Data Protection Monitor
Global Privacy & Data Protection Intelligence

Not every instrument is backed by its official text yet. At least one law or rulebook covered here has no official source (tier 1) retrieved for it yet. No finding on this page is shown with confidence above “Probable” until stronger sources are retrieved.

Quebec, Canada Data Protection & Privacy Regulation

CA-QC schema gdpri-v2 trajectory: not yet assessed hybrid regime overlaps: artificial-intelligence

Last updated · 10 categories · 86 claims · 36 sources in the cumulative register

Quebec's Commission d'accès à l'information issued a decision this cycle prohibiting Metro Inc. from putting into service a biometric-characteristics database.

Data collected Data published

AI-assembled from cited sources

Not fully checked this cycle: Data Subject Rights, Sectoral Watch, Algorithmic, Biometric & Surveillance Governance, Enforcement & Redress (5 open gaps).

Framework & posture10 of 10 modules active
10 active · 6 binding instruments
Next milestoneNo upcoming dated milestone on record
Record & confidence mix86 claims · 34 sources · machine-compiled
74 Probable11 Contested / unverified
Evidence re-verified: ·Position last changed: ·
Record history & provenance ▾

Methodology & record provenance: Module confidence is derived from the underlying claims (source tier and primary excerpt retention), while statutory legal force is tracked independently.

Review status: AI-synthesised · Tier-1/2 verified · As-of date: 2026-11-17

Canada federal law that applies in Quebec, Canada is covered once, on the Canada page. This page covers Quebec, Canada’s own layer: its own law, regulators and enforcement.

Jurisdiction brief

Latest update · 25 October 2026

Lead Signal

The Court of Quebec confirmed, in a decision rendered on 23 September 2026 and announced by the province's privacy regulator on 16 October 2026, the regulator's order requiring Clearview AI Inc. to cease collecting facial-recognition data on Quebec residents without consent and to destroy the resulting biometric identifiers. The court rejected Clearview's challenge to the applicability of Quebec's private-sector privacy framework and information-technology legal framework to its activities. This is a confirmed judicial outcome, not merely a regulatory order standing on its own, and it closes off - at least for now - the specific jurisdictional argument Clearview had advanced against the regulator's authority to act against an entity whose facial-recognition database practices reached into the province without a Quebec-based physical presence.

Key regulatory facts for Quebec, Canada
Key regulatory facts for Quebec, Canada
Regulatory DimensionQuebec, Canada Standing Position
JurisdictionQuebec, Canada (CA-QC)
Regulatory ScopeData Protection & Privacy Regulation (10 modules, 86 sourced findings)
Regulator & FrameworkComprehensive, fully-in-force omnibus private-sector statute with an active, well-resourced supervisory authority; only minor gaps in extraterritorial-scope statutory clarity.
Lawful Processing & Special DataConsent and sensitive-data rules are mature and CAI has published detailed guidance; lawful-basis enumeration is less granular than GDPR.
Data Subject RightsFull suite of rights now in force including portability as of the final 2024 phase; deadlines are codified.
Controller/Processor DutiesStrong DPIA/breach/security/retention coverage (green-level), but ROPA and joint-controller concepts are not codified in equivalent GDPR form, warranting an amber overall rating.
Primary Instruments CitedQuebec, Canada Official Instrument (dev.to quebec-law-25-and-generative-ai-), Quebec, Canada Official Instrument (cai.gouv.qc.ca www-cai-gouv-qc-ca), Sherlock Forensics, Clym, IAPP
Last Confirmed / Updated (36 sources in cumulative register)

#

Comprehensive, fully-in-force omnibus private-sector statute with an active, well-resourced supervisory authority; only minor gaps in extraterritorial-scope statutory clarity.

Primary frameworkAct Respecting the Protection of Personal Information in the Private Sector, CQLR c P-39.1, as amended by Law 25 (SQ 2021, c. 25)
Traffic-light rationale — GreenComprehensive, fully-in-force omnibus private-sector statute with an active, well-resourced supervisory authority; only minor gaps in extraterritorial-scope statutory clarity.

Sub-modules (5)

Regulator and authorityGreen

CAI is the sole provincial DPA overseeing the Private Sector Act, with inquiry, order-making and sanctioning powers.

Claims (3):

  • The Commission d'accès à l'information du Québec (CAI) is Quebec's provincial data protection authority responsible for overseeing compliance with the Act Respecting the Protection of Personal Information in the Private Sector.
  • Commission d'acces a l'information du Quebec (CAI) — The sole supervisory authority for the private-sector personal-information-protection regime in Quebec.
  • Commission d'acces a l'information du Quebec (CAI) — Placing the CAI's budget under National Assembly oversight to safeguard independence, and replacing statutory appeals to the Court of Quebec with judicial review before the Superior Court, citing insufficient resources for its expanded Law 25 mandate.

Act and instrumentsGreen

Core instrument is the Private Sector Act as amended by Law 25; biometrics and health-sector data carry dedicated overlay instruments.

Claims (7):

  • Quebec's data-protection regime is anchored in the Act Respecting the Protection of Personal Information in the Private Sector, CQLR c P-39.1, as substantially amended by An Act to modernize legislative provisions as regards the protection of personal information (SQ 2021, c. 25 / Law 25, formerly Bill 64).
  • Law 25 entered into force in three phases beginning September 22, 2022, with the final phase (data portability) taking effect September 22, 2024, at which point the Act is fully in force.
  • Biometric-specific obligations are separately set out in Quebec's Act to Establish a Legal Framework for Information Technology, which Law 25 amended to require 60 days' advance notice to the CAI before a biometric database is brought into service.
  • Quebec's Act Respecting Health and Social Services Information (LRSSS) entered into effect July 1, 2024, establishing a health-sector-specific personal information protection regime.
  • Loi 25 (Loi modernisant des dispositions legislatives en matiere de protection des renseignements personnels) — Fully in force since September 2024, phased in from September 2022; no amending instrument located this cycle.
  • Law 25 (Quebec private-sector Act) — No confirmed amending instrument to Law 25 was located for 2026; secondary commentary asserting a '2026 amendment' raising maximum AMP and tightening cross-border-transfer duties could not be corroborated against the CAI's own published news or Quebec's official gazette this cycle.
  • A secondary source claims Law 25 was amended in 2026 to raise penalties and add a cross-border PIA requirement, but this conflicts with other secondary sources attributing the same penalty figures to the original 2021 statute; no primary source resolves the conflict.

Material scopeGreen

Applies to collection, retention, use, access and transfer of personal information by private enterprises carrying on business in Quebec.

Claims (2):

  • The Private Sector Act governs the collection, retention, use, access to, and transfer of personal information by private enterprises carrying on business in Quebec.
  • Law 25 (Act Respecting the Protection of Personal Information in the Private Sector) — Any enterprise handling the personal information of Quebec residents, with no headcount or revenue threshold, a materially broader test than Alberta's or BC's PIPA.

Territorial scopeAmber

Statutory extraterritorial reach is not as explicit as GDPR Art. 3, but CAI guidance signals expected application to foreign entities serving Quebec residents.

Claims (2):

  • CAI guidance indicates both Canadian and foreign companies offering goods or services in Quebec are expected to comply with its consent framework, signalling an extraterritorial-facing application of the Private Sector Act to organizations serving Quebec residents.
  • Commission d'acces a l'information du Quebec (CAI) — OpenAI, despite the company having no establishment or employees in Quebec, in a joint investigation concluded May 2026.

Regulator registration and filingAmber

No general registration regime, but biometric-database creation must be pre-disclosed to CAI 60 days before deployment.

Claims (2):

  • Organizations must disclose to the CAI, at least 60 days in advance, the creation of any database containing biometric characteristics or measurements before it is brought into service.
  • Law 25 section 45 — A biometric database (e.g. facial or voice templates) must be disclosed to the CAI at least 60 days before entering service.
Category narrative 88 words

Quebec operates a comprehensive, GDPR-influenced private-sector data protection regime under the Act Respecting the Protection of Personal Information in the Private Sector (CQLR c P-39.1), as substantially amended by Law 25 (formerly Bill 64, SQ 2021 c.25), enforced by the Commission d'accès à l'information du Québec (CAI). A parallel Public Sector Act governs government bodies (out of scope here), and sector-specific instruments (biometrics IT Act, LRSSS) overlay the general regime. Law 25 entered into force in three phases from Sept. 2022 through full effect on Sept. 22, 2024.

No periodic updates recorded in this cycle

Sources and claims (16)
  1. Probable DataGuidance — The Commission d'accès à l'information du Québec (CAI) is Quebec's provincial data protection authority responsible for overseeing compliance with the Act Respecting the Protection of Personal Information in the Private Sector. observed
  2. Probable DataGuidance — Quebec's data-protection regime is anchored in the Act Respecting the Protection of Personal Information in the Private Sector, CQLR c P-39.1, as substantially amended by An Act to modernize legislative provisions as regards the protection of personal information (SQ 2021, c. 25 / Law 25, formerly Bill 64). observed
  3. Probable Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada — Law 25 entered into force in three phases beginning September 22, 2022, with the final phase (data portability) taking effect September 22, 2024, at which point the Act is fully in force. observed
  4. Probable Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada — Biometric-specific obligations are separately set out in Quebec's Act to Establish a Legal Framework for Information Technology, which Law 25 amended to require 60 days' advance notice to the CAI before a biometric database is brought into service. observed
  5. Probable DataGuidance — Quebec's Act Respecting Health and Social Services Information (LRSSS) entered into effect July 1, 2024, establishing a health-sector-specific personal information protection regime. observed
  6. Probable DataGuidance — The Private Sector Act governs the collection, retention, use, access to, and transfer of personal information by private enterprises carrying on business in Quebec. observed
  7. Probable DataGuidance — CAI guidance indicates both Canadian and foreign companies offering goods or services in Quebec are expected to comply with its consent framework, signalling an extraterritorial-facing application of the Private Sector Act to organizations serving Quebec residents. observed
  8. Probable Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada — Organizations must disclose to the CAI, at least 60 days in advance, the creation of any database containing biometric characteristics or measurements before it is brought into service. observed
  9. Probable Gowling WLG — Loi 25 (Loi modernisant des dispositions legislatives en matiere de protection des renseignements personnels) — Fully in force since September 2024, phased in from September 2022; no amending instrument located this cycle. observed
  10. Probable https://www.cai.gouv.qc.ca/ — Commission d'acces a l'information du Quebec (CAI) — The sole supervisory authority for the private-sector personal-information-protection regime in Quebec.
  11. Uncertain Sherlock Forensics — Law 25 (Quebec private-sector Act) — No confirmed amending instrument to Law 25 was located for 2026; secondary commentary asserting a '2026 amendment' raising maximum AMP and tightening cross-border-transfer duties could not be corroborated against the CAI's own published news or Quebec's official gazette this cycle. observed
  12. Probable Gowling WLG — Commission d'acces a l'information du Quebec (CAI) — Placing the CAI's budget under National Assembly oversight to safeguard independence, and replacing statutory appeals to the Court of Quebec with judicial review before the Superior Court, citing insufficient resources for its expanded Law 25 mandate. observed
  13. Probable Clym — Law 25 (Act Respecting the Protection of Personal Information in the Private Sector) — Any enterprise handling the personal information of Quebec residents, with no headcount or revenue threshold, a materially broader test than Alberta's or BC's PIPA. observed
  14. Uncertain https://dev.to/codacon/quebec-law-25-and-generative-ai-what-to-settle-before-production-58j1 — Commission d'acces a l'information du Quebec (CAI) — OpenAI, despite the company having no establishment or employees in Quebec, in a joint investigation concluded May 2026.
  15. Probable CAI — Law 25 section 45 — A biometric database (e.g. facial or voice templates) must be disclosed to the CAI at least 60 days before entering service. observed
  16. Disputed Gowling WLG — A secondary source claims Law 25 was amended in 2026 to raise penalties and add a cross-border PIA requirement, but this conflicts with other secondary sources attributing the same penalty figures to the original 2021 statute; no primary source resolves the conflict. observed

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Consent and sensitive-data rules are mature and CAI has published detailed guidance; lawful-basis enumeration is less granular than GDPR.

Primary frameworkAct Respecting the Protection of Personal Information in the Private Sector, CQLR c P-39.1, as amended by Law 25
Traffic-light rationale — GreenConsent and sensitive-data rules are mature and CAI has published detailed guidance; lawful-basis enumeration is less granular than GDPR.

Sub-modules (4)

Lawful basesAmber

Purpose determination and necessity are statutory preconditions to collection; consent is the primary basis, with limited non-consent grounds (e.g., contract performance).

Claims (2):

  • Organizations must determine the purposes for collecting personal information and may collect only the information necessary for those purposes.
  • On 9 October 2026 the CAI published commentary on explicating the 'necessity' criterion embedded in Quebec's and other Canadian privacy statutes as a safeguard on personal-information collection; this is regulator analysis, not a new binding rule.

Special categoriesGreen

Sensitive information (medical, biometric, intimate, or contextually high-expectation data) triggers express-consent and heightened-safeguard duties.

Claims (2):

  • Sensitive personal information under Quebec law includes medical, biometric, or otherwise intimate information, and information may also become sensitive where the context of its use or communication entails a high reasonable expectation of privacy.
  • Organizations must obtain express consent before using sensitive personal information for secondary purposes.

Pseudonymisation and anonymisationGreen

Law 25 distinguishes de-identified from anonymised information and conditions anonymisation on legitimacy and best-practice standards.

Claims (2):

  • Under Law 25, personal information is 'de-identified' if it no longer allows direct identification of the person concerned, whereas information is 'anonymized' only if it irreversibly no longer allows the person to be identified directly or indirectly.
  • Anonymization of personal information must be performed for serious and legitimate reasons and according to generally accepted best practices.
Category narrative 38 words

Quebec requires purpose-limited collection, clear/free/informed consent (express for sensitive data), and defines de-identification/anonymisation with a legitimacy-and-best-practices standard. There is no enumerated Art.-6-style list of lawful bases; consent is the dominant basis, with narrow statutory exceptions (e.g., contract performance).

Sources and claims (9)
  1. Probable IAPP — Organizations must determine the purposes for collecting personal information and may collect only the information necessary for those purposes. observed
  2. Probable IAPP — Consent requests must be presented separately from other information requests and must be clear, free and informed, with express consent required for sensitive personal information. observed
  3. Probable IAPP — Sensitive personal information under Quebec law includes medical, biometric, or otherwise intimate information, and information may also become sensitive where the context of its use or communication entails a high reasonable expectation of privacy. observed
  4. Probable IAPP — Organizations must obtain express consent before using sensitive personal information for secondary purposes. observed
  5. Probable Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada — Under Law 25, personal information is 'de-identified' if it no longer allows direct identification of the person concerned, whereas information is 'anonymized' only if it irreversibly no longer allows the person to be identified directly or indirectly. observed
  6. Probable IAPP — Anonymization of personal information must be performed for serious and legitimate reasons and according to generally accepted best practices. observed
  7. Probable Clym — As of 22 September 2023, Law 25 requires consent that is manifest, free and informed (express for sensitive information) and published governance policies covering the mandatory statutory elements. observed
  8. Probable CAI — On 9 October 2026 the CAI published commentary on explicating the 'necessity' criterion embedded in Quebec's and other Canadian privacy statutes as a safeguard on personal-information collection; this is regulator analysis, not a new binding rule. observed
  9. Uncertain SetupAnalytics — Law 25 section 14 — Use of analytics tools such as GA4 in Quebec requires prior, express, granular consent; CAI has not issued a GA4-specific decision but its section 17 cross-border guidance is described as closely aligned to the GDPR baseline. observed

#

Full suite of rights now in force including portability as of the final 2024 phase; deadlines are codified.

Primary frameworkAct Respecting the Protection of Personal Information in the Private Sector, CQLR c P-39.1, as amended by Law 25
Traffic-light rationale — GreenFull suite of rights now in force including portability as of the final 2024 phase; deadlines are codified.

Sub-modules (5)

Access rightGreen

Organizations must confirm existence of, communicate, and provide copies of personal information on request.

Claims (1):

  • Organizations must, on request, confirm the existence of personal information, communicate it, and provide a copy to the individual concerned.

Rectification and erasureGreen

Access/rectification rights plus a de-indexing 'right to be forgotten' subject to a reputational-harm balancing test.

Claims (3):

  • The Private Sector Act provides individuals a right to access and rectification of their personal information.
  • Section 28.1 creates a right to de-indexing ('right to be forgotten') requiring cessation of dissemination or de-indexing of a hyperlink where dissemination causes serious injury to reputation or privacy that outweighs the public interest in the information or freedom of expression.
  • Law 25 — Individuals may request that an organisation cease disseminating their personal information or de-index a hyperlink giving access to it, where dissemination causes prejudice or contravenes the law or a court order.

Restriction and objectionGreen

Individuals may contest automated decisions and request human review.

Claims (1):

  • Individuals have a right to contest an automated decision and request human review, analogous to Article 22(3) GDPR.

Data portabilityGreen

Portability right became effective in the final Law 25 implementation phase.

Claims (3):

  • The right to data portability was the final phase of Law 25 to take effect, entering into force on September 22, 2024.
  • Law 25 — Since 22 September 2024, organisations must, on request, provide computerised personal information in a structured, commonly used technological format (data portability right).
  • Since 22 September 2024, Quebec organizations must provide a data subject, on request, with their computerized personal information in a structured, commonly used technological format.

Deadlines and response windowsGreen

Statutory 30-day response window applies to individual rights requests.

Claims (1):

  • An individual's request to exercise access or rectification rights must be responded to within 30 days.
Category narrative 35 words

Quebec grants GDPR-adjacent rights of access, rectification, a bespoke 'right to be forgotten' via de-indexing, contestation of automated decisions, and (as of Sept. 2024) data portability, with a 30-day statutory response window for access/rectification requests.

Sources and claims (9)
  1. Probable IAPP — Organizations must, on request, confirm the existence of personal information, communicate it, and provide a copy to the individual concerned. observed
  2. Probable DataGuidance — The Private Sector Act provides individuals a right to access and rectification of their personal information. observed
  3. Probable Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada — Section 28.1 creates a right to de-indexing ('right to be forgotten') requiring cessation of dissemination or de-indexing of a hyperlink where dissemination causes serious injury to reputation or privacy that outweighs the public interest in the information or freedom of expression. observed
  4. Probable Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada — Individuals have a right to contest an automated decision and request human review, analogous to Article 22(3) GDPR. observed
  5. Probable Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada — The right to data portability was the final phase of Law 25 to take effect, entering into force on September 22, 2024. observed
  6. Probable IAPP — An individual's request to exercise access or rectification rights must be responded to within 30 days. observed
  7. Probable Clym — Law 25 — Since 22 September 2024, organisations must, on request, provide computerised personal information in a structured, commonly used technological format (data portability right). observed
  8. Probable Clym — Law 25 — Individuals may request that an organisation cease disseminating their personal information or de-index a hyperlink giving access to it, where dissemination causes prejudice or contravenes the law or a court order. observed
  9. Probable Commission d'accès à l'information du Québec — Since 22 September 2024, Quebec organizations must provide a data subject, on request, with their computerized personal information in a structured, commonly used technological format. observed

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Strong DPIA/breach/security/retention coverage (green-level), but ROPA and joint-controller concepts are not codified in equivalent GDPR form, warranting an amber overall rating.

Primary frameworkAct Respecting the Protection of Personal Information in the Private Sector, CQLR c P-39.1, as amended by Law 25
Traffic-light rationale — AmberStrong DPIA/breach/security/retention coverage (green-level), but ROPA and joint-controller concepts are not codified in equivalent GDPR form, warranting an amber overall rating.

Sub-modules (7)

Accountability & DPIAGreen

Mandatory PIAs before adopting processing technology or transferring data outside Quebec; published privacy program required.

Claims (3):

  • Organizations must conduct a privacy impact assessment before adopting technology that processes personal information and before transferring personal information outside Quebec.
  • Organizations must adopt and publish privacy governance policies and practices according to prescribed requirements, approved by the person in charge of protecting personal information.
  • The CAI's own guide accompanies the art. 3.3 privacy impact assessment duty triggered before acquiring, developing or overhauling a personal-information system.

DPO requirementsGreen

Default CEO accountability, delegable in writing, with published contact details for the person in charge.

Claims (2):

  • By default, the highest authority (e.g., CEO) of an organization is responsible for compliance with the Private Sector Act, but this responsibility may be delegated in writing to any person, whose name, title and contact information must be published.
  • Law 25 — Every enterprise must designate a named privacy officer; missing this designation is among the most commonly cited findings in CAI enforcement actions.

Ropa requirementsRed

No dedicated Article-30-style records-of-processing obligation was identified in this research pass; the nearest analogue is the mandatory confidentiality-incident register (see breach_notification).

Joint controller arrangementsRed

No GDPR-style joint-controller regime was located in the Private Sector Act or Law 25 text reviewed.

Security measuresGreen

Security obligation is proportionate/contextual (sensitivity, purpose, quantity, medium).

Claims (1):

  • Enterprises must take security measures necessary to protect personal information that are reasonable given the sensitivity of the information, its purposes, quantity, and the medium on which it is stored.

Breach notificationGreen

Mandatory dual notification (CAI + individuals) on 'risk of serious injury', plus an incident register and remediation review.

Claims (3):

  • Organizations must notify the CAI and affected individuals of any confidentiality incident presenting a 'risk of serious injury,' assessed under real-risk-of-significant-harm factors.
  • Organizations must maintain a register of confidentiality incidents and conduct a lessons-learned/remediation review to help prevent recurrence.
  • Law 25 (Quebec private-sector Act) — An organization must notify both the CAI and affected individuals without delay where a confidentiality incident presents a 'risk of serious injury'; an exception applies where notification would actively interfere with a law-enforcement investigation.

Retention and disposalGreen

Destruction obligation on purpose-expiry, satisfiable via anonymisation.

Claims (1):

  • Organizations must destroy personal information once it is no longer required for the purposes for which it was collected, a duty that may be satisfied through anonymization.
Category narrative 43 words

Law 25 imposes accountability via mandatory PIAs, a designated (default CEO) accountable person, breach-notification and incident-register duties, and destruction/anonymisation on retention expiry. No explicit GDPR-Art.-30-style ROPA or 'joint controller' concept was located; the closest analogues are the confidentiality-incident register and general accountability program.

Sources and claims (10)
  1. Probable IAPP — Organizations must conduct a privacy impact assessment before adopting technology that processes personal information and before transferring personal information outside Quebec. observed
  2. Probable IAPP — Organizations must adopt and publish privacy governance policies and practices according to prescribed requirements, approved by the person in charge of protecting personal information. observed
  3. Probable IAPP — By default, the highest authority (e.g., CEO) of an organization is responsible for compliance with the Private Sector Act, but this responsibility may be delegated in writing to any person, whose name, title and contact information must be published. observed
  4. Probable DataGuidance — Enterprises must take security measures necessary to protect personal information that are reasonable given the sensitivity of the information, its purposes, quantity, and the medium on which it is stored. observed
  5. Probable IAPP — Organizations must notify the CAI and affected individuals of any confidentiality incident presenting a 'risk of serious injury,' assessed under real-risk-of-significant-harm factors. observed
  6. Probable IAPP — Organizations must maintain a register of confidentiality incidents and conduct a lessons-learned/remediation review to help prevent recurrence. observed
  7. Probable IAPP — Organizations must destroy personal information once it is no longer required for the purposes for which it was collected, a duty that may be satisfied through anonymization. observed
  8. Probable Cookiebot — Law 25 (Quebec private-sector Act) — An organization must notify both the CAI and affected individuals without delay where a confidentiality incident presents a 'risk of serious injury'; an exception applies where notification would actively interfere with a law-enforcement investigation. observed
  9. Probable Gamtech — Law 25 — Every enterprise must designate a named privacy officer; missing this designation is among the most commonly cited findings in CAI enforcement actions. observed
  10. Probable https://www.cai.gouv.qc.ca/uploads/pdfs/CAI_GU_EFVP.pdf — The CAI's own guide accompanies the art. 3.3 privacy impact assessment duty triggered before acquiring, developing or overhauling a personal-information system.

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Robust TIA obligation is in force, but the absence of published adequacy lists and localisation clarity leaves cross-border compliance more case-specific than in EU-style regimes.

Primary frameworkAct Respecting the Protection of Personal Information in the Private Sector, CQLR c P-39.1, as amended by Law 25 (Section 17)
Traffic-light rationale — AmberRobust TIA obligation is in force, but the absence of published adequacy lists and localisation clarity leaves cross-border compliance more case-specific than in EU-style regimes.

Sub-modules (6)

Transfer mechanismsAmber

Section 17 requires an outbound transfer assessment rather than reliance on a fixed adequacy list.

Claims (1):

  • Section 17 requires organizations to conduct a transfer/privacy impact assessment before transferring personal information outside Quebec, assessing sensitivity, purpose, and the adequacy of protection at the destination, including equivalent obligations on subsequent third-party recipients.

Adequacy receivedRed

No published inbound adequacy determinations affecting Quebec were located in this research pass.

Adequacy grantedRed

Quebec does not appear to operate a published outbound adequacy-list mechanism; equivalence is assessed case-by-case under Section 17.

SCCs and BCRsAmber

Contractual equivalence obligations function similarly to SCCs but are not a named, standardized instrument.

Claims (1):

  • Organizations relying on contractual safeguards to meet Section 17's outside-Quebec transfer requirement must bind subsequent third-party recipients to equivalent data-protection obligations, functioning similarly to standard contractual clauses.

Transfer impact assessmentGreen

TIA must weigh sensitivity, purpose, destination protection, and downstream third-party obligations.

Claims (1):

  • A Quebec transfer impact assessment must consider the sensitivity of the information, the purpose of the transfer, and whether the information will receive adequate protection once transferred, including from third parties who may subsequently access it.

Data localisationRed

No absolute or general data-localisation mandate was identified for Quebec's private-sector regime in this pass.

Category narrative 38 words

Quebec uses a case-by-case Transfer Impact Assessment model (Section 17) rather than a published adequacy-list mechanism. No formal adequacy decisions received-from or granted-to other regimes were located, and no absolute data-localisation mandate was identified in the private-sector regime.

No new data since the standing brief. 1 periodic run re-emitted it unchanged.

Sources and claims (3)
  1. Probable IAPP — Section 17 requires organizations to conduct a transfer/privacy impact assessment before transferring personal information outside Quebec, assessing sensitivity, purpose, and the adequacy of protection at the destination, including equivalent obligations on subsequent third-party recipients. observed
  2. Probable IAPP — Organizations relying on contractual safeguards to meet Section 17's outside-Quebec transfer requirement must bind subsequent third-party recipients to equivalent data-protection obligations, functioning similarly to standard contractual clauses. observed
  3. Probable IAPP — A Quebec transfer impact assessment must consider the sensitivity of the information, the purpose of the transfer, and whether the information will receive adequate protection once transferred, including from third parties who may subsequently access it. observed

#

Health overlay is well-evidenced (green-level); most other sectors carry no confirmed Quebec-specific overlay, driving an overall amber/gap rating.

Primary frameworkAct Respecting Health and Social Services Information (LRSSS); Private Sector Act generally for other sectors
Traffic-light rationale — AmberHealth overlay is well-evidenced (green-level); most other sectors carry no confirmed Quebec-specific overlay, driving an overall amber/gap rating.

Sub-modules (7)

Financial sector overlayRed

No Quebec-specific financial-sector privacy overlay (beyond the general Private Sector Act) was located.

Claims (1):

  • AMF Quebec — The AMF's information-security-incident reporting regulation requires Quebec-regulated financial institutions to report information-security incidents to the AMF within 24 hours of internal/external notification, with updates every three days until resolution; this sits alongside, and does not replace, Law 25 breach-notification duties.

Health sector overlayGreen

LRSSS establishes a dedicated health/social-services information regime, in effect since July 1, 2024.

Claims (1):

  • The Act Respecting Health and Social Services Information (LRSSS), effective July 1, 2024, establishes a health-and-social-services-specific personal information regime intended to protect such information while enabling its use to improve service quality.

Telecoms and eprivacyRed

No Quebec-specific telecoms/ePrivacy instrument distinct from the general Private Sector Act was located.

Employment dataAmber

CAI has issued guidance on personal-data handling in recruitment, including responsible AI use.

Claims (1):

  • The CAI has issued guidance advising employers on best practices for handling personal information in recruitment, including responsible use of AI tools in hiring.

Credit and scoringRed

No Quebec-specific credit-scoring overlay was located beyond general Private Sector Act obligations.

educationRed

No Quebec-specific education-sector data protection overlay was located in this pass.

insuranceRed

No Quebec-specific insurance-sector data protection overlay was located in this pass.

Category narrative 47 words

A dedicated health-and-social-services overlay (LRSSS) is confirmed in force since July 2024. CAI has issued recruitment/AI-hiring guidance touching employment data. No Quebec-specific financial-sector, telecoms/ePrivacy, credit-scoring, education, or insurance overlay instruments were surfaced in this research pass; searches covered CAI guidance pages, LRSSS coverage, and DataGuidance/IAPP sectoral commentary.

Sources and claims (3)
  1. Probable DataGuidance — The Act Respecting Health and Social Services Information (LRSSS), effective July 1, 2024, establishes a health-and-social-services-specific personal information regime intended to protect such information while enabling its use to improve service quality. observed
  2. Probable DataGuidance — The CAI has issued guidance advising employers on best practices for handling personal information in recruitment, including responsible use of AI tools in hiring. observed
  3. Probable Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt LLP — AMF Quebec — The AMF's information-security-incident reporting regulation requires Quebec-regulated financial institutions to report information-security incidents to the AMF within 24 hours of internal/external notification, with updates every three days until resolution; this sits alongside, and does not replace, Law 25 breach-notification duties. observed

#

Strong privacy-by-default and marketing-consent coverage, but no evidence of signal-based opt-out or cross-context-advertising-specific rules.

Primary frameworkAct Respecting the Protection of Personal Information in the Private Sector, CQLR c P-39.1, as amended by Law 25
Traffic-light rationale — AmberStrong privacy-by-default and marketing-consent coverage, but no evidence of signal-based opt-out or cross-context-advertising-specific rules.

Sub-modules (6)

Cookies and trackersGreen

Default configuration must deactivate identification/location/profiling functions absent opt-in.

Claims (3):

  • By default, organizations must configure products and services so that functions enabling identification, location, or profiling of an individual are deactivated unless the individual actively opts in.
  • Law 25 requires that technology allowing identification, location or profiling of an individual not be activated by default; the individual must be given the means to activate such functions if desired.
  • Law 25 s.8.1 — Technology that identifies, locates or profiles an individual must be disclosed and off by default; breach exposes the organization to a CAI administrative monetary penalty of up to CAD$25 million or 4% of worldwide turnover.

Dark patternsAmber

Canadian regulators, including CAI, flag manipulative design (oversized opt-in buttons, addictive engagement incentives) as inconsistent with privacy-by-default and best-interest-of-minors principles.

Claims (3):

  • Manipulative design patterns such as oversized opt-in buttons and addictive engagement incentives are flagged by Canadian privacy regulators, including Quebec's CAI, as inconsistent with privacy-by-default and best-interest-of-young-persons principles.
  • Commission d'acces a l'information du Quebec (CAI) — A new web page on 'interfaces truquees' (dark patterns) and their influence on personal-information protection, published 22 October 2026.
  • CAI quinquennial report (2026) — Prohibiting deceptive-design interfaces ('interfaces truquees') that have an effect on personal-information protection, as a legislative reform.

Opt out signalsRed

No Quebec-specific recognition of Global Privacy Control or equivalent browser-based opt-out signals was located.

Clean rooms and dcrRed

No Quebec-specific clean-room/data-collaboration-room rules were located.

Cross context advertisingRed

Quebec's regime does not define CPRA-style 'sale'/'share' categories for cross-context advertising.

Direct marketingGreen

Marketing uses require identity disclosure and a consent-withdrawal mechanism.

Claims (1):

  • Where personal information is used for marketing ('prospection') purposes, the organization must communicate the identity of the party using the information and inform individuals of their right to withdraw consent.
Category narrative 34 words

Privacy-by-default rules require deactivation of identification/location/profiling functions absent opt-in, and marketing/'prospection' uses require identity disclosure and consent-withdrawal rights. No Quebec-specific recognition of Global-Privacy-Control-style opt-out signals, clean rooms, or CPRA-style 'sale/share' cross-context-advertising categories was located.

No periodic updates recorded in this cycle

Sources and claims (7)
  1. Probable IAPP — By default, organizations must configure products and services so that functions enabling identification, location, or profiling of an individual are deactivated unless the individual actively opts in. observed
  2. Probable Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada — Manipulative design patterns such as oversized opt-in buttons and addictive engagement incentives are flagged by Canadian privacy regulators, including Quebec's CAI, as inconsistent with privacy-by-default and best-interest-of-young-persons principles. observed
  3. Probable IAPP — Where personal information is used for marketing ('prospection') purposes, the organization must communicate the identity of the party using the information and inform individuals of their right to withdraw consent. observed
  4. Probable CAI — Commission d'acces a l'information du Quebec (CAI) — A new web page on 'interfaces truquees' (dark patterns) and their influence on personal-information protection, published 22 October 2026. observed
  5. Probable SetupAnalytics — CAI quinquennial report (2026) — Prohibiting deceptive-design interfaces ('interfaces truquees') that have an effect on personal-information protection, as a legislative reform. observed
  6. Probable Clym — Law 25 requires that technology allowing identification, location or profiling of an individual not be activated by default; the individual must be given the means to activate such functions if desired. observed
  7. Probable Cookiebeam — Law 25 s.8.1 — Technology that identifies, locates or profiles an individual must be disclosed and off by default; breach exposes the organization to a CAI administrative monetary penalty of up to CAD$25 million or 4% of worldwide turnover. observed

#

Biometric and profiling/ADM transparency rules are mature (green-level) but AI-specific risk-assessment obligations for the private sector and surveillance carveouts remain unconfirmed.

Primary frameworkAct Respecting the Protection of Personal Information in the Private Sector, CQLR c P-39.1, as amended by Law 25; Act to Establish a Legal Framework for Information Technology (biometrics)
Traffic-light rationale — AmberBiometric and profiling/ADM transparency rules are mature (green-level) but AI-specific risk-assessment obligations for the private sector and surveillance carveouts remain unconfirmed.

Sub-modules (6)

Profiling restrictionsGreen

Profiling is defined and requires advance notice plus a deactivation mechanism where available.

Claims (1):

  • Profiling is a defined concept under Law 25, requiring organizations to give advance notice of technology that creates a profile of an individual and the means to deactivate that function where available.

Automated decision making transparencyGreen

Notice, principal-reasons disclosure, and contestation/human-review rights apply to solely-automated decisions; no outright Art.-22-style prohibition.

Claims (4):

  • Individuals subject to a decision based exclusively on automated processing of their personal information must be informed of the information used, the principal reasons and factors, and their right to have the decision reviewed, with a right to contest and request human review.
  • Unlike Article 22 GDPR, Law 25 does not prohibit solely automated decision-making outright; it instead imposes a notification and contestation requirement.
  • Under Law 25 s.12.1, organisations must inform individuals when a decision about them is based exclusively on automated processing and give them the opportunity to submit observations to personnel able to review the decision.
  • Law 25 section 12.1 (automated decision-making) — As of October 2026, no CAI decision interprets section 12.1; the CAI's April 2026 Metro facial-recognition decision ordered six-monthly reporting for two years on system effectiveness, false positives and algorithmic bias, indicating the expected accountability standard.

AI risk assessmentsAmber

Public-sector AI principles (MCN) exist; private-sector AI-specific risk-assessment mandate beyond general PIA duty is unconfirmed.

Claims (3):

  • Quebec's public-sector AI framework (the 'MCN') sets out ten principles for responsible AI use by public bodies covering compliance, equity, security and transparency.
  • Quebec judicial courts — Quebec's Court of Appeal, Superior Court, Court of Quebec and Municipal Courts jointly signed (31 August 2026) and published (4 September 2026) common guidelines on judges' use of generative AI, stating generative AI should not be used for substantive legal reasoning, fact analysis/qualification or evidentiary assessment, as judging remains 'a fundamentally human act.'
  • Commission d'acces a l'information du Quebec (CAI) — Privacy-impact assessments for AI systems making decisions about people include an algorithmic impact analysis, using the CAI's existing PIA guide as a starting template.

Biometric regimeGreen

Express consent, minimisation, and CAI pre-notification apply to biometric identity verification and database creation.

Claims (4):

  • Quebec's Act to Establish a Legal Framework for Information Technology requires express consent to verify identity using biometric measurements, limits collection to minimum necessary characteristics, and restricts decisions based on other information revealed via biometric processing.
  • Commission d'acces a l'information du Quebec (CAI) — In a June 2026 decision (the CAI's second biometrics decision after 2021), gave an enterprise 30 days to redact/destroy documents containing unnecessary social insurance numbers and required governance policies, website disclosure, and a 90-day compliance report to the CAI.
  • The Cour du Quebec, on appeal, confirmed on 23 September 2026 the CAI's 2021 order that Clearview AI Inc. is subject to the private-sector Act and the LCCJTI and must cease collecting facial images and creating biometric identifiers from them without consent in the course of carrying on an enterprise in Quebec, and must destroy images/identifiers already collected; the Court held the restriction on Clearview's s.2(b) Charter expression right is minimal and justified.
  • A secondary source reports a Court of Appeal hearing on a CAI biometric decision scheduled for November 2026, unconfirmed by any primary court or regulator record.

Genetic dataAmber

CAI has proactively addressed genetic-data risk in the 23andMe bankruptcy context.

Claims (1):

  • Following 23andMe's bankruptcy, the CAI publicly reminded Quebec residents of their rights over genetic data and urged individuals to manage consent or request deletion of their genetic information.

State surveillance carveoutsRed

No specific state-surveillance carveout provisions were located in this research pass.

Category narrative 65 words

Law 25 defines profiling and imposes notice/deactivation duties, and requires notice-plus-contestation (not an outright prohibition, unlike GDPR Art. 22) for solely-automated decisions. Biometric processing carries express-consent and pre-notification duties. CAI has actively addressed genetic-data risk (23andMe) and AI use in recruitment; public-sector AI principles (the 'MCN') exist but are adjacent to (not squarely within) the private-sector DP regime. No specific state-surveillance carveout evidence was located.

Periodic update · new data 2026-11-04

Quebec's regulator has been materially more active on biometrics than on automated decision-making proper, and the gap between the two is itself informative. Section 12.1 of Law 25, which addresses automated decision-making, remains, as of October 2026, without any Commission decision interpreting it directly. What exists instead is a proxy signal from the Commission's biometrics enforcement: its facial-recognition decision concerning Metro Inc., issued in April 2026, ordered six-monthly reporting for two years covering system effectiveness, false-positive rates and algorithmic bias. That reporting condition is a reasonable guide to the accountability standard the Commission would likely expect of an automated decision-making system under section 12.1 even though no such case has yet reached a decision.

Biometric enforcement itself escalated this period. In a June 2026 decision — only the Commission's second biometrics ruling since 2021 — an enterprise was given 30 days to redact or destroy documents containing social insurance numbers found to be unnecessary to its purposes, and was separately required to adopt governance policies, disclose its practices on its public website, and report back to the Commission on compliance within 90 days. The pairing of a biometric data point with social-insurance-number handling in the same decision suggests the Commission is treating these as connected risk categories rather than isolated findings, and the short remediation and reporting windows it imposed are consistent with its approach in the Metro matter.

On the forward-looking side, the Commission's June 2026 quinquennial report is understood to recommend that privacy-impact assessments for AI systems making decisions about individuals incorporate an algorithmic impact analysis, built out from the Commission's existing privacy-impact-assessment guide rather than a wholly new instrument. This is a recommendation, not a binding rule, but it signals the direction the Commission wants assessment practice to move in ahead of any section 12.1 decision actually testing the statute.

Outlook

The absence of a section 12.1 decision leaves genuine uncertainty about how the Commission will actually apply Law 25's automated-decision-making provisions once a case reaches it, though the reporting conditions imposed in the Metro and June 2026 biometrics matters give the clearest available indication of the accountability metrics the Commission is likely to demand. Organisations deploying biometric or algorithmic decision systems reaching Quebec residents should expect continued case-by-case enforcement through corrective orders in the near term, with the recommended algorithmic-impact-analysis addition to privacy-impact assessments a signal of where assessment expectations are heading rather than a present requirement.

2 earlier distinct updates
Periodic update · new data 2026-10-25

The most significant development in this area is judicial rather than legislative: the Court of Quebec, in a decision rendered on 23 September 2026 and announced by the province's privacy regulator on 16 October 2026, confirmed the regulator's order against Clearview AI Inc. The order requires Clearview to cease collecting facial-recognition data on Quebec residents without their consent and to destroy the biometric identifiers already collected. Clearview had challenged the applicability of Quebec's private-sector privacy framework and its information-technology legal framework to its operations, and the court rejected that challenge, confirming the regulator's authority to act notwithstanding Clearview's position that it fell outside the reach of those statutes.

Separately, and at a different stage of development entirely, the regulator's quinquennial report recommended greater legal accounting for algorithmic inferences drawn about individuals as a direction for future legislative reform. This recommendation has not been enacted and should not be read as describing a current obligation; it describes a direction the regulator considers the law should move in, concerning how organisations that derive inferences about individuals through automated or algorithmic means should be held accountable for those inferences under privacy law specifically.

Outlook

The Clearview confirmation is likely to be influential well beyond the immediate case, since it establishes at the provincial court level that out-of-province or no-local-presence operators of facial-recognition and biometric-identification systems are reachable under Quebec's privacy and information-technology statutes where their data practices affect Quebec residents. Any other biometric or surveillance-technology provider operating without a Quebec establishment but processing Quebec residents' biometric data should treat this confirmation as a live precedent rather than a one-off result. The algorithmic-inference recommendation, by contrast, remains at the advocacy stage, and its progression toward an actual legislative amendment - or its stalling - is the item to track over the coming periods.

Periodic update · new data 2026-10-18

The Cour du Quebec's confirmation on appeal, rendered 23 September 2026, of the Commission d'acces a l'information's 2021 order against Clearview AI Inc. is the principal development in Quebec's algorithmic and biometric governance posture within the observed window. The order, now judicially confirmed, holds that Clearview AI Inc. is subject to Quebec's private-sector privacy statute and to the Act to establish a legal framework for information technology, and must cease collecting facial images and creating biometric identifiers from them without consent in the course of carrying on an enterprise in Quebec, and must destroy images and identifiers already collected. Clearview is an out-of-province entity with no Quebec physical presence, so the central legal question on appeal was whether Quebec's privacy framework reaches an entity engaged in commercial facial-image scraping and biometric-database construction despite that absence of physical presence. The Court answered that question affirmatively.

The Court's reasoning on the Charter dimension of the case is itself a significant governance marker. Clearview argued that the order restricted its freedom of expression under section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter and the equivalent Quebec Charter provision. The Court held that this restriction is minimal and is justified in a free and democratic society, weighing the beneficial effects of the restriction for the public interest and for privacy protection against its limited impact on expression. Legal-affairs commentary characterises the decision as an important and substantial one, specifically for its confirmation that Quebec's privacy statutes operate extraterritorially against commercial biometric-collection activity directed at Quebec residents from outside the province. This is a meaningful building block for any future enforcement action against out-of-jurisdiction entities engaged in similar facial-recognition or biometric-database activity touching Quebec residents, since it establishes, at the appellate level, that physical absence from the province does not place such activity beyond the Commission's order-making reach.

Separately, but within the same governance space, Quebec's judiciary adopted institutional guidance on generative AI. The Court of Appeal, Superior Court, Court of Quebec and Municipal Courts jointly signed common guidelines on 31 August 2026, published 4 September 2026, addressing judges' use of generative AI tools. The guidelines state that generative AI should not be used for substantive legal reasoning, fact analysis or qualification, or evidentiary assessment, framing judging as a fundamentally human act that generative tools should not substitute for. This is judicial-administration guidance internal to the courts rather than a private-sector or general-public AI obligation, and it does not itself create a binding rule applicable to organizations subject to Quebec's private-sector privacy statute. It is nonetheless indicative of an institutional caution toward delegating consequential, rights-affecting determinations to automated or AI-assisted processes, a posture that sits alongside, and is broadly consistent with, the extraterritorial-reach holding in the Clearview matter regarding automated biometric processing of personal data.

Taken together, these two developments describe a Quebec algorithmic-governance environment that is actively defining the boundaries of acceptable automated and biometric processing of personal information, whether undertaken commercially (Clearview) or institutionally (judicial AI guidelines), with the former now carrying the weight of an appellate confirmation.

Outlook

The Clearview AI decision, now confirmed at the Cour du Quebec level, is likely to be cited as a leading authority for the extraterritorial reach of Quebec's private-sector privacy statute against out-of-jurisdiction biometric-data collectors, absent a further appeal. Organizations engaged in facial-recognition, biometric-identifier creation or similar automated-identification activity touching Quebec residents from outside the province should expect this precedent to inform future CAI enforcement postures. The judicial generative-AI guidelines, being confined to internal court administration, are not expected to generate a parallel private-sector obligation in the near term, though they may inform the tenor of future CAI guidance on automated decision-making more broadly.

1 further periodic run re-emitted the standing brief unchanged and is not shown.

Sources and claims (13)
  1. Probable IAPP — Profiling is a defined concept under Law 25, requiring organizations to give advance notice of technology that creates a profile of an individual and the means to deactivate that function where available. observed
  2. Probable IAPP — Individuals subject to a decision based exclusively on automated processing of their personal information must be informed of the information used, the principal reasons and factors, and their right to have the decision reviewed, with a right to contest and request human review. observed
  3. Probable Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada — Unlike Article 22 GDPR, Law 25 does not prohibit solely automated decision-making outright; it instead imposes a notification and contestation requirement. observed
  4. Probable DataGuidance — Quebec's public-sector AI framework (the 'MCN') sets out ten principles for responsible AI use by public bodies covering compliance, equity, security and transparency. observed
  5. Probable Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada — Quebec's Act to Establish a Legal Framework for Information Technology requires express consent to verify identity using biometric measurements, limits collection to minimum necessary characteristics, and restricts decisions based on other information revealed via biometric processing. observed
  6. Probable DataGuidance — Following 23andMe's bankruptcy, the CAI publicly reminded Quebec residents of their rights over genetic data and urged individuals to manage consent or request deletion of their genetic information. observed
  7. Probable Gowling WLG — Commission d'acces a l'information du Quebec (CAI) — In a June 2026 decision (the CAI's second biometrics decision after 2021), gave an enterprise 30 days to redact/destroy documents containing unnecessary social insurance numbers and required governance policies, website disclosure, and a 90-day compliance report to the CAI. observed
  8. Probable Clym — Under Law 25 s.12.1, organisations must inform individuals when a decision about them is based exclusively on automated processing and give them the opportunity to submit observations to personnel able to review the decision. observed
  9. Probable https://blogue.soquij.qc.ca/2026/10/08/la-protection-du-droit-a-la-vie-privee-a-lere-des-logiciels-de-surveillance-de-masse/ — The Cour du Quebec, on appeal, confirmed on 23 September 2026 the CAI's 2021 order that Clearview AI Inc. is subject to the private-sector Act and the LCCJTI and must cease collecting facial images and creating biometric identifiers from them without consent in the course of carrying on an enterprise in Quebec, and must destroy images/identifiers already collected; the Court held the restriction on Clearview's s.2(b) Charter expression right is minimal and justified.
  10. Probable Les Affaires / CNW (courts of Quebec) — Quebec judicial courts — Quebec's Court of Appeal, Superior Court, Court of Quebec and Municipal Courts jointly signed (31 August 2026) and published (4 September 2026) common guidelines on judges' use of generative AI, stating generative AI should not be used for substantive legal reasoning, fact analysis/qualification or evidentiary assessment, as judging remains 'a fundamentally human act.' observed
  11. Probable Blogue SOQUIJ — Law 25 section 12.1 (automated decision-making) — As of October 2026, no CAI decision interprets section 12.1; the CAI's April 2026 Metro facial-recognition decision ordered six-monthly reporting for two years on system effectiveness, false positives and algorithmic bias, indicating the expected accountability standard. observed
  12. Probable https://dev.to/codacon/quebec-law-25-and-generative-ai-what-to-settle-before-production-58j1 — Commission d'acces a l'information du Quebec (CAI) — Privacy-impact assessments for AI systems making decisions about people include an algorithmic impact analysis, using the CAI's existing PIA guide as a starting template.
  13. Uncertain Clym — A secondary source reports a Court of Appeal hearing on a CAI biometric decision scheduled for November 2026, unconfirmed by any primary court or regulator record. observed

#

Parental consent threshold is well-evidenced (green-level) but age-verification, education-settings, and dependent-adults sub-modules are unconfirmed gaps.

Primary frameworkAct Respecting the Protection of Personal Information in the Private Sector, CQLR c P-39.1, as amended by Law 25
Traffic-light rationale — AmberParental consent threshold is well-evidenced (green-level) but age-verification, education-settings, and dependent-adults sub-modules are unconfirmed gaps.

Sub-modules (5)

Age verificationRed

No Quebec-specific age-verification mandate was located in this research pass.

Minor profiling bansAmber

CAI has urged (not yet codified) stricter minors' data rules including a commercial-use prohibition.

Claims (1):

  • The CAI has urged stricter rules to protect minors' personal information, including prohibiting its commercial use and prioritizing children's best interests in data-processing decisions.

Education settingsRed

No Quebec-specific education-settings data protection rule was located.

Dependent adultsRed

No Quebec-specific dependent-adults data protection provision was located.

Category narrative 42 words

Quebec sets a parental-consent threshold at under-14 (differing from the federal PIPEDA/OPC-suggested under-13 benchmark), with a minor's-benefit exception, and CAI has advocated for stricter minors' data rules including a commercial-use prohibition. No Quebec-specific age-verification mandate, education-settings rule, or dependent-adults provision was located.

No periodic updates recorded in this cycle

Sources and claims (2)
  1. Probable IAPP — Personal information concerning a minor under 14 may not be collected without the consent of a parent or legal guardian, unless collection is clearly for the minor's benefit. observed
  2. Probable DataGuidance — The CAI has urged stricter rules to protect minors' personal information, including prohibiting its commercial use and prioritizing children's best interests in data-processing decisions. observed

#

Active, uniquely well-empowered regulator with recent (within-180-day) enforcement activity and a codified private right of action; funding/capacity and collective-redress specifics remain unconfirmed gaps.

Primary frameworkAct Respecting the Protection of Personal Information in the Private Sector, CQLR c P-39.1, as amended by Law 25
Traffic-light rationale — GreenActive, uniquely well-empowered regulator with recent (within-180-day) enforcement activity and a codified private right of action; funding/capacity and collective-redress specifics remain unconfirmed gaps.

Sub-modules (6)

Regulator powers and penaltiesGreen

CAI can impose AMPs up to $25M/4% turnover (orgs) or $50,000 (individuals), plus lesser $10M/2% administrative sanctions, and is the only Canadian regulator with such power.

Claims (4):

  • The CAI may issue notices of noncompliance and impose administrative monetary penalties of up to $25 million or, if greater, 4% of worldwide turnover for the preceding year for organizations (or up to $50,000 for individuals), with lesser administrative sanctions of $10 million or 2% of turnover for other violations.
  • Quebec's CAI is currently the only Canadian privacy regulator empowered to impose administrative monetary penalties, and it can proactively verify organizational compliance.
  • Loi 25, ss. 90.12, 91, 92.1 — The greater of $10 million CAD or 2% of worldwide turnover for less-severe violations; the greater of $25 million CAD or 4% for serious or repeated violations. No published AMP has yet been issued despite the CAI holding this power since September 2023.
  • Law 25 sections 90.1 and 91 — Administrative monetary penalties up to the greater of CAD10 million or 2% of worldwide turnover for less-serious violations; penal fines up to the greater of CAD25 million or 4% of worldwide turnover for serious violations.

Enforcement activity indexGreen

May 2026 joint OpenAI investigation is CAI's most significant recent enforcement action, finding consent/transparency/default-settings deficiencies.

Claims (6):

  • In a joint investigation with the federal OPC and the BC and Alberta privacy commissioners, the CAI found that OpenAI had not adequately documented how it fulfilled the duty to inform or obtained consent from individuals in connection with ChatGPT training data, and that disclosures for the free web version were insufficient.
  • The CAI found that, under Quebec's Private Sector Act, default privacy settings for OpenAI's models should have provided the most privacy-protective option, i.e., that user chats would not be used for model training by default.
  • Court of Quebec / Commission d'acces a l'information (CAI) v. Clearview AI Inc. — The Court of Quebec, in a decision rendered 23 September 2026 (announced by the CAI 16 October 2026), confirmed the CAI's order requiring Clearview AI Inc. to cease collecting facial-recognition data on Quebec residents without consent and to destroy the resulting biometric identifiers, rejecting Clearview's challenge to the applicability of Quebec's private-sector and IT-legal-framework statutes.
  • Cour du Quebec — The 23 September 2026 decision is described by SOQUIJ's legal-affairs blog as an 'important and substantial decision' confirming that Quebec's privacy statutes apply extraterritorially to an out-of-province entity scraping facial images, and that the resulting restriction on freedom of expression is minimal and justified in a free and democratic society given its beneficial effects for the public interest and privacy protection.
  • Commission d'acces a l'information du Quebec (CAI) — As of October 2026, no published administrative monetary penalty despite holding the power since September 2023; enforcement record to date consists of corrective orders rather than monetary sanctions.
  • On 23 September 2026, the Cour du Québec upheld the CAI's decision that Clearview AI is subject to Québec's private-sector privacy law.

Regulator funding and capacityRed

No specific CAI budget/headcount figures were located in this research pass.

Collective redress and class actionsRed

No Quebec-specific class-action mechanism data tied to the Private Sector Act was located; general Quebec class-action procedure exists under the Code of Civil Procedure but was not specifically evidenced for privacy claims in this pass.

Claims (1):

  • Zenleads inc. (2026 QCCS 5) — The Apollo.io sales-prospecting platform company, authorised 5 January 2026 by the Quebec Superior Court; Court of Appeal has granted leave to appeal, hearing scheduled November 2026.

Private right of actionGreen

Law 25 creates a statutory private right of action with punitive damages for intentional/gross-fault infringements.

Claims (1):

  • Law 25 creates a private right of action allowing individuals to seek compensation for unlawful infringement of a right conferred by the Private Sector Act or the privacy provisions of the Civil Code of Québec, with punitive damages of at least $1,000 available for intentional or grossly-faulty infringements.

Recent developments 180dGreen

Within the last 180 days: the May 6, 2026 joint OpenAI/ChatGPT report of findings and the February 23, 2026 multinational joint statement on AI-generated imagery, both involving CAI.

Claims (2):

  • On May 6, 2026, the CAI joined the federal OPC and the BC and Alberta privacy commissioners in releasing a joint report of findings concluding that OpenAI's early ChatGPT models were not compliant with their respective privacy laws, leading OpenAI to implement new safeguards.
  • On February 23, 2026, the CAI joined a multinational joint statement of data protection and privacy authorities addressing AI-generated imagery and its implications for privacy.
Category narrative 72 words

CAI holds the only administrative-monetary-penalty (AMP) power among Canadian privacy regulators (up to CAD $25M/4% global turnover for organizations), plus notice-of-noncompliance powers, alongside a statutory private right of action. Recent enforcement activity includes the May 2026 joint OpenAI/ChatGPT investigation finding non-compliance with Quebec's consent/transparency duties, and CAI's February 2026 participation in a multinational joint statement on AI-generated imagery. No Quebec-specific class-action mechanism data or regulator funding/headcount figures were located in this pass.

Periodic update · new data 2026-11-04

The statutory penalty exposure under Law 25 has not changed but is worth restating as context for the enforcement pattern observed below: sections 90.1 and 91 set administrative monetary penalties of up to the greater of CAD10 million or 2% of worldwide turnover for less-serious violations, and penal fines of up to the greater of CAD25 million or 4% of worldwide turnover for serious violations. Those ceilings place Law 25 in the same register as the GDPR's penalty architecture.

What stands out is how little of that exposure has actually been used. As of October 2026, the Commission is reported not to have published a single administrative monetary penalty despite having held that power since September 2023. Its enforcement record to date is said to consist of corrective orders — the redaction, destruction, governance-policy and reporting conditions seen in its biometrics decisions — rather than monetary sanctions. That reported absence has not been independently verified against the Commission's own decisions register this period and should be read as attributed rather than confirmed, but if accurate it marks a meaningful gap between the Commission's statutory powers and its exercised practice three years into having them.

Private redress is moving on a separate and more active track. In Zenleads inc. (2026 QCCS 5), the Quebec Superior Court authorised a class action against the operator of the Apollo.io sales-prospecting platform on 5 January 2026. The Court of Appeal has since granted leave to appeal that authorisation, with a hearing scheduled for November 2026. The matter is a test of how Quebec's civil courts, rather than the Commission, will handle large-scale commercial data-collection claims under Law 25's private-sector regime, and the outcome of the leave-to-appeal hearing will bear on how readily similar authorisations are granted in future matters.

Outlook

Two threads are worth separating going forward. On the regulatory side, whether the Commission issues its first administrative monetary penalty would be a significant marker of a shift from corrective-order practice toward the financial-sanction regime the statute already permits, though no such penalty has surfaced to date. On the judicial side, the Court of Appeal's November 2026 hearing in the Zenleads/Apollo.io matter is the nearer-term event, and its outcome will indicate how class-action authorisation under Law 25 is likely to be treated at the appellate level going forward.

2 earlier distinct updates
Periodic update · new data 2026-10-25

The defining enforcement development this period is the Court of Quebec's confirmation, in a decision rendered 23 September 2026 and announced by the regulator on 16 October 2026, of the regulator's order against Clearview AI Inc. The order requires Clearview to stop collecting facial-recognition data on Quebec residents without consent and to destroy the resulting biometric identifiers. The court's rejection of Clearview's jurisdictional challenge - that Quebec's private-sector privacy framework and information-technology legal framework did not properly apply to its conduct - gives the regulator's order the weight of a confirmed judicial outcome rather than an unresolved administrative position.

Against that active enforcement backdrop, it is notable that the regulator has held the power to impose administrative monetary penalties since September 2023, with ceilings set at the greater of $10 million Canadian dollars or two percent of worldwide turnover for less severe violations, rising to the greater of $25 million or four percent for serious or repeated violations. As at this period, no administrative monetary penalty has been published as having been issued under that power. The Clearview matter proceeded as an order-and-court-confirmation enforcement track rather than, on the evidence available this period, as a monetary-penalty track, and whether a monetary penalty forms part of that matter's resolution going forward was not confirmed this period.

Outlook

The Clearview confirmation strengthens the regulator's enforcement position generally and may encourage it to pursue similarly structured orders against other biometric or surveillance-technology operators with no Quebec establishment. Separately, the continued absence of any published administrative monetary penalty more than three years into the regulator holding that power remains a notable gap in the public enforcement record; whether the Clearview matter or a future case becomes the occasion for the first published penalty is the item most worth tracking in subsequent periods.

Periodic update · new data 2026-10-18

The Cour du Quebec's 23 September 2026 decision confirming the Commission d'acces a l'information's order against Clearview AI Inc. is the principal enforcement-and-redress development in Quebec this window, and is described in contemporaneous legal-affairs commentary as an important and substantial decision. The case traces back to the CAI's original 2021 order, which Clearview appealed to the Cour du Quebec; the appellate confirmation closes out that appeal process with the order's substance intact, requiring Clearview to cease non-consensual facial-image collection and biometric-identifier creation in the course of carrying on an enterprise in Quebec, and to destroy images and identifiers already collected.

The enforcement significance of the decision lies substantially in its confirmation of extraterritorial reach. The Court held that Quebec's privacy statutes apply to Clearview despite its lack of physical presence in the province, because its commercial activity -- scraping facial images to build a biometric database used in connection with services offered to Quebec-reachable clients -- brings it within the scope of the private-sector Act and the Act to establish a legal framework for information technology. In reaching this conclusion the Court also rejected Clearview's Charter-based challenge to the order, holding that the restriction on its freedom of expression is minimal and is justified in a free and democratic society given the order's beneficial effects for the public interest and for privacy protection. This is a two-part enforcement precedent: it confirms both that the CAI's original order was substantively sound and that it survives constitutional scrutiny on appeal.

For redress purposes, the decision strengthens the practical force of CAI enforcement orders generally, since it demonstrates that such orders can be upheld on appeal against a well-resourced, out-of-jurisdiction respondent raising a constitutional defence. It is the first judicial-level confirmation of a CAI biometric-enforcement order within the observed window, giving the Commission's biometric-enforcement program an appellate precedent it did not previously hold on this specific point.

Outlook

Absent a further appeal by Clearview to a higher court, the Cour du Quebec's confirmation is likely to stand as the operative precedent for CAI enforcement against out-of-jurisdiction biometric-data collectors going forward, and may be expected to inform the CAI's approach to future enforcement matters involving similar fact patterns of non-consensual biometric data collection by entities without a Quebec physical presence. No further enforcement or redress development was identified within the observed window beyond this matter.

1 further periodic run re-emitted the standing brief unchanged and is not shown.

Sources and claims (14)
  1. Probable IAPP — The CAI may issue notices of noncompliance and impose administrative monetary penalties of up to $25 million or, if greater, 4% of worldwide turnover for the preceding year for organizations (or up to $50,000 for individuals), with lesser administrative sanctions of $10 million or 2% of turnover for other violations. observed
  2. Probable Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada — Quebec's CAI is currently the only Canadian privacy regulator empowered to impose administrative monetary penalties, and it can proactively verify organizational compliance. observed
  3. Probable Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada — In a joint investigation with the federal OPC and the BC and Alberta privacy commissioners, the CAI found that OpenAI had not adequately documented how it fulfilled the duty to inform or obtained consent from individuals in connection with ChatGPT training data, and that disclosures for the free web version were insufficient. observed
  4. Probable Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada — The CAI found that, under Quebec's Private Sector Act, default privacy settings for OpenAI's models should have provided the most privacy-protective option, i.e., that user chats would not be used for model training by default. observed
  5. Probable Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada — Law 25 creates a private right of action allowing individuals to seek compensation for unlawful infringement of a right conferred by the Private Sector Act or the privacy provisions of the Civil Code of Québec, with punitive damages of at least $1,000 available for intentional or grossly-faulty infringements. observed
  6. Probable Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada — On May 6, 2026, the CAI joined the federal OPC and the BC and Alberta privacy commissioners in releasing a joint report of findings concluding that OpenAI's early ChatGPT models were not compliant with their respective privacy laws, leading OpenAI to implement new safeguards. observed
  7. Probable Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada (hosting joint statement) — On February 23, 2026, the CAI joined a multinational joint statement of data protection and privacy authorities addressing AI-generated imagery and its implications for privacy. observed
  8. Probable DEV Community (codacon) — Zenleads inc. (2026 QCCS 5) — The Apollo.io sales-prospecting platform company, authorised 5 January 2026 by the Quebec Superior Court; Court of Appeal has granted leave to appeal, hearing scheduled November 2026. observed
  9. Probable Blogue SOQUIJ — Court of Quebec / Commission d'acces a l'information (CAI) v. Clearview AI Inc. — The Court of Quebec, in a decision rendered 23 September 2026 (announced by the CAI 16 October 2026), confirmed the CAI's order requiring Clearview AI Inc. to cease collecting facial-recognition data on Quebec residents without consent and to destroy the resulting biometric identifiers, rejecting Clearview's challenge to the applicability of Quebec's private-sector and IT-legal-framework statutes. observed
  10. Probable Gamtech — Loi 25, ss. 90.12, 91, 92.1 — The greater of $10 million CAD or 2% of worldwide turnover for less-severe violations; the greater of $25 million CAD or 4% for serious or repeated violations. No published AMP has yet been issued despite the CAI holding this power since September 2023. observed
  11. Probable https://blogue.soquij.qc.ca/2026/10/08/la-protection-du-droit-a-la-vie-privee-a-lere-des-logiciels-de-surveillance-de-masse/ — Cour du Quebec — The 23 September 2026 decision is described by SOQUIJ's legal-affairs blog as an 'important and substantial decision' confirming that Quebec's privacy statutes apply extraterritorially to an out-of-province entity scraping facial images, and that the resulting restriction on freedom of expression is minimal and justified in a free and democratic society given its beneficial effects for the public interest and privacy protection.
  12. Probable Lilach Bullock — Law 25 sections 90.1 and 91 — Administrative monetary penalties up to the greater of CAD10 million or 2% of worldwide turnover for less-serious violations; penal fines up to the greater of CAD25 million or 4% of worldwide turnover for serious violations. observed
  13. Uncertain https://dev.to/codacon/quebec-law-25-and-generative-ai-what-to-settle-before-production-58j1 — Commission d'acces a l'information du Quebec (CAI) — As of October 2026, no published administrative monetary penalty despite holding the power since September 2023; enforcement record to date consists of corrective orders rather than monetary sanctions.
  14. Probable Blogue SOQUIJ — On 23 September 2026, the Cour du Québec upheld the CAI's decision that Clearview AI is subject to Québec's private-sector privacy law. observed
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Disclosure model: category cards load OPEN; narratives render in full; standing narratives load as a clamped teaser with an explicit “read full” control carrying the true word count. No text is hidden without disclosing how much of it there is.

Sub-modules are DP-specific nested subsections with their own real per-sub-module traffic light, rendered under each category across all regulatory modules.

Traffic-light dots are REAL data (baseline.<category>.traffic_light), not renderer-invented taxonomy, and are never suppressed -- unlike WPM, where a RAG dot would be forbidden as invented severity.

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Band honesty: uncertainty bands are computed against a frozen build clock of 2026-11-17. A year-precision row is never promoted into a tighter band.

Envelope: baseline resolved at jurisdiction_json.baseline; 10 categories, 57 sub-module(s), 86 claim(s) (86 category placement(s)), 36 source(s) in the cumulative register.

Audit trail

Machine checkChallenged on 17 Nov 2026: not upheld (27 confirmed against the cited source; 2 contradicted by the cited source; 4 could not be checked). An automated, adversarial test run by a second model; no person has assessed the result.

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GDPR article map

Cross-reference: which category/sub-module covers each UK GDPR article (38 mapped).

Show article map
GDPR article to category mapping
ArticleCategorySub-module
Art. 5Controller/Processor Dutiesaccountability and dpia
Art. 6Lawful Processing & Special Datalawful bases
Art. 7Lawful Processing & Special Dataconsent thresholds
Art. 9Lawful Processing & Special Dataspecial categories
Art. 13Data Subject Rightsdeadlines and response windows
Art. 14Data Subject Rightsdeadlines and response windows
Art. 15Data Subject Rightsaccess right
Art. 16Data Subject Rightsrectification and erasure
Art. 17Data Subject Rightsrectification and erasure
Art. 18Data Subject Rightsrestriction and objection
Art. 19Data Subject Rightsrestriction and objection
Art. 20Data Subject Rightsdata portability
Art. 21Data Subject Rightsrestriction and objection
Art. 22Algorithmic, Biometric & Surveillance Governanceautomated decision making transparency
Art. 25Controller/Processor Dutiesaccountability and dpia
Art. 28Controller/Processor Dutiesjoint controller arrangements
Art. 30Controller/Processor Dutiesropa requirements
Art. 32Controller/Processor Dutiessecurity measures
Art. 33Controller/Processor Dutiesbreach notification
Art. 34Controller/Processor Dutiesbreach notification
Art. 35Controller/Processor Dutiesaccountability and dpia
Art. 37Controller/Processor Dutiesdpo requirements
Art. 38Controller/Processor Dutiesdpo requirements
Art. 39Controller/Processor Dutiesdpo requirements
Art. 44Cross-Border & Adequacytransfer mechanisms
Art. 45Cross-Border & Adequacyadequacy received
Art. 46Cross-Border & Adequacysccs and bcrs
Art. 47Cross-Border & Adequacysccs and bcrs
Art. 48Cross-Border & Adequacytransfer mechanisms
Art. 49Cross-Border & Adequacytransfer impact assessment
Art. 77Enforcement & Redressregulator powers and penalties
Art. 78Enforcement & Redressregulator powers and penalties
Art. 79Enforcement & Redressprivate right of action
Art. 80Enforcement & Redresscollective redress and class actions
Art. 81Enforcement & Redressregulator powers and penalties
Art. 82Enforcement & Redressprivate right of action
Art. 83Enforcement & Redressregulator powers and penalties
Art. 84Enforcement & Redressregulator powers and penalties