Data Protection Monitor
Global Privacy & Data Protection Intelligence

Latvia Data Protection & Privacy Regulation

LV schema gdpri-v2 trajectory: not yet assessed regulated (omnibus) overlaps: artificial-intelligence

Last updated · 10 categories · 61 claims · 42 sources in the cumulative register

Latvia receives its first full ten-module structured-claims baseline this cycle, and a challenger-fold review has corrected two stale case-law characterisations while surfacing a confirmed national variance on children's consent age.

Data collected Data published

AI-assembled from cited sources

Not covered: Algorithmic, Biometric & Surveillance Governance. Not fully checked this cycle: Sectoral Watch, Enforcement & Redress (3 open gaps).

Framework & posture10 of 10 modules active
10 active · 11 binding instruments
Next milestoneNo upcoming dated milestone on record
Record & confidence mix61 claims · 36 sources · machine-compiled
11 Confirmed38 Probable12 Contested / unverified
Evidence re-verified: ·Position last changed: ·
Record history & provenance ▾

Methodology & record provenance: Module confidence is derived from the underlying claims (source tier and primary excerpt retention), while statutory legal force is tracked independently.

Review status: AI-synthesised · Tier-1/2 verified · As-of date: 2026-11-17

Law made at European Economic Area (Bloc) level that applies in Latvia is covered once, on the European Economic Area (Bloc) page. This page covers Latvia’s own layer: implementation, national authorities, national options and local enforcement.

Jurisdiction brief

Latest update · 25 October 2026

Lead Signal

Latvia's Data State Inspectorate fined SIA 4YOU MEBELES EUR 1,000 on 2 July 2026 following a cookie-compliance sweep that found unremedied consent deficiencies under Article 31, with the penalty issued under Article 83(5)(e) for insufficient cooperation with the authority under Article 58(1)(e) rather than for the underlying cookie breach itself. The penalty is modest in absolute terms, but it extends a visible pattern: the Inspectorate runs active, routine sweeps of adtech and cookie-consent practices and is prepared to penalise non-cooperation with its inspection process as a distinct violation from the substantive breach.

Key regulatory facts for Latvia
Key regulatory facts for Latvia
Regulatory DimensionLatvia Standing Position
JurisdictionLatvia (LV)
Regulatory ScopeData Protection & Privacy Regulation (10 modules, 61 sourced findings)
Regulator & FrameworkGDPR is directly applicable and the national implementing Law plus an active, EDPB-recognised supervisory authority are confirmed; territorial/material scope questions are being actively clarified via CJEU referrals rather than left as gaps.
Lawful Processing & Special DataCore consent rules track GDPR directly, but the special-categories sub-module carries live CJEU interpretive uncertainty and an unconfirmed Article 9(4) national-derogation status.
Data Subject RightsRights framework is confirmed via direct GDPR effect and evidenced through an actual DVI enforcement decision on the erasure right; deadline-specific and portability/restriction sub-modules lack Latvia-specific confirmatory findings.
Controller/Processor DutiesDPO-related guidance is mature and consistent, but the DPIA-exemption list underpinning accountability_and_dpia was still in EDPB-reviewed draft form, and breach-notification, ROPA, joint-controller, security and retention sub-modules lack confirmed Latvia-specific findings.
Primary Instruments CitedLatvijas Vēstnesis (official gazette), EUR-Lex, EUR-Lex, EUR-Lex, Beeble
Last Confirmed / Updated (42 sources in cumulative register)

#

GDPR is directly applicable and the national implementing Law plus an active, EDPB-recognised supervisory authority are confirmed; territorial/material scope questions are being actively clarified via CJEU referrals rather than left as gaps.

Primary frameworkGeneral Data Protection Regulation (EU) 2016/679, as implemented by the Personal Data Processing Law of 21 June 2018
Traffic-light rationale — GreenGDPR is directly applicable and the national implementing Law plus an active, EDPB-recognised supervisory authority are confirmed; territorial/material scope questions are being actively clarified via CJEU referrals rather than left as gaps.

Sub-modules (5)

Regulator and authorityGreen

DVI is confirmed as Latvia's Article 51 GDPR supervisory authority, listed on the EDPB member register with its Riga headquarters and its representative to the Board.

Claims (6):

  • The Data State Inspectorate (DVI), located at Elijas Street 17, Riga, LV-1050, is Latvia's GDPR supervisory authority and EDPB member.
  • Datu valsts inspekcija (DVI) — The DVI is Latvia's independent national data-protection supervisory authority, resident in Riga.
  • Datu valsts inspekcija (DVI) — The Data State Inspectorate (DVI) is Latvia's national data-protection authority and is functionally independent.
  • DVI's 2026-2030 strategy sets deepening public understanding, responsible-innovation promotion, strengthened active supervision/risk management and organisational development as its priorities.
  • Datu valsts inspekcija (DVI) — The Personal Data Processing Law states that the Data State Inspectorate continues to act as the supervisory authority in Latvia.
  • Data State Inspectorate (DVI) — DVI is Latvia's national supervisory authority for personal-data processing within the meaning of the GDPR, as a direct-administration institution under Cabinet of Ministers oversight.

Act and instrumentsGreen

The Personal Data Processing Law of 21 June 2018 implements the GDPR into Latvian national law, following Cabinet of Ministers endorsement of the implementing bill on 6 March 2018.

Claims (5):

  • The Personal Data Processing Law of 21 June 2018 implements the GDPR into Latvian national law, following Cabinet of Ministers endorsement of the draft bill on 6 March 2018.
  • Personal Data Processing Law (Latvia) — Latvia's Personal Data Processing Law implements GDPR nationally and provides derogating provisions, including for use of the national identity code under GDPR Art 87.
  • The Personal Data Processing Law is Latvia's national GDPR-implementing statute, comprising nine chapters and 39 sections.
  • The Personal Data Processing Law applies as Latvia's national GDPR-implementing act, with pre-GDPR legislation fully repealed.
  • Ministru kabineta noteikumi Nr. 12 (AI Centre regulatory sandbox regulation) — Participants in the AI Centre's special regulatory environment (sandbox) must minimise, anonymise or pseudonymise personal data processed there in accordance with an opinion of DVI, and the AI system must be assessed for compliance with personal-data-protection requirements.

Material scopeGreen

Material scope questions (e.g., obligations of internet-advertising service providers vis-à-vis tax-authority information requests) have reached the CJEU via a Latvian court referral, clarifying GDPR's material/temporal limits in a Latvian administrative-law context.

Claims (1):

  • The CJEU received a preliminary-ruling request from Latvia's Administratīvā apgabaltiesa (Regional Administrative Court) concerning the material and temporal limits of GDPR obligations applicable to internet-advertising service providers responding to tax-authority information requests.

Territorial scopeAmber

No Latvia-specific territorial-scope derogation or extension beyond GDPR Article 3 was identified in this research pass.

Regulator registration and filingAmber

No general processing-notification/filing regime was identified beyond GDPR's own framework; DPO-appointment notification to DVI is addressed under controller_processor_duties.dpo_requirements rather than here.

Category narrative 101 words

Latvia's data-protection regime is anchored on the GDPR as directly-applicable EU law, implemented and supplemented domestically by the Personal Data Processing Law of 21 June 2018 (Fizisko personu datu apstrādes likums). The Data State Inspectorate (Datu valsts inspekcija, DVI), headquartered at Elijas Street 17, Riga LV-1050, is the Article 51 GDPR supervisory authority and sits as Latvia's representative on the EDPB. Material and territorial scope questions have been the subject of CJEU preliminary rulings originating from Latvian courts, including a referral from the Regional Administrative Court on the scope of GDPR obligations for internet-advertising service providers responding to tax-authority information requests.

Periodic update · new data 2026-10-11

The Datu valsts inspekcija (DVI) remains Latvia's single national data-protection supervisory authority under the Personal Data Processing Law, an institutional position unrelated to the 2023 merger of the former financial and capital markets regulator into Latvijas Banka. DVI's regulatory remit has grown in scope through its role in Latvia's AI Act implementation: a Cabinet of Ministers regulation establishing the procedure for the AI Centre's organisation of a special regulatory sandbox and associated data processing was published in Latvijas Vēstnesis on 15 January 2026. That regulation requires DVI to issue a concluding opinion assessing a sandboxed AI system's compliance with personal-data-protection requirements and permits DVI to recommend protective measures where appropriate.

This development places DVI at the intersection of two distinct regulatory frameworks, data protection proper and AI governance, within a single national instrument. The sandbox procedure is now in force, and the obligation it places on DVI is triggered on the operation of an AI system within the regulatory sandbox, rather than running on a fixed calendar schedule.

Outlook

The sandbox-opinion duty is a standing in-force obligation rather than a forward deadline; the item to watch is how DVI exercises this opinion function as applications enter the sandbox, and whether the Cabinet regulation's procedure is further elaborated or amended. No Latvia-specific EU Data Act implementing or designating instrument was located this cycle, leaving that an open gap in the broader sectoral-watch picture connected to this module.

Sources and claims (12)
  1. Confirmed EDPB — The Data State Inspectorate (DVI), located at Elijas Street 17, Riga, LV-1050, is Latvia's GDPR supervisory authority and EDPB member. observed
  2. Confirmed OneTrust DataGuidance — The Personal Data Processing Law of 21 June 2018 implements the GDPR into Latvian national law, following Cabinet of Ministers endorsement of the draft bill on 6 March 2018. observed
  3. Probable EUR-Lex — The CJEU received a preliminary-ruling request from Latvia's Administratīvā apgabaltiesa (Regional Administrative Court) concerning the material and temporal limits of GDPR obligations applicable to internet-advertising service providers responding to tax-authority information requests. observed
  4. Confirmed noyb.eu — Datu valsts inspekcija (DVI) — The DVI is Latvia's independent national data-protection supervisory authority, resident in Riga. observed
  5. Probable White & Case — Personal Data Processing Law (Latvia) — Latvia's Personal Data Processing Law implements GDPR nationally and provides derogating provisions, including for use of the national identity code under GDPR Art 87. observed
  6. Confirmed noyb.eu — Datu valsts inspekcija (DVI) — The Data State Inspectorate (DVI) is Latvia's national data-protection authority and is functionally independent. observed
  7. Probable noyb.eu — The Personal Data Processing Law is Latvia's national GDPR-implementing statute, comprising nine chapters and 39 sections. observed
  8. Probable noyb.eu — DVI's 2026-2030 strategy sets deepening public understanding, responsible-innovation promotion, strengthened active supervision/risk management and organisational development as its priorities. observed
  9. Probable White & Case — The Personal Data Processing Law applies as Latvia's national GDPR-implementing act, with pre-GDPR legislation fully repealed. observed
  10. Probable White & Case — Datu valsts inspekcija (DVI) — The Personal Data Processing Law states that the Data State Inspectorate continues to act as the supervisory authority in Latvia. observed
  11. Probable Likumi.lv (official publisher Latvijas Vestnesis) — Data State Inspectorate (DVI) — DVI is Latvia's national supervisory authority for personal-data processing within the meaning of the GDPR, as a direct-administration institution under Cabinet of Ministers oversight. observed
  12. Probable Latvijas Vēstnesis (official gazette) — Ministru kabineta noteikumi Nr. 12 (AI Centre regulatory sandbox regulation) — Participants in the AI Centre's special regulatory environment (sandbox) must minimise, anonymise or pseudonymise personal data processed there in accordance with an opinion of DVI, and the AI system must be assessed for compliance with personal-data-protection requirements. observed

#

Core consent rules track GDPR directly, but the special-categories sub-module carries live CJEU interpretive uncertainty and an unconfirmed Article 9(4) national-derogation status.

Primary frameworkGDPR Articles 6, 7 and 9; Personal Data Processing Law of 21 June 2018
Traffic-light rationale — AmberCore consent rules track GDPR directly, but the special-categories sub-module carries live CJEU interpretive uncertainty and an unconfirmed Article 9(4) national-derogation status.

Sub-modules (4)

Lawful basesAmber

No Latvia-specific supplement to the GDPR Article 6 lawful-basis enumeration was identified.

Claims (2):

  • GDPR Art 6 (lawful bases for processing) applies directly in Latvia without need for national transposition.
  • Data State Inspectorate (DVI) — DVI guidance (#DVIskaidro) states that recording online workplace meetings is personal-data processing for which the controller/employer's legitimate interest (subject to a prior balancing test) is the most suitable legal basis; public-sector bodies recording meetings purely for minutes are treated differently as they lack their own 'legitimate interests'.

Special categoriesAmber

A CJEU reference from Latvia's Constitutional Court tested the interpretation of Article 10 GDPR (criminal-offence data) in the context of a public traffic-penalty-points register, and GDPR Article 9(4) allows member states to impose further conditions on genetic/biometric/health data.

Claims (2):

  • Latvia's Satversmes tiesa referred to the CJEU the question of how to interpret 'processing of personal data relating to criminal convictions and offences' under Article 10 GDPR in the context of a public register of road-traffic penalty points.
  • GDPR Article 9(4) permits member states, including Latvia, to maintain or introduce further conditions, including limitations, on the processing of genetic data, biometric data or health data; whether Latvia has exercised this derogation was not conclusively confirmed in this pass.

Pseudonymisation and anonymisationAmber

No Latvia-specific pseudonymisation/anonymisation safe-harbour or definition beyond the GDPR baseline was identified.

Category narrative 74 words

Lawful bases and consent standards follow GDPR Articles 6 and 7 directly, with no confirmed Latvia-specific derogation identified for general lawful bases. Special-category processing has been the subject of a CJEU reference from Latvia's Satversmes tiesa (Constitutional Court) concerning Article 10 GDPR's treatment of criminal-offence/penalty-point data, and GDPR Article 9(4) permits member states to add further conditions on genetic, biometric and health data — whether Latvia has exercised this option was not conclusively confirmed.

No periodic updates recorded in this cycle

Sources and claims (5)
  1. Confirmed EDPB — Consent relied on as a lawful basis for processing must be freely given, informed, specific and unambiguous, with data subjects retaining a genuine ability to withdraw it. observed
  2. Probable EUR-Lex — Latvia's Satversmes tiesa referred to the CJEU the question of how to interpret 'processing of personal data relating to criminal convictions and offences' under Article 10 GDPR in the context of a public register of road-traffic penalty points. observed
  3. Uncertain EUR-Lex — GDPR Article 9(4) permits member states, including Latvia, to maintain or introduce further conditions, including limitations, on the processing of genetic data, biometric data or health data; whether Latvia has exercised this derogation was not conclusively confirmed in this pass. observed
  4. Confirmed noyb.eu — GDPR Art 6 (lawful bases for processing) applies directly in Latvia without need for national transposition. observed
  5. Confirmed Data State Inspectorate (DVI), Latvia — Data State Inspectorate (DVI) — DVI guidance (#DVIskaidro) states that recording online workplace meetings is personal-data processing for which the controller/employer's legitimate interest (subject to a prior balancing test) is the most suitable legal basis; public-sector bodies recording meetings purely for minutes are treated differently as they lack their own 'legitimate interests'. observed

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Rights framework is confirmed via direct GDPR effect and evidenced through an actual DVI enforcement decision on the erasure right; deadline-specific and portability/restriction sub-modules lack Latvia-specific confirmatory findings.

Primary frameworkGDPR Chapter III (Articles 12-23); Personal Data Processing Law of 21 June 2018
Traffic-light rationale — GreenRights framework is confirmed via direct GDPR effect and evidenced through an actual DVI enforcement decision on the erasure right; deadline-specific and portability/restriction sub-modules lack Latvia-specific confirmatory findings.

Sub-modules (5)

Access rightGreen

Access and other data-subject rights are governed by GDPR Chapter III together with the Personal Data Processing Law of 21 June 2018.

Claims (2):

  • Latvia's data subject rights framework is governed by the GDPR together with the Personal Data Processing Law of 21 June 2018.
  • GDPR Chapter III, entitled 'Rights of the data subject', contains Articles 12 to 23, which apply directly in Latvia as an EU Member State.

Rectification and erasureGreen

DVI has actively enforced the Article 17 erasure right, fining an online retailer for failing to execute an erasure request and for non-cooperation with the authority.

Claims (1):

  • DVI imposed a €7,000 fine on an online retailer in 2019 for failing to comply with a data subject's Article 17 erasure request and for non-cooperation with the supervisory authority.

Restriction and objectionAmber

No Latvia-specific restriction/objection finding was identified beyond the general GDPR framework.

Data portabilityAmber

No Latvia-specific portability finding was identified beyond the general GDPR framework.

Deadlines and response windowsAmber

No Latvia-specific variance from the GDPR's statutory response deadlines (Article 12(3)) was identified.

Category narrative 62 words

Data subject rights in Latvia derive directly from GDPR Chapter III (Articles 12-23), supplemented by the Personal Data Processing Law. DVI's 2019 enforcement action against an online retailer for failure to execute an Article 17 erasure request and for non-cooperation under Article 58(2)(c) and (g) and Article 23 of the Personal Data Processing Law demonstrates the rights framework is operative and enforced.

Periodic update · new data 2026-08-25

The Data State Inspectorate's enforcement action against SIA "Tet" is this cycle's principal data-subject-rights finding for Latvia. DVI imposed a EUR 1,200,000 fine against the internet-service-provider for disclosing unverified personal data, including data belonging to a minor, to debt-recovery services without first verifying the data subject's identity, in violation of GDPR Article 5(1)'s accuracy and lawfulness principles. This is rectification-and-erasure-adjacent in character: had the disclosed data been properly verified before disclosure, the inaccuracy, and the affected individual's status as a minor, would plausibly have been identified before the data reached a third party.

The case is significant for several reasons beyond its size. First, it demonstrates that DVI treats pre-disclosure identity verification as a component of the lawfulness and accuracy obligations under GDPR Article 5(1), rather than as a separate, lower-stakes administrative step; the fine's basis was the disclosure of unverified data, not merely an unauthorised disclosure of accurate data. Second, the involvement of a minor's data elevates the case's severity within DVI's assessment. Third, debt-recovery disclosure is a specific, recurring risk vector for data-subject-rights violations: personal data transferred to third-party debt-recovery services is a common commercial practice across sectors, and Tet's failure to verify data before such a transfer is a cautionary pattern relevant to any controller engaging in similar third-party disclosures for debt-recovery or similar purposes.

At EUR 1.2 million, the Tet fine sits well below the GDPR's statutory maximum of EUR 20,000,000 or 4 percent of worldwide annual turnover, whichever is higher, indicating that even DVI's most significant known case to date has been calibrated substantially under the available ceiling. It is worth situating this case within the broader taxonomy of data-subject-rights risk. The right to accuracy and the associated obligation on controllers to take reasonable steps to ensure data is not inaccurate before further processing or disclosure sits alongside, but is analytically distinct from, the right to erasure and the right to rectification proper; the Tet case's core failure was upstream of any data-subject request for rectification or erasure. This distinction matters for compliance purposes: a controller cannot rely solely on a functioning rectification-request process to discharge its Article 5(1) accuracy obligations, since that obligation applies proactively to the controller's own data-handling practices, independent of whether any data subject has exercised a formal rights request.

The absence of any further data-subject-rights-specific finding for Latvia this cycle, beyond the Tet case, should be read against the backdrop of DVI's broader enforcement volume: 266 in-depth review proceedings and 143 identified violations across DVI's full docket in a recent reporting period represent a much larger population of matters than data-subject-rights cases specifically, and this cycle's evidence base isolates Tet as the identifiable data-subject-rights-specific case within that broader volume rather than indicating that no other data-subject-rights matters exist within DVI's docket.

Outlook

The clearest forward-looking test for this domain is whether DVI issues any further data-subject-rights enforcement action addressing pre-disclosure verification failures, particularly in debt-recovery or other third-party-disclosure contexts, which would establish the Tet case as the first instance of a now-settled enforcement pattern rather than a singular event. A secondary item to track is whether Tet or any similarly situated controller in Latvia updates its third-party-disclosure verification practices in response to this case, and whether any private civil claim follows from the affected data subjects independent of DVI's administrative fine; no such follow-on private action was evidenced this cycle.

Sources and claims (3)
  1. Confirmed OneTrust DataGuidance — Latvia's data subject rights framework is governed by the GDPR together with the Personal Data Processing Law of 21 June 2018. observed
  2. Confirmed EUR-Lex — GDPR Chapter III, entitled 'Rights of the data subject', contains Articles 12 to 23, which apply directly in Latvia as an EU Member State. observed
  3. Confirmed EDPB (republishing DVI press release) — DVI imposed a €7,000 fine on an online retailer in 2019 for failing to comply with a data subject's Article 17 erasure request and for non-cooperation with the supervisory authority. observed

#

DPO-related guidance is mature and consistent, but the DPIA-exemption list underpinning Accountability & DPIA was still in EDPB-reviewed draft form, and breach-notification, ROPA, joint-controller, security and retention sub-modules lack confirmed Latvia-specific findings.

Primary frameworkGDPR Articles 24-39; Personal Data Processing Law of 21 June 2018
Traffic-light rationale — AmberDPO-related guidance is mature and consistent, but the DPIA-exemption list underpinning Accountability & DPIA was still in EDPB-reviewed draft form, and breach-notification, ROPA, joint-controller, security and retention sub-modules lack confirmed Latvia-specific findings.

Sub-modules (7)

Accountability & DPIAAmber

DVI's draft list of DPIA-exempt processing operations under Article 35(5) GDPR was the subject of EDPB Opinion 6/2024, indicating the list was in a consultative/draft stage as of that opinion.

Claims (2):

  • The EDPB adopted Opinion 6/2024 on the Latvian supervisory authority's draft list of processing operations exempt from the DPIA requirement under Article 35(5) GDPR.
  • In 2026 the DVI issued updated guidance clarifying that employees may record workplace meetings on a legitimate-interest basis, subject to clear internal procedures.

DPO requirementsGreen

DVI guidance requires notification of DPO appointments and permits a single DPO for a group of companies provided accessibility and independence criteria are met; DVI frames the DPO's role as an independent, auditor-like consultant to management.

Claims (3):

  • Organisations must notify DVI of a Data Protection Officer's appointment.
  • DVI guidance (June 2026) confirms that an international group of companies may appoint a single DPO provided each entity can easily communicate with them, while each entity remains responsible for its own compliance decisions.
  • DVI's August 2022 guidance describes the DPO's primary function as leading consultant on personal data protection issues, with duties resembling an internal auditor, while final processing decisions remain with organisational management.

Ropa requirementsAmber

No Latvia-specific ROPA finding beyond the general GDPR Article 30 requirement was identified.

Joint controller arrangementsAmber

No Latvia-specific joint-controller finding was identified beyond the general GDPR Article 26 framework.

Security measuresAmber

No Latvia-specific security-of-processing finding beyond the general GDPR Article 32 framework was identified.

Claims (3):

  • Datu valsts inspekcija (DVI) — The DVI has the right to visit and inspect controllers' premises (production facilities, warehouses, commercial/non-residential premises) to check compliance with Latvian data-protection law.
  • DVI fined SIA ZZ Dats EUR 300,000 under GDPR Art 32 following a large-scale breach affecting almost all Latvian municipalities; the decision is under appeal.
  • Data State Inspectorate (DVI) — During an inspection of a controller or processor, DVI officials are entitled, in the presence of the controller's authorised representative or employee, to visit the data-processing site (including production facilities, warehouses and commercial/non-residential premises).

Breach notificationAmber

No Latvia-specific breach-notification variance beyond the general GDPR Articles 33-34 framework was identified.

Claims (3):

  • FPDAL — DVI must issue its decision in administrative-offence proceedings within six months of case initiation; this deadline governs the pending decision on the CSDD mass personal-data breach, which will determine the basis for compensating affected individuals.
  • DVI opened an inquiry into whether CSDD implemented appropriate technical and organisational measures following a cybersecurity incident affecting personal data; the inquiry had not concluded as of this cycle.
  • SIA ZZ Dats was fined EUR 300,000 by DVI following a large-scale personal data breach in late 2024, for breach of Article 32 GDPR as a data processor; the decision has been appealed.

Retention and disposalAmber

No Latvia-specific retention/disposal finding beyond the general GDPR storage-limitation principle was identified.

Claims (1):

  • Datu valsts inspekcija (DVI) — In 2026 the DVI issued updated guidance permitting employees to record workplace meetings on a legitimate-interest basis, provided clear internal procedures are followed.
Category narrative 65 words

Controller/processor accountability obligations follow GDPR Articles 24-39. DVI's draft list of processing operations exempt from the DPIA requirement (Article 35(5)) was reviewed by the EDPB in Opinion 6/2024, indicating the list remains subject to finalisation. DVI has also issued repeated guidance clarifying DPO functions, including a June 2026 note on appointing a single DPO for corporate groups and requiring notification of DPO appointments to DVI.

Periodic update · new data 2026-09-28

In 2026 the DVI issued updated guidance permitting employees to record workplace meetings on a legitimate-interest basis, provided clear internal procedures are followed. This is an uncertain-confidence finding, drawn from a single Tier-3 source, and represents a shift in how the legitimate-interest lawful basis is being applied to an employee-initiated recording scenario rather than a controller-initiated one. Employers operating in Latvia should note that this guidance addresses recording by employees rather than by the employer itself, and the requirement for clear internal procedures suggests the DVI expects documented governance around the practice rather than an unconditional permission.

Separately, the DVI retains its established statutory power to visit and inspect controllers' premises, including production facilities, warehouses, and other commercial or non-residential premises, in order to check compliance with Latvian data-protection law. This inspection power is a probable-confidence, standing feature of the DVI's regulatory toolkit rather than a new development this cycle, but it forms part of the same controller-facing compliance architecture that the 2026 workplace-recording guidance sits within.

Outlook

The item to watch is whether further DVI guidance clarifies the internal-procedure standard referenced in the 2026 workplace-recording guidance, and whether any enforcement action tests the legitimate-interest basis in this specific employee-recording context.

1 earlier distinct update
Periodic update · new data 2026-08-25

Latvia's controller and processor duties saw two incremental clarifications from the Data State Inspectorate this cycle, both addressing recurring practical-compliance ambiguities rather than introducing new statutory obligations. First, 2026 DVI guidance clarifies that employees may record workplace meetings on a legitimate-interest basis, subject to internal policy safeguards. This resolves a common employment-context question by confirming legitimate interest as an available basis, conditioned on the employer having internal policy safeguards in place. This is the most recent identified controller-processor-duties development for Latvia, dated to 2026.

Second, DVI's data-minimisation guidance for CCTV and video-surveillance systems establishes a practical retention norm: footage is generally expected to be limited to approximately 30 days absent strong, documented justification for longer retention. This is a guidance-level norm rather than a binding statutory retention period, and is accordingly assessed rather than confirmed in confidence, reflecting its status as regulatory expectation rather than codified law. Separately, but related, Latvia's CCTV regime does not require mandatory DVI registration of surveillance systems, but does require clear signage stating the surveillance purpose and providing controller contact information, a binding requirement.

Read together, these two developments describe DVI's approach to controller-processor duties as one of targeted, sector- or context-specific guidance issued incrementally, rather than a single comprehensive controller-processor-duties framework document. The workplace-recording guidance addresses an employment-relations context; the CCTV guidance addresses a physical-security and surveillance context; both narrow practical uncertainty for controllers operating in those specific contexts without altering Latvia's underlying GDPR-based statutory obligations.

The accountability dimension of both pieces of guidance is also worth noting: the workplace-recording guidance is explicitly conditioned on internal policy safeguards, which implies an accountability expectation that employers relying on employee legitimate-interest recording maintain a documented internal policy, even though the guidance does not appear to specify the precise content such a policy must contain. Similarly, the CCTV signage requirement functions as a transparency-and-accountability control, giving data subjects notice of surveillance and a contact point for further inquiry or rights exercise, even in the absence of a formal registration obligation. It is also useful to distinguish these two 2026 guidance items from the security-measures and retention-and-disposal sub-modules they respectively sit under: the CCTV signage requirement is a security-and-transparency measure, while the 30-day retention norm is a data-minimisation and retention-and-disposal matter, and controllers should treat compliance with one as distinct from, though related to, compliance with the other.

Outlook

The main open question for this domain is whether either piece of 2026 guidance is tested against an actual DVI enforcement action — for instance, an employer relying on the workplace-recording legitimate-interest basis without adequate internal policy safeguards, or a CCTV operator retaining footage well beyond the 30-day norm without documented justification. No such enforcement test was evidenced this cycle, and until one occurs, both pieces of guidance remain untested compliance expectations rather than confirmed enforcement standards. A further item worth monitoring is whether DVI extends the workplace-recording legitimate-interest logic to analogous contexts beyond meetings specifically, since the 2026 guidance as evidenced this cycle is specific to meetings and does not itself address those adjacent scenarios.

Sources and claims (12)
  1. Confirmed EDPB — The EDPB adopted Opinion 6/2024 on the Latvian supervisory authority's draft list of processing operations exempt from the DPIA requirement under Article 35(5) GDPR. observed
  2. Probable OneTrust DataGuidance — Organisations must notify DVI of a Data Protection Officer's appointment. observed
  3. Confirmed OneTrust DataGuidance — DVI guidance (June 2026) confirms that an international group of companies may appoint a single DPO provided each entity can easily communicate with them, while each entity remains responsible for its own compliance decisions. observed
  4. Confirmed OneTrust DataGuidance — DVI's August 2022 guidance describes the DPO's primary function as leading consultant on personal data protection issues, with duties resembling an internal auditor, while final processing decisions remain with organisational management. observed
  5. Probable Jauns.lv — FPDAL — DVI must issue its decision in administrative-offence proceedings within six months of case initiation; this deadline governs the pending decision on the CSDD mass personal-data breach, which will determine the basis for compensating affected individuals. observed
  6. Probable LSM (Latvian Public Broadcasting) — In 2026 the DVI issued updated guidance clarifying that employees may record workplace meetings on a legitimate-interest basis, subject to clear internal procedures. observed
  7. Probable noyb.eu — Datu valsts inspekcija (DVI) — The DVI has the right to visit and inspect controllers' premises (production facilities, warehouses, commercial/non-residential premises) to check compliance with Latvian data-protection law. observed
  8. Uncertain Beeble — Datu valsts inspekcija (DVI) — In 2026 the DVI issued updated guidance permitting employees to record workplace meetings on a legitimate-interest basis, provided clear internal procedures are followed. observed
  9. Probable LSM (Latvian Public Broadcasting) — DVI fined SIA ZZ Dats EUR 300,000 under GDPR Art 32 following a large-scale breach affecting almost all Latvian municipalities; the decision is under appeal. observed
  10. Probable noyb.eu — DVI opened an inquiry into whether CSDD implemented appropriate technical and organisational measures following a cybersecurity incident affecting personal data; the inquiry had not concluded as of this cycle. observed
  11. Probable LSM (Latvian Public Broadcasting) — SIA ZZ Dats was fined EUR 300,000 by DVI following a large-scale personal data breach in late 2024, for breach of Article 32 GDPR as a data processor; the decision has been appealed. observed
  12. Probable Likumi.lv (official publisher Latvijas Vestnesis) — Data State Inspectorate (DVI) — During an inspection of a controller or processor, DVI officials are entitled, in the presence of the controller's authorised representative or employee, to visit the data-processing site (including production facilities, warehouses and commercial/non-residential premises). observed

#

Full GDPR Chapter V applies directly via EU membership; no Latvia-specific derogation, additional localisation mandate, or independent adequacy instrument was found, which is the expected baseline for an EU Member State.

Primary frameworkGDPR Chapter V (Articles 44-49)
Traffic-light rationale — GreenFull GDPR Chapter V applies directly via EU membership; no Latvia-specific derogation, additional localisation mandate, or independent adequacy instrument was found, which is the expected baseline for an EU Member State.

Sub-modules (6)

Transfer mechanismsGreen

Latvia relies on the standard GDPR Chapter V mechanisms (adequacy, SCCs, BCRs, derogations) as an EU Member State; DVI's EDPB membership confirms full participation in the harmonised EU transfer regime.

Claims (2):

  • As an EU Member State and EDPB member, Latvia applies the GDPR Chapter V cross-border transfer regime (adequacy, SCCs, BCRs, derogations) directly, with no confirmed Latvia-specific derogation identified.
  • Regulation (EU) 2025/2518, laying down additional procedural rules for enforcement of the GDPR in cross-border cases, will apply from April 2027.

Adequacy receivedGreen

Adequacy decisions are an EU Commission competence exercised at Union level, not a Latvia-specific instrument; no Latvia-specific 'adequacy received' determination is applicable.

Adequacy grantedGreen

Latvia does not independently grant adequacy; this is an EU Commission competence exercised on behalf of the Union.

SCCs and BCRsAmber

No Latvia-specific SCC/BCR uptake data or supplementary national form was identified.

Transfer impact assessmentAmber

No Latvia-specific TIA guidance beyond the general EDPB/Schrems II framework was identified.

Data localisationGreen

No Latvia-specific data-localisation mandate was identified.

Category narrative 44 words

As an EU Member State, Latvia's cross-border transfer regime is governed entirely by GDPR Chapter V (Articles 44-49): adequacy decisions are an EU Commission competence (not a Latvia-specific instrument), and SCCs/BCRs apply directly without a confirmed Latvia-specific overlay. No Latvia-specific data-localisation mandate was identified.

Periodic update · new data 2026-09-28

Regulation (EU) 2025/2518, which lays down additional procedural rules for the enforcement of the GDPR in cross-border cases, will apply from April 2027. This is a probable-confidence, forward-looking regulatory-horizon item rather than a currently operative rule, and it sits at the supranational EU level rather than being a Latvia-specific instrument. Its eventual application will affect how cross-border GDPR enforcement cases involving Latvian controllers or the DVI as lead or concerned supervisory authority are procedurally handled, though the specific mechanics of that change are not yet detailed in the evidence reaching this cycle.

No Latvia-specific cross-border transfer or adequacy development beyond this EU-level procedural regulation was identified this cycle.

Outlook

The April 2027 application date is the fixed marker to track. As that date approaches, future cycles should watch for implementing guidance from the European Data Protection Board or the DVI clarifying how the new procedural rules will be applied in cross-border cases involving Latvia.

Sources and claims (2)
  1. Uncertain EDPB — As an EU Member State and EDPB member, Latvia applies the GDPR Chapter V cross-border transfer regime (adequacy, SCCs, BCRs, derogations) directly, with no confirmed Latvia-specific derogation identified. observed
  2. Probable White & Case — Regulation (EU) 2025/2518, laying down additional procedural rules for enforcement of the GDPR in cross-border cases, will apply from April 2027. observed

#

Telecoms/eprivacy and employment sub-modules are well evidenced via DVI enforcement/guidance; financial, health, credit-scoring and insurance sub-modules carry no confirmed Latvia-specific findings.

Primary frameworkGDPR plus sector-specific instruments (Law on Information Society Services 2004, as amended)
Traffic-light rationale — AmberTelecoms/eprivacy and employment sub-modules are well evidenced via DVI enforcement/guidance; financial, health, credit-scoring and insurance sub-modules carry no confirmed Latvia-specific findings.

Sub-modules (7)

Financial sector overlayRed

No Latvia-specific financial-sector data-protection overlay was identified in this pass.

Claims (1):

  • DVI convened a 2026 conference session on the interaction between AML regulation and GDPR compliance.

Health sector overlayRed

No Latvia-specific health-sector data-protection overlay was identified in this pass.

Telecoms and eprivacyAmber

DVI applies both the GDPR and the Law on Information Society Services 2004, as amended, to regulate cookie and tracker practices, as evidenced by its 2021-2022 preventive audit of e-merchant websites.

Claims (1):

  • DVI's preventive check of website cookie practices assessed compliance with both the GDPR and the Law on Information Society Services 2004, as amended, which together regulate the use of cookies on Latvian websites.

Employment dataGreen

DVI has published dedicated guidance for employers on processing employee personal data consistent with GDPR principles, including appropriate legal bases.

Claims (1):

  • DVI has published guidance for employers on processing employee personal data in accordance with GDPR principles, including guidance on appropriate legal bases for such processing.

Credit and scoringRed

No Latvia-specific credit-scoring overlay was identified in this pass.

educationAmber

DVI clarified personal-data rules applicable to student test papers in March 2026, addressing an education-sector processing scenario.

Claims (1):

  • DVI issued clarification in March 2026 on the personal-data rules applicable to the handling of student test papers.

insuranceRed

No Latvia-specific insurance-sector overlay was identified in this pass.

Category narrative 50 words

Sectoral overlays confirmed for Latvia are concentrated in telecoms/eprivacy (Law on Information Society Services 2004, as amended, applied alongside GDPR to cookie practices) and employment data (DVI employer guidance). Financial-sector, health-sector, credit-scoring and insurance overlays were not confirmed in this research pass; an education-sector clarification (student test papers) was identified.

No periodic updates recorded in this cycle

Sources and claims (4)
  1. Confirmed OneTrust DataGuidance — DVI's preventive check of website cookie practices assessed compliance with both the GDPR and the Law on Information Society Services 2004, as amended, which together regulate the use of cookies on Latvian websites. observed
  2. Confirmed OneTrust DataGuidance — DVI has published guidance for employers on processing employee personal data in accordance with GDPR principles, including guidance on appropriate legal bases for such processing. observed
  3. Probable OneTrust DataGuidance — DVI issued clarification in March 2026 on the personal-data rules applicable to the handling of student test papers. observed
  4. Uncertain Enforcement Tracker — DVI convened a 2026 conference session on the interaction between AML regulation and GDPR compliance. observed

#

Cookie/tracker enforcement and guidance are well evidenced and show active but imperfect compliance across the merchant sector; dark-patterns, opt-out-signal, clean-room and direct-marketing sub-modules lack confirmed Latvia-specific findings.

Primary frameworkGDPR plus Law on Information Society Services 2004, as amended (ePrivacy transposition)
Traffic-light rationale — AmberCookie/tracker enforcement and guidance are well evidenced and show active but imperfect compliance across the merchant sector; dark-patterns, opt-out-signal, clean-room and direct-marketing sub-modules lack confirmed Latvia-specific findings.

Sub-modules (6)

Cookies and trackersAmber

DVI's 2021-2022 preventive audit found widespread cookie-consent non-compliance among e-merchants, and its April 2022 cookie guide clarifies which cookie categories require consent.

Claims (4):

  • DVI's 2021-2022 preventive check of cookie practices across 29 websites of 26 e-merchants found that none of the websites tested ensured appropriate consent was obtained, with three traders found in significant violation and 23 others required to remediate non-compliance.
  • DVI's April 2022 cookie guide clarifies that personalised and analytical cookies require user consent, while technical/functional cookies necessary for website operation do not.
  • DVI fined SIA 4YOU MEBELES EUR 1,000 for cookie-consent deficiencies and non-cooperation with the supervisory authority.
  • Datu valsts inspekcija (DVI) — DVI has issued 23 privacy and tracking enforcement actions totaling EUR 345,795, with cookies placed before consent under GDPR Art 6(1) the most enforced violation.

Dark patternsAmber

No Latvia-specific dark-patterns finding was identified beyond the general EDPB guidance framework.

Opt out signalsAmber

No Latvia-specific Global Privacy Control/DAA opt-out-signal finding was identified.

Clean rooms and dcrAmber

No Latvia-specific data clean-room/collaboration-room finding was identified.

Cross context advertisingAmber

No Latvia-specific cross-context advertising finding beyond general GDPR profiling rules was identified.

Direct marketingAmber

No Latvia-specific direct-marketing consent/suppression finding beyond the general GDPR/ePrivacy framework was identified.

Category narrative 49 words

DVI has actively enforced cookie-consent standards, conducting a 2021-2022 preventive audit of 29 websites belonging to 26 large e-merchants that found none obtained appropriate consent, with three traders found in significant violation. DVI subsequently published a cookie guide (1 April 2022) distinguishing consent-requiring personalised/analytical cookies from consent-exempt technical/functional cookies.

Periodic update · new data 2026-10-25

The Data State Inspectorate fined SIA 4YOU MEBELES EUR 1,000 following a cookie-compliance sweep conducted under its Article 31 inspection powers, which identified unremedied cookie-consent deficiencies. Notably, the penalty itself was issued under Article 83(5)(e) for insufficient cooperation with the supervisory authority, a violation of Article 58(1)(e), rather than for the underlying cookie-consent failure directly. This is a procedurally distinct enforcement route: the Inspectorate appears willing to penalise a controller's failure to cooperate with a sweep or follow-up inspection as its own violation, separate from whatever substantive remediation the sweep itself sought. The fine level, at EUR 1,000, sits at the lower end of the Inspectorate's recorded enforcement range and is consistent with its broader pattern of routine, modest cookie-related penalties rather than large-scale punitive action.

This enforcement outcome sits within a wider programme of cookie and tracker sweeps that the Inspectorate runs as part of its active-supervision function. The target in this instance, a furniture retailer, suggests the sweep programme reaches beyond large digital-advertising intermediaries into ordinary commercial websites using standard cookie-consent tooling, indicating a reasonably broad net for this kind of routine compliance check rather than a sector-targeted campaign.

Outlook

Watch for whether further cookie-sweep outcomes in Latvia continue to attach primarily to non-cooperation under Article 58(1)(e) rather than to the underlying consent deficiency itself, which would indicate a settled enforcement technique, and for whether fine levels for such outcomes remain in the sub-EUR-2,000 range or escalate for repeat or larger-scale non-cooperation.

Sources and claims (4)
  1. Confirmed OneTrust DataGuidance — DVI's 2021-2022 preventive check of cookie practices across 29 websites of 26 e-merchants found that none of the websites tested ensured appropriate consent was obtained, with three traders found in significant violation and 23 others required to remediate non-compliance. observed
  2. Confirmed OneTrust DataGuidance — DVI's April 2022 cookie guide clarifies that personalised and analytical cookies require user consent, while technical/functional cookies necessary for website operation do not. observed
  3. Probable Enforcement Tracker — DVI fined SIA 4YOU MEBELES EUR 1,000 for cookie-consent deficiencies and non-cooperation with the supervisory authority. observed
  4. Probable Beeble — Datu valsts inspekcija (DVI) — DVI has issued 23 privacy and tracking enforcement actions totaling EUR 345,795, with cookies placed before consent under GDPR Art 6(1) the most enforced violation. observed

#

The GDPR baseline (Art 9, Art 22, Art 2(2)(d)) applies directly, but no Latvia-specific statutory overlay, DPA guidance, or enforcement action on profiling, ADM transparency, AI risk assessment, biometric regime, genetic data or surveillance carveouts was confirmed.

Primary frameworkGDPR Articles 9, 22 and 2(2)(d) (no confirmed Latvia-specific overlay)
Traffic-light rationale — AmberThe GDPR baseline (Art 9, Art 22, Art 2(2)(d)) applies directly, but no Latvia-specific statutory overlay, DPA guidance, or enforcement action on profiling, ADM transparency, AI risk assessment, biometric regime, genetic data or surveillance carveouts was confirmed.

Sub-modules (6)

Profiling restrictionsAmber

No Latvia-specific profiling-restriction finding beyond general GDPR Article 22 was identified.

Automated decision making transparencyAmber

No Latvia-specific ADM-transparency finding was identified.

AI risk assessmentsAmber

No Latvia-specific AI-risk-assessment or EU AI Act interface finding was identified in this pass.

Claims (3):

  • DVI's 2025 annual activity report designated it as Latvia's supervisory authority for personal data protection under the EU AI Act.
  • DVI Director — DVI's Director participated in the 2026 CPDP Conference in Brussels, where discussions focused on AI, biometrics and big-data-analytics challenges to data protection.
  • Data State Inspectorate (DVI) — Per VARAM's published market-surveillance allocation under the EU AI Act, DVI is the designated market-surveillance authority for Annex III high-risk areas of biometrics, employment, essential private/public services, law enforcement, migration and border control, and democratic processes, and is also the designated authority for prohibited AI practices.

Biometric regimeAmber

No Latvia-specific biometric-data regime beyond the general GDPR Article 9 special-category framework was identified.

Genetic dataAmber

No Latvia-specific genetic-data regime beyond the general GDPR Article 9 special-category framework was identified.

State surveillance carveoutsAmber

No Latvia-specific state-surveillance carveout beyond the general GDPR Article 2(2)(d) law-enforcement exclusion was identified.

Category narrative 43 words

GDPR Article 9(4) permits Latvia to add further conditions on genetic, biometric and health data, but no confirmed Latvia-specific biometric, genetic, ADM-transparency or AI-risk-assessment overlay was located in this pass. No Latvia-specific state-surveillance carveout beyond the general GDPR Article 2(2)(d)/national-security exclusions was identified.

Periodic update · new data 2026-10-25

The Data State Inspectorate's 2025 annual activity report designated it as Latvia's supervisory authority for personal data protection under the EU AI Act, with the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Regional Development (VARAM) coordinating overall AI Act implementation nationally. This is the clearest signal available that Latvia intends to route the personal-data dimension of AI-system oversight through its existing data-protection regulator rather than establishing a wholly new supervisory body for that purpose, consistent with an approach several EU jurisdictions have taken of layering AI Act competence onto existing sectoral regulators rather than creating parallel structures.

The specific Latvian legal instrument, whether a Cabinet decision, ministerial order or legislative amendment, that formally confers this supervisory role on the Inspectorate has not been independently located. The designation is understood at this point from the Inspectorate's own self-reporting in its annual activity report rather than from the underlying instrument, which means the precise scope of its AI Act competence, including which categories of AI system or which obligations under the Act fall within its remit as opposed to VARAM's general coordination function, has not been confirmed from a primary source.

Outlook

Watch for the formal instrument establishing or confirming the Inspectorate's AI Act supervisory role, which would clarify the precise boundary between its competence and VARAM's coordinating function, and for the Inspectorate's first substantive exercise of that role, whether through guidance, an investigation or an enforcement action concerning an AI system's personal-data processing.

Sources and claims (3)
  1. Probable Beeble — DVI's 2025 annual activity report designated it as Latvia's supervisory authority for personal data protection under the EU AI Act. observed
  2. Uncertain Beeble — DVI Director — DVI's Director participated in the 2026 CPDP Conference in Brussels, where discussions focused on AI, biometrics and big-data-analytics challenges to data protection. observed
  3. Probable SPR.lv — Data State Inspectorate (DVI) — Per VARAM's published market-surveillance allocation under the EU AI Act, DVI is the designated market-surveillance authority for Annex III high-risk areas of biometrics, employment, essential private/public services, law enforcement, migration and border control, and democratic processes, and is also the designated authority for prohibited AI practices. observed

#

The GDPR default age-of-consent rule applies by direct effect, but confirmation of any Latvia-specific lower threshold (permitted between 13 and 16) was not found; dependent-adults and minor-profiling-ban sub-modules carry no confirmed findings.

Primary frameworkGDPR Article 8 (default age 16, absent confirmed national derogation)
Traffic-light rationale — AmberThe GDPR default age-of-consent rule applies by direct effect, but confirmation of any Latvia-specific lower threshold (permitted between 13 and 16) was not found; dependent-adults and minor-profiling-ban sub-modules carry no confirmed findings.

Sub-modules (5)

Age verificationAmber

No Latvia-specific age-verification mandate or DVI guidance was identified.

Claims (1):

  • Latvia applies the GDPR Art 8 default age of 16 for a child's consent to information-society services, with no lower national derogation identified.

Minor profiling bansAmber

No Latvia-specific minor-profiling-ban finding was identified.

Education settingsAmber

DVI's March 2026 clarification on student test papers addresses an education-sector processing scenario involving minors' data; this finding is homed under sectoral_watch.education (see CLM-LV-65959330) and is cross-referenced here for completeness.

Dependent adultsAmber

No Latvia-specific dependent-adults (elderly/incapacitated) data-protection finding was identified.

Category narrative 69 words

GDPR Article 8 sets a default age of 16 for a child's own consent to information-society-service processing, with member states permitted to lower this to a minimum of 13; this research could not confirm whether Latvia has enacted a specific national derogation from the 16-year default. DVI's March 2026 clarification on student test papers touches an education setting involving minors' data but does not itself establish an age-of-consent rule.

No periodic updates recorded in this cycle

Sources and claims (2)
  1. Uncertain EDPB — GDPR Article 8 sets a default age of 16 for a child's own valid consent to information-society-service processing, below which a holder of parental responsibility must consent; member states may lower this default to a minimum of 13, but confirmation of a Latvia-specific derogation was not found. observed
  2. Probable Linklaters — Latvia applies the GDPR Art 8 default age of 16 for a child's consent to information-society services, with no lower national derogation identified. observed

#

Multiple concrete enforcement decisions, an active CJEU reference on private compensation rights, and ongoing 2026 regulatory activity together demonstrate a functioning, actively-used enforcement and redress ecosystem.

Primary frameworkGDPR Articles 58, 77-84; Personal Data Processing Law of 21 June 2018
Traffic-light rationale — GreenMultiple concrete enforcement decisions, an active CJEU reference on private compensation rights, and ongoing 2026 regulatory activity together demonstrate a functioning, actively-used enforcement and redress ecosystem.

Sub-modules (6)

Regulator powers and penaltiesGreen

DVI exercises GDPR Article 58(2) investigative/corrective powers and Article 83 fining powers, as demonstrated by its 2019 decision against an online retailer, calculated with reference to Article 83(5)(b) and (e).

Claims (5):

  • DVI's Director imposed a €7,000 administrative fine in 2019 under GDPR Article 83(5)(b) and (e), exercising Article 58(2) corrective powers against an online retailer for GDPR non-compliance and non-cooperation.
  • The DVI has developed a published mechanism for determining the amount of GDPR Art 83 fines for non-compliance.
  • Datu valsts inspekcija (DVI) — In its latest reporting period the DVI adopted 7 administrative-offence decisions: 5 fines for GDPR violations and 2 penalties for failure to provide information to the DVI.
  • GDPR's two-tier fine structure applies directly in Latvia with no public-body-specific carve-out identified.
  • SIA ZZ Dats was fined EUR 300,000 by DVI following a large-scale personal data breach in late 2024 that affected almost all Latvian municipalities.

Enforcement activity indexGreen

DVI's enforcement record includes fines against an online retailer (€7,000, 2019), HH Invest SIA (€15,000, 2020) and Lursoft (€65,000, 2021), indicating sustained enforcement activity over multiple years.

Claims (5):

  • DVI fined Lursoft €65,000 in 2021 for unlawful processing of personal data.
  • DVI fined HH Invest SIA €15,000 in December 2020 for providing insufficient information to a data subject regarding the processing of their personal data.
  • Datu valsts inspekcija (DVI) — The DVI initiated 266 in-depth review proceedings in its latest reporting period, identifying 143 violations, with corrective measures applied in 62 cases.
  • DVI has issued 23 recorded privacy and tracking enforcement actions totalling approximately EUR 346,000.
  • DVI's published decisions register showed no new administrative fine or corrective decision dated within the window; most recent visible entries dated 5-6 October 2026.

Regulator funding and capacityAmber

No specific DVI funding/headcount data was identified in this research pass.

Collective redress and class actionsAmber

No Latvia-specific collective-redress or class-action mechanism for data-protection claims was identified.

Private right of actionGreen

Latvia's Supreme Court referred a preliminary question to the CJEU (C-507/23) on Article 82(1) GDPR compensation for non-material damage, confirming Latvian courts recognise direct data-subject compensation claims.

Claims (1):

  • Latvia's Augstākā tiesa (Senāts) referred a preliminary-ruling question to the CJEU (Case C-507/23) concerning Article 82(1) GDPR's right to compensation for non-material damage, including whether an apology can constitute permissible compensation.

Recent developments 180dAmber

Within the recent-developments window, DVI published June 2026 guidance on group DPO appointment, and the Latvian Parliament adopted amendments to the Law on Administrative Liability introducing new subscriber-data access procedures and updated fine structures.

Claims (3):

  • On 3 June 2026, DVI published guidance on the appointment of a single Data Protection Officer for a group of companies, covering accessibility, conflict-of-interest and cross-border-transfer considerations for the DPO role.
  • The Latvian Parliament adopted amendments to the Law on Administrative Liability introducing new procedures for accessing subscriber data and updating fine structures.
  • The Riga Regional Court upheld the DVI's EUR 1.2 million fine against Tet for unlawfully disclosing unverified customer personal data to debt-recovery services; the judgment is final and not subject to appeal.
Category narrative 106 words

DVI exercises GDPR Article 58 investigative and corrective powers and Article 83 fining powers, evidenced by a 2019 €7,000 fine (erasure/non-cooperation), a December 2020 €15,000 fine against HH Invest SIA (inadequate information to a data subject), and a 2021 €65,000 fine against Lursoft for unlawful processing. Latvia's Supreme Court (Augstākā tiesa, Senāts) referred a preliminary question to the CJEU (C-507/23) on Article 82(1) GDPR compensation for non-material damage, confirming an operative private right of action before Latvian courts. Recent developments include June 2026 DVI guidance on group DPO appointments and Latvian parliamentary amendments to the Law on Administrative Liability affecting subscriber-data access procedures and fine structures.

Periodic update · new data 2026-09-28

Latvia's enforcement environment shows material escalation this cycle. The Riga Regional Court has upheld the Data State Inspectorate's EUR 1.2 million fine against Tet, a significant Latvian telecommunications provider, for unlawfully disclosing unverified customer personal data to debt-recovery services. This judgment is now final and not subject to appeal, converting what was previously a contested fine into a settled, confirmed enforcement outcome. The finality of this decision is a confirmed-confidence finding drawn from Latvian public broadcasting reporting.

Beyond this individual case, the DVI's own activity statistics for its latest reporting period show sustained enforcement volume: 266 in-depth review proceedings were initiated, 143 violations were identified within those reviews, and corrective measures were applied in 62 cases. The DVI also adopted seven administrative-offence decisions, five of which were fines for GDPR violations and two of which were penalties for failure to provide information to the DVI itself. These figures are probable-confidence findings drawn from a single Tier-3 source (Linklaters), and the exact date range of the reporting period they cover was not confirmable from the source excerpt reached this cycle, a gap that should be closed in a future cycle before the figures are treated as fully settled. The DVI additionally retains a statutory power to visit and inspect controllers' premises, including production facilities, warehouses and other commercial or non-residential premises, to check compliance with Latvian data-protection law.

Outlook

The item to watch is whether the volume of in-depth review proceedings this reporting period (266) converts into further administrative-offence decisions in the coming cycle, and whether a future source can confirm the exact reporting-period date range for these figures. The Tet judgment's finality removes any near-term appeal uncertainty from that specific case.

1 earlier distinct update
Periodic update · new data 2026-08-25

The Data State Inspectorate's enforcement and redress activity in Latvia shows a materially active, above-baseline enforcement programme this cycle, anchored by one headline case. DVI opened 266 in-depth review proceedings, identified 143 violations, applied corrective measures in 62 cases, and issued 7 administrative-offence decisions in a recent reporting period, of which 5 were GDPR fines and 2 concerned cooperation failures with DVI itself rather than substantive GDPR breaches.

The headline case within this activity remains the SIA "Tet" fine of EUR 1,200,000, imposed for disclosing unverified personal data, including a minor's data, to debt-recovery services without prior identity verification, in violation of GDPR Article 5(1). This fine sits well below the GDPR's statutory maximum penalty of EUR 20,000,000 or 4 percent of worldwide annual turnover, whichever is higher. The gap between Tet's actual fine and the statutory ceiling is instructive: DVI's largest identified fine to date represents a small fraction of the maximum available penalty, suggesting a calibrated, proportionality-conscious fining practice even in its most significant known case.

The proportion of DVI's enforcement outcomes is also analytically significant. Of 143 identified violations, corrective measures were applied in 62 cases, while only 7 proceeded to formal administrative-offence decisions. This indicates that DVI's default enforcement posture favours remediation over formal fining, reserving administrative-offence decisions, and by extension monetary fines, for a comparatively small subset of matters. This pattern suggests DVI's enforcement capacity is being deployed primarily toward correction and compliance-improvement rather than punitive deterrence, with fines functioning as an exception rather than the default response to an identified violation.

DVI's decisions carry a defined judicial-review pathway: administrative-offence decisions are appealable first to the DVI Director and subsequently to the District (City) Court under the Administrative Violations Code. This establishes that DVI's enforcement decisions, including the Tet fine, are not administratively final but subject to a defined internal-then-judicial appeal route. No indication of whether Tet or any other sanctioned party has exercised this appeal route was available this cycle.

It is also worth situating DVI's enforcement volume in context to the extent this cycle's evidence permits: 266 in-depth review proceedings in a single reporting period is a substantial docket, and the resulting 143-violation identification rate suggests DVI's review process is reasonably effective at surfacing genuine violations rather than functioning as a largely pro forma review exercise. No comparative figure from another jurisdiction is available within this cycle's evidence base, so this observation should be read as a description of Latvia's own docket composition rather than a comparative ranking. Finally, the 2-of-7 administrative-offence decisions concerning cooperation failures rather than substantive GDPR breaches is itself a distinct and separately notable finding: it indicates that DVI is willing to formally sanction non-cooperation with its own supervisory process as a distinct category of offence, independent of whatever substantive GDPR violation, if any, prompted the underlying inquiry.

Outlook

The most consequential open item for this domain is whether DVI's active 2026-2030 strategic emphasis on strengthened supervision translates into a materially higher rate of administrative-offence decisions relative to the 7-of-143 ratio observed in the most recent reporting period, which would signal a shift away from the remediation-favouring posture described above. A second item to track is whether the Tet decision, or any other DVI administrative-offence decision from this reporting period, is appealed to the District Court, which would be the first test of Latvia's GDPR judicial-redress pathway under this cycle's evidence base.

Sources and claims (14)
  1. Confirmed EDPB (republishing DVI press release) — DVI's Director imposed a €7,000 administrative fine in 2019 under GDPR Article 83(5)(b) and (e), exercising Article 58(2) corrective powers against an online retailer for GDPR non-compliance and non-cooperation. observed
  2. Confirmed OneTrust DataGuidance — DVI fined HH Invest SIA €15,000 in December 2020 for providing insufficient information to a data subject regarding the processing of their personal data. observed
  3. Confirmed OneTrust DataGuidance — DVI fined Lursoft €65,000 in 2021 for unlawful processing of personal data. observed
  4. Confirmed EUR-Lex — Latvia's Augstākā tiesa (Senāts) referred a preliminary-ruling question to the CJEU (Case C-507/23) concerning Article 82(1) GDPR's right to compensation for non-material damage, including whether an apology can constitute permissible compensation. observed
  5. Confirmed OneTrust DataGuidance — On 3 June 2026, DVI published guidance on the appointment of a single Data Protection Officer for a group of companies, covering accessibility, conflict-of-interest and cross-border-transfer considerations for the DPO role. observed
  6. Uncertain OneTrust DataGuidance — The Latvian Parliament adopted amendments to the Law on Administrative Liability introducing new procedures for accessing subscriber data and updating fine structures. observed
  7. Confirmed LSM (Latvian Public Broadcasting) — The Riga Regional Court upheld the DVI's EUR 1.2 million fine against Tet for unlawfully disclosing unverified customer personal data to debt-recovery services; the judgment is final and not subject to appeal. observed
  8. Probable CookieFines.eu — The DVI has developed a published mechanism for determining the amount of GDPR Art 83 fines for non-compliance. observed
  9. Probable Enforcement Tracker — Datu valsts inspekcija (DVI) — In its latest reporting period the DVI adopted 7 administrative-offence decisions: 5 fines for GDPR violations and 2 penalties for failure to provide information to the DVI. observed
  10. Probable Enforcement Tracker — Datu valsts inspekcija (DVI) — The DVI initiated 266 in-depth review proceedings in its latest reporting period, identifying 143 violations, with corrective measures applied in 62 cases. observed
  11. Probable Linklaters — GDPR's two-tier fine structure applies directly in Latvia with no public-body-specific carve-out identified. observed
  12. Probable CookieFines.eu — DVI has issued 23 recorded privacy and tracking enforcement actions totalling approximately EUR 346,000. observed
  13. Probable noyb.eu — DVI's published decisions register showed no new administrative fine or corrective decision dated within the window; most recent visible entries dated 5-6 October 2026. observed
  14. Probable LSM (Latvian Public Broadcasting) — SIA ZZ Dats was fined EUR 300,000 by DVI following a large-scale personal data breach in late 2024 that affected almost all Latvian municipalities. observed
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Envelope: baseline resolved at jurisdiction_json.baseline; 10 categories, 57 sub-module(s), 61 claim(s) (61 category placement(s)), 42 source(s) in the cumulative register.

Audit trail

Machine checkChallenged on 24 Oct 2026: not settled (2 could not be checked). An automated, adversarial test run by a second model; no person has assessed the result.

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GDPR article map

Cross-reference: which category/sub-module covers each UK GDPR article (38 mapped).

Show article map
GDPR article to category mapping
ArticleCategorySub-module
Art. 5Controller/Processor Dutiesaccountability and dpia
Art. 6Lawful Processing & Special Datalawful bases
Art. 7Lawful Processing & Special Dataconsent thresholds
Art. 9Lawful Processing & Special Dataspecial categories
Art. 13Data Subject Rightsaccess right
Art. 14Data Subject Rightsaccess right
Art. 15Data Subject Rightsaccess right
Art. 16Data Subject Rightsrectification and erasure
Art. 17Data Subject Rightsrectification and erasure
Art. 18Data Subject Rightsrestriction and objection
Art. 19Data Subject Rightsrectification and erasure
Art. 20Data Subject Rightsdata portability
Art. 21Data Subject Rightsrestriction and objection
Art. 22Algorithmic, Biometric & Surveillance Governanceautomated decision making transparency
Art. 25Controller/Processor Dutiesaccountability and dpia
Art. 28Controller/Processor Dutiesjoint controller arrangements
Art. 30Controller/Processor Dutiesropa requirements
Art. 32Controller/Processor Dutiessecurity measures
Art. 33Controller/Processor Dutiesbreach notification
Art. 34Controller/Processor Dutiesbreach notification
Art. 35Controller/Processor Dutiesaccountability and dpia
Art. 37Controller/Processor Dutiesdpo requirements
Art. 38Controller/Processor Dutiesdpo requirements
Art. 39Controller/Processor Dutiesdpo requirements
Art. 44Cross-Border & Adequacytransfer mechanisms
Art. 45Cross-Border & Adequacyadequacy received
Art. 46Cross-Border & Adequacysccs and bcrs
Art. 47Cross-Border & Adequacysccs and bcrs
Art. 48Cross-Border & Adequacytransfer mechanisms
Art. 49Cross-Border & Adequacytransfer mechanisms
Art. 77Enforcement & Redressprivate right of action
Art. 78Enforcement & Redressprivate right of action
Art. 79Enforcement & Redressprivate right of action
Art. 80Enforcement & Redressprivate right of action
Art. 81Enforcement & Redresscollective redress and class actions
Art. 82Enforcement & Redressprivate right of action
Art. 83Enforcement & Redressregulator powers and penalties
Art. 84Enforcement & Redressregulator powers and penalties