Data Protection Monitor
Global Privacy & Data Protection Intelligence

Based mainly on secondary sources. Only 1 of the sources retrieved for this jurisdiction is official or direct reporting of official material (tier 1 or 2), against the 3 we look for. No finding on this page is shown with confidence above “Uncertain” until stronger sources are retrieved.

Myanmar Data Protection & Privacy Regulation

MM schema gdpri-v2 trajectory: not yet assessed unregulated gap overlaps: Sentinel (AML/CFT), World Payments, artificial-intelligence, Crypto

Last updated · 10 categories · 29 claims · 10 sources in the cumulative register

Myanmar's 2017 Law Protecting the Privacy and Security of Citizens is the jurisdiction's principal privacy statute.

Data collected Data published

AI-assembled from cited sources

Not covered: Lawful Processing & Special Data, Data Subject Rights, Cross-Border & Adequacy, AdTech & Commercial Privacy, Children & Vulnerable Groups. Not fully checked this cycle: Regulator & Framework (9 open gaps).

Framework & posture10 of 10 modules active
10 active · 10 binding instruments
Next milestoneNo upcoming dated milestone on record
Record & confidence mix43 claims · 13 sources · machine-compiled
28 Contested / unverified
Evidence re-verified: ·Position last changed: ·
Record history & provenance ▾

Methodology & record provenance: Module confidence is derived from the underlying claims (source tier and primary excerpt retention), while statutory legal force is tracked independently.

Review status: AI-synthesised · Tier-1/2 verified · As-of date: 2026-11-17

Jurisdiction brief

Latest update · 25 October 2026

Lead Signal

Myanmar's 2017 Law Protecting the Privacy and Security of Citizens is the jurisdiction's principal privacy statute. Its core protections in Sections 5, 7 and 8, covering warrantless search, arrest and communications surveillance, were suspended by a February 2021 NDSC/SAC amendment, and this suspension was formally reinstated in August 2025. The correction was surfaced through the challenger fold process rather than the original baseline research.

Key regulatory facts for Myanmar
Key regulatory facts for Myanmar
Regulatory DimensionMyanmar Standing Position
JurisdictionMyanmar (MM)
Regulatory ScopeData Protection & Privacy Regulation (10 modules, 29 sourced findings)
Regulator & FrameworkNo comprehensive DP statute and no general supervisory authority exist; regulatory coverage is fragmented and sector-driven.
Lawful Processing & Special DataNo lawful-bases, consent, special-category, or anonymisation regime found across searched sources.
Data Subject RightsNo omnibus data-subject-rights regime exists; the Privacy Law addresses communications privacy but not GDPR-style subject rights.
Controller/Processor DutiesOnly a narrow sectoral security duty exists; no general controller/processor accountability framework is in force.
Primary Instruments CitedMyanmar Official Instrument (lincolnmyanmar.com Cybersecurity-Law-pdf), Myanmar Official Instrument (irrawaddy.com myanmar-amends-privacy-law-prote), Myanmar Official Instrument (dlapiperdataprotection.com guide-pdf-c-MM), DLA Piper, OneTrust DataGuidance
Last Confirmed / Updated (10 sources in cumulative register)

#

No comprehensive DP statute and no general supervisory authority exist; regulatory coverage is fragmented and sector-driven.

Primary frameworkNo omnibus data protection statute; operative instruments are the Law Protecting the Privacy and Security of Citizens (Union Parliament Law 5/2017, amended 2020), the amended Electronic Transactions Law (SAC Law 7/2021), and the Cybersecurity Law (2025).
Traffic-light rationale — RedNo comprehensive DP statute and no general supervisory authority exist; regulatory coverage is fragmented and sector-driven.

Sub-modules (5)

Regulator and authorityRed

There is no general data protection authority in Myanmar; oversight functions are dispersed across the Ministry of Transport and Communications (cybersecurity/telecoms), the Central Bank of Myanmar (financial-sector customer data), and general law-enforcement/judicial bodies for privacy-law offences.

Claims (3):

  • Myanmar has no general/omnibus data protection authority; regulatory oversight of personal data is fragmented across sectoral ministries and regulators.
  • Ministry of Transport and Communications (MOTC) — There is no general data protection law in Myanmar and no independent supervisory authority; adjacent competence sits with MOTC.
  • Ministry of Transport and Communications (MOTC) — Myanmar has no independent dedicated data-protection authority; adjacent competence over electronic-transactions and data matters sits with MOTC

Act and instrumentsAmber

The principal instruments are the 2017/2020 Privacy Law, the 2021-amended Electronic Transactions Law, and the 2025 Cybersecurity Law.

Claims (5):

  • The Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar 2008 and the Law Protecting the Privacy and Security of Citizens (Union Parliament Law 5/2017), as amended in 2020, provide the principal non-comprehensive statutory basis for privacy and communications-security protection in Myanmar.
  • The amended Electronic Transactions Law (State Administration Council Law 7/2021), effective 15 February 2021, introduced provisions on the protection of personal data.
  • Myanmar's Cybersecurity Law, enacted in 2025, entered into force on 30 July 2025 and introduces a licensing regime for cybersecurity-service providers and digital-platform operators, together with mandatory Ministry approval for VPN use.
  • Myanmar sectoral legal patchwork — Data protection obligations derive from sectoral laws: Financial Institutions Law (2016), Telecommunications Law (2013), Competition Law (2015), Law Protecting the Privacy and Security of Citizens (2017), Law Relating to Private Health Care Services (2007), Electronic Transactions Law (2004, amended 2021), Cybersecurity Law (2025).
  • Myanmar data-protection legal framework — Constitution Art 357, Electronic Transactions Law (2004, amended 2021, 2026 Chapter 10), Telecommunications Law (2013), Law Protecting the Privacy and Security of Citizens (2017), Cybersecurity Law (2025); no single comprehensive statute

Material scopeAmber

Material scope of personal-data protection is defined sector-by-sector rather than through a unitary definition.

Claims (1):

  • In the absence of a unitary omnibus definition, the material scope of personal-data protection in Myanmar is delineated through sector-specific statutes, including the Telecommunications Law 2013 and the Financial Institutions Law 2016.

Territorial scopeRed

No explicit extraterritorial/territorial-scope provision applicable to non-established controllers has been identified in currently available secondary sources.

Regulator registration and filingRed

No general controller registration or filing regime exists absent an omnibus statute or general regulator.

Claims (1):

  • No general controller-registration or filing regime exists in Myanmar in the absence of an omnibus data protection law or general regulator.
Category narrative 105 words

Myanmar has no omnibus data protection statute and no dedicated general data protection authority. Privacy-related obligations instead arise from a patchwork of the 2008 Constitution, the Law Protecting the Privacy and Security of Citizens (2017, amended 2020), the amended Electronic Transactions Law (2021), and the newly enacted Cybersecurity Law (2025, effective 30 July 2025), overlaid with sectoral statutes (Telecommunications Law 2013, Financial Institutions Law 2016). A January 2023 draft cybersecurity bill previously circulated by the Ministry of Transport and Communications appears to have culminated in the 2025 Cybersecurity Law, though independent confirmation of textual continuity between the draft and the enacted law was not obtained.

No new data since the standing brief. 1 periodic run re-emitted it unchanged.

Sources and claims (10)
  1. Uncertain OneTrust DataGuidance — Myanmar has no general/omnibus data protection authority; regulatory oversight of personal data is fragmented across sectoral ministries and regulators. observed
  2. Uncertain OneTrust DataGuidance — The Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar 2008 and the Law Protecting the Privacy and Security of Citizens (Union Parliament Law 5/2017), as amended in 2020, provide the principal non-comprehensive statutory basis for privacy and communications-security protection in Myanmar. observed
  3. Uncertain OneTrust DataGuidance — The amended Electronic Transactions Law (State Administration Council Law 7/2021), effective 15 February 2021, introduced provisions on the protection of personal data. observed
  4. Uncertain IAPP — Myanmar's Cybersecurity Law, enacted in 2025, entered into force on 30 July 2025 and introduces a licensing regime for cybersecurity-service providers and digital-platform operators, together with mandatory Ministry approval for VPN use. observed
  5. Uncertain OneTrust DataGuidance — In the absence of a unitary omnibus definition, the material scope of personal-data protection in Myanmar is delineated through sector-specific statutes, including the Telecommunications Law 2013 and the Financial Institutions Law 2016. observed
  6. Uncertain OneTrust DataGuidance — No general controller-registration or filing regime exists in Myanmar in the absence of an omnibus data protection law or general regulator. observed
  7. Uncertain https://www.dlapiperdataprotection.com/guide.pdf?c=MM — Ministry of Transport and Communications (MOTC) — There is no general data protection law in Myanmar and no independent supervisory authority; adjacent competence sits with MOTC.
  8. Uncertain https://www.dlapiperdataprotection.com/guide.pdf?c=MM — Myanmar sectoral legal patchwork — Data protection obligations derive from sectoral laws: Financial Institutions Law (2016), Telecommunications Law (2013), Competition Law (2015), Law Protecting the Privacy and Security of Citizens (2017), Law Relating to Private Health Care Services (2007), Electronic Transactions Law (2004, amended 2021), Cybersecurity Law (2025).
  9. Uncertain Primary statutory record — Ministry of Transport and Communications (MOTC) — Myanmar has no independent dedicated data-protection authority; adjacent competence over electronic-transactions and data matters sits with MOTC
  10. Uncertain Primary statutory record — Myanmar data-protection legal framework — Constitution Art 357, Electronic Transactions Law (2004, amended 2021, 2026 Chapter 10), Telecommunications Law (2013), Law Protecting the Privacy and Security of Citizens (2017), Cybersecurity Law (2025); no single comprehensive statute

#

No lawful-bases, consent, special-category, or anonymisation regime found across searched sources.

Traffic-light rationale — Not assessedNo lawful-bases, consent, special-category, or anonymisation regime found across searched sources.

Sub-modules (4)

Lawful basesRed

No enumerated lawful bases regime identified.

Special categoriesRed

No special/sensitive-category data regime identified.

Pseudonymisation and anonymisationRed

No pseudonymisation/anonymisation definitions or safe-harbours identified.

Category narrative 32 words

No enumerated lawful-basis framework, consent-standard regime, special/sensitive-category classification, or statutory pseudonymisation/anonymisation safe-harbour was identified for Myanmar. This module is emitted as a gap module consistent with the absence of an omnibus statute.

#

No omnibus data-subject-rights regime exists; the Privacy Law addresses communications privacy but not GDPR-style subject rights.

Traffic-light rationale — Not assessedNo omnibus data-subject-rights regime exists; the Privacy Law addresses communications privacy but not GDPR-style subject rights.

Sub-modules (5)

Access rightRed

No general right of access to personal data identified.

Rectification and erasureRed

No general rectification/erasure right identified.

Restriction and objectionRed

No restriction/objection right (including profiling opt-out) identified.

Data portabilityRed

No portability right identified.

Deadlines and response windowsRed

No statutory controller-response deadlines identified.

Category narrative 27 words

No general subject-access, rectification/erasure, restriction/objection, portability, or statutory response-deadline framework was identified for data subjects in Myanmar outside the narrow privacy/communications-security protections of the 2017/2020 Privacy Law.

#

Only a narrow sectoral security duty exists; no general controller/processor accountability framework is in force.

Primary frameworkFinancial Institutions Law 2016 (sectoral security-of-customer-information duty only).
Traffic-light rationale — RedOnly a narrow sectoral security duty exists; no general controller/processor accountability framework is in force.

Sub-modules (7)

Accountability & DPIARed

No general accountability principle or DPIA trigger exists outside the sectoral financial-institution duty.

Claims (1):

  • In the absence of a general data protection statute, Myanmar imposes no general-purpose DPIA, DPO-appointment, ROPA, or breach-notification obligations on controllers outside the sectoral financial-institution security duty.

DPO requirementsRed

No DPO-appointment regime identified.

Ropa requirementsRed

No ROPA requirement identified.

Joint controller arrangementsRed

No joint-controller framework identified.

Security measuresAmber

The Financial Institutions Law 2016 imposes a sector-specific customer-information-protection duty functioning as a security-of-processing obligation for regulated financial institutions.

Claims (1):

  • Myanmar's Financial Institutions Law 2016 mandates that regulated financial institutions protect customer information, operating as a sector-specific security-of-processing obligation in the absence of a general security-measures regime.

Breach notificationRed

No general breach-notification regime (regulator or data-subject facing) identified.

Claims (1):

  • Regulation on Mobile Financial Services (2016) — Requires notification of any indication of loss of confidential data in the mobile financial services system to the Central Bank of Myanmar within two business days.

Retention and disposalRed

No statutory retention limits or disposal duties identified.

Category narrative 31 words

Outside a sector-specific customer-information-protection duty under the Financial Institutions Law 2016, Myanmar has no general accountability principle, DPIA trigger, DPO-appointment threshold, ROPA requirement, joint-controller framework, breach-notification regime, or statutory retention/disposal duty.

No new data since the standing brief. 1 periodic run re-emitted it unchanged.

Sources and claims (3)
  1. Uncertain OneTrust DataGuidance — Myanmar's Financial Institutions Law 2016 mandates that regulated financial institutions protect customer information, operating as a sector-specific security-of-processing obligation in the absence of a general security-measures regime. observed
  2. Uncertain OneTrust DataGuidance — In the absence of a general data protection statute, Myanmar imposes no general-purpose DPIA, DPO-appointment, ROPA, or breach-notification obligations on controllers outside the sectoral financial-institution security duty. observed
  3. Uncertain DLA Piper — Regulation on Mobile Financial Services (2016) — Requires notification of any indication of loss of confidential data in the mobile financial services system to the Central Bank of Myanmar within two business days. observed

#

No cross-border transfer mechanism, adequacy arrangement, or localisation statute identified.

Traffic-light rationale — Not assessedNo cross-border transfer mechanism, adequacy arrangement, or localisation statute identified.

Sub-modules (6)

Transfer mechanismsRed

No codified transfer mechanism (adequacy, SCCs, BCRs, derogations) identified.

Adequacy receivedRed

No adequacy decision received from another regime identified.

Adequacy grantedRed

No adequacy decision granted to another regime identified.

SCCs and BCRsRed

No SCC or BCR uptake/forms identified.

Transfer impact assessmentRed

No TIA requirement identified.

Data localisationRed

No absolute or partial data-localisation mandate identified beyond VPN/platform-licensing controls under the 2025 Cybersecurity Law.

Category narrative 52 words

No adequacy decisions have been received from or granted to other regimes, no SCC/BCR framework is codified, no transfer-impact-assessment obligation exists, and no explicit data-localisation mandate was identified for Myanmar. The 2025 Cybersecurity Law's VPN-approval and platform-licensing requirements function as digital-sovereignty-adjacent controls but do not constitute a formal data-transfer or localisation regime.

#

Meaningful sectoral coverage exists for financial and telecoms/cyber, but health, employment, credit-scoring, education, and insurance sub-modules are unpopulated.

Primary frameworkTelecommunications Law 2013; Financial Institutions Law 2016; Cybersecurity Law 2025.
Supervisory authorityMinistry of Transport and Communications
Traffic-light rationale — AmberMeaningful sectoral coverage exists for financial and telecoms/cyber, but health, employment, credit-scoring, education, and insurance sub-modules are unpopulated.

Sub-modules (7)

Financial sector overlayAmber

The Financial Institutions Law 2016 mandates protection of customer information by banks and financial institutions; supervisory function rests with the Central Bank of Myanmar (not independently confirmed in this run).

Claims (1):

  • The Financial Institutions Law 2016 mandates that regulated financial institutions protect customer information, operating as a sector-specific overlay in the absence of an omnibus data protection statute.

Health sector overlayRed

No health-sector-specific data rules identified.

Telecoms and eprivacyAmber

The Telecommunications Law 2013 addresses confidentiality of subscriber/personal information; the 2025 Cybersecurity Law adds licensing and VPN-approval requirements for cybersecurity-service and digital-platform operators.

Claims (2):

  • The Telecommunications Law 2013 addresses the confidentiality of personal information handled by telecommunications service providers.
  • Myanmar's 2025 Cybersecurity Law imposes Ministry-approval licensing requirements on VPN use and on cybersecurity-service and digital-platform operators exceeding 100,000 users, with licenses valid for three to ten years and criminal penalties for non-compliance.

Employment dataRed

No employment-specific data rules identified.

Credit and scoringRed

No credit-scoring-specific rules identified.

educationRed

No education-sector-specific data rules identified.

insuranceRed

No insurance-sector-specific data rules identified.

Category narrative 48 words

Sectoral overlays are the primary source of enforceable data-protection-adjacent duties in Myanmar: the Financial Institutions Law 2016 for banking customer information, the Telecommunications Law 2013 for subscriber confidentiality, and the 2025 Cybersecurity Law for digital-platform/VPN licensing. No dedicated health, employment, credit-scoring, education, or insurance data rules were identified.

No new data since the standing brief. 1 periodic run re-emitted it unchanged.

Sources and claims (3)
  1. Uncertain OneTrust DataGuidance — The Financial Institutions Law 2016 mandates that regulated financial institutions protect customer information, operating as a sector-specific overlay in the absence of an omnibus data protection statute. observed
  2. Uncertain OneTrust DataGuidance — The Telecommunications Law 2013 addresses the confidentiality of personal information handled by telecommunications service providers. observed
  3. Uncertain IAPP — Myanmar's 2025 Cybersecurity Law imposes Ministry-approval licensing requirements on VPN use and on cybersecurity-service and digital-platform operators exceeding 100,000 users, with licenses valid for three to ten years and criminal penalties for non-compliance. observed

#

No adtech/commercial-privacy regulation identified in any searched source.

Traffic-light rationale — RedNo adtech/commercial-privacy regulation identified in any searched source.

Sub-modules (6)

Cookies and trackersRed

No cookie/tracker consent law identified.

Dark patternsRed

No dark-pattern prohibition identified.

Opt out signalsRed

No opt-out-signal (GPC/DAA-equivalent) recognition identified.

Clean rooms and dcrRed

No clean-room/data-collaboration-room rules identified.

Cross context advertisingRed

No cross-context-advertising ('sale'/'share') regime identified.

Direct marketingRed

No direct-marketing consent/suppression framework identified.

Claims (1):

  • Cybersecurity Law 2025 — Transmission of unwanted/unsolicited messages: imprisonment 1-2 years, fine MMK 5-20 million, or both
Category narrative 20 words

No cookie/tracker consent regime, dark-pattern prohibition, opt-out-signal recognition, clean-room rule, cross-context-advertising regime, or direct-marketing consent/suppression framework was identified for Myanmar.

Sources and claims (1)
  1. Uncertain Primary statutory record — Cybersecurity Law 2025 — Transmission of unwanted/unsolicited messages: imprisonment 1-2 years, fine MMK 5-20 million, or both

#

The only substantive content in this module concerns broadened state-surveillance carve-outs; ADM, biometric, genetic, and AI-risk-assessment sub-modules are unpopulated.

Primary frameworkLaw Protecting the Privacy and Security of Citizens (2017, as amended 2020).
Traffic-light rationale — RedThe only substantive content in this module concerns broadened state-surveillance carve-outs; ADM, biometric, genetic, and AI-risk-assessment sub-modules are unpopulated.

Sub-modules (6)

Profiling restrictionsRed

No profiling-restriction regime identified.

Automated decision making transparencyRed

No ADM-transparency right identified.

AI risk assessmentsRed

No AI-specific risk-assessment regime identified.

Biometric regimeRed

No biometric-data regime identified.

Genetic dataRed

No genetic-data regime identified.

State surveillance carveoutsAmber

The 2020 amendment narrowed privacy protections against government interference to apply specifically to 'competent authorities,' and the NDSC separately expanded authority to restrict constitutional rights during martial law.

Claims (5):

  • The 2020 amendment to the Law Protecting the Privacy and Security of Citizens narrowed Section 8 so that its prohibitions on government interference apply specifically to 'competent authorities' acting without an order, permission, or warrant from the President or Union Government, rather than to persons generally.
  • The 2020 amendment narrowed criminal liability under Section 10 of the Privacy Law so that it applies specifically to 'competent authorities' who commit offences under Sections 7 or 8, rather than to persons generally.
  • Electronic Transactions Law (amended 2021) s.27-C — Creates an exception to safe personal-data management for cybersecurity/cybercrime matters relating to stability, tranquility or national security, terms left undefined, enabling broad government data-access claims.
  • Electronic Transactions Law s.27-C — National-security/cybersecurity exception permits government access to personal data for undefined 'stability, tranquility, national security' purposes
  • Cybersecurity Law No. 1/2025 (Myanmar) — Continuing to provide cybersecurity services without renewing a licence is punishable, upon conviction, by a fine of MMK 1-5 million (s.63); establishing or providing a VPN without Ministry approval carries imprisonment of 1-6 months and/or a fine of MMK 1-10 million for individuals, with a minimum MMK 10 million fine and confiscation for companies (s.70); operating a digital platform with >=100,000 users without registration carries a fine of at least MMK 100 million (s.64).
Category narrative 78 words

No profiling restriction, ADM-transparency right, AI-specific risk-assessment regime, biometric-data regime, or genetic-data regime was identified. State-surveillance carve-outs are, however, evidenced: the 2020 amendment to the Privacy Law narrowed the scope of protection against government interference by confining Section 8 obligations and Section 10 criminal liability to 'competent authorities' acting under presidential/Union Government order, permission, or warrant, and the National Defence and Security Council (NDSC) separately issued an amendment law expanding authority to restrict constitutional rights during martial law.

No new data since the standing brief. 1 periodic run re-emitted it unchanged.

Sources and claims (5)
  1. Uncertain OneTrust DataGuidance — The 2020 amendment to the Law Protecting the Privacy and Security of Citizens narrowed Section 8 so that its prohibitions on government interference apply specifically to 'competent authorities' acting without an order, permission, or warrant from the President or Union Government, rather than to persons generally. observed
  2. Uncertain OneTrust DataGuidance — The 2020 amendment narrowed criminal liability under Section 10 of the Privacy Law so that it applies specifically to 'competent authorities' who commit offences under Sections 7 or 8, rather than to persons generally. observed
  3. Uncertain Tilleke & Gibbins — Electronic Transactions Law (amended 2021) s.27-C — Creates an exception to safe personal-data management for cybersecurity/cybercrime matters relating to stability, tranquility or national security, terms left undefined, enabling broad government data-access claims. observed
  4. Uncertain Primary statutory record — Electronic Transactions Law s.27-C — National-security/cybersecurity exception permits government access to personal data for undefined 'stability, tranquility, national security' purposes
  5. Uncertain https://www.lincolnmyanmar.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/Cybersecurity-Law.pdf — Cybersecurity Law No. 1/2025 (Myanmar) — Continuing to provide cybersecurity services without renewing a licence is punishable, upon conviction, by a fine of MMK 1-5 million (s.63); establishing or providing a VPN without Ministry approval carries imprisonment of 1-6 months and/or a fine of MMK 1-10 million for individuals, with a minimum MMK 10 million fine and confiscation for companies (s.70); operating a digital platform with >=100,000 users without registration carries a fine of at least MMK 100 million (s.64).

#

No children/vulnerable-groups data protection regime identified.

Traffic-light rationale — Not assessedNo children/vulnerable-groups data protection regime identified.

Sub-modules (5)

Age verificationRed

No age-verification requirement identified.

Minor profiling bansRed

No minor-profiling ban identified.

Education settingsRed

No education-settings-specific rule identified.

Dependent adultsRed

No dependent-adults protection identified.

Category narrative 19 words

No age-of-consent, parental-consent mechanism, minor-profiling ban, education-settings-specific rule, or dependent-adults protection was identified for Myanmar in any reviewed source.

#

Enforcement powers are narrow, sector/criminal-law based, and there is no dedicated DP regulator, enforcement-activity index, or private right of action.

Primary frameworkLaw Protecting the Privacy and Security of Citizens (2017, amended 2020); Cybersecurity Law (2025).
Traffic-light rationale — RedEnforcement powers are narrow, sector/criminal-law based, and there is no dedicated DP regulator, enforcement-activity index, or private right of action.

Sub-modules (6)

Regulator powers and penaltiesAmber

Criminal penalties exist under both the Privacy Law and the 2025 Cybersecurity Law, but are administered through general courts/ministries rather than a dedicated DP regulator.

Claims (5):

  • Under the Law Protecting the Privacy and Security of Citizens, violations of Sections 7 or 8 are punishable by imprisonment of between six months and three years and a fine of between MMK 300,000 and MMK 1.5 million, with liability narrowed by the 2020 amendment to 'competent authorities' who commit such violations.
  • Myanmar's 2025 Cybersecurity Law provides criminal penalties for operating unlicensed cybersecurity services or digital platforms and for unauthorized VPN use.
  • Myanmar data-protection enforcement — As at 11 February 2026, no data-protection enforcement action or penalty regime existed in Myanmar.
  • Law Protecting the Privacy and Security of Citizens (Union Parliament Law 5/2017) — Violation of s.7 or s.8 of the Privacy Law is punishable under s.10 by imprisonment of six months to three years and a fine of between MMK 300,000 and MMK 1,500,000.
  • Law Protecting the Privacy and Security of Citizens, as amended by Law 16/2020 — The 2020 amendment replaced the word 'whoever' in s.10 with wording restricting liability to a Responsible Authority (a government department, government organisation or government official), so that s.7/s.8 offences via s.10 can no longer be prosecuted against ordinary citizens.

Enforcement activity indexRed

No enforcement-activity data (fines, decisions) for the last 12 months was identified.

Claims (1):

  • Myanmar data-protection and cybersecurity regime — No enforcement action under the Myanmar data-protection or cybersecurity regime was recorded as at 11 February 2026, and no superseding legal development was identified through the research window to August 2026.

Regulator funding and capacityRed

No dedicated DP regulator exists, so no funding/capacity signals are applicable.

Collective redress and class actionsRed

No collective-redress or class-action mechanism for data-protection matters identified.

Private right of actionRed

No explicit private civil right of action for data subjects was identified; the Privacy Law's remedies appear criminal/administrative in nature.

Recent developments 180dRed

No material Myanmar data-protection or cybersecurity regulatory development was identified within the 180 days preceding this run (February-August 2026).

Claims (1):

  • No material Myanmar data-protection or cybersecurity regulatory development has been identified within the 180 days preceding this run; the most recent substantive development remains the 30 July 2025 entry into force of the Cybersecurity Law.
Category narrative 100 words

Enforcement is criminal/administrative and sector-specific rather than centralised in a data protection authority. The Privacy Law imposes imprisonment and fines for violations of its confidentiality/interference provisions (as narrowed to 'competent authorities' by the 2020 amendment), and the 2025 Cybersecurity Law imposes criminal penalties for unlicensed cybersecurity-service/digital-platform operation and unauthorized VPN use. No enforcement-activity index, dedicated regulator funding/capacity data, collective-redress mechanism, or private right of action was identified. No material Myanmar DP/cybersecurity development was confirmed within the 180 days preceding this run (February-August 2026); the most recent substantive development remains the 30 July 2025 entry into force of the Cybersecurity Law.

No new data since the standing brief. 1 periodic run re-emitted it unchanged.

Sources and claims (7)
  1. Uncertain OneTrust DataGuidance — Under the Law Protecting the Privacy and Security of Citizens, violations of Sections 7 or 8 are punishable by imprisonment of between six months and three years and a fine of between MMK 300,000 and MMK 1.5 million, with liability narrowed by the 2020 amendment to 'competent authorities' who commit such violations. observed
  2. Uncertain IAPP — Myanmar's 2025 Cybersecurity Law provides criminal penalties for operating unlicensed cybersecurity services or digital platforms and for unauthorized VPN use. observed
  3. Uncertain IAPP — No material Myanmar data-protection or cybersecurity regulatory development has been identified within the 180 days preceding this run; the most recent substantive development remains the 30 July 2025 entry into force of the Cybersecurity Law. observed
  4. Uncertain DLA Piper — Myanmar data-protection enforcement — As at 11 February 2026, no data-protection enforcement action or penalty regime existed in Myanmar. observed
  5. Uncertain DLA Piper — Myanmar data-protection and cybersecurity regime — No enforcement action under the Myanmar data-protection or cybersecurity regime was recorded as at 11 February 2026, and no superseding legal development was identified through the research window to August 2026. observed
  6. Uncertain https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmar-lawmakers-submit-bill-amend-controversial-privacy-law.html — Law Protecting the Privacy and Security of Citizens (Union Parliament Law 5/2017) — Violation of s.7 or s.8 of the Privacy Law is punishable under s.10 by imprisonment of six months to three years and a fine of between MMK 300,000 and MMK 1,500,000.
  7. Uncertain https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmar-amends-privacy-law-protect-citizens-state-intrusion.html — Law Protecting the Privacy and Security of Citizens, as amended by Law 16/2020 — The 2020 amendment replaced the word 'whoever' in s.10 with wording restricting liability to a Responsible Authority (a government department, government organisation or government official), so that s.7/s.8 offences via s.10 can no longer be prosecuted against ordinary citizens.
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Provenance and declared absence

Disclosure model: category cards load OPEN; narratives render in full; standing narratives load as a clamped teaser with an explicit “read full” control carrying the true word count. No text is hidden without disclosing how much of it there is.

Sub-modules are DP-specific nested subsections with their own real per-sub-module traffic light, rendered under each category across all regulatory modules.

Traffic-light dots are REAL data (baseline.<category>.traffic_light), not renderer-invented taxonomy, and are never suppressed -- unlike WPM, where a RAG dot would be forbidden as invented severity.

Family/accent taxonomy is renderer-level presentation config, not a JID field; it decorates the RAG dot, it does not replace it. Colour is always duplicated in text and is never the sole carrier of meaning.

Suppressed by doctrine: derived risk score. Not shown on this page.

Band honesty: uncertainty bands are computed against a frozen build clock of 2026-11-17. A year-precision row is never promoted into a tighter band.

Envelope: baseline resolved at jurisdiction_json.baseline; 10 categories, 57 sub-module(s), 29 claim(s) (29 category placement(s)), 10 source(s) in the cumulative register.

Audit trail

Machine checkChallenged on 24 Oct 2026: not settled (4 could not be checked). An automated, adversarial test run by a second model; no person has assessed the result.

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GDPR article map

Cross-reference: which category/sub-module covers each UK GDPR article (34 mapped).

Show article map
GDPR article to category mapping
ArticleCategorySub-module
Art. 5Controller/Processor Dutiesaccountability and dpia
Art. 6Lawful Processing & Special Datalawful bases
Art. 7Lawful Processing & Special Dataconsent thresholds
Art. 9Lawful Processing & Special Dataspecial categories
Art. 13Data Subject Rightsaccess right
Art. 14Data Subject Rightsaccess right
Art. 15Data Subject Rightsaccess right
Art. 16Data Subject Rightsrectification and erasure
Art. 17Data Subject Rightsrectification and erasure
Art. 18Data Subject Rightsrestriction and objection
Art. 19Data Subject Rightsrectification and erasure
Art. 20Data Subject Rightsdata portability
Art. 21Data Subject Rightsrestriction and objection
Art. 22Algorithmic, Biometric & Surveillance Governanceautomated decision making transparency
Art. 25Controller/Processor Dutiesaccountability and dpia
Art. 28Controller/Processor Dutiesjoint controller arrangements
Art. 30Controller/Processor Dutiesropa requirements
Art. 32Controller/Processor Dutiessecurity measures
Art. 33Controller/Processor Dutiesbreach notification
Art. 34Controller/Processor Dutiesbreach notification
Art. 35Controller/Processor Dutiesaccountability and dpia
Art. 37Controller/Processor Dutiesdpo requirements
Art. 38Controller/Processor Dutiesdpo requirements
Art. 39Controller/Processor Dutiesdpo requirements
Art. 44Cross-Border & Adequacytransfer mechanisms
Art. 45Cross-Border & Adequacyadequacy received
Art. 46Cross-Border & Adequacysccs and bcrs
Art. 47Cross-Border & Adequacysccs and bcrs
Art. 49Cross-Border & Adequacytransfer mechanisms
Art. 77Enforcement & Redressprivate right of action
Art. 78Enforcement & Redressprivate right of action
Art. 82Enforcement & Redressregulator powers and penalties
Art. 83Enforcement & Redressregulator powers and penalties
Art. 84Enforcement & Redressregulator powers and penalties