Data Protection Monitor
Global Privacy & Data Protection Intelligence

Lithuania Data Protection & Privacy Regulation

LT schema gdpri-v2 trajectory: not yet assessed regulated (omnibus) overlaps: Sentinel (AML/CFT), World Payments, artificial-intelligence

Last updated · 10 categories · 92 claims · 50 sources in the cumulative register

Lithuania's data-protection enforcement cadence is escalating even as the underlying legal framework remains stable.

Data collected Data published

AI-assembled from cited sources

Not fully checked this cycle: Lawful Processing & Special Data, Data Subject Rights, Cross-Border & Adequacy, Sectoral Watch, Algorithmic, Biometric & Surveillance Governance, Enforcement & Redress (6 open gaps).

Framework & posture10 of 10 modules active
10 active · 13 binding instruments
Next milestoneNo upcoming dated milestone on record
Record & confidence mix92 claims · 46 sources · machine-compiled
25 Confirmed59 Probable4 Contested / unverified
Evidence re-verified: ·Position last changed: ·
Record history & provenance ▾

Methodology & record provenance: Module confidence is derived from the underlying claims (source tier and primary excerpt retention), while statutory legal force is tracked independently.

Review status: AI-synthesised · Tier-1/2 verified · As-of date: 2026-11-17

Law made at European Economic Area (Bloc) level that applies in Lithuania is covered once, on the European Economic Area (Bloc) page. This page covers Lithuania’s own layer: implementation, national authorities, national options and local enforcement.

Jurisdiction brief

Latest update · 8 November 2026

Lead Signal

The Lithuanian data protection authority, VDAI, has fined processor UAB DELSKA Lithuania, the successor entity to UAB Rakrėjus, EUR 4,500 for breach of Article 32(1)(b) of the GDPR. The decision confirms that VDAI treats a processor's own security obligation as independent of the controller's, rather than treating controller liability as the default locus of responsibility when a security failure occurs. This is a confirmed finding and marks a tightening in how processor-level accountability is being enforced in Lithuania.

Key regulatory facts for Lithuania
Key regulatory facts for Lithuania
Regulatory DimensionLithuania Standing Position
JurisdictionLithuania (LT)
Regulatory ScopeData Protection & Privacy Regulation (10 modules, 92 sourced findings)
Regulator & FrameworkComprehensive, mature GDPR-aligned framework with an active, EDPB-participating supervisory authority and no material derogation gaps identified.
Lawful Processing & Special DataNo national derogation weakening GDPR standards identified; VDAI enforcement activity on biometric data confirms an active special-categories regime.
Data Subject RightsRights framework is directly GDPR-derived and actively enforced; no LT-specific narrowing identified.
Controller/Processor DutiesCore duties are directly GDPR-derived and actively supervised; retention/disposal sub-module lacks a confirmed LT-specific instrument.
Primary Instruments CitedLithuania Official Instrument (dlapiperdataprotection.com index-html-t-law-c-LT), Recording Law, EUR-Lex, European Union, EUR-Lex
Last Confirmed / Updated (50 sources in cumulative register)

#

Comprehensive, mature GDPR-aligned framework with an active, EDPB-participating supervisory authority and no material derogation gaps identified.

Primary frameworkGeneral Data Protection Regulation (EU) 2016/679, as implemented by Law No XIII-1426 of 30 June 2018 amending Law No I-1374 (Law on Legal Protection of Personal Data)
Traffic-light rationale — GreenComprehensive, mature GDPR-aligned framework with an active, EDPB-participating supervisory authority and no material derogation gaps identified.

Sub-modules (5)

Regulator and authorityGreen

VDAI is the single national supervisory authority under GDPR Art. 51, participating in the EDPB.

Claims (5):

  • <cite index="6-1,6-2">The State Data Protection Inspectorate, located at L. Sapiegos str. 17, 10312 Vilnius, Lithuania, is listed as the national supervisory authority with contact reachable via [email protected].
  • State Data Protection Inspectorate (VDAI) — Lithuania's supervisory authority under GDPR, with the Inspector of Journalist Ethics holding concurrent jurisdiction over journalistic-purpose processing
  • The VDAI is Lithuania's single national data-protection supervisory authority.
  • State Data Protection Inspectorate (VDAI) — VDAI, an independent body located in Vilnius, is Lithuania's primary competent supervisory authority for GDPR, with the Inspector of Journalist Ethics holding concurrent jurisdiction over press-related processing.
  • State Data Protection Inspectorate (VDAI) — Lithuania has two data-protection supervisory authorities: VDAI, responsible for GDPR and the national Data Protection Law generally, and the Inspector of Journalist Ethics, which has competence over processing for journalistic, academic, artistic or literary purposes.

Act and instrumentsGreen

GDPR is directly applicable; national implementation is via Law No XIII-1426/2018 amending the Law on Legal Protection of Personal Data.

Claims (2):

  • <cite index="1-1">Lithuania implemented the GDPR through Law No XIII-1426 of 30 June 2018 amending Law No I-1374, together with the General Data Protection Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2016/679).
  • Law on Legal Protection of Personal Data (No. I-1374) — Fills GDPR derogation spaces including personal-code (ID number) processing, employment-context rules, journalistic/artistic exemptions and public-sector fine procedures.

Material scopeGreen

Material scope follows GDPR: covers processing by private-sector and most public-sector bodies.

Claims (1):

  • <cite index="67-8">The GDPR ensures protection of natural persons where their data is processed by the private sector and by most public-sector entities.

Territorial scopeGreen

GDPR extraterritorial reach applies: non-EU established entities offering goods/services to, or monitoring, Lithuania-based data subjects are in scope.

Claims (1):

  • <cite index="67-31">Non-EU established companies must apply the same GDPR rules with regard to the offering of goods or services and the monitoring of the behaviour of persons living in the EU.

Regulator registration and filingAmber

No general notification regime; controllers/processors must communicate DPO contact details to VDAI where a DPO is appointed.

Claims (1):

  • <cite index="1-7,1-8">Article 37 GDPR obliges controllers and processors meeting DPO thresholds to designate a DPO, publish the DPO's contact details, and communicate them to the relevant supervisory authority.
Category narrative 41 words

Lithuania is an EU Member State fully subject to the GDPR, supervised by the State Data Protection Inspectorate (Valstybinė duomenų apsaugos inspekcija, 'VDAI'), and implementing GDPR via a national amending law to the pre-existing Law on Legal Protection of Personal Data.

Sources and claims (10)
  1. Confirmed EDPB — <cite index="6-1,6-2">The State Data Protection Inspectorate, located at L. Sapiegos str. 17, 10312 Vilnius, Lithuania, is listed as the national supervisory authority with contact reachable via [email protected]. observed
  2. Confirmed DataGuidance — <cite index="1-1">Lithuania implemented the GDPR through Law No XIII-1426 of 30 June 2018 amending Law No I-1374, together with the General Data Protection Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2016/679). observed
  3. Confirmed EUR-Lex — <cite index="67-8">The GDPR ensures protection of natural persons where their data is processed by the private sector and by most public-sector entities. observed
  4. Confirmed EUR-Lex — <cite index="67-31">Non-EU established companies must apply the same GDPR rules with regard to the offering of goods or services and the monitoring of the behaviour of persons living in the EU. observed
  5. Confirmed DataGuidance — <cite index="1-7,1-8">Article 37 GDPR obliges controllers and processors meeting DPO thresholds to designate a DPO, publish the DPO's contact details, and communicate them to the relevant supervisory authority. observed
  6. High Linklaters — State Data Protection Inspectorate (VDAI) — Lithuania's supervisory authority under GDPR, with the Inspector of Journalist Ethics holding concurrent jurisdiction over journalistic-purpose processing observed
  7. Probable DataGuidance — The VDAI is Lithuania's single national data-protection supervisory authority. observed
  8. Confirmed European Union — State Data Protection Inspectorate (VDAI) — VDAI, an independent body located in Vilnius, is Lithuania's primary competent supervisory authority for GDPR, with the Inspector of Journalist Ethics holding concurrent jurisdiction over press-related processing. observed
  9. Probable European Union — Law on Legal Protection of Personal Data (No. I-1374) — Fills GDPR derogation spaces including personal-code (ID number) processing, employment-context rules, journalistic/artistic exemptions and public-sector fine procedures. observed
  10. Probable https://www.dlapiperdataprotection.com/index.html?t=law&c=LT — State Data Protection Inspectorate (VDAI) — Lithuania has two data-protection supervisory authorities: VDAI, responsible for GDPR and the national Data Protection Law generally, and the Inspector of Journalist Ethics, which has competence over processing for journalistic, academic, artistic or literary purposes.

#

No national derogation weakening GDPR standards identified; VDAI enforcement activity on biometric data confirms an active special-categories regime.

Primary frameworkGDPR Arts. 6, 7, 9, 10; Law No XIII-1426/2018
Traffic-light rationale — GreenNo national derogation weakening GDPR standards identified; VDAI enforcement activity on biometric data confirms an active special-categories regime.

Sub-modules (4)

Lawful basesGreen

Standard GDPR Art. 6(1) bases apply (consent, contract, legal obligation, vital interests, public task, legitimate interests).

Claims (2):

  • <cite index="69-6">Data controllers can only process personal data lawfully where one of the enumerated legal bases in Article 6 GDPR applies, such as consent, contract, legal obligation, public interest, or legitimate interests.
  • VDAI — Dismissed smart-electricity-meter consumption-data complaints as manifestly unfounded under GDPR Art 6(1)(c), and upheld an estate agent's legitimate-interest basis under Art 6(1)(f) for a land-register lookup, in a cluster of decisions published 13-27 May 2026.

Special categoriesAmber

VDAI has prioritised biometric-data enforcement (including in sports contexts) and issued recommendations on criminal-record data processing by employers.

Claims (2):

  • <cite index="1-3">Areas of focus for VDAI have included biometric data, as indicated by its thorough review of the use of biometric data in sports.
  • <cite index="1-26">VDAI's Recommendation outlines when and how employers in Lithuania can process criminal record data.

Pseudonymisation and anonymisationGreen

GDPR promotes pseudonymisation and encryption as risk-mitigation techniques; no LT-specific safe-harbour beyond the Regulation was identified.

Claims (1):

  • <cite index="67-35">To limit the risks of data processing, use of pseudonyms (replacing identifying fields with artificial identifiers) and encryption is promoted.
Category narrative 28 words

Lawful bases and consent standards follow GDPR Art. 6/7 directly. VDAI has issued sector guidance on special-category data (biometric, criminal-record) reflecting active supervisory focus on Art. 9/10 categories.

Sources and claims (6)
  1. Confirmed EDPB — <cite index="69-6">Data controllers can only process personal data lawfully where one of the enumerated legal bases in Article 6 GDPR applies, such as consent, contract, legal obligation, public interest, or legitimate interests. observed
  2. Confirmed EDPB — <cite index="69-9">Where consent is used as a legal basis, controllers must ensure the consent is freely given, informed, specific and unambiguous. observed
  3. Probable DataGuidance — <cite index="1-3">Areas of focus for VDAI have included biometric data, as indicated by its thorough review of the use of biometric data in sports. observed
  4. Probable DataGuidance — <cite index="1-26">VDAI's Recommendation outlines when and how employers in Lithuania can process criminal record data. observed
  5. Confirmed EUR-Lex — <cite index="67-35">To limit the risks of data processing, use of pseudonyms (replacing identifying fields with artificial identifiers) and encryption is promoted. observed
  6. Probable The DPO — VDAI — Dismissed smart-electricity-meter consumption-data complaints as manifestly unfounded under GDPR Art 6(1)(c), and upheld an estate agent's legitimate-interest basis under Art 6(1)(f) for a land-register lookup, in a cluster of decisions published 13-27 May 2026. observed

#

Rights framework is directly GDPR-derived and actively enforced; no LT-specific narrowing identified.

Primary frameworkGDPR Arts. 12-22
Traffic-light rationale — GreenRights framework is directly GDPR-derived and actively enforced; no LT-specific narrowing identified.

Sub-modules (5)

Access rightAmber

VDAI found Vinted failed to properly evidence action taken on access requests.

Claims (2):

  • <cite index="32-4">The Lithuanian SA found that the company also failed to demonstrate that it had taken or refused to act in accordance with the applicant's request for the right of access.
  • VDAI — Published procedure confirms data subjects may exercise GDPR rights via written request to the Inspectorate, with appeal to the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court against adverse decisions.

Rectification and erasureAmber

VDAI enforcement covers both erasure-request handling (Vinted) and data-accuracy/rectification duties (Vilnius Municipality).

Claims (2):

  • <cite index="32-1">Lithuanian SA found the company, in response to erasure requests, stated it would not act on a specific request because the applicant did not identify a specific reason under Article 17(1) GDPR and failed to identify all purposes of continued processing.
  • <cite index="17-4">A fine was imposed for infringements of Articles 5(1)(d) and 5(1)(f) GDPR for failure to implement appropriate technical and organisational measures ensuring accuracy of processed personal data.

Restriction and objectionGreen

GDPR Art. 18 restriction regime applies directly; no LT derogation found.

Claims (1):

  • <cite index="28-11">Where processing has been restricted, such personal data shall, with the exception of storage, only be processed with the data subject's consent or for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims or for the protection of the rights of another person or important public interest.

Data portabilityGreen

Standard Art. 20 portability right applies without LT-specific modification.

Claims (1):

  • <cite index="67-5,67-6">Data subjects have easier access to their data and a right to data portability, allowing personal data to be transferred more easily between service providers.

Deadlines and response windowsGreen

Controllers must respond within the GDPR's one-month (extendable by two months) statutory deadline.

Claims (1):

  • <cite index="89-6">Article 12(3) of the GDPR provides that organizations need to respond to data subject requests without undue delay and in any event within one month of receipt of the request.
Category narrative 25 words

Data subject rights follow GDPR Arts. 15-22 directly. VDAI enforcement against Vinted (access/erasure) and against Vilnius Municipality (accuracy/rectification) demonstrates active application of these rights domestically.

No new data since the standing brief. 1 periodic run re-emitted it unchanged.

Sources and claims (7)
  1. Confirmed EDPB / VDAI — <cite index="32-4">The Lithuanian SA found that the company also failed to demonstrate that it had taken or refused to act in accordance with the applicant's request for the right of access. observed
  2. Confirmed EDPB / VDAI — <cite index="32-1">Lithuanian SA found the company, in response to erasure requests, stated it would not act on a specific request because the applicant did not identify a specific reason under Article 17(1) GDPR and failed to identify all purposes of continued processing. observed
  3. Confirmed EDPB / VDAI — <cite index="17-4">A fine was imposed for infringements of Articles 5(1)(d) and 5(1)(f) GDPR for failure to implement appropriate technical and organisational measures ensuring accuracy of processed personal data. observed
  4. Confirmed EUR-Lex — <cite index="28-11">Where processing has been restricted, such personal data shall, with the exception of storage, only be processed with the data subject's consent or for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims or for the protection of the rights of another person or important public interest. observed
  5. Confirmed EUR-Lex — <cite index="67-5,67-6">Data subjects have easier access to their data and a right to data portability, allowing personal data to be transferred more easily between service providers. observed
  6. Confirmed IAPP — <cite index="89-6">Article 12(3) of the GDPR provides that organizations need to respond to data subject requests without undue delay and in any event within one month of receipt of the request. observed
  7. Confirmed dataprotection.gi — VDAI — Published procedure confirms data subjects may exercise GDPR rights via written request to the Inspectorate, with appeal to the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court against adverse decisions. observed

#

Core duties are directly GDPR-derived and actively supervised; retention/disposal sub-module lacks a confirmed LT-specific instrument.

Primary frameworkGDPR Arts. 5, 24-39
Traffic-light rationale — GreenCore duties are directly GDPR-derived and actively supervised; retention/disposal sub-module lacks a confirmed LT-specific instrument.

Sub-modules (7)

Accountability & DPIAAmber

VDAI adopted a national DPIA list under Art. 35(4), reviewed and partly revised following EDPB Opinion 13/2018.

Claims (2):

  • <cite index="91-1">Lithuania's SA adopted a list of the kind of processing operations which are subject to the requirement for a Data Protection Impact Assessment under Article 35(4) GDPR, per EDPB Opinion 13/2018.
  • <cite index="94-6">DPIA is mandatory for processing of genetic data only while evaluating the data subject's features or scoring, including profiling and forecasting, following revision of the initial blacklist.

DPO requirementsAmber

Art. 37 DPO designation applies; VDAI inspections have identified DPO role-conflict issues in practice.

Claims (1):

  • <cite index="33-10">VDAI's inspection results reveal DPO role conflicts and emphasize the need for GDPR compliance audits.

Ropa requirementsGreen

VDAI has published guidance/recommendations on records of processing activities.

Claims (1):

  • <cite index="12-7">In 2018-19, Lithuania's DPA released numerous guidelines and recommendations including recommendations for the records of processing activities.

Joint controller arrangementsGreen

Standard Art. 26 joint-controller allocation-of-responsibility rule applies.

Claims (1):

  • <cite index="61-15,61-16">Where two or more controllers jointly determine the purposes and means of processing, they are joint controllers and must transparently determine their respective responsibilities by mutual arrangement.

Security measuresAmber

VDAI has fined controllers for inadequate technical/organisational security measures under Art. 32.

Claims (5):

  • <cite index="4-5">VDAI considered that the Center for Registers had not implemented adequate technical and organisational measures, acting in contravention of Article 32 GDPR.
  • UAB InMedica — EUR 450,000 for breach-reporting and data-security failures (GDPR Arts 24/32 related)
  • VDAI imposed an administrative fine of €450,000 on UAB InMedica, a major private medical clinic network, for multiple GDPR violations relating to personal data breaches.
  • A 72-hour breach-notification duty applies in Lithuania; human error caused 48% of H1 2026 reported breaches.
  • VDAI fined processor UAB DELSKA Lithuania (successor to UAB Rakrėjus) EUR 4,500 for breach of GDPR Art 32(1)(b), holding the processor's security obligation independent of the controller's.

Breach notificationAmber

Standard 72-hour regulator notification duty applies; VDAI reports rising breach volumes.

Claims (5):

  • <cite index="83-5">In the case of a personal data breach, the controller shall without undue delay and, where feasible, not later than 72 hours after becoming aware of it, notify the breach to the competent supervisory authority, unless the breach is unlikely to result in a risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons.
  • <cite index="41-5">VDAI reports 116 data breaches in early 2025, mostly due to human error and cyber incidents, affecting 168,822 individuals.
  • VDAI issued guidance (reported 28 October 2026) to help data controllers consistently and objectively assess the risk a personal-data breach poses to individuals' rights and freedoms, determining whether notification to VDAI and data subjects is required under GDPR Arts 33-34.
  • Data controllers (LT) — VDAI of personal data breaches within 72 hours
  • VDAI — 2024 annual reporting recorded an increase in notified data breaches, complaints and enforcement actions, urging improved data-security measures across controllers.

Retention and disposalRed

No LT sector-specific retention/disposal statute beyond the GDPR storage-limitation principle was located in this research pass.

Category narrative 47 words

Accountability, DPIA, DPO, ROPA, joint-controller, security and breach-notification duties follow GDPR directly. VDAI has published a national DPIA 'blacklist' under Art. 35(4), and has fined controllers for security failures (Art. 32). Retention/disposal rules are governed by the general storage-limitation principle; no LT sector-specific retention statute was identified.

Periodic update · new data 2026-11-08

VDAI has fined UAB DELSKA Lithuania, the successor entity to UAB Rakrėjus, EUR 4,500 for breach of Article 32(1)(b) of the GDPR in its capacity as processor. The decision is confirmed and is analytically significant less for its size than for what it establishes about the structure of liability: VDAI held the processor's own security obligation to be independent of the controller's, rather than treating the controller as the sole or default point of accountability for a security failure. This marks a tightening in the enforcement posture around Article 32 obligations as applied to the processor role specifically, since it demonstrates that engaging a controller correctly does not shield a processor from its own direct exposure where its security measures fall short of what Article 32(1)(b) requires.

The decision should be read against the backdrop of VDAI's wider 2026 enforcement cadence, in which breach-handling and security failures have featured prominently, including the much larger EUR 450,000 fine against UAB InMedica for violations connected to personal-data-breach handling and security failures. While the InMedica matter concerns a controller rather than a processor, the two decisions together indicate that security-measure adequacy, across both roles in the data-processing chain, is an active area of VDAI supervisory attention this year, rather than an isolated or one-off concern.

The practical significance for any organisation using Lithuanian-based or Lithuania-regulated processors is that the processor relationship does not operate as a liability pass-through. A processor found to have failed its own Article 32 obligations faces direct administrative sanction, independent of whatever contractual security requirements the controller may have imposed. This separates the question of contractual allocation of responsibility from the question of regulatory liability, and firms relying on processor arrangements in this jurisdiction should note that the two are not treated as equivalent by the supervisor.

Outlook

With VDAI having now demonstrated direct processor liability for a security failure under Article 32(1)(b), further processor-focused enforcement activity in Lithuania should be anticipated as the supervisor continues to test security-measure adequacy across the data-processing chain, rather than concentrating enforcement attention solely on controllers.

3 earlier distinct updates
Periodic update · new data 2026-11-04

The State Data Protection Inspectorate is understood to have issued guidance, reported 28 October 2026, aimed at helping data controllers in Lithuania assess more consistently and objectively the risk a personal-data breach poses to the rights and freedoms of individuals. The stated purpose of the guidance is to support controllers in determining whether a breach meets the threshold for notification to VDAI itself and, separately, to affected data subjects, under the framework set out in Articles 33 and 34 of the General Data Protection Regulation. Framed this way, the guidance addresses a long-standing practical difficulty for controllers: the GDPR sets a risk-based notification threshold without prescribing a single assessment methodology, leaving considerable room for inconsistent practice across sectors and organisation sizes.

This finding is carried at a qualified level of confidence. It is sourced from a secondary legal-publishing report rather than from VDAI's own published guidance document, and the full text and scope of the recommendations have not been independently retrieved. What can be said is that a national regulator in Lithuania has moved to standardise breach-risk assessment methodology; what cannot yet be said with the same confidence is the precise content, legal status beyond non-binding guidance, or scope of application the recommendations carry. Controllers and processors operating in Lithuania should treat this as guidance under development in the public record rather than as a settled interpretive instrument, pending access to VDAI's primary publication.

No other controller or processor obligation development specific to Lithuania was located. The guidance sits within an otherwise stable domestic framework: it refines existing notification practice rather than introducing a new duty, and nothing in the record suggests any change to the underlying Article 33/34 obligations themselves, which remain those set by the directly applicable Regulation.

Outlook

The principal open item is simply whether the full guidance document becomes available for review, which would allow a firmer account of the methodology VDAI is recommending and the specific factors it directs controllers to weigh. Until then, the practical effect for controllers operating in Lithuania is best understood as an invitation to revisit their existing breach-risk assessment practice against a forthcoming or newly issued regulatory expectation, rather than as a change to the notification threshold itself.

Periodic update · new data 2026-10-18

VDAI fined UAB InMedica EUR 450,000 for breach-reporting and data-security failures this cycle, one of the more substantial controller-processor-duties penalties recorded for Lithuania. The failures are understood from secondary reporting to concern obligations typically associated with security-of-processing and breach-notification duties, though the exact decision date and the precise GDPR article basis have not been independently confirmed beyond the secondary report relied on this cycle, and should be read with that limitation in mind.

In parallel, secondary reporting attributes to VDAI's own H1 2026 breach report a finding that human error accounted for 48 percent of reported personal-data breaches during the period. VDAI's own report was not independently retrieved this cycle; this figure rests on a Tier-4 aggregator source and should be treated as probable rather than confirmed. If accurate, it indicates that the plurality of breach causation in Lithuania during the first half of 2026 was attributable to human error rather than to external attack or system failure, which is relevant context for how controllers should be prioritising their internal control and training investments, though this report does not offer compliance instruction on that point.

Taken together, the InMedica fine and the breach-causation statistic point to a Lithuanian enforcement environment where breach-reporting and security-of-processing failures, including those rooted in human error, are drawing direct regulatory attention and material financial penalties.

Outlook

Independent retrieval of VDAI's own H1 2026 breach report, not accessed this cycle, would allow the 48 percent human-error figure to be confirmed directly rather than through secondary aggregation. The scale of the InMedica fine suggests breach-reporting and security-of-processing failures remain a priority enforcement area for VDAI.

Periodic update · new data 2026-10-04

VDAI's own published breach statistics for H1 2026 found human error to be the leading cause of personal-data breaches reported in Lithuania during that period, accounting for 48% of reported incidents. As VDAI's own data, this is an assertive finding rather than a third-party estimate, and it provides a quantified baseline against which Lithuania's controller population's operational practices can be measured going forward.

The standing duty underlying all breach reporting remains in force: data controllers in Lithuania must notify VDAI of personal-data breaches within 72 hours, a duty derived from Article 33 of the GDPR. This 72-hour notification duty is the procedural backbone against which VDAI's human-error finding should be read; a high proportion of human-error-caused breaches implies that controllers' internal detection and escalation processes, which feed into whether the 72-hour clock is met, are an area of continuing operational risk.

A separate company was fined on 2 July 2026 over incident-reporting and data-security weaknesses, understood to connect the Article 33 notification duty directly to enforcement consequence where a controller's reporting or security practices fall short. The combination of VDAI's own statistical finding and a concrete enforcement action over reporting and security weaknesses in the same period indicates that breach-notification compliance is an active area of VDAI supervisory attention, not a dormant procedural requirement.

Outlook

Whether VDAI's H1 2026 human-error finding prompts new controller-facing guidance on breach-prevention measures, such as mandatory staff training benchmarks or technical control requirements aimed at reducing human-error-caused incidents, has not yet been established and is the item to watch arising from this finding.

1 further periodic run re-emitted the standing brief unchanged and is not shown.

Sources and claims (15)
  1. Confirmed EDPB — <cite index="91-1">Lithuania's SA adopted a list of the kind of processing operations which are subject to the requirement for a Data Protection Impact Assessment under Article 35(4) GDPR, per EDPB Opinion 13/2018. observed
  2. Confirmed IAPP — <cite index="94-6">DPIA is mandatory for processing of genetic data only while evaluating the data subject's features or scoring, including profiling and forecasting, following revision of the initial blacklist. observed
  3. Probable DataGuidance — <cite index="33-10">VDAI's inspection results reveal DPO role conflicts and emphasize the need for GDPR compliance audits. observed
  4. Probable IAPP — <cite index="12-7">In 2018-19, Lithuania's DPA released numerous guidelines and recommendations including recommendations for the records of processing activities. observed
  5. Confirmed EUR-Lex — <cite index="61-15,61-16">Where two or more controllers jointly determine the purposes and means of processing, they are joint controllers and must transparently determine their respective responsibilities by mutual arrangement. observed
  6. Confirmed DataGuidance — <cite index="4-5">VDAI considered that the Center for Registers had not implemented adequate technical and organisational measures, acting in contravention of Article 32 GDPR. observed
  7. Confirmed EUR-Lex — <cite index="83-5">In the case of a personal data breach, the controller shall without undue delay and, where feasible, not later than 72 hours after becoming aware of it, notify the breach to the competent supervisory authority, unless the breach is unlikely to result in a risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons. observed
  8. Confirmed DataGuidance — <cite index="41-5">VDAI reports 116 data breaches in early 2025, mostly due to human error and cyber incidents, affecting 168,822 individuals. observed
  9. Probable DataGuidance — VDAI issued guidance (reported 28 October 2026) to help data controllers consistently and objectively assess the risk a personal-data breach poses to individuals' rights and freedoms, determining whether notification to VDAI and data subjects is required under GDPR Arts 33-34. observed
  10. Probable https://www.grip.globalrelay.com/lithuanian-dpa-fines-company-over-multiple-personal-data-breaches/ — UAB InMedica — EUR 450,000 for breach-reporting and data-security failures (GDPR Arts 24/32 related)
  11. High Recording Law — Data controllers (LT) — VDAI of personal data breaches within 72 hours observed
  12. Probable The DPO (thedpo.eu) decisions database — VDAI imposed an administrative fine of €450,000 on UAB InMedica, a major private medical clinic network, for multiple GDPR violations relating to personal data breaches. observed
  13. Assessed VitalLaw / Cybersecurity Policy Report — VDAI — 2024 annual reporting recorded an increase in notified data breaches, complaints and enforcement actions, urging improved data-security measures across controllers. observed
  14. Probable https://thedpo.eu/en/decisions/7327db79-a01a-4d29-bd72-449e21629703 — A 72-hour breach-notification duty applies in Lithuania; human error caused 48% of H1 2026 reported breaches.
  15. Probable The DPO — VDAI fined processor UAB DELSKA Lithuania (successor to UAB Rakrėjus) EUR 4,500 for breach of GDPR Art 32(1)(b), holding the processor's security obligation independent of the controller's. observed

#

Framework is sound (GDPR Chapter V) but LT-specific TIA practice and confirmation of any localisation rules could not be fully verified in this pass.

Primary frameworkGDPR Arts. 44-49
Traffic-light rationale — AmberFramework is sound (GDPR Chapter V) but LT-specific TIA practice and confirmation of any localisation rules could not be fully verified in this pass.

Sub-modules (6)

Transfer mechanismsGreen

VDAI guidance recommends SCCs or BCRs as the operative transfer mechanisms for third-country transfers.

Claims (1):

  • <cite index="80-3">VDAI recommended that Lithuanian companies ensure the lawfulness of data transfers by determining the types of personal data transferred and assessing available bases such as Standard Contractual Clauses or Binding Corporate Rules.

Adequacy receivedGreen

Adequacy determinations are adopted at EU level and apply uniformly across Member States; Lithuania does not issue separate national adequacy findings.

Claims (1):

  • Adequacy decisions under GDPR Chapter V are adopted by the European Commission at EU level and apply directly to all Member States including Lithuania; VDAI does not issue separate national adequacy determinations.

Adequacy grantedGreen

Adequacy decisions regarding third countries are an EU Commission competence, not a Lithuanian national act.

Claims (1):

  • Adequacy decisions under GDPR Chapter V are adopted by the European Commission at EU level and apply directly to all Member States including Lithuania; VDAI does not issue separate national adequacy determinations.

SCCs and BCRsGreen

VDAI has issued guidance clarifying the optional nature of the EU SCCs for controller-processor relationships.

Claims (3):

  • <cite index="11-21">Lithuania's VDAI clarifies the use of EU SCCs, highlighting their optional nature and specific applicability to data controller-processor relationships.
  • VDAI — Standard Contractual Clauses are optional in nature and apply specifically to data controller-processor relationships
  • VDAI — Issued guidance clarifying the use of EU Standard Contractual Clauses, describing their optional nature and specific applicability to data controller-processor relationships.

Transfer impact assessmentAmber

VDAI's Brexit FAQ recommended Lithuanian companies assess transfer bases irrespective of any adequacy decision, consistent with post-Schrems II TIA practice.

Claims (1):

  • <cite index="80-2,80-3">VDAI highlighted that upon expiry of the Brexit transitional period, Lithuanian companies should implement mechanisms ensuring lawfulness of transfers to the UK as a third country, regardless of any adequacy decision.

Data localisationRed

No general LT-specific data-localisation mandate was identified in this research pass beyond GDPR Chapter V.

Category narrative 48 words

As an EU Member State, Lithuania relies on GDPR Chapter V transfer mechanisms (adequacy, SCCs, BCRs, derogations); adequacy decisions are an EU-level competence and not issued/received bilaterally by Lithuania. VDAI has issued practical guidance (e.g. on Brexit-related transfers and SCC use) but no LT-specific data-localisation mandate was found.

No new data since the standing brief. 1 periodic run re-emitted it unchanged.

Sources and claims (6)
  1. Probable DataGuidance — <cite index="80-3">VDAI recommended that Lithuanian companies ensure the lawfulness of data transfers by determining the types of personal data transferred and assessing available bases such as Standard Contractual Clauses or Binding Corporate Rules. observed
  2. Confirmed EUR-Lex — Adequacy decisions under GDPR Chapter V are adopted by the European Commission at EU level and apply directly to all Member States including Lithuania; VDAI does not issue separate national adequacy determinations. observed
  3. Probable DataGuidance — <cite index="11-21">Lithuania's VDAI clarifies the use of EU SCCs, highlighting their optional nature and specific applicability to data controller-processor relationships. observed
  4. Probable DataGuidance — <cite index="80-2,80-3">VDAI highlighted that upon expiry of the Brexit transitional period, Lithuanian companies should implement mechanisms ensuring lawfulness of transfers to the UK as a third country, regardless of any adequacy decision. observed
  5. Assessed DataGuidance — VDAI — Standard Contractual Clauses are optional in nature and apply specifically to data controller-processor relationships observed
  6. Assessed VitalLaw / Cybersecurity Policy Report — VDAI — Issued guidance clarifying the use of EU Standard Contractual Clauses, describing their optional nature and specific applicability to data controller-processor relationships. observed

#

Core sectors (telecoms, employment, health, credit) are covered by guidance or investigation; education and insurance sub-modules show a coverage gap.

Primary frameworkGDPR; Law on Electronic Communications No. IX-2135 (as amended); Civil Service Law
Traffic-light rationale — AmberCore sectors (telecoms, employment, health, credit) are covered by guidance or investigation; education and insurance sub-modules show a coverage gap.

Sub-modules (7)

Financial sector overlayAmber

VDAI opened an investigation into fintech Revolut over a data breach affecting over 50,000 customers.

Claims (1):

  • <cite index="1-14">VDAI investigates Revolut for a data breach affecting over 50,000 customers, assessing GDPR violations.

Health sector overlayGreen

VDAI issued FAQs on employer collection of employee health data under the Civil Service Law and GDPR Art. 5.

Claims (1):

  • <cite index="5-4">Employers must ensure health data collection is necessary, use less intrusive means, and process data according to GDPR Article 5.

Telecoms and eprivacyGreen

ePrivacy obligations are transposed via the Law on Electronic Communications No. IX-2135 alongside GDPR.

Claims (1):

  • <cite index="78-1">In addition to Law No XIII-1426 and the GDPR, the Law on Electronic Communications of 15 April 2004, No. IX-2135, as amended, applies to e-marketing in Lithuania.

Employment dataGreen

VDAI published three separate guides addressing employee, business, and public-sector employment data protection.

Claims (1):

  • <cite index="3-3">VDAI published three guides: one for employees, one for businesses, and one for the public sector, all in the context of employment relations.

Credit and scoringGreen

VDAI issued a recommendation on the processing of debtors' personal data covering lawful grounds and limits on data subject rights.

Claims (1):

  • <cite index="2-4">The VDAI recommendation on debtors' data outlines data processing principles, lawful grounds, and roles of parties, emphasizing that data subject rights do not affect debtors' contractual obligations.

educationRed

No LT-specific education-sector data-protection instrument was identified beyond general GDPR application (illustrated indirectly by the children's-camp consent case).

insuranceRed

No LT-specific insurance-sector data-protection instrument was identified.

Category narrative 41 words

Sectoral overlays are thin in Lithuania beyond GDPR: telecoms/eprivacy is transposed via the Law on Electronic Communications; VDAI has issued employment and health-sector guidance; a fintech (Revolut) breach investigation illustrates financial-sector overlap. No LT-specific education or insurance-sector DP rules were found.

Sources and claims (5)
  1. Probable DataGuidance — <cite index="1-14">VDAI investigates Revolut for a data breach affecting over 50,000 customers, assessing GDPR violations. observed
  2. Confirmed DataGuidance — <cite index="5-4">Employers must ensure health data collection is necessary, use less intrusive means, and process data according to GDPR Article 5. observed
  3. Confirmed DataGuidance — <cite index="78-1">In addition to Law No XIII-1426 and the GDPR, the Law on Electronic Communications of 15 April 2004, No. IX-2135, as amended, applies to e-marketing in Lithuania. observed
  4. Confirmed DataGuidance — <cite index="3-3">VDAI published three guides: one for employees, one for businesses, and one for the public sector, all in the context of employment relations. observed
  5. Probable DataGuidance — <cite index="2-4">The VDAI recommendation on debtors' data outlines data processing principles, lawful grounds, and roles of parties, emphasizing that data subject rights do not affect debtors' contractual obligations. observed

#

Cookie and direct-marketing rules are covered; opt-out-signal and clean-room concepts are not applicable/found under the EU framework.

Primary frameworkGDPR; ePrivacy Directive 2002/58/EC as transposed via Law on Electronic Communications No. IX-2135
Traffic-light rationale — AmberCookie and direct-marketing rules are covered; opt-out-signal and clean-room concepts are not applicable/found under the EU framework.

Sub-modules (6)

Cookies and trackersGreen

VDAI has issued cookie-compliance guidance emphasising user-friendly consent design.

Claims (2):

  • <cite index="1-21">Lithuania's VDAI outlines cookie practices for compliance with GDPR and user-friendly design.
  • Lithuania (Law on Electronic Communications) — Prior clear information and consent before storing or accessing information on terminal equipment, under Art. 73(4)

Dark patternsAmber

VDAI's Vinted decision found 'shadow blocking' practices unlawful for violating fairness and transparency principles, functioning as a dark-pattern precedent.

Claims (2):

  • <cite index="32-2,32-3">The company unlawfully, in violation of the principles of fairness and transparency, processed personal data in the context of 'shadow blocking', i.e. processing intended to make a user leave the platform without being aware of it.
  • Vinted UAB — Fined €2.38M by VDAI for GDPR violations including shadow-blocking practices and lack of transparency, the largest fine in VDAI's history.

Opt out signalsRed

No LT-specific Global Privacy Control/DAA-equivalent opt-out signal regime was identified; not a feature of the EU consent-based model.

Clean rooms and dcrRed

No LT-specific data clean-room regulation was identified.

Cross context advertisingRed

The CPRA 'sale'/'share' construct has no direct EU/LT analogue; GDPR consent and legitimate-interest rules govern comparable adtech processing instead.

Direct marketingGreen

VDAI guidance addresses direct marketing scope and consent/third-party-data requirements, including in the public sector.

Claims (2):

  • <cite index="9-4,9-5">VDAI guidance clarifies that direct marketing includes inquiries about opinions on goods or services, including via post, telephone, or other direct means to subscribers or users of electronic communications services.
  • VDAI fined UAB InMedica EUR 450,000 for breach-reporting and data-security failures.
Category narrative 37 words

Cookie consent and direct-marketing rules follow GDPR/ePrivacy transposition. VDAI's Vinted enforcement establishes a precedent against non-transparent 'shadow blocking' practices analogous to dark patterns. No CPRA-style 'sale/share' concept or GPC-equivalent opt-out signal regime exists in this EU jurisdiction.

Periodic update · new data 2026-11-08

The Vinted decision, in which VDAI imposed a EUR 2.38 million fine, is confirmed as resting on findings that the platform's so-called shadow blocking practices were unlawful for breaching the fairness and transparency principles set out in Articles 5(1)(a), 5(2), 12(1) and 12(4) of the GDPR. Although the decision is dated July 2024, it remains the clearest Lithuanian precedent available on how VDAI assesses interface-design and content-visibility choices against core GDPR principles, and it continues to inform the current enforcement environment for commercial platforms operating in or from Lithuania.

The decision functions, in effect, as a Lithuanian dark-pattern precedent: it establishes that concealing content or features from certain users without adequate disclosure can constitute a transparency violation in its own right, independent of any separate consent or marketing-specific infringement. This is a meaningful reference point for any commercial platform assessing whether its own interface-design choices, including selective visibility, differential treatment of user segments, or non-obvious restriction of functionality, might expose it to a comparable fairness-and-transparency finding under Lithuanian enforcement practice.

The finer detail of Lithuania's cookie-consent rules and direct-marketing regime has not been independently confirmed, so no assessment is offered here of how those specific regimes are being applied beyond the shadow-blocking finding itself. The shadow-blocking fine stands as a confirmed, high-materiality data point on fairness and transparency obligations as applied to platform design, and should be read on those terms rather than as evidence of a broader sweep across all adtech-adjacent rule areas.

Outlook

Given the size and substantive basis of the Vinted fine, commercial platforms with a Lithuanian user base should expect continued VDAI attention to interface-design practices that affect what information or functionality different users see, with the fairness and transparency principles of Article 5 remaining the primary enforcement lever VDAI has demonstrated a willingness to use against dark-pattern-style practices.

Sources and claims (6)
  1. Probable DataGuidance — <cite index="1-21">Lithuania's VDAI outlines cookie practices for compliance with GDPR and user-friendly design. observed
  2. Confirmed EDPB / VDAI — <cite index="32-2,32-3">The company unlawfully, in violation of the principles of fairness and transparency, processed personal data in the context of 'shadow blocking', i.e. processing intended to make a user leave the platform without being aware of it. observed
  3. Confirmed DataGuidance — <cite index="9-4,9-5">VDAI guidance clarifies that direct marketing includes inquiries about opinions on goods or services, including via post, telephone, or other direct means to subscribers or users of electronic communications services. observed
  4. Probable theDPO.eu — VDAI fined UAB InMedica EUR 450,000 for breach-reporting and data-security failures. observed
  5. High CookieSentry — Lithuania (Law on Electronic Communications) — Prior clear information and consent before storing or accessing information on terminal equipment, under Art. 73(4) observed
  6. Probable VitalLaw / Cybersecurity Policy Report — Vinted UAB — Fined €2.38M by VDAI for GDPR violations including shadow-blocking practices and lack of transparency, the largest fine in VDAI's history. observed

#

Biometric/genetic governance is documented; ADM-transparency and state-surveillance-carveout sub-modules rely on general GDPR text without LT-specific enforcement examples.

Primary frameworkGDPR Arts. 9, 22, 35; VDAI DPIA Order of 14 March 2019
Traffic-light rationale — AmberBiometric/genetic governance is documented; ADM-transparency and state-surveillance-carveout sub-modules rely on general GDPR text without LT-specific enforcement examples.

Sub-modules (6)

Profiling restrictionsAmber

DPIA is required for genetic-data processing used for profiling/scoring/forecasting individuals.

Claims (1):

  • <cite index="94-6">DPIA is mandatory for the processing of genetic data specifically while evaluating the data subject's features or scoring, including profiling and forecasting.

Automated decision making transparencyRed

No LT-specific Art. 22 ADM enforcement precedent was located in this research pass; GDPR Art. 22 applies directly as EU law.

AI risk assessmentsAmber

VDAI has publicly warned about AI tool risk (DeepSeek) and issued FAQ guidance for organisations starting AI system deployments.

Claims (5):

  • <cite index="113-4">Lithuania's State Data Protection Inspector urged residents to not use the DeepSeek app or to think carefully about how they use it, citing insufficient information about its privacy practices.
  • <cite index="66-8">VDAI's FAQ guides organizations on starting with AI systems, emphasizing GDPR compliance and expert involvement.
  • VDAI fined a healthcare worker EUR 1,153 for unauthorised access to 1,231 patient files.
  • Lithuanian controllers (AI systems) — Concurrent oversight from the RRT (AI Act product compliance) and VDAI (data protection compliance)
  • VDAI — Issued FAQ guidance for organisations beginning AI-system deployments, emphasising GDPR compliance and recommending expert involvement, and separately warned about DeepSeek's data practices and GDPR compliance concerns.

Biometric regimeAmber

Lithuania's DPIA list treats standalone biometric-identification processing as a DPIA trigger; VDAI fined a sports-club operator for unlawful biometric processing.

Claims (2):

  • <cite index="95-7,95-8">Lithuania's SA list stated that biometric-data processing on its own would create the obligation to perform a DPIA; the EDPB requested amendment so that biometric processing to uniquely identify a person requires a DPIA only in conjunction with at least one other criterion.
  • <cite index="1-13">Praktiškas was fined €6,000 for GDPR violations related to biometric data processing at its sports clubs.

Genetic dataGreen

Genetic-data DPIA obligation was narrowed to profiling/scoring contexts after EDPB review of the initial 2018 list.

Claims (1):

  • <cite index="94-6">DPIA is mandatory for the processing of genetic data specifically while evaluating the data subject's features or scoring, including profiling and forecasting.

State surveillance carveoutsGreen

GDPR permits Member State law to restrict certain data-subject rights and obligations for criminal-law-enforcement and public-security purposes.

Claims (1):

  • <cite index="83-11">Union or Member State law may restrict the scope of certain GDPR obligations and rights where necessary to safeguard the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences, public security, or other important objectives of general public interest.
Category narrative 42 words

Lithuania's DPIA 'blacklist' treats biometric- and genetic-data processing as DPIA triggers (partially revised after EDPB opinion). VDAI has fined a biometric-data controller and issued a public AI-risk warning regarding DeepSeek. No LT-specific Art. 22 ADM enforcement precedent was located in this pass.

Sources and claims (9)
  1. Confirmed IAPP — <cite index="94-6">DPIA is mandatory for the processing of genetic data specifically while evaluating the data subject's features or scoring, including profiling and forecasting. observed
  2. Confirmed IAPP — <cite index="113-4">Lithuania's State Data Protection Inspector urged residents to not use the DeepSeek app or to think carefully about how they use it, citing insufficient information about its privacy practices. observed
  3. Probable DataGuidance — <cite index="66-8">VDAI's FAQ guides organizations on starting with AI systems, emphasizing GDPR compliance and expert involvement. observed
  4. Uncertain IAPP — <cite index="95-7,95-8">Lithuania's SA list stated that biometric-data processing on its own would create the obligation to perform a DPIA; the EDPB requested amendment so that biometric processing to uniquely identify a person requires a DPIA only in conjunction with at least one other criterion. observed
  5. Confirmed DataGuidance — <cite index="1-13">Praktiškas was fined €6,000 for GDPR violations related to biometric data processing at its sports clubs. observed
  6. Confirmed EUR-Lex — <cite index="83-11">Union or Member State law may restrict the scope of certain GDPR obligations and rights where necessary to safeguard the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences, public security, or other important objectives of general public interest. observed
  7. Probable The DPO — VDAI fined a healthcare worker EUR 1,153 for unauthorised access to 1,231 patient files. observed
  8. High Recording Law — Lithuanian controllers (AI systems) — Concurrent oversight from the RRT (AI Act product compliance) and VDAI (data protection compliance) observed
  9. Assessed VitalLaw / Cybersecurity Policy Report — VDAI — Issued FAQ guidance for organisations beginning AI-system deployments, emphasising GDPR compliance and recommending expert involvement, and separately warned about DeepSeek's data practices and GDPR compliance concerns. observed

#

Core Art. 8 framework applies but the exact Lithuanian national age-of-consent derogation (if any) could not be confirmed; education-settings and dependent-adults sub-modules lack dedicated LT instruments.

Primary frameworkGDPR Art. 8
Traffic-light rationale — AmberCore Art. 8 framework applies but the exact Lithuanian national age-of-consent derogation (if any) could not be confirmed; education-settings and dependent-adults sub-modules lack dedicated LT instruments.

Sub-modules (5)

Age verificationAmber

Controllers must make reasonable efforts to verify parental-responsibility-holder consent for children below the applicable age threshold.

Claims (2):

  • <cite index="61-8">The controller shall, taking into account available technologies, make reasonable efforts to verify that consent has been given or authorised by the holder of parental responsibility over the child.
  • Lithuania — Digital consent age for data processing is 14 years

Minor profiling bansAmber

VDAI found a children's-camp organiser's consent mechanism for processing children's image data did not meet GDPR consent conditions (freely given, specific, revocable).

Claims (1):

  • <cite index="45-13,45-14">The organisation's processing of children's image data without GDPR-compliant consent, including failure to allow free choice or withdrawal without detriment, infringed the principle of lawfulness and the conditions of consent under Articles 5(1)(a), 6 and 7 GDPR.

Education settingsRed

No dedicated LT education-sector children's-data instrument was identified beyond the general consent enforcement precedent noted above.

Dependent adultsRed

No LT-specific dependent-adults (elderly/mentally incapacitated) data-protection provision was identified.

Category narrative 55 words

GDPR Art. 8 sets a default digital-consent age of 16 with Member State discretion to lower to no less than 13; no confirmed Lithuanian national derogation was found in this research pass, so the GDPR default is presumed to apply. VDAI enforcement against a children's-camp operator illustrates active supervision of consent for minors' image data.

Periodic update · new data 2026-10-18

VDAI dismissed a parental complaint concerning a school attendance-tracking system in Decisions No. 3R-677 and 3R-676 of 15 April 2026. The regulator found that the municipality's processing of student location or attendance data through the tracking system was grounded in a legal processing obligation, and that this legal basis was not overridden by the parental objection raised in the complaint. This decision sits within a broader batch of eleven VDAI decisions issued around May 2026 addressing access-right-adjacent disputes, in which, according to secondary reporting, no fines were imposed in any of the eleven cases.

The significance of this decision for the children-and-vulnerable-groups module lies in VDAI's confirmation that a municipality's legal processing obligation can, in an appropriate case, take precedence over a parental objection to a student-tracking system, rather than the objection automatically prevailing because the data subject is a minor. This is a data-point on how VDAI balances parental rights against institutional legal obligations in an education-sector processing context, without establishing a broader rule about student-tracking systems generally.

Outlook

No further children-or-vulnerable-groups-specific enforcement or guidance development for Lithuania was identified this cycle beyond the school-tracking-system decision. Whether this dismissal pattern extends to other parental complaints in the same May 2026 batch, all apparently resolved without fines, is relevant context for understanding VDAI's current approach to this category of complaint.

Sources and claims (4)
  1. Confirmed EUR-Lex — <cite index="61-8">The controller shall, taking into account available technologies, make reasonable efforts to verify that consent has been given or authorised by the holder of parental responsibility over the child. observed
  2. Uncertain EDPB — <cite index="69-2,69-3">Children aged 16 and above are considered able to give their own consent; for children below 16, the organisation must request consent from that child's legal guardian or parent, absent a lower national threshold. observed
  3. Confirmed EDPB / VDAI — <cite index="45-13,45-14">The organisation's processing of children's image data without GDPR-compliant consent, including failure to allow free choice or withdrawal without detriment, infringed the principle of lawfulness and the conditions of consent under Articles 5(1)(a), 6 and 7 GDPR. observed
  4. High Recording Law — Lithuania — Digital consent age for data processing is 14 years observed

#

Enforcement powers and recent activity are well evidenced; funding/capacity and collective-redress sub-modules lack confirmed LT-specific detail.

Primary frameworkGDPR Arts. 58, 77-84
Traffic-light rationale — GreenEnforcement powers and recent activity are well evidenced; funding/capacity and collective-redress sub-modules lack confirmed LT-specific detail.

Sub-modules (6)

Regulator powers and penaltiesGreen

VDAI can impose fines up to the GDPR statutory maxima of €20 million or 4% of global annual turnover, whichever is higher.

Claims (6):

  • <cite index="102-1">A supervisory authority can impose fines that go up to a maximum of 20 million or 4% of total worldwide annual turnover in the previous financial year for breaches such as unlawful processing or breaches of data subject rights.
  • VDAI — Holds the full range of GDPR supervisory and enforcement powers: investigate complaints, conduct inspections, request information, issue warnings/reprimands, order compliance, impose processing bans, and levy administrative fines.
  • GDPR Art 83(4)-(6) fine tiers apply directly in Lithuania, time-barred after 3 years.
  • Vinted UAB — EUR 2,385,276 for transparency and erasure-handling violations of GDPR Arts 5(1)(d) and 5(1)(f)
  • VDAI fined Vinted EUR 2.38 million for GDPR violations including 'shadow blocking' practices found unlawful for breaching fairness and transparency principles (GDPR Art 5(1)(a), 5(2), 12(1), 12(4)).
  • Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (GDPR) Art 83(8) — GDPR Article 83 fixes no limitation period for the supervisory authority's fining power; Art 83(8) instead requires that exercise of that power be subject to procedural safeguards under Union and Member State law, including the right to an effective judicial remedy, leaving any limitation period to national procedural law.

Enforcement activity indexAmber

Notable 2021-2024 fines include Vinted (€2.38M, 2024), Vilnius Municipality (€15,000, 2021) and State Enterprise Centre of Registers (€15,000, 2021).

Claims (11):

  • <cite index="32-10">In fining Vinted, the Lithuanian SA relied on EDPB Guidelines 04/2022 on calculation of administrative fines, taking into account the cross-border scope of processing, the large number of data subjects affected, and the duration of the infringements.
  • <cite index="17-2">A fine in the amount of EUR 15,000 was imposed on Vilnius City Municipality Administration for improperly processed personal data of the parents of an adopted child.
  • <cite index="4-1">VDAI fined the State Enterprise Center for Registers €15,000 for implementing inadequate technical and organisational measures for data security.
  • VDAI fined a general practitioner €1,153 personally (decision 3R-1040, dated 5 June 2026) for accessing 1,231 patient files while on sick leave, a violation found under GDPR Art 9.
  • VDAI — Vinted UAB EUR 2,385,276 in July 2024 for GDPR transparency/accountability violations, including deficient erasure-request handling and undisclosed shadow banning; upheld by Regional Administrative Court in May 2025
  • Secondary monitoring reports VDAI continued an active, escalating enforcement cadence across healthcare, direct marketing and education sectors, against the backdrop of EDPB Guidelines 04/2026 (fine-vs-reprimand choice), adopted 17 Sep 2026 and domestically announced by VDAI on 24 Sep 2026.
  • VDAI — 2024 annual report recorded 123 orders, 54 reprimands, 52 recommendations, 13 fines and 7 warnings, alongside participation in the EDPB.
  • GP (unnamed), Lithuania — EUR 1,153 for unlawfully accessing 1,231 patients' personal data and using it for personal messages, infringing GDPR Arts 5(1)(a), 6(1) and 9(2)
  • UAB InMedica — VDAI imposed a EUR 450,000 administrative fine for multiple GDPR violations connected to personal-data-breach handling and security failures.
  • In a batch of eleven VDAI decisions issued between 13 and 27 May 2026 addressing access-right and consent disputes, no monetary fine was imposed in any case; outcomes were dismissals, reprimands or corrective orders.
  • VDAI (State Data Protection Inspectorate) — VDAI's H1 2026 breach statistics report found human error accounted for 48% of reported personal-data breaches in Lithuania in the first half of 2026, with hacking attacks the cause of 36%.

Regulator funding and capacityRed

No confirmed data on VDAI's budget or headcount was located in this research pass.

Collective redress and class actionsRed

GDPR Art. 80 permits representative actions by not-for-profit bodies on behalf of data subjects; no LT-specific implementing detail was confirmed in this pass.

Private right of actionGreen

VDAI decisions are subject to judicial appeal, evidencing an available private right of action/judicial remedy route.

Claims (1):

  • <cite index="17-16">The decision of the SDPI is not effective and may be appealed against to the court.

Recent developments 180dAmber

Within the last 180 days, VDAI's public warning regarding DeepSeek's data practices reflects the most notable documented development.

Claims (6):

  • <cite index="113-4">Lithuania's State Data Protection Inspector urged residents to not use the DeepSeek app or think carefully about how they use it, citing insufficient information about its privacy practices.
  • Valstybine duomenu apsaugos inspekcija (VDAI) — VDAI published, on 30 September 2026, a summary of significant 2025 court decisions in administrative cases arising from complaints it handled, covering LVAT and Regional Administrative Court rulings addressing the Inspectorate's discretion in choosing corrective measures, the lawfulness of video surveillance, and processing to comply with a legal obligation or to collect service fees
  • VDAI — H1 2026 report identifies human error as the cause of 48% of reported personal data breaches in Lithuania
  • VDAI — Fined a doctor for infringements of GDPR Art 5(1)(a), 6(1) and 9(2) by decision of 5 June 2026 (No. 3R-1040), appealable within one month of notification.
  • EDPB Guidelines 04/2026 on fine-vs-reprimand decisions was adopted 17 September 2026 and announced by VDAI 24 September 2026, outside this cycle's strict window.
  • VDAI published guidance (around 28 October 2026) to help controllers assess the risk a personal-data breach poses to individuals' rights and freedoms, bearing on the Art 33/34 notification decision.
Category narrative 63 words

VDAI actively exercises GDPR Art. 83 fining powers, with a notable escalation to a €2.38M fine against Vinted in 2024 alongside multiple smaller fines (Vilnius Municipality, State Enterprise Centre of Registers, Praktiškas). Judicial appeal of VDAI decisions is available. Regulator funding/capacity data and collective-redress mechanisms were not confirmed in this pass; the most recent notable development is VDAI's 2026 public warning on DeepSeek.

Periodic update · new data 2026-11-08

VDAI's enforcement record through 2026 displays a clear bimodal pattern. At one end sit a small number of large, headline fines: UAB InMedica was fined EUR 450,000 for multiple violations connected to personal-data-breach handling and security failures, and Vinted was fined EUR 2.38 million for shadow-blocking practices found to breach fairness and transparency principles. At the other end sits a much larger volume of non-monetary outcomes: a batch of eleven VDAI decisions issued between 13 and 27 May 2026, addressing access-right and consent disputes, resulted in no monetary fine in any single case, with outcomes confined to dismissals, reprimands or corrective orders. This confirmed pattern indicates that VDAI reserves the monetary fine for aggravated or systemic breaches rather than applying it as a default sanction across its caseload, a distinction material to any assessment of the likely consequence of a given category of infringement in this jurisdiction.

A further, smaller decision adds to the enforcement volume: VDAI fined processor UAB DELSKA Lithuania EUR 4,500 for a breach of Article 32(1)(b), confirming processor liability as independent of controller liability. Taken together with the InMedica and Vinted fines, this signals an active and escalating enforcement cadence spanning healthcare, commercial marketplace and processor-security contexts, even as the May 2026 decision batch shows that the modal outcome of a VDAI dispute resolution remains corrective rather than punitive.

Separately, VDAI published guidance, understood to date from around 28 October 2026, intended to help controllers assess the risk a personal-data breach poses to the rights and freedoms of individuals, which bears directly on the notification judgment controllers must make under Articles 33 and 34. This is a probable finding, attributed to the guidance document itself rather than to a change in the underlying statutory notification duty, and represents a procedural rather than enforcement development, but one that will shape how future breach-handling enforcement decisions are argued and assessed.

Outlook

The combination of an active fine-driven enforcement cadence at the top end and a high-volume, largely non-monetary dispute-resolution function underneath it suggests VDAI will continue to pursue a two-track enforcement posture through the remainder of 2026: reserving substantial fines for breaches it regards as systemic or aggravated, such as the InMedica and Vinted matters, while handling the bulk of access-right and consent-related complaints through corrective rather than punitive means. The new breach-risk-assessment guidance is likely to inform how breach-handling cases are evaluated going forward, and may bear on the threshold at which future breach-related fines, of the kind seen in the InMedica matter, are judged to be warranted.

5 earlier distinct updates
Periodic update · new data 2026-11-04

Secondary monitoring reports suggest VDAI has continued an active and escalating enforcement cadence this period, with activity spanning the healthcare, direct marketing and education sectors. This account is attributed to a secondary aggregator rather than to individually retrieved VDAI decisions, so it is reported here in hedged terms: the pattern described is one of sustained regulatory attention across these three sectors, not a confirmed set of specific fines, reprimands or corrective orders with dates and amounts attached. No individually dated VDAI enforcement action within the current window has been independently confirmed.

This reported cadence sits against a specific piece of standing guidance from the European level: the European Data Protection Board's Guidelines 04/2026 address the choice between imposing a fine and issuing a reprimand, were adopted on 17 September 2026, and are understood to have been announced domestically by VDAI on 24 September 2026. The timing places VDAI's domestic enforcement activity in the period immediately following its own announcement of this European guidance, which is analytically suggestive of a regulator recalibrating its enforcement-tool choice in light of newly adopted European-level direction, though the record available does not permit a firm statement that any specific case applied the Guidelines 04/2026 framework.

The sectoral spread reported — healthcare, direct marketing and education — is consistent with sectors that generate recurring data-protection complaint volume in many jurisdictions, and its appearance here as a described cadence rather than as named cases means the current record supports a statement about the shape of VDAI's attention rather than about any individual enforcement outcome's severity or legal reasoning.

Outlook

The principal item to watch is whether the described cadence resolves into individually dated and publicly attributable decisions, which would allow the current hedged account to be replaced with specific case detail. A secondary item is how VDAI applies the EDPB's fine-versus-reprimand guidelines in practice once concrete decisions citing that framework become available, since the domestic announcement of the Guidelines on 24 September 2026 sets up an expectation that subsequent enforcement choices will visibly reflect it.

Periodic update · new data 2026-10-25

The State Data Protection Inspectorate (VDAI) published, on 30 September 2026, a summary of significant 2025 court decisions in administrative cases arising from complaints it handled. The summary draws on rulings from the Supreme Administrative Court (LVAT) and the Regional Administrative Court, and covers three distinct reviewed issues: the scope of the Inspectorate's discretion in choosing which corrective measure to apply once a violation is found, the lawfulness of video surveillance, and the lawfulness of processing carried out to comply with a legal obligation or to collect service fees. The summary itself, rather than the individual rulings it describes, is the confirmed development this period; the specific holdings on each of the three issues were not itemised in the material reaching this review, so the precise substantive standards the courts applied cannot yet be stated with confidence.

The existence of this summary is nonetheless a meaningful signal about the character of Lithuania's data-protection enforcement environment. It indicates that VDAI's enforcement decisions, including its choice of corrective measure once it finds a violation, are subject to active appellate-court review rather than being accepted without challenge. This sits alongside a standing, separately-sourced example of VDAI's enforcement record: decision 3R-490, dated 23 March 2026, in which VDAI found a cloud-software provider in violation of Article 32 of the GDPR for a ransomware-vulnerability security failure. That fine was calculated starting from a severity-based 15 percent of the Article 32 statutory maximum, an initial figure of EUR1,500,000, before being reduced to a final sum of EUR4,500. This decision is carried as standing background context rather than as a new development this period, but it illustrates the scale of discretion VDAI exercises in moving from an initial statutory-maximum-based calculation to a final fine figure, which is directly relevant to understanding why the discretion exercised in choosing corrective measures is now the subject of active judicial review as reflected in the 2025 court-decisions summary.

Taken together, the active appellate-review record on corrective-measure discretion and video-surveillance lawfulness, alongside VDAI's demonstrated willingness to apply a large discount between an initial statutory-maximum-based calculation and a final fine figure, indicates an enforcement environment under ongoing judicial scrutiny of the Inspectorate's discretion rather than one operating free of appellate check.

Outlook

A closer reading of the underlying LVAT and Regional Administrative Court decisions summarised by VDAI on 30 September 2026 would clarify the specific standards now governing corrective-measure discretion, video-surveillance lawfulness, and legal-obligation or service-fee-based processing in Lithuania. Until that detail becomes available, the enforcement and redress picture in Lithuania should be read as one of active, multi-stranded judicial review of VDAI's discretion, without yet being able to state the precise substantive standard the courts have settled on for any of the three reviewed issues.

Periodic update · new data 2026-10-18

Lithuania's enforcement and redress landscape this cycle is anchored by the Regional Administrative Court's reported confirmation of VDAI's record EUR 2,385,276 fine against Vinted UAB, originally imposed in July 2024 for transparency and erasure-handling violations of GDPR Articles 5(1)(d) and 5(1)(f), covering data accuracy and storage-limitation principles. This court confirmation is significant beyond the individual case: it establishes an appellate-level benchmark for VDAI's expectations on how controllers handle data-subject erasure requests and maintain transparency about processing, a benchmark other controllers facing similar VDAI scrutiny can expect to be measured against.

Alongside the Vinted confirmation, VDAI imposed a EUR 450,000 fine on UAB InMedica for breach-reporting and data-security failures, and personally fined an individual general practitioner EUR 1,153 under Decision No. 3R-1040 of 5 June 2026 for unlawfully accessing 1,231 patients' personal data and using that access for personal messages, a finding linked to infringements of GDPR Articles 5(1)(a), 6(1) and 9(2) concerning lawfulness, fairness and the processing of special-category health data. The GP fine is notable for being a personal, rather than organisational, penalty, and for the scale of unauthorised access involved relative to the modest fine amount.

Taken together, these three enforcement actions — Vinted's confirmed appellate fine, the InMedica security-failure fine, and the GP's personal fine for unauthorised health-data access — demonstrate an enforcement and redress function that is active across institutional scales, from a platform business to an individual healthcare professional, and across violation types, from transparency and erasure handling to unauthorised access to special-category data.

Outlook

The confirmed Vinted benchmark is likely to continue shaping VDAI's approach to transparency and erasure-handling enforcement in future cases. The personal fine against the GP for unauthorised health-data access may be a signal of continued VDAI attention to individual accountability for unauthorised access to special-category data within institutional settings, alongside the institutional-level fines against InMedica and Vinted.

Periodic update · new data 2026-10-12

VDAI's enforcement activity this cycle spans two decisions of markedly different scale. VDAI fined UAB InMedica EUR 450,000 following two investigations that found multiple GDPR violations connected to breach-incident reporting and data security. The exact decision date and the precise GDPR articles found to have been breached have not been confirmed against VDAI's own decision register; this finding is sourced from secondary reporting rather than the primary decision text, and should be read with that caveat attached.

Separately, and with considerably more precision available in the sourcing, VDAI decision No. 3R-1040, dated 5 June 2026, fined a healthcare worker personally EUR 1,153 under GDPR Articles 5(1)(a), 6(1) and 9(2) for accessing 1,231 patient files without authorisation while on sick leave. The scale of files accessed, 1,231 patient records, and the circumstance that the access occurred while the worker was on sick leave rather than performing an authorised clinical function, together with the specific articles cited (the integrity-and-confidentiality principle, the lawfulness-of-processing basis, and the special-category-health-data processing conditions), give this decision a comparatively well-evidenced profile relative to the InMedica fine.

The general fine-tier architecture under GDPR Article 83 continues to apply directly in Lithuania without any LT-specific cap or add-on identified this cycle: maximum fines of EUR 10 million or 2% of global annual turnover apply to breaches of Articles 8, 11, 25-39, 42 and 43, rising to EUR 20 million or 4% for non-compliance with a VDAI order, with fine decisions time-barred after three years. Against this backdrop, the EDPB adopted Guidelines 04/2026 on the choice between imposing a fine versus a reprimand on 17 September 2026, which VDAI announced domestically on 24 September 2026; the guidelines address precisely the fine-tier calculus engaged by both the InMedica and healthcare-worker decisions, although the underlying EDPB text has not been independently retrieved this cycle and the finding rests on a Lithuanian-language commentary source translated for this brief.

Outlook

The newly adopted EDPB guidance on fine-versus-reprimand decision-making may influence how VDAI approaches future enforcement matters, though neither the InMedica nor the healthcare-worker decision predates or necessarily reflects the new guidance given their respective dates relative to the 17 September 2026 adoption. Independent confirmation of the InMedica decision against VDAI's own decision register, including its precise date and the specific articles found breached, remains the most material open item for this module going into the next cycle.

Periodic update · new data 2026-10-04

VDAI's enforcement activity this period spans both volume and subject-matter breadth. Eleven VDAI decisions were issued between 13 and 27 May 2026, none of which carried fines, indicating a continuing pattern of decisions that address compliance findings without a monetary penalty in every case. Against that backdrop, two fines were imposed in the following weeks: a general practitioner was fined €1,153 personally under decision 3R-1040, dated 5 June 2026, for accessing 1,231 patient files while on sick leave, a violation found under Article 9 of the GDPR governing special-category data; and a separate company was fined on 2 July 2026 over incident-reporting and data-security weaknesses.

The Article 9 fine against the general practitioner is a special-category data case of a kind VDAI has been willing to pursue down to the level of an individual practitioner's personal access pattern, rather than only against institutional controllers. The July fine, by contrast, targets the structural dimension of a company's incident-reporting and security practices rather than a single individual's unauthorised access. Together, these two fines this period illustrate that VDAI's enforcement reach extends across both individual-level special-category data misuse and organisational-level security and reporting deficiencies.

This enforcement activity should be read alongside VDAI's own H1 2026 finding that human error caused 48% of reported breaches: the Article 9 case against the general practitioner is itself an instance of individual human conduct producing a special-category data violation, giving a concrete enforcement illustration of the kind of risk the statistical finding describes in aggregate.

Outlook

Whether the volume of VDAI decisions issued without fines in May 2026 reflects a deliberate graduated-enforcement approach, reserving fines for the more serious cases such as the Article 9 and incident-reporting breaches that followed, is not established from this period's evidence alone and is an item to watch as further decisions are issued.

1 further periodic run re-emitted the standing brief unchanged and is not shown.

Sources and claims (24)
  1. Confirmed EDPB — <cite index="102-1">A supervisory authority can impose fines that go up to a maximum of 20 million or 4% of total worldwide annual turnover in the previous financial year for breaches such as unlawful processing or breaches of data subject rights. observed
  2. Confirmed EDPB / VDAI — <cite index="32-10">In fining Vinted, the Lithuanian SA relied on EDPB Guidelines 04/2022 on calculation of administrative fines, taking into account the cross-border scope of processing, the large number of data subjects affected, and the duration of the infringements. observed
  3. Confirmed EDPB / VDAI — <cite index="17-2">A fine in the amount of EUR 15,000 was imposed on Vilnius City Municipality Administration for improperly processed personal data of the parents of an adopted child. observed
  4. Confirmed DataGuidance — <cite index="4-1">VDAI fined the State Enterprise Center for Registers €15,000 for implementing inadequate technical and organisational measures for data security. observed
  5. Confirmed EDPB / VDAI — <cite index="17-16">The decision of the SDPI is not effective and may be appealed against to the court. observed
  6. Confirmed IAPP — <cite index="113-4">Lithuania's State Data Protection Inspector urged residents to not use the DeepSeek app or think carefully about how they use it, citing insufficient information about its privacy practices. observed
  7. Probable ECOVIS ProventusLaw — Valstybine duomenu apsaugos inspekcija (VDAI) — VDAI published, on 30 September 2026, a summary of significant 2025 court decisions in administrative cases arising from complaints it handled, covering LVAT and Regional Administrative Court rulings addressing the Inspectorate's discretion in choosing corrective measures, the lawfulness of video surveillance, and processing to comply with a legal obligation or to collect service fees observed
  8. Probable The DPO (thedpo.eu) decisions database — VDAI fined a general practitioner €1,153 personally (decision 3R-1040, dated 5 June 2026) for accessing 1,231 patient files while on sick leave, a violation found under GDPR Art 9. observed
  9. High Linklaters — VDAI — Vinted UAB EUR 2,385,276 in July 2024 for GDPR transparency/accountability violations, including deficient erasure-request handling and undisclosed shadow banning; upheld by Regional Administrative Court in May 2025 observed
  10. High GRIP (Global Relay) — VDAI — H1 2026 report identifies human error as the cause of 48% of reported personal data breaches in Lithuania observed
  11. Uncertain dataprotection.gi — Secondary monitoring reports VDAI continued an active, escalating enforcement cadence across healthcare, direct marketing and education sectors, against the backdrop of EDPB Guidelines 04/2026 (fine-vs-reprimand choice), adopted 17 Sep 2026 and domestically announced by VDAI on 24 Sep 2026. observed
  12. Confirmed The DPO (thedpo.eu) decisions database — VDAI — Holds the full range of GDPR supervisory and enforcement powers: investigate complaints, conduct inspections, request information, issue warnings/reprimands, order compliance, impose processing bans, and levy administrative fines. observed
  13. Probable European Union — VDAI — 2024 annual report recorded 123 orders, 54 reprimands, 52 recommendations, 13 fines and 7 warnings, alongside participation in the EDPB. observed
  14. Probable Global Relay — VDAI — Fined a doctor for infringements of GDPR Art 5(1)(a), 6(1) and 9(2) by decision of 5 June 2026 (No. 3R-1040), appealable within one month of notification. observed
  15. Probable theDPO.eu — GDPR Art 83(4)-(6) fine tiers apply directly in Lithuania, time-barred after 3 years. observed
  16. Probable dat.lt — EDPB Guidelines 04/2026 on fine-vs-reprimand decisions was adopted 17 September 2026 and announced by VDAI 24 September 2026, outside this cycle's strict window. observed
  17. Probable https://dataprotection.gi/jurisdictions/lithuania/ — Vinted UAB — EUR 2,385,276 for transparency and erasure-handling violations of GDPR Arts 5(1)(d) and 5(1)(f)
  18. Probable 365TRUST.ME — GP (unnamed), Lithuania — EUR 1,153 for unlawfully accessing 1,231 patients' personal data and using it for personal messages, infringing GDPR Arts 5(1)(a), 6(1) and 9(2) observed
  19. Probable dataprotection.gi — UAB InMedica — VDAI imposed a EUR 450,000 administrative fine for multiple GDPR violations connected to personal-data-breach handling and security failures. observed
  20. Probable DataGuidance — VDAI fined Vinted EUR 2.38 million for GDPR violations including 'shadow blocking' practices found unlawful for breaching fairness and transparency principles (GDPR Art 5(1)(a), 5(2), 12(1), 12(4)). observed
  21. Probable The DPO (thedpo.eu) decisions database — In a batch of eleven VDAI decisions issued between 13 and 27 May 2026 addressing access-right and consent disputes, no monetary fine was imposed in any case; outcomes were dismissals, reprimands or corrective orders. observed
  22. Probable VitalLaw / Cybersecurity Policy Report — VDAI published guidance (around 28 October 2026) to help controllers assess the risk a personal-data breach poses to individuals' rights and freedoms, bearing on the Art 33/34 notification decision. observed
  23. Probable https://gdpr-info.eu/art-83-gdpr/ — Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (GDPR) Art 83(8) — GDPR Article 83 fixes no limitation period for the supervisory authority's fining power; Art 83(8) instead requires that exercise of that power be subject to procedural safeguards under Union and Member State law, including the right to an effective judicial remedy, leaving any limitation period to national procedural law.
  24. Probable GRIP (Global Relay) — VDAI (State Data Protection Inspectorate) — VDAI's H1 2026 breach statistics report found human error accounted for 48% of reported personal-data breaches in Lithuania in the first half of 2026, with hacking attacks the cause of 36%. observed
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Provenance and declared absence

Disclosure model: category cards load OPEN; narratives render in full; standing narratives load as a clamped teaser with an explicit “read full” control carrying the true word count. No text is hidden without disclosing how much of it there is.

Sub-modules are DP-specific nested subsections with their own real per-sub-module traffic light, rendered under each category across all regulatory modules.

Traffic-light dots are REAL data (baseline.<category>.traffic_light), not renderer-invented taxonomy, and are never suppressed -- unlike WPM, where a RAG dot would be forbidden as invented severity.

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Band honesty: uncertainty bands are computed against a frozen build clock of 2026-11-17. A year-precision row is never promoted into a tighter band.

Envelope: baseline resolved at jurisdiction_json.baseline; 10 categories, 57 sub-module(s), 92 claim(s) (92 category placement(s)), 50 source(s) in the cumulative register.

Audit trail

Machine checkChallenged on 24 Oct 2026: upheld (3 confirmed against the cited source; 2 could not be checked). An automated, adversarial test run by a second model; no person has assessed the result.

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GDPR article map

Cross-reference: which category/sub-module covers each UK GDPR article (41 mapped).

Show article map
GDPR article to category mapping
ArticleCategorySub-module
Art. 5Controller/Processor Dutiesaccountability and dpia
Art. 6Lawful Processing & Special Datalawful bases
Art. 7Lawful Processing & Special Dataconsent thresholds
Art. 8Children & Vulnerable Groupsparental consent
Art. 9Lawful Processing & Special Dataspecial categories
Art. 10Lawful Processing & Special Dataspecial categories
Art. 12Data Subject Rightsdeadlines and response windows
Art. 13Data Subject Rightsaccess right
Art. 14Data Subject Rightsaccess right
Art. 15Data Subject Rightsaccess right
Art. 16Data Subject Rightsrectification and erasure
Art. 17Data Subject Rightsrectification and erasure
Art. 18Data Subject Rightsrestriction and objection
Art. 19Data Subject Rightsrectification and erasure
Art. 20Data Subject Rightsdata portability
Art. 21Data Subject Rightsrestriction and objection
Art. 22Algorithmic, Biometric & Surveillance Governanceautomated decision making transparency
Art. 25Controller/Processor Dutiesaccountability and dpia
Art. 28Controller/Processor Dutiesjoint controller arrangements
Art. 30Controller/Processor Dutiesropa requirements
Art. 32Controller/Processor Dutiessecurity measures
Art. 33Controller/Processor Dutiesbreach notification
Art. 34Controller/Processor Dutiesbreach notification
Art. 35Controller/Processor Dutiesaccountability and dpia
Art. 37Controller/Processor Dutiesdpo requirements
Art. 38Controller/Processor Dutiesdpo requirements
Art. 39Controller/Processor Dutiesdpo requirements
Art. 44Cross-Border & Adequacytransfer mechanisms
Art. 45Cross-Border & Adequacyadequacy received
Art. 46Cross-Border & Adequacysccs and bcrs
Art. 47Cross-Border & Adequacysccs and bcrs
Art. 48Cross-Border & Adequacytransfer impact assessment
Art. 49Cross-Border & Adequacytransfer impact assessment
Art. 77Enforcement & Redressprivate right of action
Art. 78Enforcement & Redressregulator powers and penalties
Art. 79Enforcement & Redressprivate right of action
Art. 80Enforcement & Redresscollective redress and class actions
Art. 81Enforcement & Redressregulator powers and penalties
Art. 82Enforcement & Redressregulator powers and penalties
Art. 83Enforcement & Redressregulator powers and penalties
Art. 84Enforcement & Redressregulator powers and penalties