach-notification decree — Financial service providers must notify affected customers immediately on a breach and report to BOL if the breach has an 'important adverse impact' or is 'large scale'; neither term is defined and no sanction attaches to a failure to report
  • Law on Electronic Data Protection No. 25/NA, Article 26 — LaoCERT in the event of an intrusion or electronic data breach, primarily for technical assistance; no mandatory individual-notification duty and no stated sanction
  • The Law on Electronic Data Protection allocates breach-type responsibilities to the 'data owner' rather than distinguishing controller and processor obligations, a divergence from international good practice per the World Bank; no fixed breach-notification deadline was located.
  • Law on Electronic Data Protection No.25/NA, Art.26 — data administrator to intercept/respond to unlawful creation, access, sending, receiving, use or disclosure of electronic data; notify LaoCERT on intrusion, primarily for technical support

Retention and disposalRed

No statutory retention-limit or disposal-duty regime identified.

Category narrative 64 words

The World Bank's gap analysis specifically flags that the Lao framework misallocates breach-type responsibilities onto the 'data owner' rather than onto a controller/processor distinction, and that it lacks accountability infrastructure (DPIA triggers, DPO thresholds, ROPA) comparable to international good practice. Sector-adjacent security obligations exist in ICT licensing (e.g., confidentiality of service-user data under software/internet-content-center licensing) but do not constitute a general controller/processor accountability regime.

Periodic update · new data 2026-10-25

The Law on Cybersecurity requires all legal entities to carry out routine risk assessments, apply data encryption, screen access and maintain multi-location data backup. Entities designated as Critical National Information Infrastructure across five named sectors face additional duties covering physical access control, system monitoring and oversight of third parties. These duties sit alongside, rather than inside, the obligations already running under the 2017 data-protection law, so an entity operating critical infrastructure in Laos is now working from two instruments rather than one.

Outlook

The practical weight of the new security-measures duties will depend on how the Critical National Information Infrastructure designation is applied sector by sector, and on what, if any, guidance follows to clarify how the screening, monitoring and backup requirements are to be evidenced.

1 earlier distinct update
Periodic update · new data 2026-10-11

Controllers and processors operating in Laos now face obligations drawn from at least three distinct sources, each with different scope, different triggers, and different consequences for non-compliance. The longest-standing of these is Article 26 of the Law on Electronic Data Protection No. 25/NA, which requires notification to LaoCERT in the event of an intrusion or electronic data breach. This notification duty is oriented primarily toward obtaining technical assistance rather than toward informing affected individuals; the law as reviewed does not establish a mandatory individual-notification duty, nor does it state a sanction for a failure to notify LaoCERT.

Sitting alongside Article 26 is a sector-specific decree applicable to financial service providers, which requires those providers to notify affected customers immediately upon a breach and to report the breach to the Bank of the Lao PDR where it has an "important adverse impact" or is "large scale." Neither of these two qualifying terms is defined in the decree, and no sanction attaches to a failure to report. This leaves financial institutions operating under a notification duty whose triggering threshold is, in practical terms, a matter of judgment rather than a bright-line test, and whose enforceability is correspondingly uncertain.

The most significant recent addition to this landscape is the Law on Cybersecurity No. 87/NA, gazetted 20 March 2026, which imposes duties of risk assessment, encryption, access screening, and multi-location backup on all legal entities, not merely financial-sector participants or entities handling sensitive data. This is a materially broader and more prescriptive set of security obligations than anything previously identified in the Lao framework, and it applies on a general basis rather than being confined to a particular sector or a particular category of data. Because the relationship between this new law and the 2017 base law remains unresolved in the sources reviewed, it is not yet clear whether these Cybersecurity Law duties operate as an overlay on top of the Article 26 breach-notification regime, replace it for certain categories of entity, or exist as a wholly separate compliance track.

Two further duties are referenced only in secondary commentary and were not confirmed against primary legal text this cycle: an impact-assessment-like obligation for high-risk processing (without a located DPIA trigger list), and a requirement to maintain a team or employee supervising the protection of sensitive data, which falls well short of a GDPR-style Data Protection Officer in that it carries no defined duties, rights, scope, or registration requirement. Both of these should be treated as unconfirmed pending retrieval of primary text, rather than as settled features of the regime.

Taken together, these developments point to an accountability framework that is accreting breadth, particularly through the new Cybersecurity Law's general security-measures duty, while remaining comparatively shallow in its enforcement architecture: none of the three notification-and-security regimes identified this cycle carries a clearly stated penalty for non-compliance, and the Ministry of Technology and Communications' role as sole implementing authority means there is no independent body positioned to issue clarifying guidance on how the regimes interact.

Outlook

Entities with a Lao presence should expect the practical compliance burden to increase as the Cybersecurity Law's risk-assessment, encryption, access-screening and backup duties come into effect across all legal entities, regardless of sector. Clarification of how this new general duty interacts with the sector-specific financial-services breach decree and with the narrower Article 26 LaoCERT notification channel is the key item to watch; absent such clarification, entities face the practical choice of complying with the most conservative reading across all three regimes. No change to the absence of a defined DPIA trigger list or to the under-specified sensitive-data-supervision role has been identified this cycle.

1 further periodic run re-emitted the standing brief unchanged and is not shown.

Sources and claims (20)
  1. Probable World Bank — Laos's electronic data protection framework does not clearly delineate controller and processor roles, contributing to the World Bank's finding that breach-type responsibilities are misallocated onto the 'data owner'. observed
  2. Probable Lao Trade Portal — Operators licensed under the Decision on Software and Data Center Business must respect and protect the personal data of service users and must not disclose such data except at the request of relevant government authorities. observed
  3. Probable World Bank — The Lao electronic data law misallocates breach-type responsibilities onto the 'data owner' rather than onto the data controller or processor, per the World Bank's own gap analysis. observed
  4. Uncertain Multilaw / Tilleke & Gibbins Lao Co., Ltd — Law on Electronic Data Protection No. 25/NA may require: An impact-assessment-like duty for high-risk processing, per one secondary source; no DPIA trigger list found in a primary text. observed
  5. Uncertain Multilaw / Tilleke & Gibbins Lao Co., Ltd — Law on Electronic Data Protection No. 25/NA contemplates: A team/employee supervising protection of sensitive data, with no defined duties, rights, scope or registration requirement — not a GDPR-style DPO. observed
  6. Probable iLaw Asia — Law on Cybersecurity No. 87/NA imposes duties of: Risk assessments, encryption, access screening and multi-location backup duties on all legal entities. observed
  7. Uncertain DLA Piper — Financial-sector breach-notification decree requires customer notification and regulator reporting: Financial service providers must notify affected customers immediately on a breach and report to BOL if the breach has an 'important adverse impact' or is 'large scale'; neither term is defined and no sanction attaches to a failure to report. observed
  8. Probable Lao Trade Portal — Law on Electronic Data Protection No. 25/NA, Article 26 requires notification to: LaoCERT in the event of an intrusion or electronic data breach, primarily for technical assistance; no mandatory individual-notification duty and no stated sanction. observed
  9. Probable https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/c01714a0bc2ca257bdfe8f3f75a64adc-0070062022/original/Positioning-The-Lao-PDR-for-a-Digital-Future-11-10-22.pdf — World Bank — The law misallocates breach-type responsibilities onto the 'data owner' rather than the data controller/processor.
  10. Probable Primary statutory record — Law 25/NA — introduces team or employee role without dpo concept: true
  11. Probable World Bank — Laos data-protection regime — misallocates breach responsibility to data owner rather than controller: true
  12. Uncertain https://www.multilaw.com/Multilaw/Multilaw/Data_Protection_Laws_Guide/DataProtection_Guide_Laos.aspx — Law on Electronic Data Protection No. 25/NA — An impact-assessment-like duty for high-risk processing, per one secondary source; no DPIA trigger list found in a primary text
  13. Uncertain https://www.multilaw.com/Multilaw/Multilaw/Data_Protection_Laws_Guide/DataProtection_Guide_Laos.aspx — Law on Electronic Data Protection No. 25/NA — A team/employee supervising protection of sensitive data, with no defined duties, rights, scope or registration requirement — not a GDPR-style DPO
  14. Uncertain DLA Piper — Financial-sector breach-notification decree — Financial service providers must notify affected customers immediately on a breach and report to BOL if the breach has an 'important adverse impact' or is 'large scale'; neither term is defined and no sanction attaches to a failure to report observed
  15. Probable https://www.laotradeportal.gov.la/en-gb/site/display/1718 — Law on Electronic Data Protection No. 25/NA, Article 26 — LaoCERT in the event of an intrusion or electronic data breach, primarily for technical assistance; no mandatory individual-notification duty and no stated sanction
  16. Probable Internet in Laos — Law on Cybersecurity No. 87/NA — Requires all legal entities to implement routine risk assessments, data encryption, access screening and multi-location data backup; imposes additional physical-access-control, system-monitoring and third-party-oversight duties on CNII entities across five named sectors. observed
  17. Probable Asia IP Law — Law on Electronic Data Protection, Art. 23 — Article 23 of the Law on Electronic Data Protection requires the data administrator to conduct a risk assessment of the information system at least once a year. observed
  18. Uncertain CaseGuard — The Law on Electronic Data Protection allocates breach-type responsibilities to the 'data owner' rather than distinguishing controller and processor obligations, a divergence from international good practice per the World Bank; no fixed breach-notification deadline was located. observed
  19. Probable Ministry of Industry and Commerce, Lao PDR (Trade Services Information Portal) — Law on Electronic Data Protection No.25/NA, Art.26 — data administrator to intercept/respond to unlawful creation, access, sending, receiving, use or disclosure of electronic data; notify LaoCERT on intrusion, primarily for technical support observed
  20. Probable Asia IP Law — Law on Cybersecurity No.87/NA — all legal entities and organisations to implement cybersecurity measures covering risk assessment, access control, encryption and network security; enhanced duties for designated CNII operators observed

#

Sourced confirmation of absence of a clear transfer-mechanism regime, notwithstanding a general cross-border/encryption reference in the underlying law.

Primary frameworkLaw on Electronic Data Protection No. 25/NA (12 May 2017) / No. 117/PO (23 June 2017)
Traffic-light rationale — RedSourced confirmation of absence of a clear transfer-mechanism regime, notwithstanding a general cross-border/encryption reference in the underlying law.

Sub-modules (6)

Transfer mechanismsRed

No codified adequacy/SCC/BCR/derogation mechanism identified; the World Bank finds the framework lacks a clear cross-border transfer regime.

Claims (6):

  • The World Bank's assessment finds that Laos's electronic data protection framework lacks a clear cross-border-transfer regime comparable to international good practice (e.g., adequacy, SCCs, BCRs).
  • Law on Electronic Data Protection No. 25/NA requires for cross border transfer: Consent from the 'Data Administrator' or explicit data-subject consent, adequate protection in the receiving country, implemented safeguards, or government approval where required by law; no SCC/BCR mechanism found.
  • Law on Electronic Data Protection No.25/NA — Data Administrator consent for transferring personal or official data outside Lao PDR, which must not contravene national interests.
  • Law 25/NA — requires information owner consent for cross border transfer: true
  • Law on Electronic Data Protection No. 25/NA — Transferring personal or official data outside Lao PDR requires consent from the Information Owner/Data Administrator and must not contravene Lao laws or national interests.
  • Law on Electronic Data Protection No.25/NA — Information Owner consent plus assurance the receiving entity can protect the data properly, for cross-border data transfer

Adequacy receivedRed

No adequacy decision received by Laos from another regime was identified.

Adequacy grantedRed

No adequacy decision granted by Laos to another regime was identified.

SCCs and BCRsRed

No SCC or BCR uptake mechanism identified.

Transfer impact assessmentRed

No TIA requirement identified.

Data localisationAmber

The law governs cross-border transfer and encryption rules without imposing broad data-localisation requirements, per UNECA's digital-trade profile.

Claims (3):

  • The Law on Electronic Data Protection No. 25/NA governs cross-border transfer and encryption rules without imposing broad data localisation on service providers.
  • Law on Electronic Data Protection No. 25/NA does not impose: A general data-localisation mandate; the law governs cross-border transfer and encryption without broad localisation.
  • Law 25/NA — governs transfer and encryption without broad localisation mandate: true
Category narrative 56 words

Available secondary analysis indicates the Lao electronic data protection framework touches on cross-border transfer and encryption rules without imposing broad data-localisation mandates, but the World Bank assessment separately finds the framework lacks a clear cross-border-transfer regime comparable to GDPR-style mechanisms (adequacy, SCCs, BCRs, TIA). No adequacy decisions received from or granted to other regimes were identified.

No new data since the standing brief. 1 periodic run re-emitted it unchanged.

Sources and claims (9)
  1. Probable World Bank — The World Bank's assessment finds that Laos's electronic data protection framework lacks a clear cross-border-transfer regime comparable to international good practice (e.g., adequacy, SCCs, BCRs). observed
  2. Probable UNECA — The Law on Electronic Data Protection No. 25/NA governs cross-border transfer and encryption rules without imposing broad data localisation on service providers. observed
  3. Uncertain Multilaw / Tilleke & Gibbins Lao Co., Ltd — Law on Electronic Data Protection No. 25/NA requires for cross border transfer: Consent from the 'Data Administrator' or explicit data-subject consent, adequate protection in the receiving country, implemented safeguards, or government approval where required by law; no SCC/BCR mechanism found. observed
  4. Probable Council of Europe Octopus Cybercrime Community — Law on Electronic Data Protection No. 25/NA does not impose: A general data-localisation mandate; the law governs cross-border transfer and encryption without broad localisation. observed
  5. Probable DLA Piper — Law on Electronic Data Protection No.25/NA — Data Administrator consent for transferring personal or official data outside Lao PDR, which must not contravene national interests. observed
  6. Probable Clym — Law 25/NA — requires information owner consent for cross border transfer: true observed
  7. Uncertain UNECA — Law 25/NA — governs transfer and encryption without broad localisation mandate: true observed
  8. Probable https://www.dlapiperdataprotection.com/index.html?t=transfer&c=LA — Law on Electronic Data Protection No. 25/NA — Transferring personal or official data outside Lao PDR requires consent from the Information Owner/Data Administrator and must not contravene Lao laws or national interests.
  9. Probable DLA Piper — Law on Electronic Data Protection No.25/NA — Information Owner consent plus assurance the receiving entity can protect the data properly, for cross-border data transfer observed

#

Financial and telecoms sectoral instruments are sourced; health/employment/credit/education/insurance overlays are an explicit, sourced gap.

Primary frameworkLaw on Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Financing of Terrorism No. 50/NA; Law on Payment Systems (2017); Law on Telecommunications (Amended) No. 09/NA (2021)
Supervisory authorityBank of Lao PDR (BoL) / Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (TRA)
Traffic-light rationale — AmberFinancial and telecoms sectoral instruments are sourced; health/employment/credit/education/insurance overlays are an explicit, sourced gap.

Sub-modules (7)

Financial sector overlayAmber

AML/CFT Law No. 50/NA and the 2017 Law on Payment Systems (BoL oversight) govern financial-sector data handling relevant to AML data-sharing.

Claims (3):

  • Laos's Law on Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Financing of Terrorism (No. 50/NA) governs financial-sector data-sharing obligations relevant to AML compliance.
  • The Bank of Lao PDR has oversight of the national payment system, and the Law on Payment Systems adopted in 2017 set a strategic approach to payment-system reform including increased adoption of non-cash payment instruments.
  • Law on Cybersecurity No. 87/NA — designates finance and banking as cnii sector: true

Health sector overlayRed

No health-sector-specific data protection overlay identified.

Telecoms and eprivacyAmber

The 2021-amended Telecommunications Law No. 09/NA and TRA governance intersect with telecom subscriber data, though no ePrivacy-style cookie/communications-confidentiality regime distinct from the general electronic data law was identified.

Claims (1):

  • Laos updated its telecommunications legal framework via the Law on Information and Communications Technology (December 2016) and revised the 2011 Telecommunications Law in 2021, with the Telecommunications Regulatory Authority structured to be independent of telecom operators.

Employment dataRed

No employment-specific data protection code identified.

Credit and scoringRed

No credit-scoring-specific data rules identified.

educationRed

No education-sector-specific data protection rules identified.

insuranceRed

No insurance-sector-specific data protection rules identified.

Category narrative 65 words

Laos has sector-specific instruments that intersect with data flows: an Anti-Money-Laundering and Counter-Financing of Terrorism law governing financial-sector data sharing, a 2017 Law on Payment Systems under Bank of Lao PDR (BoL) oversight, and a 2021-amended Telecommunications Law with import/technical controls administered by an ostensibly independent Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (TRA). No health-sector, employment-data, credit-scoring, education-sector, or insurance-sector data-protection overlays were identified in available secondary sources.

Periodic update · new data 2026-11-04

The Law on Cybersecurity (No. 87/NA), gazetted on 20 March 2026, designates finance and banking as one of five Critical National Information Infrastructure sectors, alongside national defence and public security, technology and communications, energy, and commerce, transport and logistics. This is a newly surfaced sectoral overlay: entities operating within the finance and banking sector now sit within a designated infrastructure-protection category under the Cybersecurity Law, layered on top of whatever obligations already attach to them under the 2017 electronic data protection framework.

This development is distinct from, and additional to, the data-protection law's general consent-based processing rules; it is a national-security and infrastructure-resilience designation rather than a personal-data-specific obligation, though its reach into the finance and banking sector gives it direct relevance for any organisation processing personal data within that sector's systems.

Outlook

As at 20 March 2026, the finance-sector designation is in force under the Cybersecurity Law. No further sector-specific guidance or implementing regulation detailing the practical content of the finance-sector overlay has been located in this record.

1 further periodic run re-emitted the standing brief unchanged and is not shown.

Sources and claims (4)
  1. Probable Council of Europe — Laos's Law on Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Financing of Terrorism (No. 50/NA) governs financial-sector data-sharing obligations relevant to AML compliance. observed
  2. Probable World Bank — The Bank of Lao PDR has oversight of the national payment system, and the Law on Payment Systems adopted in 2017 set a strategic approach to payment-system reform including increased adoption of non-cash payment instruments. observed
  3. Probable World Bank — Laos updated its telecommunications legal framework via the Law on Information and Communications Technology (December 2016) and revised the 2011 Telecommunications Law in 2021, with the Telecommunications Regulatory Authority structured to be independent of telecom operators. observed
  4. Probable Asia IP Law — Law on Cybersecurity No. 87/NA — designates finance and banking as cnii sector: true observed

#

Comprehensive absence of an adtech/commercial-privacy regime; explicit gap finding rather than silent omission.

Traffic-light rationale — RedComprehensive absence of an adtech/commercial-privacy regime; explicit gap finding rather than silent omission.

Sub-modules (6)

Cookies and trackersRed

No cookie/tracker consent regime identified.

Dark patternsRed

No dark-pattern prohibition identified.

Opt out signalsRed

No recognised opt-out signal mechanism identified.

Clean rooms and dcrRed

No clean-room/data-collaboration-room rule identified.

Cross context advertisingRed

No cross-context advertising ('sale'/'share') rule identified.

Direct marketingRed

No direct-marketing consent/suppression regime identified.

Claims (1):

  • Law 25/NA — prohibited outside 08:00-17:00 Mon-Fri; max 2/day, 10/month
Category narrative 27 words

No cookie/tracker consent regime, dark-pattern prohibition, recognised opt-out signal (GPC/DAA-equivalent), clean-room rule, cross-context-advertising rule, or direct-marketing consent/suppression regime specific to Laos was identified in available Tier-1/Tier-2 sources.

Sources and claims (1)
  1. Uncertain DLA Piper — Law 25/NA — prohibited outside 08:00-17:00 Mon-Fri; max 2/day, 10/month observed

#

No profiling/ADM/biometric/genetic regime found; only a narrow, sourced state-surveillance carve-out exists, without independent oversight limits.

Primary frameworkLaw on Prevention and Combating Cyber Crime No. 61/NA (2015)
Supervisory authorityMinistry of Public Security / LaoCERT
Traffic-light rationale — RedNo profiling/ADM/biometric/genetic regime found; only a narrow, sourced state-surveillance carve-out exists, without independent oversight limits.

Sub-modules (6)

Profiling restrictionsRed

No profiling restriction identified.

Automated decision making transparencyRed

No ADM transparency or explanation right identified.

Claims (1):

  • Laos may require impact assessments for: High-risk data processing, including profiling and automated decision-making, per secondary commentary; no primary ADM-specific provision located.

AI risk assessmentsRed

No AI-specific risk-assessment regime identified.

Claims (1):

  • Law on Cybersecurity No. 87/NA — Establishes a National Cybersecurity Operations System combining expert personnel with big-data analytics and artificial intelligence for continuous (24/7) monitoring and response; the law does not state whether the system is already operational or its relationship to LaoCERT.

Biometric regimeRed

No biometric-data-specific regime identified.

Genetic dataRed

No genetic-data-specific regime identified.

State surveillance carveoutsAmber

ICT service licensing conditions and the Cyber Crime Law create investigatory access to user/subscriber data by government authorities, without an identified independent oversight or judicial-authorisation limit in available sources.

Claims (3):

  • Software and Internet Content Center licensees must not disclose users' data except when requested by related government authorities, and must cooperate with monitoring and inspection activities affecting national defence and public security.
  • Law No. 61/NA on Prevention and Combating Cyber Crime (2015) establishes LaoCERT as the national CSIRT and contains procedural rules and international-cooperation measures relevant to state investigatory access to electronic data.
  • Law on Electronic Data Protection No. 25/NA requires compliance with: 'National security, stability and social order' as a controller duty, functioning as a broad state-interest carve-out.
Category narrative 66 words

No profiling restriction, automated-decision-making transparency right, AI-specific risk-assessment regime, biometric-data regime, or genetic-data regime was identified for Laos. A state-surveillance carve-out is evidenced indirectly: ICT-licensed operators must not disclose users' data except at the request of relevant government authorities, and the Law on Prevention and Combating Cyber Crime (No. 61/NA, 2015) grants investigatory powers including subscriber and traffic data access, without an identified independent oversight limit.

Periodic update · new data 2026-10-25

The Law on Cybersecurity establishes a National Cybersecurity Operations System combining expert personnel with big-data analytics and artificial intelligence, intended to provide continuous, round-the-clock monitoring and response. The law does not state whether the system is already operational, and its relationship to the country's existing computer emergency response function is not addressed in the text. This is the first instrument in Laos to place artificial intelligence and large-scale data analytics explicitly inside a state monitoring function, rather than leaving such activity to unwritten practice.

Outlook

Whether the monitoring system becomes operationally distinct from, or absorbed into, existing incident-response arrangements will determine how visible its activity becomes to entities and individuals affected by it.

1 further periodic run re-emitted the standing brief unchanged and is not shown.

Sources and claims (5)
  1. Probable Lao Trade Portal — Software and Internet Content Center licensees must not disclose users' data except when requested by related government authorities, and must cooperate with monitoring and inspection activities affecting national defence and public security. observed
  2. Probable Council of Europe — Law No. 61/NA on Prevention and Combating Cyber Crime (2015) establishes LaoCERT as the national CSIRT and contains procedural rules and international-cooperation measures relevant to state investigatory access to electronic data. observed
  3. Uncertain Multilaw / Tilleke & Gibbins Lao Co., Ltd — Laos may require impact assessments for: High-risk data processing, including profiling and automated decision-making, per secondary commentary; no primary ADM-specific provision located. observed
  4. Uncertain Lao Trade Portal — Law on Electronic Data Protection No. 25/NA requires compliance with: 'National security, stability and social order' as a controller duty, functioning as a broad state-interest carve-out. observed
  5. Probable DLA Piper — Law on Cybersecurity No. 87/NA — Establishes a National Cybersecurity Operations System combining expert personnel with big-data analytics and artificial intelligence for continuous (24/7) monitoring and response; the law does not state whether the system is already operational or its relationship to LaoCERT. observed

#

Comprehensive absence of a children/vulnerable-groups data protection regime; explicit gap finding.

Traffic-light rationale — Not assessedComprehensive absence of a children/vulnerable-groups data protection regime; explicit gap finding.

Sub-modules (5)

Age verificationRed

No age-verification requirement identified.

Minor profiling bansRed

No minor-profiling ban identified.

Education settingsRed

No education-settings-specific data rule identified.

Dependent adultsRed

No dependent-adults data protection provision identified.

Category narrative 25 words

No age-of-consent threshold, parental-consent mechanism, minor-profiling ban, education-settings-specific rule, or dependent-adults protection specific to electronic/personal data processing was identified for Laos in available secondary sources.

#

No independent enforcement body, no sourced penalty/redress framework, and no recent developments identified — an explicit, sourced gap.

Primary frameworkLaw on Electronic Data Protection No. 25/NA (12 May 2017) / No. 117/PO (23 June 2017)
Traffic-light rationale — RedNo independent enforcement body, no sourced penalty/redress framework, and no recent developments identified — an explicit, sourced gap.

Sub-modules (6)

Regulator powers and penaltiesRed

MTC combines implementation and enforcement functions with no independent DPA; no detailed penalty schedule was located.

Claims (4):

  • MTC itself implements and coordinates enforcement of the electronic data law, per the World Bank's assessment, creating no separation between rule-setter, business-facilitator and enforcer, and Laos has no independent data-protection authority.
  • Law on Electronic Data Protection No. 25/NA provides for sanctions of: Warnings and re-education for minor infractions, disciplinary action for government officials, and escalation to Penal Code No. 26/NA sanctions for serious violations; no fixed monetary maximum fine confirmed in a primary instrument.
  • Law on Electronic Data Protection No.25/NA — Minor infractions with warnings/re-education; government officials with disciplinary measures; serious violations with Penal Code No.26/NA sanctions.
  • Ministry of Technology and Communications; Economic Police; Lao People's Court — Electronic-data-protection enforcement in Laos is divided among the Ministry of Technology and Communications, the Economic Police and the Lao People's Court; the Department of Cyber Security does not by law have authority to issue fines or sanctions.

Enforcement activity indexRed

No documented enforcement actions (fines/decisions) under the electronic data law were identified.

Regulator funding and capacityRed

No funding/headcount data for a dedicated DP enforcement function was identified, consistent with the absence of an independent DPA.

Claims (1):

  • Ministry of Technology and Communications (MTC) — MTC both implements and coordinates enforcement of Law 25/NA, creating no separation between rule-setter, business-facilitator and enforcer.

Collective redress and class actionsRed

No collective-redress or class-action mechanism for data-protection claims was identified.

Private right of actionRed

No private right of direct court access for data-protection claims was identified.

Recent developments 180dRed

No Laos-specific data-protection legislative, case-law, guidance, or adequacy developments within the last 180 days were identified.

Claims (1):

  • Ministry of Technology and Communications (MTC) — Revisions to the Law on Electronic Data Protection that may incorporate GDPR-inspired principles.
Category narrative 69 words

Laos has no independent DPA; MTC both implements and coordinates enforcement of the electronic data law, which the World Bank characterizes as creating no separation between rule-setter, business-facilitator and enforcer. No detailed statutory penalty schedule, collective-redress mechanism, or private right of action specific to data protection was identified. No recent (180-day) legislative, case-law, guidance, or adequacy developments specific to Laos data protection were identified as of the research date.

No new data since the standing brief. 1 periodic run re-emitted it unchanged.

Sources and claims (6)
  1. Probable World Bank — MTC itself implements and coordinates enforcement of the electronic data law, per the World Bank's assessment, creating no separation between rule-setter, business-facilitator and enforcer, and Laos has no independent data-protection authority. observed
  2. Uncertain Multilaw / Tilleke & Gibbins Lao Co., Ltd — Law on Electronic Data Protection No. 25/NA provides for sanctions of: Warnings and re-education for minor infractions, disciplinary action for government officials, and escalation to Penal Code No. 26/NA sanctions for serious violations; no fixed monetary maximum fine confirmed in a primary instrument. observed
  3. Probable https://dig.watch/resource/laos-law-on-electronic-data-protection-no-25-na — Law on Electronic Data Protection No.25/NA — Minor infractions with warnings/re-education; government officials with disciplinary measures; serious violations with Penal Code No.26/NA sanctions.
  4. Uncertain https://www.multilaw.com/Multilaw/Multilaw/Data_Protection_Laws_Guide/DataProtection_Guide_Laos.aspx — Ministry of Technology and Communications (MTC) — Revisions to the Law on Electronic Data Protection that may incorporate GDPR-inspired principles.
  5. Probable https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/c01714a0bc2ca257bdfe8f3f75a64adc-0070062022/original/Positioning-The-Lao-PDR-for-a-Digital-Future-11-10-22.pdf — Ministry of Technology and Communications (MTC) — MTC both implements and coordinates enforcement of Law 25/NA, creating no separation between rule-setter, business-facilitator and enforcer.
  6. Probable https://www.dlapiperdataprotection.com/index.html?t=collection-and-processing&c=LA — Ministry of Technology and Communications; Economic Police; Lao People's Court — Electronic-data-protection enforcement in Laos is divided among the Ministry of Technology and Communications, the Economic Police and the Lao People's Court; the Department of Cyber Security does not by law have authority to issue fines or sanctions.
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Band honesty: uncertainty bands are computed against a frozen build clock of 2026-11-17. A year-precision row is never promoted into a tighter band.

Envelope: baseline resolved at jurisdiction_json.baseline; 10 categories, 57 sub-module(s), 86 claim(s) (86 category placement(s)), 23 source(s) in the cumulative register.

Audit trail

Machine checkChallenged on 24 Oct 2026: not upheld (3 confirmed against the cited source; 1 contradicted by the cited source; 8 could not be checked). An automated, adversarial test run by a second model; no person has assessed the result.

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GDPR article map

Cross-reference: which category/sub-module covers each UK GDPR article (43 mapped).

Show article map
GDPR article to category mapping
ArticleCategorySub-module
Art. 5Controller/Processor Dutiesaccountability and dpia
Art. 6Lawful Processing & Special Datalawful bases
Art. 7Lawful Processing & Special Dataconsent thresholds
Art. 9Lawful Processing & Special Dataspecial categories
Art. 13Data Subject Rightsaccess right
Art. 14Data Subject Rightsaccess right
Art. 15Data Subject Rightsaccess right
Art. 16Data Subject Rightsrectification and erasure
Art. 17Data Subject Rightsrectification and erasure
Art. 18Data Subject Rightsrestriction and objection
Art. 19Data Subject Rightsrestriction and objection
Art. 20Data Subject Rightsdata portability
Art. 21Data Subject Rightsrestriction and objection
Art. 22Algorithmic, Biometric & Surveillance Governanceautomated decision making transparency
Art. 25Controller/Processor Dutiesaccountability and dpia
Art. 28Controller/Processor Dutiesjoint controller arrangements
Art. 30Controller/Processor Dutiesropa requirements
Art. 32Controller/Processor Dutiessecurity measures
Art. 33Controller/Processor Dutiesbreach notification
Art. 34Controller/Processor Dutiesbreach notification
Art. 35Controller/Processor Dutiesaccountability and dpia
Art. 37Controller/Processor Dutiesdpo requirements
Art. 38Controller/Processor Dutiesdpo requirements
Art. 39Controller/Processor Dutiesdpo requirements
Art. 44Cross-Border & Adequacytransfer mechanisms
Art. 45Cross-Border & Adequacyadequacy received
Art. 46Cross-Border & Adequacysccs and bcrs
Art. 47Cross-Border & Adequacysccs and bcrs
Art. 48Cross-Border & Adequacytransfer mechanisms
Art. 49Cross-Border & Adequacytransfer mechanisms
Art. 77Enforcement & Redressregulator powers and penalties
Art. 78Enforcement & Redressprivate right of action
Art. 79Enforcement & Redressprivate right of action
Art. 80Enforcement & Redresscollective redress and class actions
Art. 81Enforcement & Redressregulator powers and penalties
Art. 82Enforcement & Redressregulator powers and penalties
Art. 83Enforcement & Redressregulator powers and penalties
Art. 84Enforcement & Redressregulator powers and penalties
Art. 13-22Data Subject Rightsaccess right
Art. 32-34Controller/Processor Dutiessecurity measures
Art. 37-39Controller/Processor Dutiesdpo requirements
Art. 44-49Cross-Border & Adequacytransfer mechanisms
Art. 77-84Enforcement & Redressregulator powers and penalties