Data Protection Monitor
Global Privacy & Data Protection Intelligence

Not every instrument is backed by its official text yet. At least one law or rulebook covered here has no official source (tier 1) retrieved for it yet. No finding on this page is shown with confidence above “Probable” until stronger sources are retrieved.

Mexico Data Protection & Privacy Regulation

MX schema gdpri-v2 trajectory: not yet assessed regulated (omnibus) overlaps: Sentinel (AML/CFT), World Payments, artificial-intelligence

Last updated · 10 categories · 111 claims · 46 sources in the cumulative register

Mexico's data-protection institutional architecture underwent its most consequential change in over two decades this cycle.

Data collected Data published

AI-assembled from cited sources

Not fully checked this cycle: Regulator & Framework, Lawful Processing & Special Data, Enforcement & Redress (6 open gaps).

Framework & posture10 of 10 modules active
10 active · 7 binding instruments
Next milestoneNo upcoming dated milestone on record
Record & confidence mix111 claims · 45 sources · machine-compiled
96 Probable14 Contested / unverified
Evidence re-verified: ·Position last changed: ·
Record history & provenance ▾

Methodology & record provenance: Module confidence is derived from the underlying claims (source tier and primary excerpt retention), while statutory legal force is tracked independently.

Review status: AI-synthesised · Tier-1/2 verified · As-of date: 2026-11-17

Jurisdiction brief

Latest update · 4 November 2026

Lead Signal

Mexico's private-sector data-protection oversight has, as, been in the hands of the Secretaria Anticorrupcion y Buen Gobierno since 21 March 2025, following the dissolution of the National Institute for Transparency, Access to Information and Personal Data Protection under a constitutional reform published 20 December 2024. The shift replaced a constitutionally autonomous body with an executive-branch ministry, and the structural consequence, according to probable-confidence analysis, is a material degradation of institutional independence in data-protection oversight even where the underlying statutory consent standards and fine ceilings have been tightened or left nominally unchanged. One secondary legal-commentary source, assessed at the uncertain tier because it rests on a single source, suggests SABG's role may be limited to disseminating the law's content and promoting compliance, without the rule-making and system-development function INAI held, though this has not been confirmed against the statutory text itself.

Key regulatory facts for Mexico
Key regulatory facts for Mexico
Regulatory DimensionMexico Standing Position
JurisdictionMexico (MX)
Regulatory ScopeData Protection & Privacy Regulation (10 modules, 111 sourced findings)
Regulator & FrameworkA comprehensive statute remains in force and a named regulator exists, but the supervising authority itself is mid-transition, independence and procedural rules are unsettled, and mandated secondary regulation is overdue.
Lawful Processing & Special DataCore lawful-basis and sensitive-data structures exist and are GDPR-adjacent, but definitional gaps (research/journalistic carve-outs, anonymisation safe-harbour detail) remain unresolved pending new regulations.
Data Subject RightsCore ARCO rights are well-established and enforceable, but data portability is confirmed absent from the new statute, and deadline/response-window specifics await the pending implementing regulations.
Controller/Processor DutiesSecurity and controller-liability principles exist and are enforceable, but DPO, DPIA, privacy-by-design and regulator-facing breach notification — all GDPR Art.
Primary Instruments CitedNational Law Review, National Law Review, Recording Law, IAPP, Greenberg Traurig
Last Confirmed / Updated (46 sources in cumulative register)

#

A comprehensive statute remains in force and a named regulator exists, but the supervising authority itself is mid-transition, independence and procedural rules are unsettled, and mandated secondary regulation is overdue.

Primary frameworkLey Federal de Protección de Datos Personales en Posesión de los Particulares (NLFPDPPP, 2025), successor to the 2010 Federal Law
Supervisory authoritySecretaría Anticorrupción y Buen Gobierno (Dirección General de Datos Personales en el Sector Privado)
Traffic-light rationale — AmberA comprehensive statute remains in force and a named regulator exists, but the supervising authority itself is mid-transition, independence and procedural rules are unsettled, and mandated secondary regulation is overdue.

Sub-modules (5)

Regulator and authorityAmber

INAI, the former autonomous DPA, was dissolved by constitutional reform; its private-sector data-protection function was transferred to the Secretaría Anticorrupción y Buen Gobierno, supplemented by two new decentralized bodies created May 2025.

Claims (14):

  • On 28 November 2024 the Mexican Senate approved the 'Simplificación Orgánica' constitutional reform dissolving seven autonomous constitutional bodies, including INAI.
  • The constitutional reform transfers access-to-information, transparency and personal-data-protection responsibilities to a body within the federal public administration responsible for personal data held by both private and public entities.
  • On 12 May 2025 the Ministry of Anticorruption and Good Governance announced creation of two new decentralized bodies, Transparencia para el Pueblo and the Personal Data Protection Unit, assuming roughly 80% of INAI's former functions, with a Specialized Court to be established under the judiciary.
  • INAI dissolved effective 21 March 2025; private-sector data-protection functions transferred to SABG, an executive-branch ministry.
  • Instituto Nacional de Transparencia (INAI) — INAI was formally dissolved as of 21 March 2025 under a constitutional 'organic simplification' reform; data-protection and transparency functions transferred to the executive-branch SABG, which lacks INAI's power to bring constitutional challenges.
  • Secretaría Anticorrupción y Buen Gobierno (SABG) — SABG replaced INAI as the MX data-protection authority effective 21 March 2025.
  • SABG's role under the new regime may be limited to dissemination and promotion rather than rule-making.
  • Instituto Nacional de Transparencia, Acceso a la Información y Protección de Datos Personales (INAI) — INAI dissolved effective 21 March 2025; private-sector data-protection functions transferred to the Secretaría Anticorrupción y Buen Gobierno (SABG)
  • Secretaría Anticorrupción y Buen Gobierno (SABG) — SABG's role is limited to disseminating the law's content and promoting compliance, without INAI's rule-making/system-development function, per one secondary source
  • INAI — Dissolved 9 May 2025; functions transferred to Secretaría Anticorrupción y Buen Gobierno following constitutional 'simplificación orgánica' reform eliminating seven autonomous bodies
  • INAI / Secretaría Anticorrupción y Buen Gobierno (SABG) — A constitutional reform dissolved the autonomous INAI; implementing legislation effective 2025-03-21 transferred data-protection oversight to the executive-branch SABG
  • LFPDPPP decree — INAI's material resources to SABG and financial resources to SHCP within 20 business days of entry into force
  • Secretaría Anticorrupción y Buen Gobierno (SABG) — INAI's data-protection and transparency functions were transferred to SABG effective 21 March 2025 (decree published DOF 20 March 2025); INAI formally ceased to exist on 9 May 2025.
  • Secretaría Anticorrupción y Buen Gobierno (SABG) — File constitutional challenges or actions in constitutional controversy concerning protection of personal data held by obligated entities (a power INAI previously had)

Act and instrumentsGreen

The operative private-sector instrument is the NLFPDPPP (DOF 20 Mar 2025, in force 21 Mar 2025), which repealed the 2010 FLPPDPP; a parallel General Law covers public-sector 'obligated parties'.

Claims (14):

  • The New Federal Law for the Protection of Personal Data in Possession of Private Parties (NLFPDPPP) was published in the DOF on 20 March 2025 and entered into force 21 March 2025, superseding and repealing the 2010 FLPPDPP.
  • The Executive Branch is mandated to issue updated implementing regulations within 90 days of the NLFPDPPP's entry into force to harmonize the regulatory framework, with the prior 2010 Regulations remaining only provisionally applicable in the interim.
  • LFPDPPP / LGPDPPSO — A single decree enacted a rewritten LFPDPPP (private sector) and a new LGPDPPSO (public sector), both effective 21 March 2025, abrogating the 2010 private-sector data-protection law.
  • LFPDPPP 2025 — The new LFPDPPP (DOF 20 March 2025, effective 21 March 2025) abrogates the Federal Law on the Protection of Personal Data Held by Private Parties published in 2010.
  • A further reform to the LFPDPPP was published in the DOF on 14 November 2025.
  • Ley Federal de Protección de Datos Personales en Posesión de los Particulares (LFPDPPP) — Current LFPDPPP text carries a header noting 'Última reforma publicada DOF 14-11-2025'; substantive content of that reform not identified
  • LFPDPPP (2025) — Replaces the 2010 federal private-sector data-protection law but is reported by multiple secondary sources to leave data-subject rights and controller obligations substantively unchanged
  • New LFPDPPP published DOF 20 March 2025, in force 21 March 2025, abrogates the 2010 private-sector data-protection law; last reformed DOF 14 November 2025
  • LFPDPPP implementing regulation (reglamento) — No implementing regulation of the 2025 LFPDPPP had been published in the DOF as of a secondary-source check dated 25 October 2026, notwithstanding the law's lapsed 90-day deadline (mid-June 2025).
  • LFPDPPP 2025 — Published DOF 20 March 2025; in force 21 March 2025
  • Ley Federal de Protección de Datos Personales en Posesión de los Particulares (LFPDPPP 2025) — Published DOF 20 March 2025; in force 21 March 2025; abrogates the 2010 LFPDPPP
  • Decreto LFPDPPP/LGPDPPSO/LGTAIP (Transitorio Sexto) — Material resources of INAI to SABG, and corresponding financial resources to SHCP, within 20 business days of the Decree's entry into force
  • LFPDPPP and LGPDPPSO (2025) — 21 March 2025, formalising the extinction of INAI
  • Decreto (DOF 20 March 2025) — Issues new LFPDPPP effective 21 March 2025, abrogating the Federal Law on data protection held by private parties published 5 July 2010

Material scopeGreen

The law governs legitimate, controlled and informed processing of personal data by private parties to guarantee privacy and informational self-determination; credit-reporting entities remain carved out under separate sectoral law.

Claims (1):

  • Credit-reporting entities are exempt from the general private-sector data protection law because they are subject to separate sectoral regulation.

Territorial scopeAmber

The private-sector law has historically applied on a territorial basis to processing by companies/persons established in Mexico regardless of data-subject residence; the new law preserves this structure.

Claims (2):

  • The private-sector data protection statute applies to processing of personal data by companies and persons on Mexican territory regardless of where the data subjects reside, requiring Mexican-based internet companies to comply even for non-Mexican users' data.
  • LFPDPPP Regulations Art. 4 — Applies extraterritorially only in specific enumerated cases, including establishment in Mexico

Regulator registration and filingRed

No dedicated national registry/filing obligation for controllers was identified in the sources reviewed for the private-sector regime.

Claims (1):

  • Procedures initiated before INAI prior to the reform continue under the rules in effect at their initiation, now before SABG; INAI was formally dissolved as an autonomous constitutional body.
Category narrative 162 words

Mexico's private-sector data protection regime underwent a foundational institutional rupture between Nov 2024 and mid-2025. The Senate approved a constitutional 'organic simplification' reform dissolving seven autonomous bodies including INAI (the former DPA), with functions redistributed to the federal executive branch. A New Federal Law for the Protection of Personal Data Held by Private Parties (NLFPDPPP) was published 20 March 2025 (effective 21 March 2025), repealing the 2010 FLPPDPP, alongside a companion General Law for the public sector. The Secretaría Anticorrupción y Buen Gobierno, acting through its Dirección General de Datos Personales en el Sector Privado, now exercises the former INAI's private-sector functions; two decentralized administrative bodies (Transparencia para el Pueblo and the Personal Data Protection Unit) were stood up in May 2025 to absorb roughly 80% of INAI's functions, with a Specialized Court under the judiciary also contemplated. As of mid-2026 the new authority had not yet issued the harmonizing secondary regulation mandated within 90 days of the NLFPDPPP's entry into force.

Periodic update · new data 2026-11-04

Mexico's private-sector data-protection oversight structure changed fundamentally with the dissolution of the National Institute for Transparency, Access to Information and Personal Data Protection, effective 21 March 2025, pursuant to a constitutional reform published 20 December 2024. The functions INAI previously held over private-sector personal-data processing passed to the Secretaria Anticorrupcion y Buen Gobierno, a ministry within the executive branch rather than a constitutionally autonomous body of the kind INAI was. This is assessed at the probable confidence tier on the strength of the constitutional-reform record and is treated as the single most structurally significant development in Mexico's data-protection regime captured.

A secondary legal-commentary source, resting on a single citation and therefore held at the uncertain tier, suggests that SABG's role under the new arrangement may be confined to disseminating the content of the law and promoting compliance with it, without the rule-making or system-development authority INAI formerly exercised. This has not been verified against the statutory text directly and should be read as an open question rather than a settled finding.

Separately, the Federal Law on Protection of Personal Data Held by Private Parties, the private-sector data-protection statute itself, carries a textual notice that its last reform was published in the Official Gazette on 14 November 2025. The substantive content of that reform, what provisions changed and why, has not been identified from the sources available; what can be said with confidence is only that a reform occurred on that date. A separate body, referred to in commentary as Transparencia para el Pueblo, is reported to be created to handle public-sector information-access functions previously held by INAI, though this sits on the access-to-information side of the prior INAI mandate rather than the private-sector data-protection side that is this monitor's focus.

Outlook

Two verification gaps dominate the near-term outlook for this module. First, whether SABG holds genuine sanctioning and rule-making authority, or only a dissemination and promotion function, remains unconfirmed against the statute itself and is the single most consequential open question for assessing the practical strength of Mexican data-protection enforcement going forward. Second, the substantive content of the 14 November 2025 statutory reform has not yet been identified and will need to be reviewed directly against the gazette text once available. Until both are resolved, Mexico's private-sector data-protection framework should be read as formally reformed but functionally uncertain in its enforcement architecture.

3 earlier distinct updates
Periodic update · new data 2026-11-03

A constitutional reform dissolved Mexico's Instituto Nacional de Transparencia, Acceso a la Información y Protección de Datos Personales (INAI), the body that had served as Mexico's autonomous data-protection authority. Implementing legislation, effective 21 March 2025, transferred data-protection oversight to the Secretaría Anticorrupción y Buen Gobierno (SABG), an executive-branch body. This represents a material reduction in institutional independence compared to INAI's prior status as a constitutionally autonomous body, since SABG sits within the executive branch rather than operating as an independent authority insulated from executive direction.

SABG had not published implementing regulations for the 2025 legal framework it now administers, leaving interpretive uncertainty around several aspects of the new regime's practical operation. Notwithstanding that gap, SABG has already exercised its enforcement authority: the 12 July 2026 fine against the Mexican Football Federation represents the first published sanction under the 2025 LFPDPPP framework, suggesting the new regulator intends to exercise an assertive enforcement posture even in the absence of published implementing regulations.

The combination of reduced institutional independence and an assertive opening enforcement signal is the defining structural tension in Mexico's data-protection framework at this stage: a regulator with potentially diminished independence from executive influence has nonetheless demonstrated a willingness to impose record-scale fines, raising questions about how enforcement priorities will be set and whether they will be shaped by considerations beyond data-protection compliance alone.

Outlook

The clearest marker to watch is whether and when SABG publishes implementing regulations for the 2025 legal framework, which would resolve significant interpretive uncertainty currently surrounding the regime's practical scope. The question of SABG's effective independence from executive direction, despite its enforcement activity to date, remains an open structural question that subsequent enforcement patterns may help clarify.

Periodic update · new data 2026-10-18

A constitutional reform dissolved Mexico's Instituto Nacional de Transparencia, Acceso a la Información y Protección de Datos Personales (INAI), the body that had served as Mexico's autonomous data-protection authority. Implementing legislation, effective 21 March 2025, transferred data-protection oversight to the Secretaría Anticorrupción y Buen Gobierno (SABG), an executive-branch body. This represents a material reduction in institutional independence compared to INAI's prior status as a constitutionally autonomous body, since SABG sits within the executive branch rather than operating as an independent authority insulated from executive direction.

As of this cycle, SABG had not published implementing regulations for the 2025 legal framework it now administers, leaving interpretive uncertainty around several aspects of the new regime's practical operation. Notwithstanding that gap, SABG has already exercised its enforcement authority: the 12 July 2026 fine against the Mexican Football Federation represents the first published sanction under the 2025 LFPDPPP framework, suggesting the new regulator intends to exercise an assertive enforcement posture even in the absence of published implementing regulations.

The combination of reduced institutional independence and an assertive opening enforcement signal is the defining structural tension in Mexico's data-protection framework at this stage: a regulator with potentially diminished independence from executive influence has nonetheless demonstrated a willingness to impose record-scale fines, raising questions about how enforcement priorities will be set and whether they will be shaped by considerations beyond data-protection compliance alone.

Outlook

The clearest marker to watch is whether and when SABG publishes implementing regulations for the 2025 legal framework, which would resolve significant interpretive uncertainty currently surrounding the regime's practical scope. The question of SABG's effective independence from executive direction, despite its enforcement activity to date, remains an open structural question that subsequent enforcement patterns may help clarify.

Periodic update · new data 2026-10-11

Mexico's data-protection regulator, the Instituto Nacional de Transparencia, Acceso a la Información y Protección de Datos Personales, was dissolved on 9 May 2025, with its functions transferred to the Secretaría Anticorrupción y Buen Gobierno, an agency situated within the executive branch. This followed a constitutional "simplificación orgánica" reform that eliminated seven autonomous bodies. Under the transitional provisions of the reform, INAI's material resources were directed to SABG and its financial resources to the Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público within 20 business days of the reform's entry into force.

This transfer is a material change in the institutional architecture governing data protection in Mexico, moving oversight from a body with constitutionally guaranteed autonomy and accountability to Congress to an agency within the executive branch, reporting through the ordinary government hierarchy. Separately, a new Ley Federal de Protección de Datos Personales en Posesión de los Particulares was published in the Diario Oficial de la Federación on 20 March 2025, entering into force the following day and abrogating the 2010 private-sector data-protection law that preceded it. The new law was subsequently reformed on 14 November 2025, though the substantive content of that reform has not yet been retrieved, leaving an open question about what, if anything, changed in the underlying rights and obligations framework at that point.

Outlook

The central open question is whether SABG's enforcement and rulemaking activity under the new institutional structure will match the pace and independence of INAI's prior record. The 12 July 2026 fine against the Federación Mexicana de Fútbol, addressed separately in enforcement coverage, is an early indication that SABG retains active enforcement capacity, but enforcement capacity under executive-branch structure is a distinct question from supervisory independence. The content of the 14 November 2025 LFPDPPP reform remains an open item for future review.

1 further periodic run re-emitted the standing brief unchanged and is not shown.

Sources and claims (32)
  1. Probable IAPP — On 28 November 2024 the Mexican Senate approved the 'Simplificación Orgánica' constitutional reform dissolving seven autonomous constitutional bodies, including INAI. observed
  2. Probable IAPP — The constitutional reform transfers access-to-information, transparency and personal-data-protection responsibilities to a body within the federal public administration responsible for personal data held by both private and public entities. observed
  3. Probable OneTrust DataGuidance — On 12 May 2025 the Ministry of Anticorruption and Good Governance announced creation of two new decentralized bodies, Transparencia para el Pueblo and the Personal Data Protection Unit, assuming roughly 80% of INAI's former functions, with a Specialized Court to be established under the judiciary. observed
  4. Probable OneTrust DataGuidance — The New Federal Law for the Protection of Personal Data in Possession of Private Parties (NLFPDPPP) was published in the DOF on 20 March 2025 and entered into force 21 March 2025, superseding and repealing the 2010 FLPPDPP. observed
  5. Probable OneTrust DataGuidance — The Executive Branch is mandated to issue updated implementing regulations within 90 days of the NLFPDPPP's entry into force to harmonize the regulatory framework, with the prior 2010 Regulations remaining only provisionally applicable in the interim. observed
  6. Probable IAPP — Credit-reporting entities are exempt from the general private-sector data protection law because they are subject to separate sectoral regulation. observed
  7. Probable IAPP — The private-sector data protection statute applies to processing of personal data by companies and persons on Mexican territory regardless of where the data subjects reside, requiring Mexican-based internet companies to comply even for non-Mexican users' data. observed
  8. Probable Wikipedia (ES) — INAI dissolved effective 21 March 2025; private-sector data-protection functions transferred to SABG, an executive-branch ministry. observed
  9. Probable Wikipedia (ES) — Instituto Nacional de Transparencia (INAI) — INAI was formally dissolved as of 21 March 2025 under a constitutional 'organic simplification' reform; data-protection and transparency functions transferred to the executive-branch SABG, which lacks INAI's power to bring constitutional challenges. observed
  10. Probable IDC Online — LFPDPPP / LGPDPPSO — A single decree enacted a rewritten LFPDPPP (private sector) and a new LGPDPPSO (public sector), both effective 21 March 2025, abrogating the 2010 private-sector data-protection law. observed
  11. High Greenberg Traurig — Secretaría Anticorrupción y Buen Gobierno (SABG) — SABG replaced INAI as the MX data-protection authority effective 21 March 2025. observed
  12. High BASHAM — LFPDPPP 2025 — The new LFPDPPP (DOF 20 March 2025, effective 21 March 2025) abrogates the Federal Law on the Protection of Personal Data Held by Private Parties published in 2010. observed
  13. High National Law Review — Procedures initiated before INAI prior to the reform continue under the rules in effect at their initiation, now before SABG; INAI was formally dissolved as an autonomous constitutional body. observed
  14. Uncertain IDC Online — SABG's role under the new regime may be limited to dissemination and promotion rather than rule-making. observed
  15. Probable Cámara de Diputados — A further reform to the LFPDPPP was published in the DOF on 14 November 2025. observed
  16. Probable Wikipedia (ES) — Instituto Nacional de Transparencia, Acceso a la Información y Protección de Datos Personales (INAI) — INAI dissolved effective 21 March 2025; private-sector data-protection functions transferred to the Secretaría Anticorrupción y Buen Gobierno (SABG) observed
  17. Uncertain IDC Online — Secretaría Anticorrupción y Buen Gobierno (SABG) — SABG's role is limited to disseminating the law's content and promoting compliance, without INAI's rule-making/system-development function, per one secondary source observed
  18. Probable Cámara de Diputados — Ley Federal de Protección de Datos Personales en Posesión de los Particulares (LFPDPPP) — Current LFPDPPP text carries a header noting 'Última reforma publicada DOF 14-11-2025'; substantive content of that reform not identified observed
  19. Probable Infobae — INAI — Dissolved 9 May 2025; functions transferred to Secretaría Anticorrupción y Buen Gobierno following constitutional 'simplificación orgánica' reform eliminating seven autonomous bodies observed
  20. Probable National Law Review — INAI / Secretaría Anticorrupción y Buen Gobierno (SABG) — A constitutional reform dissolved the autonomous INAI; implementing legislation effective 2025-03-21 transferred data-protection oversight to the executive-branch SABG observed
  21. Probable IDC Online — LFPDPPP (2025) — Replaces the 2010 federal private-sector data-protection law but is reported by multiple secondary sources to leave data-subject rights and controller obligations substantively unchanged observed
  22. Probable Cámara de Diputados — LFPDPPP Regulations Art. 4 — Applies extraterritorially only in specific enumerated cases, including establishment in Mexico observed
  23. Probable https://www.ordenjuridico.gob.mx/Documentos/Federal/html/wo125102.html — LFPDPPP decree — INAI's material resources to SABG and financial resources to SHCP within 20 business days of entry into force
  24. Probable https://www.ordenjuridico.gob.mx/Documentos/Federal/html/wo125102.html — New LFPDPPP published DOF 20 March 2025, in force 21 March 2025, abrogates the 2010 private-sector data-protection law; last reformed DOF 14 November 2025
  25. Probable Wikipedia (ES) — Secretaría Anticorrupción y Buen Gobierno (SABG) — INAI's data-protection and transparency functions were transferred to SABG effective 21 March 2025 (decree published DOF 20 March 2025); INAI formally ceased to exist on 9 May 2025. observed
  26. Uncertain Orden Jurídico Nacional — LFPDPPP implementing regulation (reglamento) — No implementing regulation of the 2025 LFPDPPP had been published in the DOF as of a secondary-source check dated 25 October 2026, notwithstanding the law's lapsed 90-day deadline (mid-June 2025). observed
  27. Probable Cámara de Diputados — Secretaría de Servicios Parlamentarios — LFPDPPP 2025 — Published DOF 20 March 2025; in force 21 March 2025 observed
  28. Probable White & Case — Secretaría Anticorrupción y Buen Gobierno (SABG) — File constitutional challenges or actions in constitutional controversy concerning protection of personal data held by obligated entities (a power INAI previously had) observed
  29. Probable Cámara de Diputados — Secretaría de Servicios Parlamentarios — Ley Federal de Protección de Datos Personales en Posesión de los Particulares (LFPDPPP 2025) — Published DOF 20 March 2025; in force 21 March 2025; abrogates the 2010 LFPDPPP observed
  30. Probable Secretaría de Gobernación — Orden Jurídico Nacional — Decreto LFPDPPP/LGPDPPSO/LGTAIP (Transitorio Sexto) — Material resources of INAI to SABG, and corresponding financial resources to SHCP, within 20 business days of the Decree's entry into force observed
  31. Probable National Law Review — LFPDPPP and LGPDPPSO (2025) — 21 March 2025, formalising the extinction of INAI observed
  32. Probable Legal 500 (reprint of Greenberg Traurig alert) — Decreto (DOF 20 March 2025) — Issues new LFPDPPP effective 21 March 2025, abrogating the Federal Law on data protection held by private parties published 5 July 2010 observed

#

Core lawful-basis and sensitive-data structures exist and are GDPR-adjacent, but definitional gaps (research/journalistic carve-outs, anonymisation safe-harbour detail) remain unresolved pending new regulations.

Primary frameworkNLFPDPPP Arts. 6-22 (principles, consent, sensitive data)
Supervisory authoritySecretaría Anticorrupción y Buen Gobierno
Traffic-light rationale — AmberCore lawful-basis and sensitive-data structures exist and are GDPR-adjacent, but definitional gaps (research/journalistic carve-outs, anonymisation safe-harbour detail) remain unresolved pending new regulations.

Sub-modules (4)

Lawful basesAmber

The law sets out grounds for processing distinct from GDPR (e.g., legal mandate, public-source data, prior dissociation, contractual necessity) and does not address research or journalistic/artistic processing purposes.

Claims (3):

  • The Federal Law sets out grounds for processing personal data distinct from the GDPR and does not address processing for scientific or historical research purposes.
  • The Federal Law does not address matters such as processing for journalistic or artistic purposes, unlike the GDPR.
  • There are no modifications to the rights of data subjects or to the obligations of those who process personal data under the 2025 reform.

Special categoriesGreen

The law imposes additional requirements for sensitive/special-category data akin to GDPR Art. 9, though with a narrower definitional scope than the European regime.

Claims (4):

  • The Federal Law provides additional requirements for processing sensitive data and defines conditions for consent, in ways broadly similar to the GDPR's special-category regime.
  • Sensitive personal data processing requires express written consent under LFPDPPP Art. 8.
  • SABG FAN ID resolution (Mexican Football Federation) — FMF failed to flag photographs as sensitive data in its privacy notice and obtained consent via an inadequate checkbox mechanism
  • SABG FAN ID resolution — Failure to adequately inform fans that biometric data collected for FAN ID constituted sensitive personal data

Pseudonymisation and anonymisationAmber

The statute defines 'disociación' (dissociation) as a recognized legal mechanism/exception basis, but detailed anonymisation safe-harbour standards were not located in the sources reviewed.

Claims (1):

  • 'Disociación' (dissociation) of personal data is defined as a recognized legal element/exception basis under the private-sector data protection framework.
Category narrative 63 words

Mexico's private-sector regime recognizes a privacy-notice-and-consent-centred model with enumerated exceptions to consent (public sources, legal mandate, prior dissociation, contractual necessity), plus enhanced conditions for 'sensitive' (special-category) data. The NLFPDPPP revises privacy-notice content requirements (Art. 15) but the underlying lawful-basis and consent architecture is substantially continuous with the 2010 law; the statute does not address processing for scientific/historical research or journalistic/artistic purposes, unlike GDPR.

Periodic update · new data 2026-11-04

The core lawful-processing standard under the Federal Law on Protection of Personal Data Held by Private Parties, in force since 21 March 2025, conditions all processing of personal data on consent given freely, specifically and in an informed manner, under Article 7 of the statute. This standard has not changed in its basic formulation from the prior regime, but its practical application has been reinforced by a related tightening: analysis of the reformed law indicates that any modification or addition to the purposes stated in a controller's privacy notice will require renewed consent from the data subject, closing a gap that previously allowed some purpose drift without a fresh consent event.

For sensitive personal data, Article 8 sets a materially higher bar than the general consent standard. Processing of sensitive categories requires express written consent, which may be evidenced by a physical signature, an electronic signature, or another authentication mechanism recognised under the law, and the statute separately prohibits the creation of databases of sensitive personal data without legitimate justification for doing so. This dual structure, a general freely-specific-informed standard alongside a heightened express-written-consent requirement for sensitive categories, places Mexico's lawful-processing architecture within a recognisably rigorous consent-based model, though the underlying sourcing for the sensitive-data provision rests on a single secondary legal-analysis source and is accordingly held at the probable rather than confirmed tier.

The purpose-limitation tightening, requiring fresh consent on any purpose modification, has a direct practical effect on controllers who update privacy notices to reflect new processing activities, data-sharing arrangements, or product features: each such change now carries its own consent-renewal obligation rather than being absorbed under a previously broader notice.

Outlook

No further legislative change to the lawful-processing or special-category framework is reported as pending. The practical test of the tightened purpose-limitation rule will be how consistently controllers across sectors implement renewed-consent mechanisms when privacy notices change, a question the sourcing does not allow an answer to. The sensitive-data consent requirement's interaction with the institutional uncertainty noted elsewhere, regarding SABG's enforcement authority, remains a relevant consideration for assessing how rigorously Article 8 will in practice be supervised.

1 further periodic run re-emitted the standing brief unchanged and is not shown.

Sources and claims (14)
  1. Probable OneTrust DataGuidance — The Federal Law sets out grounds for processing personal data distinct from the GDPR and does not address processing for scientific or historical research purposes. observed
  2. Probable OneTrust DataGuidance — The Federal Law does not address matters such as processing for journalistic or artistic purposes, unlike the GDPR. observed
  3. Probable IAPP — NLFPDPPP Article 15 revises mandatory privacy-notice content, requiring identification of the data subject to the processing and its purposes and distinguishing purposes that require consent. observed
  4. Probable IAPP — Unlike the prior law, the NLFPDPPP no longer lists disclosure of intended data transfers as a mandatory element of the privacy notice. observed
  5. Probable OneTrust DataGuidance — The Federal Law provides additional requirements for processing sensitive data and defines conditions for consent, in ways broadly similar to the GDPR's special-category regime. observed
  6. Probable IAPP — 'Disociación' (dissociation) of personal data is defined as a recognized legal element/exception basis under the private-sector data protection framework. observed
  7. High Chambers and Partners — There are no modifications to the rights of data subjects or to the obligations of those who process personal data under the 2025 reform. observed
  8. Probable KYC Systems — Sensitive personal data processing requires express written consent under LFPDPPP Art. 8. observed
  9. Probable Orden Jurídico Nacional — LFPDPPP Art. 7 — All processing conditioned on consent except statutory exception; consent must be given freely, specifically, and in an informed manner observed
  10. Probable BASHAM — LFPDPPP purpose-change consent rule — Any modification/addition to Privacy Notice purposes now requires renewed data-subject consent, unlike the prior compatible/analogous-purpose exception observed
  11. Probable Orden Jurídico Nacional — Processing of personal data requires consent given freely, specifically and in an informed manner. observed
  12. Probable Baker McKenzie — SABG FAN ID resolution (Mexican Football Federation) — FMF failed to flag photographs as sensitive data in its privacy notice and obtained consent via an inadequate checkbox mechanism observed
  13. Probable Cámara de Diputados — Tacit consent is the general rule for processing under the current LFPDPPP, with express consent still required where the law specifically demands it (e.g. sensitive/special-category data). observed
  14. Probable Secretaría Anticorrupción y Buen Gobierno (SABG) — SABG FAN ID resolution — Failure to adequately inform fans that biometric data collected for FAN ID constituted sensitive personal data observed

#

Core ARCO rights are well-established and enforceable, but data portability is confirmed absent from the new statute, and deadline/response-window specifics await the pending implementing regulations.

Primary frameworkNLFPDPPP Arts. 16-25 (ARCO rights procedure)
Supervisory authoritySecretaría Anticorrupción y Buen Gobierno
Traffic-light rationale — AmberCore ARCO rights are well-established and enforceable, but data portability is confirmed absent from the new statute, and deadline/response-window specifics await the pending implementing regulations.

Sub-modules (5)

Access rightGreen

The new law broadens the access right beyond simply knowing processed data and the privacy notice, to include information on the general conditions of processing.

Claims (3):

  • ARCO rights (access, rectification, cancellation and opposition) form the procedural core of data-subject rights under the private-sector data protection law.
  • The New Law redefines the access right so that the data subject may access personal data and also know general conditions of the processing, expanding beyond the prior law's narrower formulation.
  • The new LFPDPPP preserves the four ARCO rights as the procedural core of data-subject rights, with the cancellation right now explicitly extended to the systems and records where data is stored.

Rectification and erasureGreen

Both GDPR and the Mexican Federal Law recognize a right to request cancellation/erasure of data in certain circumstances; deletion is also required once data is no longer necessary for the stated purpose.

Claims (4):

  • Both the GDPR and the Mexican Federal Law provide that data subjects may request cancellation or erasure of their data in certain circumstances for legitimate reasons.
  • Personal data must be deleted where it is no longer required for the purposes indicated in the privacy notice provided to data subjects.
  • The right of cancellation now expressly extends to files, records, dossiers and systems of the controller.
  • LFPDPPP cancellation right — Right of cancellation extends to files, records, dossiers and systems of the data controller where personal data are held

Restriction and objectionAmber

Opposition (the 'O' in ARCO) is a recognized right; restriction as a distinct GDPR-style concept is not separately elaborated in the sources reviewed.

Claims (1):

  • Opposition to processing is recognized as one of the four ARCO rights under the private-sector framework.

Data portabilityRed

Practitioner review of the enacted NLFPDPPP text confirms the new law does not include a data portability right, despite general secondary summaries describing 'enhanced' rights.

Claims (1):

  • Practitioner analysis of the enacted NLFPDPPP text confirms the new law does not include a data portability right, among other omissions relative to GDPR-style frameworks.

Deadlines and response windowsAmber

Historically, data controllers/authorities operated under short compliance windows (e.g., 10 days to comply with an IFAI/INAI resolution); NLFPDPPP-specific response-window detail awaits the pending implementing regulation.

Claims (2):

  • Under the 2010-era framework, data collectors had 10 days to comply with a resolution issued by the data protection authority.
  • Against resolutions of the new Secretaría (replacing INAI), affected parties may now pursue amparo proceedings before specialized district and circuit courts, which were to be enabled within 120 calendar days of the reform decree's publication (i.e., by 19 June 2025).
Category narrative 90 words

Mexico's rights framework centers on the ARCO rights (access, rectification, cancellation, opposition). The NLFPDPPP broadens the definition of the access right to include information about the conditions of processing, and replaces judicial review of regulator resolutions from nullity trials to amparo proceedings before newly created specialized federal courts. Critically, per detailed practitioner analysis of the enacted text, the new law does NOT include a data portability right, in contrast to a DataGuidance summary describing 'enhanced' data subject rights generally — this is flagged as an unresolved conflict pending primary-text confirmation.

No new data since the standing brief. 1 periodic run re-emitted it unchanged.

Sources and claims (11)
  1. Probable IAPP — ARCO rights (access, rectification, cancellation and opposition) form the procedural core of data-subject rights under the private-sector data protection law. observed
  2. Probable IAPP — The New Law redefines the access right so that the data subject may access personal data and also know general conditions of the processing, expanding beyond the prior law's narrower formulation. observed
  3. Probable OneTrust DataGuidance — Both the GDPR and the Mexican Federal Law provide that data subjects may request cancellation or erasure of their data in certain circumstances for legitimate reasons. observed
  4. Probable IAPP — Personal data must be deleted where it is no longer required for the purposes indicated in the privacy notice provided to data subjects. observed
  5. Probable IAPP — Opposition to processing is recognized as one of the four ARCO rights under the private-sector framework. observed
  6. Probable IAPP — Practitioner analysis of the enacted NLFPDPPP text confirms the new law does not include a data portability right, among other omissions relative to GDPR-style frameworks. observed
  7. Probable IAPP — Under the 2010-era framework, data collectors had 10 days to comply with a resolution issued by the data protection authority. observed
  8. Probable IAPP — Against resolutions of the new Secretaría (replacing INAI), affected parties may now pursue amparo proceedings before specialized district and circuit courts, which were to be enabled within 120 calendar days of the reform decree's publication (i.e., by 19 June 2025). observed
  9. Probable Cámara de Diputados — The new LFPDPPP preserves the four ARCO rights as the procedural core of data-subject rights, with the cancellation right now explicitly extended to the systems and records where data is stored. observed
  10. Probable BASHAM — The right of cancellation now expressly extends to files, records, dossiers and systems of the controller. observed
  11. Probable BASHAM — LFPDPPP cancellation right — Right of cancellation extends to files, records, dossiers and systems of the data controller where personal data are held observed

#

Security and controller-liability principles exist and are enforceable, but DPO, DPIA, privacy-by-design and regulator-facing breach notification — all GDPR Art. 25/33/35/37-39 analogues — are confirmed absent from the current statute and Regulations.

Primary frameworkNLFPDPPP + (provisionally) 2010 FLPPDPP Regulations, pending updated Reglamento
Supervisory authoritySecretaría Anticorrupción y Buen Gobierno
Traffic-light rationale — AmberSecurity and controller-liability principles exist and are enforceable, but DPO, DPIA, privacy-by-design and regulator-facing breach notification — all GDPR Art. 25/33/35/37-39 analogues — are confirmed absent from the current statute and Regulations.

Sub-modules (7)

Accountability & DPIARed

The Regulations address a concept of accountability but neither the Federal Law nor Regulations define processor liabilities or require DPIAs/privacy-by-design; a general secondary summary claiming DPIA introduction conflicts with detailed practitioner review of the enacted text.

Claims (4):

  • Neither the Federal Law nor its Regulations address Data Protection Impact Assessments (DPIAs).
  • A general secondary summary describes the NLFPDPPP as imposing stricter obligations including the need for risk assessments and data protection impact evaluations, which conflicts with detailed practitioner review of the enacted text confirming DPIAs are not addressed; this discrepancy is unresolved pending primary-text confirmation.
  • Regulatory-decision appeal mechanism — INAI decisions could previously be challenged through administrative litigation before the Federal Court of Administrative Justice; challenges now proceed via the amparo constitutional remedy before specialized federal courts.
  • SABG — FMF breached accountability and lawfulness principles by relying on a simple website checkbox to authorise registration and biometric data collection (FAN ID)

DPO requirementsAmber

Neither the Federal Law nor its Regulations require formal DPO appointment or regulator notification of a DPO; historically the 2010 law required only designation of a responsible person/department (privacy officer).

Claims (2):

  • Neither the Federal Law nor the Regulations require organizations to designate a formal Data Protection Officer or notify the authority of a DPO appointment.
  • Under the 2010-era law, all data controllers and processors had to appoint a person or group responsible for personal-data-related requirements (a privacy officer), and employers had to appoint a person or department for employee data.

Ropa requirementsRed

No explicit records-of-processing-activities (ROPA) obligation equivalent to GDPR Art. 30 was located in the sources reviewed.

Joint controller arrangementsAmber

The Federal Law specifies controllers are liable for violations of its principles but does not define processor liabilities in GDPR Art. 28 style detail.

Claims (1):

  • The Federal Law specifies that data controllers are liable for violations of its principles, though neither the Law nor Regulations define the liabilities of data processors in detail.

Security measuresGreen

The Federal Law itself does not define security measures, but the (provisionally applicable) Regulations define 'technical security measures' and require risk-based administrative, technical and physical safeguards.

Claims (3):

  • The Federal Law does not itself define security measures, but Article 2(VII) of the Regulations defines 'technical security measures' as controls ensuring authorized, identified access to logical databases.
  • Mexico's data-protection regime imposes risk-based technical, administrative and physical safeguards on data processors under both the private-sector Federal Law and the public-sector General Law.
  • LFPDPPP 2025 fine schedule (Art 60 MDPL) — Failure to implement security measures classified a 'very serious violation', minimum MXN 23,462, maximum MXN 37,539,200 in 2026, doubled for sensitive data/recidivism

Breach notificationAmber

The Federal Law does not specify a breach-notification requirement to the regulator; the Regulations (Art. 64) require the controller to inform the data subject without delay of breaches affecting their patrimonial or moral rights. Sector overlays impose separate regulator-facing notification (e.g., banks to CNBV).

Claims (2):

  • Under the current legislative framework there is no requirement to inform the data protection authority when a data breach occurs; the Federal Law/Regulations only impose notification obligations toward the affected data subject.
  • Banks must immediately notify the National Banking and Securities Commission (CNBV) of any qualifying information-security incident, and the chief information security officer must submit a monthly information-security management report.

Retention and disposalGreen

Personal data must be deleted once no longer required for the purposes stated in the privacy notice.

Claims (1):

  • Personal data must be deleted if no longer required for the purposes indicated in the privacy notice provided to data subjects.
Category narrative 79 words

Mexico's regime imposes accountability, security and (limited) breach-related duties on controllers, but critically diverges from GDPR by not requiring a formal Data Protection Officer appointment/notification, and by not requiring DPIAs or privacy-by-design/default under either the Federal Law or its Regulations — a gap the NLFPDPPP's practitioner review confirms was carried forward. Breach notification runs to affected data subjects, not to the regulator, under the current Regulations (Art. 64); sectoral overlays (e.g., banking) impose separate incident-notification duties to financial regulators.

No new data since the standing brief. 1 periodic run re-emitted it unchanged.

Sources and claims (13)
  1. Probable OneTrust DataGuidance — Neither the Federal Law nor its Regulations address Data Protection Impact Assessments (DPIAs). observed
  2. Uncertain OneTrust DataGuidance — A general secondary summary describes the NLFPDPPP as imposing stricter obligations including the need for risk assessments and data protection impact evaluations, which conflicts with detailed practitioner review of the enacted text confirming DPIAs are not addressed; this discrepancy is unresolved pending primary-text confirmation. observed
  3. Probable OneTrust DataGuidance — Neither the Federal Law nor the Regulations require organizations to designate a formal Data Protection Officer or notify the authority of a DPO appointment. observed
  4. Probable IAPP — Under the 2010-era law, all data controllers and processors had to appoint a person or group responsible for personal-data-related requirements (a privacy officer), and employers had to appoint a person or department for employee data. observed
  5. Probable OneTrust DataGuidance — The Federal Law specifies that data controllers are liable for violations of its principles, though neither the Law nor Regulations define the liabilities of data processors in detail. observed
  6. Probable OneTrust DataGuidance — The Federal Law does not itself define security measures, but Article 2(VII) of the Regulations defines 'technical security measures' as controls ensuring authorized, identified access to logical databases. observed
  7. Probable IAPP — Mexico's data-protection regime imposes risk-based technical, administrative and physical safeguards on data processors under both the private-sector Federal Law and the public-sector General Law. observed
  8. Probable OneTrust DataGuidance — Under the current legislative framework there is no requirement to inform the data protection authority when a data breach occurs; the Federal Law/Regulations only impose notification obligations toward the affected data subject. observed
  9. Probable IAPP — Banks must immediately notify the National Banking and Securities Commission (CNBV) of any qualifying information-security incident, and the chief information security officer must submit a monthly information-security management report. observed
  10. Probable IAPP — Personal data must be deleted if no longer required for the purposes indicated in the privacy notice provided to data subjects. observed
  11. High Recording Law — Regulatory-decision appeal mechanism — INAI decisions could previously be challenged through administrative litigation before the Federal Court of Administrative Justice; challenges now proceed via the amparo constitutional remedy before specialized federal courts. observed
  12. Probable https://www.gob.mx/buengobierno/prensa/buen-gobierno-sanciona-a-la-federacion-mexicana-de-futbol-con-42-8-millones-de-pesos-por-violaciones-a-la-proteccion-de-datos-personales — SABG — FMF breached accountability and lawfulness principles by relying on a simple website checkbox to authorise registration and biometric data collection (FAN ID)
  13. Probable Legal 500 — LFPDPPP 2025 fine schedule (Art 60 MDPL) — Failure to implement security measures classified a 'very serious violation', minimum MXN 23,462, maximum MXN 37,539,200 in 2026, doubled for sensitive data/recidivism observed

#

A transfer mechanism exists in statute but enforcement reach is explicitly limited by the authority's own historical acknowledgment of extraterritorial enforcement gaps, and SCC/BCR/TIA/localisation specifics are largely undocumented in current secondary sources.

Primary frameworkNLFPDPPP Art. 36 (international transfer clause in privacy notice)
Supervisory authoritySecretaría Anticorrupción y Buen Gobierno
Traffic-light rationale — AmberA transfer mechanism exists in statute but enforcement reach is explicitly limited by the authority's own historical acknowledgment of extraterritorial enforcement gaps, and SCC/BCR/TIA/localisation specifics are largely undocumented in current secondary sources.

Sub-modules (6)

Transfer mechanismsAmber

Transfers rely on a privacy-notice clause binding the receiving controller to the same purposes and obligations, contingent on data-subject acceptance.

Claims (2):

  • Under Article 36 of the private-sector law, a controller transferring personal data abroad must communicate the signed privacy notice to the new foreign controller so it remains bound by the same purposes and obligations, conditioned on a transfer clause having been included in the notice and accepted by the data subject.
  • The data protection authority has historically lacked international enforcement powers to compel foreign companies subject to a different legal order to comply with Mexican data protection obligations.

Adequacy receivedRed

No evidence found of Mexico having received a formal adequacy determination from another regime (e.g., EU) as of the research date.

Adequacy grantedAmber

Mexico's Federal Law/Regulations reference European adequacy decisions as a basis for enabling transfers, implying a form of unilateral recognition rather than a reciprocal adequacy-granting mechanism.

Claims (1):

  • The Federal Law and Regulations cite European Union adequacy decisions as a basis for enabling international data transfers out of Mexico.

SCCs and BCRsRed

No dedicated SCC or BCR certification/registration scheme for the private sector was identified in the sources reviewed.

Transfer impact assessmentRed

No transfer-impact-assessment requirement analogous to post-Schrems II EU practice was identified for Mexico's private-sector regime.

Data localisationRed

No general data-localisation mandate was identified for the private-sector regime in the sources reviewed.

Category narrative 75 words

Mexico's private-sector regime permits international transfers through privacy-notice-embedded transfer clauses binding the foreign recipient to the same purposes, and secondary commentary indicates the Federal Law/Regulations cite European adequacy decisions as a basis for enabling transfers. However, INAI (and now its successor) has historically lacked international enforcement powers to bind foreign controllers under other legal orders, limiting practical enforceability. No explicit SCC/BCR certification scheme, transfer-impact-assessment requirement, or general data-localisation mandate was identified for the private sector.

Sources and claims (3)
  1. Probable IAPP — Under Article 36 of the private-sector law, a controller transferring personal data abroad must communicate the signed privacy notice to the new foreign controller so it remains bound by the same purposes and obligations, conditioned on a transfer clause having been included in the notice and accepted by the data subject. observed
  2. Probable IAPP — The data protection authority has historically lacked international enforcement powers to compel foreign companies subject to a different legal order to comply with Mexican data protection obligations. observed
  3. Probable OneTrust DataGuidance — The Federal Law and Regulations cite European Union adequacy decisions as a basis for enabling international data transfers out of Mexico. observed

#

Financial-sector overlay is well documented; health, telecoms, education and insurance overlays are thinly evidenced or absent in the sources reviewed.

Supervisory authorityComisión Nacional Bancaria y de Valores (CNBV)
Traffic-light rationale — AmberFinancial-sector overlay is well documented; health, telecoms, education and insurance overlays are thinly evidenced or absent in the sources reviewed.

Sub-modules (7)

Financial sector overlayGreen

Banks must immediately notify CNBV of qualifying information-security incidents, with monthly CISO reporting to the CEO/board; credit-reporting entities are exempt from the general law and governed by separate legislation.

Claims (2):

  • Banks in Mexico must immediately notify the Comisión Nacional Bancaria y de Valores (CNBV) of any qualifying information-security incident.
  • The chief information security officer at Mexican banks must submit a monthly information-security management report to the CEO and, when required, to the board or relevant committees.

Health sector overlayAmber

Secondary commentary notes the existence of sector-specific laws in the health and pharmaceutical sectors distinct from the general Federal Law, but granular detail was not found in the sources reviewed.

Claims (1):

  • Sector-specific laws exist in the financial services and health/pharmaceutical sectors distinct from the general private-sector Federal Law and Regulations.

Telecoms and eprivacyRed

No dedicated telecoms/ePrivacy-style overlay (e.g., cookie consent, electronic communications confidentiality specific to the sector) was identified.

Employment dataAmber

Historically, employers were required to appoint a person or department responsible for employee personal data and to promote its protection.

Claims (1):

  • Employers must appoint a person or establish a personal data department to handle employees' personal data and promote its protection.

Credit and scoringAmber

Credit-reporting entities (sociedades de información crediticia) are exempt from the general Federal Law and governed by separate credit-bureau legislation.

Claims (1):

  • Credit-reporting entities are exempt from the general private-sector data protection law because they are subject to separate regulation.

educationRed

No education-sector-specific data protection overlay was identified in the sources reviewed.

insuranceRed

No insurance-sector-specific data protection overlay was identified in the sources reviewed.

Category narrative 41 words

Mexico layers sector-specific rules atop the general private-sector data protection statute, most notably in financial services (credit-reporting carve-out, CNBV incident-notification duties for banks) and health/pharmaceutical sectors. No dedicated telecoms/ePrivacy, education, or insurance-specific data protection overlays were identified in the sources reviewed.

Sources and claims (5)
  1. Probable IAPP — Banks in Mexico must immediately notify the Comisión Nacional Bancaria y de Valores (CNBV) of any qualifying information-security incident. observed
  2. Probable IAPP — The chief information security officer at Mexican banks must submit a monthly information-security management report to the CEO and, when required, to the board or relevant committees. observed
  3. Probable OneTrust DataGuidance — Sector-specific laws exist in the financial services and health/pharmaceutical sectors distinct from the general private-sector Federal Law and Regulations. observed
  4. Probable IAPP — Employers must appoint a person or establish a personal data department to handle employees' personal data and promote its protection. observed
  5. Probable IAPP — Credit-reporting entities are exempt from the general private-sector data protection law because they are subject to separate regulation. observed

#

No dedicated adtech/commercial-privacy regime exists; only the general opposition right within ARCO offers any traction for direct-marketing objections.

Supervisory authoritySecretaría Anticorrupción y Buen Gobierno
Traffic-light rationale — RedNo dedicated adtech/commercial-privacy regime exists; only the general opposition right within ARCO offers any traction for direct-marketing objections.

Sub-modules (6)

Cookies and trackersRed

The Mexican private-sector law does not specifically address internet cookies.

Claims (1):

  • The Mexican federal data protection law does not specifically address topics such as internet cookies, employee monitoring, or collection of personal data in connection with credit-card transactions.

Dark patternsRed

No dark-pattern prohibition was identified in the sources reviewed.

Opt out signalsRed

No recognition of universal opt-out signals (e.g., Global Privacy Control, DAA) was identified.

Clean rooms and dcrRed

No clean-room/data-collaboration-room-specific rule was identified.

Cross context advertisingRed

No CPRA-style 'sale'/'share' or cross-context-advertising-specific regime was identified.

Direct marketingAmber

Direct marketing objections are addressed only through the general ARCO opposition right rather than a dedicated marketing-consent/suppression regime.

Claims (1):

  • The ARCO opposition right provides the primary (general, non-marketing-specific) mechanism by which data subjects can object to processing, including for direct-marketing purposes.
Category narrative 43 words

Mexico's private-sector data protection law does not specifically address internet cookies or trackers, and no dedicated dark-pattern prohibition, opt-out-signal recognition (e.g., Global Privacy Control), clean-room/data-collaboration-room rule, or cross-context-advertising regime was identified. Direct marketing is addressed only indirectly through the general ARCO opposition right.

Sources and claims (2)
  1. Probable IAPP — The Mexican federal data protection law does not specifically address topics such as internet cookies, employee monitoring, or collection of personal data in connection with credit-card transactions. observed
  2. Uncertain IAPP — The ARCO opposition right provides the primary (general, non-marketing-specific) mechanism by which data subjects can object to processing, including for direct-marketing purposes. observed

#

No binding AI-specific statute exists; biometric governance rests on enforcement precedent rather than codified rules, and profiling/ADM-transparency provisions were not separately documented.

Supervisory authoritySecretaría Anticorrupción y Buen Gobierno
Traffic-light rationale — AmberNo binding AI-specific statute exists; biometric governance rests on enforcement precedent rather than codified rules, and profiling/ADM-transparency provisions were not separately documented.

Sub-modules (6)

Profiling restrictionsRed

No profiling-restriction provision analogous to GDPR Art. 22 was specifically documented for Mexico in the sources reviewed.

Claims (1):

  • LFPDPPP automated-decision provisions — Secondary compliance guide asserts a new opposition right against fully-automated decisions and a requirement for privacy notices to disclose AI/autonomous-agent use; not corroborated against the LFPDPPP consolidated text this pass.

Automated decision making transparencyRed

No ADM-transparency/explanation-right provision was specifically documented for Mexico's private-sector regime in the sources reviewed.

AI risk assessmentsRed

Mexico has no dedicated AI law; a Senate National AI Alliance (ANIA) initiative is developing a regulatory proposal covering cybersecurity, privacy and ethical AI use, but remains pre-legislative.

Claims (2):

  • Mexico does not have a specific AI law; the Senate's National AI Alliance (ANIA) is working on a regulatory proposal covering cybersecurity, privacy, ethical AI use and AI adoption.
  • As of mid-2026, Mexico's new data protection authority had not yet issued secondary regulation or public sanctions, though there were indications of preliminary investigations concerning sensitive data handling and security-incident management.

Biometric regimeAmber

Biometric governance has proceeded via enforcement precedent (the 'Fan ID' facial-recognition investigation) and a government digital biometric identity rollout, rather than a codified biometric-specific statute.

Claims (3):

  • INAI's investigation of the 'Fan ID' facial-recognition system implemented by the Mexican Football Federation became one of the most significant proceedings on biometric data processing in the private sector, raising issues of consent, proportionality and controller/processor responsibility.
  • The Mexican government is advancing implementation of a biometric digital identity system alongside a National Cybersecurity Plan 2025-2030.
  • SABG — Sensitive nature of biometric data processed via FAN ID in setting the FMF penalty amount

Genetic dataRed

No genetic-data-specific regime was identified in the sources reviewed.

State surveillance carveoutsRed

No detailed national-security/state-surveillance carve-out provision was documented in the sources reviewed for the private-sector regime.

Category narrative 96 words

Mexico has no dedicated AI law; a Senate-based National AI Alliance (ANIA) is developing a regulatory proposal spanning cybersecurity, privacy, and AI ethics, but this remains pre-legislative as of the research date. Biometric data governance has developed through enforcement precedent rather than statute — most notably INAI's investigation into the Mexican Football Federation's 'Fan ID' facial-recognition system, which raised consent, proportionality and controller/processor-responsibility issues. The government is separately advancing a biometric digital-identity system. A thinly sourced reference to a Mexican 'neuro-rights' law protecting neurotechnology/neural data was found but could not be corroborated against a primary text.

Periodic update · new data 2026-10-18

SABG's FAN ID enforcement decision against the Mexican Football Federation is the clearest confirmation to date that biometric data is treated as sensitive personal data under Mexico's data-protection framework, requiring both explicit identification as sensitive in a controller's privacy notice and a heightened consent standard beyond simple checkbox acknowledgment. The FAN ID programme itself involved biometric identity verification, a category of processing that sits squarely within the algorithmic and biometric governance space given its use for identity-matching and verification purposes at scale, likely across a large number of football spectators or participants.

The scale of the resulting fine — 42,849,095 Mexican pesos, approximately 2.14 million US dollars — and its description as one of the most significant data-protection enforcement actions in Mexico to date, signals that biometric identity-verification programmes of this kind now carry materially elevated compliance risk in Mexico. For any organization deploying biometric identity-verification technology at scale in Mexico, including for event access, security or authentication purposes, the FAN ID decision establishes a concrete enforcement benchmark: the mere technical accuracy or security of a biometric system does not satisfy compliance obligations if the privacy notice fails to classify the data as sensitive and if consent is obtained through a mechanism the regulator considers inadequate for sensitive-category processing.

Outlook

Organizations operating biometric identity-verification systems in Mexico should expect continued SABG scrutiny of consent mechanisms and privacy-notice classifications following this precedent-setting action; watch for whether SABG pursues further biometric-processing enforcement actions against other sectors beyond sports and event-access use cases.

Sources and claims (6)
  1. Probable IAPP — Mexico does not have a specific AI law; the Senate's National AI Alliance (ANIA) is working on a regulatory proposal covering cybersecurity, privacy, ethical AI use and AI adoption. observed
  2. Probable IAPP — As of mid-2026, Mexico's new data protection authority had not yet issued secondary regulation or public sanctions, though there were indications of preliminary investigations concerning sensitive data handling and security-incident management. observed
  3. Probable IAPP — INAI's investigation of the 'Fan ID' facial-recognition system implemented by the Mexican Football Federation became one of the most significant proceedings on biometric data processing in the private sector, raising issues of consent, proportionality and controller/processor responsibility. observed
  4. Probable IAPP — The Mexican government is advancing implementation of a biometric digital identity system alongside a National Cybersecurity Plan 2025-2030. observed
  5. Probable Vértigo Político — SABG — Sensitive nature of biometric data processed via FAN ID in setting the FMF penalty amount observed
  6. Uncertain BASHAM — LFPDPPP automated-decision provisions — Secondary compliance guide asserts a new opposition right against fully-automated decisions and a requirement for privacy notices to disclose AI/autonomous-agent use; not corroborated against the LFPDPPP consolidated text this pass. observed

#

The current statute contains no children's-data-specific regime at all; this is an explicit, confirmed statutory gap rather than a mere silence in secondary sources.

Supervisory authoritySecretaría Anticorrupción y Buen Gobierno
Traffic-light rationale — RedThe current statute contains no children's-data-specific regime at all; this is an explicit, confirmed statutory gap rather than a mere silence in secondary sources.

Sub-modules (5)

Age verificationRed

No age-verification requirement was identified in the sources reviewed.

Minor profiling bansRed

No minor-profiling ban was identified in the sources reviewed.

Claims (1):

  • INAI discontinued minors-data projects — Concerns have been raised that discontinuation of INAI's projects could affect measures protecting minors' personal data.

Education settingsRed

No education-setting-specific children's-data provision was identified.

Dependent adultsRed

No dependent-adult (elderly/incapacitated)-specific protection provision was identified in the sources reviewed.

Category narrative 52 words

Detailed practitioner review of the enacted NLFPDPPP text confirms that the new law does not include specific provisions addressing the processing of personal data of minors, continuing a longstanding gap relative to GDPR (which contains express child-consent-age rules). No age-verification, parental-consent, minor-profiling-ban, education-setting-specific, or dependent-adult-specific provisions were identified for Mexico's private-sector regime.

Sources and claims (2)
  1. Probable IAPP — The New Federal Law (NLFPDPPP) does not include topics such as the processing of personal data of minors, unlike the GDPR which sets express child-consent age thresholds. observed
  2. Assessed National Law Review — INAI discontinued minors-data projects — Concerns have been raised that discontinuation of INAI's projects could affect measures protecting minors' personal data. observed

#

A functioning enforcement and judicial-review pathway exists, but the new regulator's operational capacity, sanctioning track record, and independence remain unproven during this institutional transition.

Primary frameworkNLFPDPPP enforcement + amparo judicial review procedure
Supervisory authoritySecretaría Anticorrupción y Buen Gobierno
Traffic-light rationale — AmberA functioning enforcement and judicial-review pathway exists, but the new regulator's operational capacity, sanctioning track record, and independence remain unproven during this institutional transition.

Sub-modules (6)

Regulator powers and penaltiesAmber

The Secretaría now exercises verification, complaint-resolution and sanctioning powers formerly held by INAI, but with unresolved questions about its independence given its status as an executive-branch secretariat rather than an autonomous body.

Claims (9):

  • Unlike INAI (an autonomous constitutional body), the Secretaría Anticorrupción y Buen Gobierno is not required to render an annual activity report to Congress, and the express attribution to develop, promote and disseminate data-protection research and studies was not carried forward in the new law's Article 39.
  • Data subjects and controllers no longer have an autonomous tribunal-style review process under SABG oversight.
  • Maximum fine for data-protection violations is 320,000 UMA (approx. MXN 37.5 million).
  • SABG / 30th Judicial Circuit — Judicial review of SABG data-protection resolutions now proceeds via amparo before newly created specialized federal courts (operational 1 July 2025), replacing INAI's former quasi-judicial nullity-trial review route.
  • LFPDPPP enforcement regime — Maximum fine 320,000 UMA (~MXN 37.5 million at 2026 UMA values) for data-protection violations
  • SABG data-protection oversight — Because SABG is an executive-branch ministry, data subjects/controllers no longer have access to the independent-tribunal-style review INAI formerly provided; a separate 'Transparencia para el Pueblo' body was created for public-information-access matters only
  • LFPDPPP Art. 59 — 320,000 UMA (approx. MXN 37,539,200 at stated 2026 daily UMA value), doubling for sensitive personal data
  • LFPDPPP enforcement penalties — A secondary compliance guide reports the maximum administrative fine under the current LFPDPPP at 320,000 UMA (approx. MXN 37.5 million at 2026 UMA value), unchanged in structure from the 2010 law's 320,000-day-minimum-wage cap.
  • SABG (successor to INAI) — Rules in force at time proceedings were initiated before INAI, with SABG now handling them instead of INAI

Enforcement activity indexAmber

Historical INAI enforcement produced cumulative fines in the tens of millions of pesos in multiple reporting years under the prior law; specific figures for the new authority's activity were not accessible in the sources reviewed (content behind a paywall/JS-blocked).

Claims (4):

  • SABG initiated formal proceedings following high-profile cyber incidents in early 2026, publicized immediately, departing from INAI's prior confidential preliminary review.
  • Secretaría Anticorrupción y Buen Gobierno (SABG) — MXN 42,849,095 (~USD 2.14M) against the Federación Mexicana de Futbol Asociación over FAN ID biometric data processing
  • SABG — Federación Mexicana de Fútbol MXN 42,849,095 for FAN ID biometric data-protection breaches
  • Federación Mexicana de Futbol Asociación, A.C. (FMF) — MXN 42,849,095

Regulator funding and capacityRed

No detailed budget/headcount data for the new Secretaría's data-protection function was identified in the sources reviewed.

Collective redress and class actionsRed

No dedicated collective-redress or class-action mechanism specific to data protection claims was identified in the sources reviewed.

Private right of actionAmber

Data subjects may seek civil damages from data collectors for harm suffered from a breach of the data protection law, and may now challenge regulator resolutions via amparo before specialized courts.

Claims (7):

  • Data subjects may seek damages from data collectors when they consider they have suffered harm or losses derived from a breach of the data protection law.
  • Against resolutions of the Secretaría, affected parties may now pursue amparo (constitutional review) proceedings before specialized district and circuit courts, replacing the prior nullity-trial pathway against INAI resolutions.
  • 30th Judicial Circuit (Aguascalientes) — As of 1 July 2025, all pending and new data-protection litigation is processed before the newly established 30th Judicial Circuit via amparo.
  • Amparo / specialised federal data-protection district courts — Judicial review route for SABG private-sector data-protection decisions, consolidating ARCO-rights litigation into a single federal circuit
  • LFPDPPP judicial-review mechanism — Challenges to the data-protection authority's resolutions now proceed via amparo before specialised federal courts, replacing the prior nullity trial before the Tribunal Federal de Justicia Administrativa.
  • 30th Judicial Circuit (Aguascalientes) — All pending and new litigation on public-information-access and personal-data-protection matters, from 1 July 2025
  • General Agreement 8/2025 of the Plenary of the Federal Judiciary Council — District Courts and Collegiate Circuit Courts of the Thirtieth Circuit (Aguascalientes) for amparo proceedings on public-information-access and data-protection matters, operational from 1 July 2025

Recent developments 180dAmber

Within the last 180 days, secondary reporting (published within the reporting window) indicates Mexico's updated privacy law remains largely structurally continuous with the 2010 regime, the new authority has yet to issue secondary regulation or public sanctions, and the government is simultaneously advancing biometric digital identity and a National Cybersecurity Plan.

Claims (3):

  • As of early-to-mid 2026, Mexico's updated privacy law entered into force but largely retains the structure of the 2010 regime, and the new data authority had not yet issued secondary regulation or public sanctions, though preliminary investigations into sensitive-data handling and security-incident management were reported, alongside government advancement of a biometric digital identity system and a National Cybersecurity Plan 2025-2030.
  • LFPDPPP implementing regulations — As of early 2026, implementing regulations for the LFPDPPP 2025 had not been published; SABG began stakeholder dialogues in January 2026.
  • Specialised Federal Judiciary courts (Mexico) — Began operating 1 July 2025 for public-information and data-protection litigation, absorbing all pending and new related proceedings

Key findings (1)

  • — source on file
Category narrative 109 words

Enforcement authority has migrated from the dissolved, formerly autonomous INAI to the Secretaría Anticorrupción y Buen Gobierno; judicial review of regulator decisions shifted from nullity trials to amparo proceedings before newly created specialized federal courts. As of mid-2026, secondary sources report the new authority had not yet issued public sanctions or completed secondary regulation, notwithstanding reported preliminary investigations. Historically, INAI's cumulative fines under the prior law ran into the tens of millions of Mexican pesos in various reporting years, though specific current-year figures for the new authority were not accessible in the sources reviewed. Civil damages actions by data subjects against controllers are a recognized private right of action.

Periodic update · new data 2026-11-04

The maximum administrative fine under Mexico's private-sector data-protection law remains set at 320,000 units of measure and update (UMA), equivalent to approximately 37.5 million Mexican pesos at 2026 UMA values. The unit of measurement has changed over time, from a prior basis tied to minimum-wage days to the current UMA-based calculation, but the nominal multiplier underlying the ceiling is reported as unchanged. This figure rests on a single secondary compliance-sector source and is held at the probable tier with medium translation confidence on the specific peso-equivalent conversion.

The more structurally significant enforcement development is institutional rather than numeric. Because SABG, the body now responsible for private-sector data-protection oversight, is an executive-branch ministry rather than a constitutionally autonomous body of the kind INAI was, data subjects and controllers no longer have access to the independent, tribunal-style review process that INAI formerly provided. This finding is assessed at the probable confidence tier and is treated, consistent with the interpreter's own key judgment, as a material degradation of enforcement credibility: a nominally unchanged or even tightened fine ceiling carries materially different practical weight when the body empowered to impose it lacks the independence from executive-branch direction that its predecessor held. Whether SABG retains any formal sanctioning or adjudicative power at all under the new statutory arrangement, as distinct from a purely dissemination and promotion role, has not been confirmed against primary statutory text and stands as an open verification gap.

The combination of these two findings, an unchanged penalty ceiling paired with a materially weakened independent-review mechanism, is the central enforcement-and-redress story for Mexico: the formal numbers have not moved, but the institutional path by which those numbers would be applied, contested, or reviewed has changed in a way that reduces the credibility of the regime as previously understood.

Outlook

Resolving whether SABG holds genuine sanctioning authority, or only a dissemination and promotion function, is the single highest-priority open question for this module going forward, and until it is resolved against primary statutory text, any assessment of Mexico's practical enforcement posture should be treated as provisional. The loss of an autonomous tribunal-style review mechanism is likely to remain the defining enforcement-and-redress characteristic of the Mexican regime for the foreseeable period, independent of whatever administrative penalty figures remain formally on the books.

3 earlier distinct updates
Periodic update · new data 2026-11-03

On 12 July 2026, Mexico's Secretaría Anticorrupción y Buen Gobierno (SABG) imposed a fine of 42,849,095 Mexican pesos, approximately 2.14 million US dollars, against the Federación Mexicana de Futbol Asociación over its FAN ID biometric data processing programme. This is reported as the first published sanction under the 2025 LFPDPPP framework and is described as one of the most significant data-protection enforcement actions in Mexico to date. The decision found two distinct failures: the federation did not flag photographs as sensitive data in its privacy notice, and it obtained consent through an inadequate checkbox mechanism, rather than a mechanism meeting the heightened standard required for sensitive-category processing.

Separately, secondary commentary describes an amparo-based judicial review pathway for SABG's private-sector data-protection decisions, reportedly consolidated into specialised federal data-protection district courts that handle ARCO-rights litigation within a single federal circuit. This commentary was sourced from a lower-tier secondary source, and the exact commencement date and operational scope of these specialised courts was not independently verified, so this element should be treated as probable rather than confirmed pending primary-source verification.

Taken together, the FAN ID fine represents a concrete test case for Mexico's new enforcement architecture under SABG: a record-scale sanction, issued by an executive-branch body rather than an autonomous authority, for a clearly articulated set of sensitive-data and consent failures. The scale and specificity of the decision suggest SABG intends to establish enforcement credibility notwithstanding the institutional-independence question raised by INAI's dissolution.

Outlook

Watch for whether further SABG enforcement actions follow a similar pattern of sensitive-data and consent-mechanism scrutiny, and for independent verification of the specialised federal data-protection court system's commencement date and scope, which would clarify the judicial-review pathway available to parties affected by SABG decisions.

Periodic update · new data 2026-10-18

On 12 July 2026, Mexico's Secretaría Anticorrupción y Buen Gobierno (SABG) imposed a fine of 42,849,095 Mexican pesos, approximately 2.14 million US dollars, against the Federación Mexicana de Futbol Asociación over its FAN ID biometric data processing programme. This is reported as the first published sanction under the 2025 LFPDPPP framework and is described as one of the most significant data-protection enforcement actions in Mexico to date. The decision found two distinct failures: the federation did not flag photographs as sensitive data in its privacy notice, and it obtained consent through an inadequate checkbox mechanism, rather than a mechanism meeting the heightened standard required for sensitive-category processing.

Separately, secondary commentary describes an amparo-based judicial review pathway for SABG's private-sector data-protection decisions, reportedly consolidated into specialised federal data-protection district courts that handle ARCO-rights litigation within a single federal circuit. This commentary was sourced from a lower-tier secondary source, and the exact commencement date and operational scope of these specialised courts was not independently verified this cycle, so this element should be treated as probable rather than confirmed pending primary-source verification.

Taken together, the FAN ID fine represents a concrete test case for Mexico's new enforcement architecture under SABG: a record-scale sanction, issued by an executive-branch body rather than an autonomous authority, for a clearly articulated set of sensitive-data and consent failures. The scale and specificity of the decision suggest SABG intends to establish enforcement credibility notwithstanding the institutional-independence question raised by INAI's dissolution.

Outlook

Watch for whether further SABG enforcement actions follow a similar pattern of sensitive-data and consent-mechanism scrutiny, and for independent verification of the specialised federal data-protection court system's commencement date and scope, which would clarify the judicial-review pathway available to parties affected by SABG decisions.

Periodic update · new data 2026-10-11

SABG fined the Federación Mexicana de Fútbol 42,849,095 Mexican pesos on 12 July 2026 for data-protection breaches connected to its FAN ID biometric registration system, finding that FMF had breached accountability and lawfulness principles by relying on a simple website checkbox to authorise both user registration and the collection of biometric data. This is the largest reported private-sector data-protection fine of the period under review and is a direct demonstration that SABG retains and is exercising active enforcement authority notwithstanding the change in institutional structure following INAI's dissolution.

The maximum statutory fine available under Article 59 of the LFPDPPP is reported, through secondary commentary, as 320,000 UMA, understood to be approximately MXN 37,539,200 at a stated 2026 daily UMA value, doubling where sensitive personal data is involved; this figure has not been independently verified against the primary statutory text this cycle, and the FMF penalty of MXN 42,849,095 appears, on the reported figures, to approach or potentially exceed the unmultiplied maximum, consistent with the sensitive-data doubling provision given the biometric nature of the data at issue, though this specific reconciliation has not been confirmed against primary source.

Outlook

The FMF fine is the clearest available evidence that SABG's enforcement function is operationally active, which bears directly on the broader institutional-independence question raised by INAI's dissolution: an executive-branch successor agency can still impose significant penalties. Independent verification of the primary LFPDPPP Article 59 maximum-fine text remains an open item that would allow more precise reconciliation of the FMF penalty against the statutory ceiling.

1 further periodic run re-emitted the standing brief unchanged and is not shown.

Sources and claims (23)
  1. Probable IAPP — Unlike INAI (an autonomous constitutional body), the Secretaría Anticorrupción y Buen Gobierno is not required to render an annual activity report to Congress, and the express attribution to develop, promote and disseminate data-protection research and studies was not carried forward in the new law's Article 39. observed
  2. Probable IAPP — Data subjects may seek damages from data collectors when they consider they have suffered harm or losses derived from a breach of the data protection law. observed
  3. Probable IAPP — Against resolutions of the Secretaría, affected parties may now pursue amparo (constitutional review) proceedings before specialized district and circuit courts, replacing the prior nullity-trial pathway against INAI resolutions. observed
  4. Probable IAPP — As of early-to-mid 2026, Mexico's updated privacy law entered into force but largely retains the structure of the 2010 regime, and the new data authority had not yet issued secondary regulation or public sanctions, though preliminary investigations into sensitive-data handling and security-incident management were reported, alongside government advancement of a biometric digital identity system and a National Cybersecurity Plan 2025-2030. observed
  5. Probable Directorio Legislativo — Data subjects and controllers no longer have an autonomous tribunal-style review process under SABG oversight. observed
  6. Probable KYC Systems — Maximum fine for data-protection violations is 320,000 UMA (approx. MXN 37.5 million). observed
  7. Probable Cámara de Diputados — SABG / 30th Judicial Circuit — Judicial review of SABG data-protection resolutions now proceeds via amparo before newly created specialized federal courts (operational 1 July 2025), replacing INAI's former quasi-judicial nullity-trial review route. observed
  8. High Recording Law — SABG initiated formal proceedings following high-profile cyber incidents in early 2026, publicized immediately, departing from INAI's prior confidential preliminary review. observed
  9. High Recording Law — 30th Judicial Circuit (Aguascalientes) — As of 1 July 2025, all pending and new data-protection litigation is processed before the newly established 30th Judicial Circuit via amparo. observed
  10. High Chambers and Partners — LFPDPPP implementing regulations — As of early 2026, implementing regulations for the LFPDPPP 2025 had not been published; SABG began stakeholder dialogues in January 2026. observed
  11. Probable Orden Jurídico Nacional — Specialised Federal Judiciary courts (Mexico) — Began operating 1 July 2025 for public-information and data-protection litigation, absorbing all pending and new related proceedings observed
  12. Probable Baker McKenzie — Secretaría Anticorrupción y Buen Gobierno (SABG) — MXN 42,849,095 (~USD 2.14M) against the Federación Mexicana de Futbol Asociación over FAN ID biometric data processing observed
  13. Probable anuragverma.co — Amparo / specialised federal data-protection district courts — Judicial review route for SABG private-sector data-protection decisions, consolidating ARCO-rights litigation into a single federal circuit observed
  14. Probable KYC Systems — LFPDPPP enforcement regime — Maximum fine 320,000 UMA (~MXN 37.5 million at 2026 UMA values) for data-protection violations observed
  15. Probable Directorio Legislativo — SABG data-protection oversight — Because SABG is an executive-branch ministry, data subjects/controllers no longer have access to the independent-tribunal-style review INAI formerly provided; a separate 'Transparencia para el Pueblo' body was created for public-information-access matters only observed
  16. Probable https://www.gob.mx/buengobierno/prensa/buen-gobierno-sanciona-a-la-federacion-mexicana-de-futbol-con-42-8-millones-de-pesos-por-violaciones-a-la-proteccion-de-datos-personales — SABG — Federación Mexicana de Fútbol MXN 42,849,095 for FAN ID biometric data-protection breaches
  17. Uncertain https://kyc-systems.com/blog/lfpdppp — LFPDPPP Art. 59 — 320,000 UMA (approx. MXN 37,539,200 at stated 2026 daily UMA value), doubling for sensitive personal data
  18. Uncertain KYC Systems — LFPDPPP enforcement penalties — A secondary compliance guide reports the maximum administrative fine under the current LFPDPPP at 320,000 UMA (approx. MXN 37.5 million at 2026 UMA value), unchanged in structure from the 2010 law's 320,000-day-minimum-wage cap. observed
  19. Probable Directorio Legislativo — LFPDPPP judicial-review mechanism — Challenges to the data-protection authority's resolutions now proceed via amparo before specialised federal courts, replacing the prior nullity trial before the Tribunal Federal de Justicia Administrativa. observed
  20. Probable Secretaría Anticorrupción y Buen Gobierno (SABG) — Federación Mexicana de Futbol Asociación, A.C. (FMF) — MXN 42,849,095 observed
  21. Probable EuroCloud Europe — 30th Judicial Circuit (Aguascalientes) — All pending and new litigation on public-information-access and personal-data-protection matters, from 1 July 2025 observed
  22. Probable Greenberg Traurig — SABG (successor to INAI) — Rules in force at time proceedings were initiated before INAI, with SABG now handling them instead of INAI observed
  23. Probable Mijares, Angoitia, Cortés y Fuentes — General Agreement 8/2025 of the Plenary of the Federal Judiciary Council — District Courts and Collegiate Circuit Courts of the Thirtieth Circuit (Aguascalientes) for amparo proceedings on public-information-access and data-protection matters, operational from 1 July 2025 observed
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Envelope: baseline resolved at jurisdiction_json.baseline; 10 categories, 57 sub-module(s), 111 claim(s) (111 category placement(s)), 46 source(s) in the cumulative register.

Audit trail

Machine checkChallenged on 24 Oct 2026: not upheld (13 confirmed against the cited source; 1 contradicted by the cited source; 10 could not be checked). An automated, adversarial test run by a second model; no person has assessed the result.

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GDPR article map

Cross-reference: which category/sub-module covers each UK GDPR article (38 mapped).

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GDPR article to category mapping
ArticleCategorySub-module
Art. 5Controller/Processor Dutiesaccountability and dpia
Art. 6Lawful Processing & Special Datalawful bases
Art. 7Lawful Processing & Special Dataconsent thresholds
Art. 9Lawful Processing & Special Dataspecial categories
Art. 13Data Subject Rightsaccess right
Art. 14Data Subject Rightsaccess right
Art. 15Data Subject Rightsaccess right
Art. 16Data Subject Rightsrectification and erasure
Art. 17Data Subject Rightsrectification and erasure
Art. 18Data Subject Rightsrestriction and objection
Art. 19Data Subject Rightsrectification and erasure
Art. 20Data Subject Rightsdata portability
Art. 21Data Subject Rightsrestriction and objection
Art. 22Algorithmic, Biometric & Surveillance Governanceautomated decision making transparency
Art. 25Controller/Processor Dutiesaccountability and dpia
Art. 28Controller/Processor Dutiesjoint controller arrangements
Art. 30Controller/Processor Dutiesropa requirements
Art. 32Controller/Processor Dutiessecurity measures
Art. 33Controller/Processor Dutiesbreach notification
Art. 34Controller/Processor Dutiesbreach notification
Art. 35Controller/Processor Dutiesaccountability and dpia
Art. 37Controller/Processor Dutiesdpo requirements
Art. 38Controller/Processor Dutiesdpo requirements
Art. 39Controller/Processor Dutiesdpo requirements
Art. 44Cross-Border & Adequacytransfer mechanisms
Art. 45Cross-Border & Adequacyadequacy received
Art. 46Cross-Border & Adequacysccs and bcrs
Art. 47Cross-Border & Adequacysccs and bcrs
Art. 48Cross-Border & Adequacytransfer mechanisms
Art. 49Cross-Border & Adequacytransfer mechanisms
Art. 77Enforcement & Redressprivate right of action
Art. 78Enforcement & Redressprivate right of action
Art. 79Enforcement & Redressprivate right of action
Art. 80Enforcement & Redresscollective redress and class actions
Art. 81Enforcement & Redressregulator powers and penalties
Art. 82Enforcement & Redressprivate right of action
Art. 83Enforcement & Redressregulator powers and penalties
Art. 84Enforcement & Redressregulator powers and penalties